Matt N. Williams, John R. Kerr, Mathew D. Marques, Haneen Abu-Obeid, Stephen R. Hill
Conspiracy theories are contentious, and conversations about conspiracy theories can generate conflict. It is therefore possible that developing beliefs in conspiracy theories may isolate a believer from friends and family, resulting in loneliness and reduced connectedness to others. However, evidence of such effects remains equivocal. We therefore report a preregistered longitudinal analysis testing for effects of belief in specific conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality on loneliness and connectedness (and vice versa). We conducted a longitudinal panel study (N = 839) using 12 waves collected over 11 months. We analyzed data using random intercept cross-lagged panel models (RI-CLPMs) along with several alternative statistical models for cross-lagged data. We found no evidence of an effect of belief in specific conspiracy theories on loneliness, nor of conspiracy mentality on either loneliness or connectedness. We did find evidence of a negative effect of belief in specific conspiracy theories on connectedness in our preregistered analyses, but this finding was not robust to alternative specifications. We found no evidence of converse effects (i.e., of connectedness and loneliness on belief in conspiracy theories or conspiracy mentality). Our findings suggest that average within-person effects on loneliness and connectedness (over a 1-month lag period) were small and not robust across plausible model specifications. Nevertheless, our study was subject to several limitations, including modest power, vulnerability to time-varying confounds, and a sample with low mean levels of belief in conspiracy theories. Effects that are smaller than we had adequate power to detect, unfold over different time lags, or that are concentrated within subgroups (such as highly committed “believers”) remain possible, but would require further research to establish.
Ivan Giuseppe Cammarata, Costanza Scaffidi Abbate, Martina Macrillò, Stefano Boca
Although schadenfreude, pleasure at another's misfortune, is recognized as a psychologically significant intergroup emotion, the conditions under which normative constraints regulate its expression, as opposed to its emergence following a target's own norm violation, remain comparatively underexamined. Drawing on the Justification-Suppression Model (JSM), which posits that prejudiced reactions are normally suppressed by internalized and social norms but can be released when a situational justification becomes available, the present study examined whether the availability of a situational justification for normatively constrained hostility moderates the expression of schadenfreude toward an LGBTQIA+ organization as a function of pre-existing anti-gender ideological beliefs. A between-subjects experimental design was employed with [N] Italian participants randomly assigned to a deservingness condition (in which a target LGBTQIA+ association was described as having engaged in financial misconduct) or an undeservingness condition (in which no wrongdoing was attributed to the association). Pre-existing animosity was operationalized using the Gender Ideology Belief Scale (GIBS), a multidimensional measure assessing conspiratorial beliefs, resistance to inclusive education, and adherence to traditional family values, while schadenfreude was assessed via an established multi-item measure. Moderated regression analyses revealed a significant interaction between GIBS scores and experimental condition: the association between anti-gender beliefs and schadenfreude was significantly stronger in the deservingness condition than in the undeservingness condition. These findings are consistent with an extension of the JSM to discrete affective intergroup responses. Because the two vignettes differ in the portrayal of the organization as well as in the availability of a justification, and because suppression was not measured directly, they should not be read as a demonstration of the moral-licensing mechanism the model proposes. Theoretical implications for the study of prejudice regulation, intergroup emotions, and anti-LGBTQIA+ hostility in the Italian context are discussed.
Dominika Adamczyk, Natalia Korczak, Marta Marchlewska
Vegetarianism and veganism (veg*nism) have been criticized as challenging traditional lifestyles and meat-related practices. Some criticisms take the form of conspiracy beliefs, involving assumptions about hidden intentions and coordinated efforts to impose social change. We define veg * n conspiracy beliefs as convictions that veg*ns secretly seek to manipulate and control individuals and societies by restricting meat consumption and imposing a single dietary ideology. Across three studies among meat-eaters in Poland (Study 1 N = 1011; Study 2 N = 800; Study 3 N = 569), we examined psychological correlates of veg * ns conspiracy beliefs. We hypothesized that these beliefs would be associated with a defensive and entitled identification with meat-eaters, reflected in meat-eaters collective narcissism. Across all three studies, including two cross-sectional and one experimental study, meat-eaters collective narcissism consistently predicted veg * ns conspiracy beliefs. Collective narcissism also predicted outgroup hostility, operationalized as dehumanization of veg * ns, with this association partially mediated by veg * ns conspiracy beliefs. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs about veg * ns may serve as a defensive response to perceived threats to the status and identity of meat-eaters. They further indicate that such beliefs can contribute to hostility toward veg*ns, showing a potential pathway through which identity threat may translate into intergroup prejudice.
Paulo Jorge Nogueira Ramos, Lisete dos Santos Mendes Mónico
Citizens interpret protective policies through socially shared systems of meaning that integrate cognitive and emotional dimensions. Using Social Representations Theory and Abric's structural approach, we examined the emotions and their articulation with the central elements of citizens' social representations of protective policies with a cross-national comparison of 11 countries. Based on 10,147 valid cases, a prototypical analysis was conducted. Across countries, emotions occupied peripheral and contrast zones. In the pooled structure, only Fear (n = 123), Calmness (n = 79), and Joy (n = 34) met inclusion thresholds, all located in the second periphery. Fear was the only emotion present in all countries, whereas Calmness and Joy varied across countries. Disappointment, Disgust, Shame, and Tranquility were specific to national contexts. Similarity analysis revealed two coherent affective-representational configurations centered on Fear and Calmness, linking emotions with distinct categories despite their peripheral structural position. Therefore, peripherality may not imply relational marginality, and emotions function as flexible representational resources, contextualizing and operationalizing the meaning of protective policies with citizens' contexts. Findings suggest the relevance of emotional literacy to protect the articulation and signaling role of emotions.
Maria Flakus, Adam Waszkowski, Hubert Plisiecki, Kinga Małyska, Artur Pokropek
Belief in pro-Russian disinformation about the war in Ukraine has important societal consequences. However, less is known about how media-source reliance and distrust-related dispositions jointly relate to such beliefs. Across two cross-sectional surveys conducted in Poland during the first year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Study 1: N = 397; Study 2: N = 1,066), we examined whether selecting social media, broadcast media, and online news portals as primary sources of war-related information was associated with pro-Russian disinformation beliefs, and whether these associations were moderated by political paranoia (Study 1) and conspiracy endorsement (Studies 1–2). Path analyses with multiple-testing correction showed that conspiracy-related belief indicators were consistently positively associated with disinformation beliefs across both studies, with political paranoia as a positive correlate in Study 1. Associations involving broad self-reported media-source indicators were weaker and less consistent, although direct comparisons across these predictor domains should be interpreted cautiously because they differed in measurement format, granularity, and conceptual proximity to the outcome. Reliance on social media was not positively associated with disinformation beliefs. Media-source main effects were generally weak; only online portal reliance in Study 2 remained robustly negatively associated with disinformation beliefs after correction for multiple testing. Moderation analyses suggested that source–disinformation associations were conditional on conspiracy endorsement, with different patterns emerging for classic CT endorsement vs. COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. These findings caution against uniform channel-based accounts of disinformation susceptibility and suggest that distrust-related individual differences are relevant correlates of geopolitical disinformation endorsement within the present measurement design.
