A war of words: Wittgenstein, language games, and the loss of trust in the 21st century

Introduction

Ideas have consequences. Perhaps the most piercing illustration of this truth is found in the life and writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Though he published only one small work of Philosophy during his life (Tractatus Logico Philosopicus), and had another published shortly after his death (Philosophical Investigations), his ideas endure to this day, permeating not only academic philosophy departments, but also modern cultures, political discourse, and social dynamics. Notes from his lectures have been turned into several more published works, and countless philosophers have looked to him for inspiration. In fact, his single idea “the meaning is the use”, changed the course of philosophy, re-cast norms in modern society, and set us down the path toward our current “post-truth” culture of mistrust, doublespeak, and division.

In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's ideas exercise an unmistakable influence upon our cultural scene, especially when it comes to the Loss of Trust in the 21st Century. Though his works were small and to some insignificant, I argue that his influence is vast, and the downstream effects of his ideas continue to color how we communicate and understand one another. As with any important philosopher, some scholars disagree with the “received view” of Wittgenstein's works that I have presented here, and argue for other ways to interpret him. In fact, even Wittgenstein himself may have disagreed with some of the culture's adaptation of his ideas, yet their cultural impact cannot be denied.

In this paper I will argue the following points

• Philosophy matters! A single sentence can quite literally change the world.
• One effect of the “Linguistic Turn” inspired by Wittgenstein is to confine philosophy to language, making the study of reality (metaphysics) much less fashionable and in some cases even rendering it impossible. One can describe and explain the use of terminology, but never “know” reality.
• Language game theory, though very useful to describe our communication practices, can also produce an environment where words are reality, words are pliable, we begin to lose trust in language, and words quickly become weaponized.

These three points show how our cultural, political, and scientific crisis of trust originates (at least in part) from the playing out of Wittgenstein's language game theory.

In the final part of the paper, I suggest three potential pathways to pursue in the hopes of rebuilding trust. We must agree on a few things, in order to be able to disagree (agreeably) about anything!

Philosophy matters

Each academic discipline loves to interpret the rest in light of its own primary importance. Biologists argue that we all owe our existence to biological reality, chemists argue the same about chemistry, those in the physical science realm love to chide those in the life sciences, physicists speak of origins and ultimate reality as if the world depended upon their unique contributions. Even poets & artists wonder if life would be worth living apart from their vital work. Philosophers are no different, and yet perhaps they have an important claim upon the idea that “all is philosophy”. The pursuit of wisdom has indeed spawned academic pursuits in the humanities, law, the sciences, and the arts. The myriad majors in the sciences after all, were once all called Natural Philosophy. As disciplines became more specialized, they branched out from their Philosophical roots and became their own individual games, with highly specialized language. Nevertheless, a terminal degree in most fields is still called a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in that given field. Hence, the root of philosophy continues to nourish and in some cases bear poison to the branches.

Perhaps only the theologians could claim their work prior and primary over and above the philosophers. Yet, the savvy philosopher may respond, that even the theologian seeks wisdom, and is therefore a philosopher.

The philosophical and indeed theological commitments of such luminaries as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Pascal, Bacon, Boyle, and Oldenburg propelled them in helping to produce logical structure, mathematical insights, the peer review process, and indeed the scientific method. Thus, one could argue that the scientific revolution was initiated largely by philosophers and theologians!¹

Could it be, that our modern crisis of Trust also has something to do with pesky philosophers and their ideas? In the case of Ludwig Wittgenstein, a single sentence continues to influence our society, producing ultimately a world in which each party plays at its own language game, each one defines its own terms, and each one seems tempted toward mistrust and even perhaps outright slander upon the others. While it would be foolish to blame an entire culture of mistrust upon one philosopher, and equally foolish to claim that we have a full understanding of all Wittgenstein intended by this comment, his influence cannot be ignored.

The linguistic turn

“The meaning of a word is its use in the language”. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 43)

This famously influential comment came from Wittgenstein's later work after years of struggle and a departure and return to Philosophy. It was not included in his early work or first book, the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. He had famously argued that he “solved all the problems of philosophy”, after completing his first book. Writing from his famous isolated hut in Norway, he ends this work with the wise aphorism, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 7). Believing he had said all that there was to say, he quit philosophy and began a short and troubled career search working as an elementary school teacher, then as an architect, and even as a gardener. While these career moves produced less than satisfactory outcomes (as a primary school teacher, Wittgenstein became so frustrated with one young student that he struck him in the head, knocking him unconscious) (Monk, 1991, p. 232), he must have continued to ruminate upon his early philosophy. He eventually rescinded his grandiose claim and returned to work in Philosophy, perhaps partly due to how he saw his ideas being used. While he never realized his own grand hope of solving all the problems of Philosophy, he certainly was effective in producing more puzzles and problems for philosophers and the global culture at large.

In his early work, Wittgenstein represented the “picture” theory of language, noting how a proposition was a representation of reality. He was concerned with precision, accuracy, and demonstrating how philosophy could reveal reality. For example, Wittgenstein writes, “The picture is a model of reality. To the objects correspond in the picture the elements of the picture. The elements of the picture stand, in the picture, for the objects. …The picture is a fact” (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 2.1–2.141). This sounds almost like what philosophers would call the Correspondence theory of truth, a theory which seems self-evident to most and has for centuries dominated our reasoning and scientific research. If we state something that corresponds correctly to the real world, we have stated something true. As Aristotle writes, “to say of what is, that it is and of what is not, that it is not…is true” (Aristotle, 2026, p. 4/7).

However, in his later work, Wittgenstein rejected this idea and argued that we remain trapped within our words, and our understanding never breaks the plane of the actual corresponding world. Instead, the way we use words determines their meaning, as quoted above from Philosophical Investigations remark 43. Whether they correspond to anything in the actual world is an unanswerable question. This initiated what is called the Linguistic Turn in philosophy. Philosophers who followed Wittgenstein, saw themselves not as revealers of reality, but as analyzers of definitions. One scholar describes this turn as follows:

The yardstick which analytic philosophy held was not enough to discuss the concepts of God, Soul, Time, Space, Beauty. Good, Justice etc. Because it is impossible to represent these facts through language, and if all such facts were eliminated from the philosophical discourse, then the branches of philosophy like ethics, metaphysics, religion, justice and aesthetics would become meaningless. It was quite evident that the analytic philosophers like Wittgenstein did not want to indulge in the concerns which traditional philosophy had. In a way, they marked their departure from the issues of traditional philosophy and adopted a fresh approach in philosophy (Chakraborty, 2022, p. 6523).

Wittgenstein argues that words are like tools to be used and even adjusted to our purposes: “Think of tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule… The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 11). For example, one could say “give me a hammer”, or “hammer please”, or “hammer”, or grunt and point to the needed object…all of which could result in handing the tool needed to remove a rusty nail. Moreover, different games could use words in different ways. To “get hammered” in football, means something entirely different than in home construction, and quite different indeed in the local college party scene. The community, and our habitual practice, determines the meaning of the words used.

As mentioned earlier, perhaps some of his return to philosophy could be the product of what he deemed insufficient attempts by other philosophers to understand reality. One glaring example could be the so-called Vienna circle, also known as Verificationists (or Logical Positivists). Wittgenstein had a famously complicated relationship with these philosophers, seeming at first to be in accord with them, and yet he radically diverged from their ideas in later times. Spurred on by the success of the hard sciences and critical of metaphysics, these philosophers claimed that only statements verified by empirical research or mathematical certainty could contain any real truth. All other statements were merely emotive or meaningless. Interestingly, they failed to note a contradiction in their own theory: their claim that Verificationism is true, could not be verified by their own standard. Thus, Verificationism by its own definition was either false or meaningless. Later philosophers have pointed out this embarrassing reality. Already in 1967, John Passmore wrote in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Logical positivism, then, is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes” (Passmore, 1967, pp. 52–57). Perhaps the chief proponent of Verificationism was AJ Ayer, who was interviewed in 1979 and asked about the problems of his earlier philosophy. He replied, “I suppose the most important of the defects was that nearly all of it was false” (Kreeft, 2023, p. 198). In the words of Alvin Plantinga, the Verificationists have “retreated into the obscurity (they) so richly deserve” (Plantinga, 2000, p. 8).

Wittgenstein's famous sentence, however, continues. “The meaning is the use” frees one from making any such pronouncement upon reality or ultimate truth. Wittgenstein proposed the idea that the meaning of any particular word is merely an attempt to clarify how it is used in this “way of life”. Thus, the meaning of language is dependent upon which game one is playing. A goal in soccer is different from the goal in basketball, or one's goal in life. Furthermore, games have family resemblance such that a touchdown, score, or run is similar but not the same as a goal in soccer. Similarly, the same idea or entity can be described with many different words. Snow, fluff, powder, nieve, and snø all refer to the same idea. The language being used, or the community that is using the word, determines in each case which term to employ.

More to the point in our modern trustless society, perhaps, are the larger language games. For example, there is the biology game, the chemistry game, the philosophy game, the poetry game, the religious game, the Democrat game, the Republican game, and so on. In each game, various terms and words are used in the appropriate contexts, and adherents of the game recognize the terms for how they are used. One wouldn't use the terms “hypothesis, Bunsen burner, and empirical data point” in church, just as one wouldn't shout “Hallelujah, praise the Lord” in the lab (giddy celebration of successful experiments notwithstanding).

While there is much to commend itself in this theory of language, the problem comes when we “cut the cord” so to speak, with reality. Wittgenstein notes that “philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language, it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 124). Without knowing if any language game actually refers to reality, we are stuck in a maze of definitions and may end up using and shaping words to our own ends. Rather than argue that our game contributes to a true understanding of reality, we instead are left to claim, “this is the way we talk”. We can invite others to join us, but we have no tools left to convince another that our game (or our perspective) is true in any real sense.

If language is our limitation, and we discover it to be imprecise and pliable, reality is out of reach. Norman Malcolm, a contemporary of Wittgenstein and key voice in understanding his philosophy writes, “The implication of this perception was that there could not be a correct philosophical theory of language” (Malcolm, 1994, p. 43). No one could claim to have a corner on the market of metaphysics, nor even show their language to more correctly correspond to reality. No one could claim their definitions are “more precise” than another's, even when it comes to the ultimate ideas philosophers have pursued for centuries. He writes, “The same holds for the concepts of truth, representation, knowledge, justice, and so on. Wittgenstein's new insight into the actual workings of language implies that the enterprise of philosophical analysis, as traditionally conceived, is based on a false assumption” (Malcolm, 1994, p. 43).

Though I am sure he would disagree, some of Wittgenstein's most ardent adherents have claimed that his work repudiates my former claim that Philosophy matters. They would argue that philosophers really are saying nothing of any importance about the real world. Rather, philosophers are merely engaging in an intramural debate, describing the way they use words or the method in which they make definitions. When they make a pronouncement about humans, society, or the real world in general, they are merely creating or describing their “understanding” of the terms employed at the time.

Peter Unger, for example, argues in his book Empty Ideas,

“Despite some contrary appearances, it remains true that, when they're involved with issues that aren't just so many parochial matters, the questions most exercising mainstream philosophers are questions that turn, quite entirely, upon whether or not certain conceptual connections hold, or certain semantic relations obtain, between certain words, or certain concepts, and certain other words, or concepts” (Unger, 2014).

To put it more simply, all philosophers are doing is arguing about terminology. This makes philosophy a linguistic game and removes its practitioners from any meaningful commentary about humanity or the real world. As Melchert and Morrow argue, “if Philosophy is a quest for objective certainty, for a foundation that guarantees the truth of the edifice of knowledge, then, in a certain sense, if Wittgenstein is right, philosophy is over” (Melchert and Morrow, 2023, pp. 677–678). While some may overstate this case, certainly the motivation for any study of reality or metaphysics, is sharply diminished. Where then is the “love of wisdom?” It is lost in a tangle of terminology, obscured in petty debates over definitions of terms most feel free to ignore.

Scholars disagree, as scholars tend to do, about whether we can interpret Wittgenstein's view as claiming metaphysics is nonsensical. Indeed, his work can be difficult to interpret given its form of short pithy sentences, often seemingly unrelated. GEM Anscomb, a contemporary and friend of Wittgenstein who edited and translated his work, observes that his writings often give “the impression of being a more or less haphazard arrangement of fragmentary short bits of writing” (Anscomb, 2011, pp. 190–191). P.M.S. Hacker outlines several interpretive frameworks in addition to the standard view. He lists the “Old Wittgenstein” including Norman Malcolm, Alice Ambrose, and Max Black (who each studied under Wittgenstein), the “New Wittgenstein” (including Cora Diamond and James Conant), and the even newer “Wittgenstein in America” view which he attributes to James Conant and others. Yet, he continues to argue for the standard view and observes that this debate only produces more confusion and notes that “all the followers of Wittgenstein can do now is quarrel over what kind of nonsense Wittgenstein's early work was. It is sad to see matters come to such a pass” (Hacker, 2003, pp. 1–23).

Oskari Kuusela argues for a view that would seem to rescue Wittgenstein from such relativistic meaninglessness. Kuusela writes, “Wittgensteinian pluralism of clarifications is therefore compatible with knowledge and truth and there being an objective independent reality” (Kuusela, 2019, p. 38). He makes this statement after arguing that Wittgenstein promotes a pluralism of clarifications, dependent upon the context in which they are employed. He argues that true philosophical clarifications are “understood as articulating a philosophical model to be used as an object of comparison” (Kuusela, 2019, p. 38). Yet, Kuusela admits that this comparison model depends upon agreement within context, and does not require any universal acceptance of such clarification, nor any agreement upon the origin of logic or the presence of reality. He also notes that this model restricts the philosopher's role to a minor one, seemingly reserved for clarifying only other philosophical terms and remaining removed from cultural or larger concerns. He quotes Wittgenstein who argues in the document known as The Big Type Script, “Our only task is to be just. That is, we must only point out and resolve the injustices of philosophy, and not posit new parties—and creeds” (Kuusela, 2019, p. 39).

In spite of these ideas and others like them,² the influence of Wittgenstein on culture continues. Whether a fair reading or not, the “meaning is the use” still influences us toward relativistic views where we can't even trust each other's terms.

Wittgenstein himself may have objected to the way his philosophy has been applied. He certainly did not think philosophy a waste of time, nor did he deem his own pursuits as unimportant. Rather he wrote, “What is your aim in philosophy? – To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 309). In his own life, he did not deny reality nor allow for language to be twisted and used “inaccurately”. He was well known to be a precise communicator and demand precision from his friends. Fania Pascal, a friend of Wittgenstein, related the following anecdote: “I had my tonsils out and was in the Evelyn Nursing Home feeling sorry for myself. Wittgenstein called. I croaked ‘I feel just like a dog that has been run over'. He was disgusted: ‘you don't know what a dog that has been run over feels like.’” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 24).

Yet, in his drive for accuracy and precision, he argued that explanations end and we cannot attain to any understanding of reality that is “higher” than mere language use. Malcolm writes, “Wittgenstein's emphasized theme – that reasons, justifications and explanations come to an end – does not mean that there are no reasons, justifications, explanations for anything” (Malcolm, 1994, p. 82). Instead, the reasons end at language, and any further understanding must be an issue of “faith”. Thus, Malcolm concludes that Wittgenstein's personal view was “religious”, and Bertrand Russell, BF McGuinness, and others famously called him a “mystic” (McGuinness, 1966, p. 305).

Is science exempt?

Some may applaud the metaphysically untethered approach to language, thinking that the world of science is exempt. But why should it be? If we are trapped within our language, knowledge of the world as it really is (the ding an sich in Kant's terms),³ remains entirely obscured from view. Why wouldn't this also extend to scientific and medical research? The Verificationists, mentioned above, had hoped to reduce all knowledge to the scientific or mathematical, effectively purging the theologians and philosophers from any valuable public insight. But in their failure, we are left again with Wittgenstein's sentence to guide even scientific terminology: “the meaning is the use”.

Jean-Francois Lyotard, the famous postmodern philosopher taking his cues from Wittgenstein, argued that since every discipline is a language game, no discipline could claim to be giving us knowledge of reality in a broad sense. Any claim to reality would merely be a function of the language use of their particular game. Science cannot claim to be true or an accurate representation of reality, except within its own terms. He writes, “Science plays its own game; it is incapable of legitimating the other language games. The game of prescription, for example, escapes it. But above all, it is incapable of legitimating itself” (Lyotard, 1986, p. 40). This anti-realist perspective is extremely dangerous to scientific pursuit.

Some scholars have attempted to rescue science from the relativism of language games by pointing out Wittgenstein's focus on “forms of life”. Cora Diamond, for example, argues that when one discusses matters of science or banal reality, one faces their interlocutor in a different way than one would while discussing philosophy or theology (Diamond, 2005, p. 99). Diamond takes a famous example from Wittgenstein's Lectures on Religious Belief, where he compares discussing an airplane to discussing a Final Judgment and notes the differences. While Diamond's interpretation is indeed valid at the textual level, the reception of Wittgenstein's ideas continue unhindered. Diamond and others (see for example: Miguens, 2025) have not passed on any justification to the broader culture to see these different arenas as immune to linguistic analysis. Thus, Language game theory, at least in the way it has been received, does not give us any objective “way out” of these difficulties.

In the absence of any trustworthy evidence about the real world, we are left with the choice of joining a language game based upon our affinity to the members or a viewpoint we prefer. Perhaps we think our way of speaking about the world is the best, but we have no firm ground to stand upon, no way of knowing if our vision of reality is any closer to the real thing than anyone else's view. While this may sound equalizing, it produces the opposite effect. Without any agreed upon terms, productive debate is lost, and we resort to name calling.

If one's medical research does not fit with our way of speaking about the world, for example, we feel free to dismiss it. In a study published just before the contentious political election of 2016, scholars noted that most citizens of the United States made decisions about scientific and medical debates based primarily on political and social affinity groups, rather than any knowledge or deliberation of the facts. The authors write, “partisan cues in the form of slogans, talking points, and political labels make it easier for individuals to reach decisions efficiently, resulting in a form of “limited information rationality”” (Nisbet and Markowitz, 2014). They argue for scientists to engage in the 'science of science communication' to address these factors and help to produce productive dialog. Yet, the distrust between different groups has only radically increased since the publication of this study.

As Wittgenstein wrote, “You can fight, hope, and even believe without believing scientifically”. He was critical of the perceived dominance of science and argued that it was no better suited to answer life's questions than any other language game. He continues, “Science: enrichment and impoverishment. One particular method elbows all the others aside” (Wittgenstein 1980, 60e).

Of course, there are issues of true and dubious nature that count as evidence against some theories, such as discovering financial conflicts of interest, self-fulfilling and self-enriching theories, or flawed research design and analysis. These situations have only deepened our lack of trust. Yet, in many cases, this evidence is not known nor is it the primary cause for criticism. If a theory about neurology, biology, or physics entails worldview assumptions (metaphysical or ethical) to which we disagree, we disregard it as unfitting our language game. Rather than ask what is real, true, and good…we assume we already know and search for a language game to support our bias. When presented with the facts, we feel free to employ “alternative facts”. Notice that in these cases, no arguments or evidence to support a contrary view is offered. Rather than debate, we decry. Rather than argue, we ostracize.

Wittgenstein himself struggled with this, writing in his personal journal, “You should love the truth, but you always love other things & the truth only on the side”. (Klagge and Nordmann, 2023, p. 108).

Words become weapons

How does this work itself out in our multicultural modern global society? If we recognize that every endeavor, including the Scientific Method is confined within the limits of language, where can we turn for trust in reality? If new terms appear coined and defined by the powerful or elite, how can we know if they are accurate or merely manipulations intended to retain the right to rule? If words are nothing more than games, items to be used to achieve desired outcomes, why not employ them against our enemies? Rather than raise an argument against a view that contradicts my own, I give them a moniker that reduces them to an object of scorn within my language game.

Kurt Braddock warns of such sloganizing and language use in his book, Weaponized Words (Braddock, 2020, p. 206). He makes the case that radical extremists tend to manipulate language to suit their recruiting needs. He begins with a heartbreaking story of a young American woman slowly recruited to join ISIS, through their patient, verbal persuasion over text, social media, and video. While he doesn't reference Wittgenstein, the examples are chilling reminders of “language games”, used for insidious purpose.

Perhaps the most glaring example in our own culture is a political realm where serious debate is largely absent. We often have political theater rather than productive dialogue. Instead of defeating arguments, we aim to one up each other with a quick quip, a sharp and perhaps derogatory term, or a memorable one-liner. As Donatelli illustrates, “Language games are part of language…we can imprison ourselves within our ways of speaking, unable, as it were, to see beyond them” (Donatelli, 2025, pp. 5–6). We don't debate whether the other's view is true or false but rather mention how ridiculous it must be. If someone does not follow our “way of life”, we have no language to explore, understand, and even evaluate the differences. Yet, this is all we have if logic has been exorcised from our language as meaningless. If we can't agree on anything, we can't even disagree (agreeably) about anything!

Philosophers prior to Wittgenstein have made it their aim to remove the authority from language yet have found themselves stymied by reality. Fredrich Nietzsche expressed his frustration in Twilight of the Idols. He states, ““Reason” in language! —oh what a deceptive old witch it has been! I fear we shall never be rid of God, so long as we still believe in grammar” (Nietzsche, 1911, p. 22). In his attempt to be rid of all authority save his own, Nietzsche was frustrated by how language required logic, grammar, rules and indeed a shared understanding of reality. For any effective communication to happen, we must subject ourselves to these rules.

Steven Hales explains the progress for Nietzsche: “Our faith in grammar generates a faith in logic”, which for Nietzsche “is not too much better than the old God”. A shared understanding of reality is necessary for logic, communication, and trust. “Perhaps Nietzsche's real complaint is that logic is misleading, that is even though logic does not formally insist upon realism, reliance on the logic underneath our grammar tends to lead people into accepting realism” (Hales, 1996, p. 819). A shared trust in logic presupposes a shared understanding of reality, not merely a temporary identification with certain rules.

To become the Übermensch, or gain supreme personal power, Nietzsche needed freedom from the authority of language. If he were to be truly over all, to bend even language to his own use, he required release from logic and grammar…yet he could not achieve this. Nietzsche found that in order to argue anything, we need to agree on something.

Ironically, this may be exactly what Wittgenstein was hoping to fight against! Brandon Absher argues that Wittgenstein's intent was for us to be released from the “bewitchment” of language, and learn to use it more accurately. He writes, “Wittgenstein conceived of his later work as a therapy which could rid philosophers of the disquiet that led them to philosophy. The idea was to dispel the ’superstitions” which overtake us when we demand that the world conform to some linguistic picture” (Absher, 2007). But, instead we find ourselves employing the language game theory to our detriment, manipulating and plying language to our own ends. He evaluates his own understanding of the term “Weapons of Mass Destruction”, and how it was used in the broader cultural narrative of the time. Absher particularly notes how dangerous words may become when they morph into empty terms, intended for influence. He notes that particularly in politics, “words become slogans. Here the words do not designate anything, precisely or otherwise” (Absher, 2007). This lack of a reference point leaves us vulnerable to the bewitchment Wittgenstein feared.

Sadly, after Wittgenstein, many have found a release from logic in the idea that each game creates their own rules. Many have embraced a Nietzschean view, attempting to dominate by controling language. If I cannot trust your terminology, I merely retreat to my own community where we use our own terms. If one group's logic is unacceptable, perhaps another group will create an alternate logic. In this environment, how can productive dialog be achieved? Carl Trueman writes “Nietzsche was prescient. The current battles for the future shape of Western society are being waged most fiercely in the area of language…Indeed, we are tearing away the very foundation upon which a common humanity and a common humanitarian ethic can be built” (Trueman, 2021).

Re-building trust

How can trust be built back in this post-Wittgensteinian world? Here are three simple considerations, one of which is directed at the academy, while the other two apply broadly to personal and professional communication practice.

First, on the academic side, perhaps we need a return to metaphysics? There are many philosophers today that are working productively in this realm and helping us to understand the human person, the world, ethics, government, society and the universe. The fact that metaphysics is notoriously difficult and there are many debates, should not deter us from pursuing answers to ultimate questions.

Following Wittgenstein, many universities dropped courses in Metaphysics, thinking that knowledge of reality could not be known nor would it be valuable to pursue such questions. But, thanks to several recent and contemporary philosophers, this trend seems to be changing. Edward Lowe, for example, argued before his death in 2014 that metaphysics deserves to be placed at the heart of philosophical studies in his work The Possibility of Metaphysics (Lowe, 1998). Consider such influential philosophers as Saul Kripke, Richard Swinburne, JP Moreland, Peter Van Inwagen, Dean Zimmerman, Alvin Plantinga, and indeed many others. These philosophers don't always agree, but they are willing to tackle and explore questions of ultimate reality, the human person, consciousness, free will, God, the soul, and the existence of truth.

What is more, this can be done in community with others if we agree on the laws of logic for example. Cross disciplinary approaches are to be commended, where scientists, philosophers, theologians, social scientists, and even artists can collaborate in helping us to understand the world as it is. If used in this context, language game theory can help us to discover the vast rich diversity of ideas and terms, adding seasoning and culture to society. The vast lexicons of our own language can assist us in providing nuance and precision if we remain convinced that reality is at least knowable and progress is possible. We can debate wholeheartedly, if we can agree that debate is productive.

In a more personal or professional sense, we can also contribute to the rebuilding of trust. First, make it your aim to be a person whose language is trustworthy, logical, and understandable. Rather than hiding behind complex definitions or colloquially exclusive terms, seek to communicate with others using language that is consistent, concise, and clear. This is no new idea. Consider the ancient words of Jesus who implored us to “Let your “yes” be yes, and your “no” no” (Matthew 5:37, NKJV). Without redefining “yes” and “no” to suit our own language game, recognize the reality of what is being argued. Rather than seeking to merely impress or mobilize your own community, seek to be understood by those outside of your community. This could mean learning to “translate” your terminology, to extend a hand to those who speak differently than you or share a different language game.⁴

Finally, seek to understand those outside your language game. Perhaps the most useful rhetorical tool in communication in our modern era is a simple question: “What do you mean by X?” In asking this non-threatening question, we seek to understand how someone may use a certain term or phrase, what assumptions and ideas are behind it, and how their community (or language game) may employ the term in practice. It could be that we discover we use the term in the same way, but in many cases, we may discover a different sense or connotation. This can aid us in gaining trust, producing clarity, and increasing effective communication between communities.

We can agree to disagree, agreeably, if we agree on a few basic ideas: truth can be known, logic can be employed, progress can indeed be made, and contrary to Wittgenstein's famous phrase, meaning is more than mere use.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Wenge Chen, Huaqiao University, China

Reviewed by: Gabriel Fredi Daar, Santu Paulus Indonesian Catholic University, Indonesia

Wen Hu, Fujian Normal University, China

Footnotes

¹Numerous scholars have indeed made this argument such as: Peter Harrison, Michael Polyani, Stanley Jaki, Nancey Pearcy, John Polkinghorne, John Lennox, and more.

²Martin Kusch has very recently published an entire volume discussing the different ways “relativism” may or may not be applied to Wittgenstein's philosophy depending on historical vs modern use of the term. See: Martin Kusch, Wittgenstein and Relativism, Cambridge University Press, 2026.

³Immanuel Kant argued in Critique of Pure Reason, that we are never capable of seeing the world as it really is, but are restricted to only our phenomenal experiences of it. We must assume that there is a reality behind it all in order to make sense of our experiences, but we can never observe or reason our way to reality.

⁴A body of research is beginning to grow on what is called Plain Language approaches in medicine, language acquisition, health literacy, government, psychology, and many other disciplines. These approaches encourage specialists to communicate their findings to non-experts in language that is simple, direct, and communicates clearly. PL enthusiasts encourage using “you” and “we” where possible, and seeking connections and understanding. See for example: Peter Maryke, Stacy Maddocks, Clarice Tang, Pat G Camp, “Simplicity: Using the Power of Plain Language to Encourage Patient-Centered Communication,” Physical Therapy, Volume 104, Issue 1, January 2024, pzad103, https://doi.org/10.1093/ptj/pzad103; Marlene Stoll, Martin Kerwer, Klaus Leib, Anita Chasiotis, “Plain Language Summaries: A systematic review of theory, guidelines, and empirical research,” PLOS One, June 6, 2022, Sigal Uziel-Karl, “Editorial: Simple and Simplified Languages,” Frontiers in Communciation, May 4, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2022.910680. It should be noted that there is a government website devoted to better communication entitled: www.plainlanguage.gov. More than mere academic pursuits, however, we can employ these basic ideas in personal communication.