Political branding through journalistic disintermediation: a case based approach

1 Introduction

Although the academic research in political marketing is a relatively new phenomenon, it has been richly contributed to by many scholars (Mauser, 1983; Newman and Sheth, 1985, 1987; Farrell and Wortmann, 1987; O’Shaughnessy, 1990) and many others who have analysed and presented various facets of political marketing. The use of political communication as a tool to create and nurture perceptions, images, and narratives has been presented in detail (Harrop, 1990; Worcester and Mortimore, 2005). Personal branding in political marketing has also been studied (Needham, 2005; Peng and Hackley, 2009). Many studies have focused on the interaction between the image of the leader and their performance (Popkin, 1991; Scammell, 1995).

For many scholars, the role of the media and journalists in political communication goes far beyond providing information and enabling debate. Gurevitch and Blumler (1990) elaborated on eight roles that the media plays in a democratic society, whereas Curran (2000) provided a more intensive role of the media in the democratic process as a watchdog, public representative (the fourth estate), and source of public information. Some other scholars detailed a more inclusive role in improving the quality of the electoral system, political parties, parliament, judiciary, and other branches of the state, even civil society, and safeguarding their democratic performance (McQuail, 2000; Street, 2010).

Given the importance of the media in society, it is only to be expected that political actors use the media for their public relations and to frame their personal image (McNair, 1996). Numerous other works suggest the importance of public relations in exploring, defining, and communicating image (Grunig, 1992; Haberman and Dolphin, 1988). Furthermore, Pich et al. (2019) stated, “While extant research has tended to focus on identity or image, there are calls to take a more holistic perspective to ground future studies.” Farhan and Omar (2021) commented that the effect of political brand relationship investment on voter citizenship behaviour has not been examined enough. Perloff (2023) noted that, while the political marketing field is rich with insightful models, conceptual maps, and frameworks drawing from strategic marketing, it lacks hypotheses “a priori” about marketing effects, contingent conditions, and underlying processes. This paper attempts to fulfil these gaps, especially the effects of direct marketing.

Not many have studied direct marketing in political marketing. This paper explores how the Indian Prime Minister has pursued a rather unconventional branding strategy in his political career. He has been the most popular leader since he assumed office in 2014. From 2014 to 2024, his approval ratings have exceeded 75% every year, except for 2017 (63%), 2019 (64%), and 2021 (74% in January and 71% in September).¹ In 2023, he was the most popular leader in the world, with an approval rating of 76%.² His personal popularity is twice that of his party, and “he is by far the world's most popular elected leader.”³ This study contributes to scholarship on populist communication styles (Engesser et al., 2017; Hameleers, 2018) by demonstrating that direct-to-citizen messaging functions simultaneously as brand storytelling and as a populist strategy of bypassing “elite” institutional intermediaries. This convergence challenges the traditional distinction between political marketing and populist performance, indicating that contemporary political communication increasingly integrates marketing strategies with performative populist practices.

The novelty of this study extends beyond its empirical focus to the theoretical insights it generates. The Modi case challenges the conventional assumption in the mediatization literature that successful political brand-building depends on media cooperation or, at a minimum, media tolerance. Instead, the findings demonstrate that strong political brand equity (Keller, 1993) can be achieved through strategic communicative sovereignty. It involves the deliberate creation of direct, repeated, and emotionally resonant communication channels that circumvent traditional journalistic mediation. This concept extends Needham's (2005) citizen-as-consumer model and connects with recent scholarship on political disintermediation (Enli, 2017) and the “personal vote” in digital environments (Larsson and Kalsnes, 2014). Future research should test these propositions comparatively across political systems with varying levels of press freedom and digital penetration.

The Prime Minister has garnered popularity by avoiding interactions with journalists, an unprecedented practice in any democratic society. This phenomenon needs to be studied to understand how the Prime Minister has achieved this rare accomplishment. This study aims to explore the ways and means employed by Prime Minister Modi, by answering the following research questions: The study is organized so that Section 2 explains the methodology, followed by Section 3, which explores the theoretical underpinnings of political marketing, followed by the establishment of the role of media in political marketing, looking at personal branding in the political marketing literature. Section 4 studies the strategies adopted by Prime Minister Modi to communicate and discusses the results and findings, while Section 5 is dedicated to conclusions and an agenda for further research.

• RQ1: How has Mr. Modi bypassed journalistic intermediation in communicating with citizens?
• RQ2: Through which communication strategies has Modi constructed credibility and political brand identity?
• RQ3: How does political rhetoric contribute to the perception of direct leader–citizen communication?

2 Methodology

By employing a longitudinal case study methodology (Yin, 2018) spanning three electoral cycles (2014, 2019, and 2024), the study extends political branding theory beyond the campaign window, demonstrating that brand equity can be built, sustained, and refreshed through non-electoral communicative routines. Although prior studies have examined political marketing and populist communication independently, the convergence of these phenomena has not been systematically addressed in the extant literature (Marland, 2016; Scammell, 2015).

Mr. Modi's popularity persists despite his “lack of interaction” with journalists. Exemplifying this, when PM Modi interacted with the media at White House in June 2023 during his US tour, the international media described the event as “rare.” The WSJ remarked that PM Modi “gives many speeches but fewer news conferences and interviews.”⁴ Indeed, after becoming Prime Minister, Mr. Modi's first press conference took place in 2019, i.e., after 5 years into his tenure, and concluded without any questions. Only on three occasions did he take questions from the press: in 2015, when US President Barack Obama visited India; with UK Prime Minister David Cameron in 2015, and in 2023 in the United States.

In the run-up to the 2024 elections, he interacted with several Indian and international media representatives, but the interactions were limited to one media house at a time. These interactions were not in a typical press conference format. However, he succeeded in forming a government for a third consecutive term after completing two full terms—a feat accomplished by very few post-World War II political leaders. Not only did Mr. Modi form a government for a third term, but his party's vote share also increased compared to the first term. The BJP, Mr. Modi's party, received 31.3% of the vote in 2014, which increased to 37.7% in 2019 and marginally reduced to 36.6% in 2024.⁵

This suggests that the approach(es) employed by Mr. Modi to reach out to his voter constituency are unique, making the case study method of research appropriate for studying the phenomenon. As Yin (1994) stated, case studies are best suited when a phenomenon has to be studied within its real-life context to inquire into the “how” and “why” of the phenomenon (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2002). Butler and Collins (1999) opined that politics cannot be independent of cultural and social aspects. Further, Mancini and Swanson (1996) concluded that “interactions and dependencies of politics on the economy, the legal system, and social and cultural experiences (and vice versa) give a clear indication for the arbitrariness of any attempt to disentangle the conditio politicae from its contextual frame.” Therefore, as Henneberg (2008) pointed out, the use of analytical and empirical studies employing higher-level qualitative or quantitative methods (e.g., action research, case study methodologies, or multivariate statistical modelling) is still extremely rare in any dimension of political research.

2.1 Case methodology

As case studies allow for a longitudinal study of the phenomenon for better understanding (Ghauri, 2004) and provide an opportunity to examine the phenomenon from different perspectives and factors over a long period of time (Ghauri, 1983), this method has been used in the study. Also, when the concepts and variables involved are difficult to quantify, rendering experimental or survey methods inappropriate, the case study method proves very effective (Bonoma, 1985). This study also meets the criteria necessary for the use of a single case in research: when a case is critical for explaining or questioning an established theory; when a case is an extreme or a unique case; when a case is revelatory; when an inductive approach and specific explanations are possible (Ghauri, 2004).

In addition, the case method involves data collection through various sources, such as speeches, in-person interviews, observations, and secondary sources such as reports, archives, marketing communications, and news reports. This way, the research question can be investigated in depth from various perspectives to characterize and explain the unique features and many dimensions of the case under study for a cohesive interpretation (Selltiz et al., 1976).

As established in the above sections, the subject of the study, Mr. Modi, does n't give interviews. Also, reaching out to the team involved in designing his communication is futile, and interviewing experts would likely yield only the information available in the media. Thus, this study relies entirely all the above-mentioned secondary data collection tools.

2.2 Inclusion criteria

Relevant information was collected from reputed international media outlets—such as The Economist, Time, Financial Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and Reuters—as well as Indian English media outlets—such as India Today, The Hindu, The Times of India, Business Today, Economic Times, Hindustan Times, Live Mint, First Post, and The Print, among other reputable publications—covering the period from 2012 to 2024.

The case study methodology employed in this study (Yin, 2018) offers depth and contextual richness but raises well-documented questions about the external validity of the findings (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A single-case design is best suited to theory building and analytical generalization, allowing for the extension of theoretical propositions to new contexts rather than statistical generalization from a sample to a population (Yin, 2018). The findings reported here are therefore offered as theoretical propositions grounded in one richly documented case, rather than as empirical generalizations about all political systems or all instances of disintermediated political branding. Readers seeking to apply these findings in other national contexts should treat them as hypotheses to be tested rather than as conclusions to be transferred directly.

2.3 Methodological boundaries and limitations

Rather than claiming universal applicability, this study invites comparative testing of the following conditional propositions: (i) disintermediated political branding generates greater brand equity returns in contexts where mainstream media credibility is low, press freedom is restricted, or partisan media alignment is high; (ii) the effectiveness of populist communication as a branding amplifier is moderated by pre-existing levels of social trust and inter-group polarization; (iii) digital platform-based political brand building is most effective where data costs are low, smartphone penetration is high, and platform-level regulatory oversight is limited; and (iv) personal political brands built on cultural–religious symbolism are effective where the relevant symbolic repertoire commands broad in-group resonance but may generate significant negative externalities for political pluralism. These propositions are falsifiable and comparative and constitute the appropriate form of generalization from a single-case inductive study (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2018).

This study is built entirely on publicly available information taken from the sources mentioned above. As the study intends to investigate Mr. Modi's political branding over a period of three election cycles, longitudinal data collection through primary sources is not feasible; therefore, a case method using published sources was employed. Relevant material from published sources was thematically analysed to answer research questions and draw conclusions.

3 Literature review: politics and marketing

Scholars from various disciplines have been studying political marketing for some time now, but the increased interest is evident from the 1990s (Baines and Egan, 2001; Kavanagh, 1995; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Lock and Harris, 1996; Morley, 2002; O’Shaugnessy and O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Scammell, 1999; Wheeler, 1997). Consequently, political marketing is considered a subdiscipline of marketing, attracting many researchers (Henneberg, 2008). The only difference is that, in political marketing, candidates, ideas, and philosophies are marketed rather than products and sales, as in commercial marketing. This proposition is in consonance with Harrop (1990), who says that party image and policies are offered by political marketing. Farrell and Wortmann (1987) stated that party image, leader image, and manifesto proposals or selected issues will constitute the product in political marketing. Similarly, Worcester and Mortimore (2005) identified issues, party image, and leader image as offerings.

Comparisons of political marketing with commercial advertising have generated considerable interest among researchers, leading to contrasting conclusions about whether the two spheres are similar. Some researchers opine that advertising in both political and commercial marketing evokes similar affective, cognitive, and behavioural responses. They further state that marketing techniques employed by political parties closely resemble those of corporate entities.

However, some scholars argue that the contexts differ between voting and consumption. Therefore, attitude formation and decision-making will not be similar (Lock and Harris, 1996), as voting cannot be postponed like buying decisions. Although a monetary price does n't exist in voting, a “political price”—expressed as feelings of hope or insecurity regarding national and economic interests (Wring, 1997)—means that voting is perceived as a “psychological purchase” (Reid, 1988). An election represents a collective choice, and the elected candidate cannot be altered or revoked, even if the candidate is not the preference of a particular segment of voters (Lock and Harris, 1996).

Further, the political process is highly difficult to understand; i.e., voting decisions might be underinformed or uninformed; the scope for brand introduction or creation might be very constricted, as political parties (and, in some cases, candidate choices) are heavily governed by law. Further, political marketing can be ideological, propagandistic, and rhetorical (Harris et al., 2000), whereas commercial marketing focuses on functional, instrumental, and intrinsic values (O’shaughnessy, 2003). In short, the political choice of a voter is not always rational, unlike buying choices.

Notwithstanding these differences, both business entities and political parties exploit marketing campaigns to appeal to their respective constituencies (Norris, 1999). Marketing campaigns naturally lead to brands and branding, prompting Kotler to emphasize the application of brand management theories and branding frameworks to positively influence voter attitudes and behaviour in a political context (Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Kotler and Levy, 1969).

Schattschneider (1975) described democracy as a competitive political system in which political organizations and leaders propose alternative public policies to enable a participative decision-making process. Harrop (1990) elaborated on this notion, saying that the parties try to position themselves “in the electoral market,” and Beresford (2000) stated that each party tries to relate itself to a particular segment.

It has been well established that media messages have a high impact on voters as they do on consumers (Hackley, 2005; Lewis, 2002; Messaris, 1997; Morley, 2002; O’Shaugnessy and O’Shaughnessy, 2003). Newman (1994) opined that technological improvements in media, especially television, are the main reason for the accelerated use of media in political marketing. The role of television in political marketing, advertising, and branding was extensively studied by Newman (1999) and O’Shaughnessy (1990).

Since its origin in the United States,⁶ branding has become popular in political marketing. Both political parties and contesting candidates are being branded (Peng and Hackley, 2009). As Needham (2005) pointed out, branding techniques are increasingly used to reinforce certain key attributes of the candidate and to build trust and relatability with voters.

To meet the demands of electoral politics, a candidate's image is cultivated to be vibrant with political rhetoric, symbolism, and emotional appeals to better engage voters. In political advertising, the core goal of branding is to consistently protect a candidate's image amid an ever-changing political environment. Political advertising aims to build public confidence and influence voting by marketing ideas, attitudes, and solutions to public issues.

3.1 Role of media in political marketing

Ullah (2009) argued that the media is a principal institution in democracy, as citizens come to better understand society through media coverage. The media provides information to citizens, encourage and contribute to public debates by offering diverse perspectives, give opinion makers a platform, and act as a watchdog—exposing the inner workings of various public institutions (Curran, 2000) to safeguard democratic values (McQuail, 2000; Street, 2010). Media serves as both the representative of the public in national discourse and a source of information for citizens. Democracy requires active public engagement for its success, and that engagement is driven by political literacy, which involves media literacy. Lund and Carr (2008) opined that the process of the public becoming politically literate should begin with education.

Carr (2009) stated that media literacy is critical for people to understand the world, to change positions, to arrive at their own conclusions, to identify truth, not to succumb to herd mentality, and to better judge critical issues. Media not only provides information but also guides the public in interpreting it, facilitating opinion formation by the public. Further, media provides a venue for all sections of society to express opinions as a democratic institution (McQuail, 2000; Street, 2010). This role of the media allows for an inclusive public debate on all important topics and issues. In contrast, low media literacy makes people and democracy vulnerable.

Couldry (2009) emphasized the role of media, saying that the sustenance of the modern nation-state depends on the existence of media, which, in itself, is a critical component of the wider organization of economic, social, and political structures.

According to Kellner (2009), media is a powerful force in contemporary societies, as it is integrated into all spheres of social life, ranging from the economy and politics to culture. Media shapes society's understanding of reality and serves as the mirror through which the public perceives it (Apuke, 2017). Because of this reality-portraying role, political leaders use media to emphasize their election campaigns and tarnish their opponents so that rivals stay in a bad light in public opinion. All parties seek media endorsements to strengthen their images at the cost of their opponents (Ullah, 2009).

Media plays a prominent role in shaping long-term perceptions of political issues, as acknowledged (Kavanagh, 1995; Kraus and Davis, 1976). It has also been suggested that the way the media reports events, or omits some events from reporting, is crucial in shaping public perceptions (McQuail, 1977). This is because voters tend to believe that the issues that get more coverage in the media are more important than those that get less coverage (Mancini and Swanson, 1996). Issues not covered by the media do not make it into public discourse. The same is applicable to parties as well: the parties that garner more coverage will get more visibility than their competitors (Semetko and Schönbach, 1994).

Political leaders have been leveraging various media to advance their political agenda. It began with the development of the newspaper market. One statement or one announcement could reach thousands through a newspaper. Advances in radio technology allowed political leaders to “talk” (not converse) with a large number of people, and radio became the centre of political marketing. With the commercialization of television, politicians’ interest in the media has increased manifold due to “visibility” to many people. Also, with television broadcasting, the message is fully under the control of the party or the candidate (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 1995).

Technology has provided an efficient way of campaigning to achieve political goals (Towner and Dulio, 2013). Apart from reinforcing the existing image (Kavanagh, 1995; Scammell, 1995) or creating the image, political advertising has disseminated issue-based information to the voting public. Visibility on screen has been helping to imprint the physical image of political leaders in the minds of people, and thus branding and personalization become easier (Swanson and Mancini 1996). Personalization leads to attachment between the public and political leaders. Television debates increasingly became the focal point of the election campaign (Maarek, 1995), even though evidence could not be found to suggest that debates dramatically altered the outcome of the campaign (Newman, 1994). However, many authors agree that television is the key political marketing tool (Newman, 1994; O’Shaughnessy, 1990; Scammell, 1995) as it paves the way for cultivating and nurturing a desirable image for a political leader.

3.2 Personal image creation in political marketing

Political marketing witnessed a new turn in the United States, as political communication began to revolve around party leaders (Maarek, 1995; Newman, 1994)—a phenomenon subsequently followed by political communication across the globe. The United Kingdom has caught on by televising the Prime Minister's Question Time in the House of Commons, and the party leaders have since been the central focus of political communication (Kavanagh, 1995; Scammell, 1995). With the leaders occupying the central stage of communications, voters' likes and dislikes towards the individual leader replace ideological bonds with a political party, even while casting votes (Harris et al., 2000). Thus, in some cases, the brand of the political leader has become much bigger than the party they represent. People outside the United Kingdom may remember Margaret Thatcher, for instance, but may not remember the party she represents. The same would be the case with Ronald Regan or J. F. Kennedy for people outside the United States. In view of the importance of personal branding in politics, political parties always seek to project the right image of their leader(s) (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). Further, Pitch et al. (2020) provided a personal brand identity framework with six dimensions: (1) legacy and experience, (2) continuous brand building, (3) coherency of personal values, (4) develop and maintain personalized relationships, (5) visibility and presence, and (6) goals and aspirations.

The growing prominence of personal branding in politics has been described by some authors as democratization of the relationship between elites and citizens (Van Zoonen, 2005), but some others did not like the idea, such as Habermas (1989, 1992) and Postman (1985), as it undermines philosophies and policies of political parties. However, scholars have been highlighting that the image of a leader favourably influences voting decisions (Cutlip, 1994; Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 1995). Smith (2001) argued that the brand image of the party and leader will determine voting more than policies. Needham (2006) favoured the idea that brand image will simplify decision-making for voters.

Popkin (1991) and Scammell (1995) proposed that the image of the leader will substitute for their performance in the minds of voters (Bartels, 1987; Carmines and Stimson, 1980). Scammell (1995) explained that the image of a candidate stands on reputation, trustworthiness (used extensively by Bush in 2000), and credibility rather than on appearance, which includes body language or dress. Harrop (1990) argued that the performance of the candidate adds to credibility, further enhancing the image. Although voters give more prominence to the image of a leader than to policies, this may not be admitted explicitly.

All political marketing focuses on establishing the image of a leader (Newman, 1994) that is relatable to all critical voter segments and effectively counters the image of the opponents. Voters relate to the image of the leader much more quickly than to issues (O’Shaughnessy, 1990); hence, image advertising leaves a stronger imprint on voters than issue advertisements (Sabato, 1981). Maarek (1995) suggested that, compared with other candidates' image advertising, facing a tough challenge will yield better results than trying to build an image. Indeed, Towner and Dulio (2013) argued that every candidate strives to distinguish themselves from opponents to be better remembered by voters during elections. Therefore, “campaigns are fundamentally about contrasts.” Often, parties and candidates attempt to undermine the credibility and consistency of opponents' image (Baines et al., 1999). Consequently, to maintain image credibility and consistency, all parties and candidates constantly resort “spin-doctoring” and “rapid rebutting.” As Blumenthal (1980) proposed, all parties and candidates are in “permanent campaign” mode. Essentially, political marketing has become permanent campaigning in which the people and party in power have an advantage, as Nimmo (1999) succinctly stated: officeholders turn “…office itself into a full-time campaign platform.”

However, brands cannot be built solely on differentiation; they need substance for long-term survival. Speed et al. (2015) proposed that political brands must have (a) credibility to advocate for the policies of the party and (b) authority to promise on behalf of the party; in other words, voters must perceive the leader to be the face of the party. No candidate or leader can become a brand without these two conditions being met; however, as seen previously, political leaders are products that parties offer to the people. That means, in political marketing and political communications, leaders are both products in themselves and also brand advocates. In this context, in political marketing, human brands have to embody the philosophy of their party and must be able to build favourable associations with the voters for the party to edge out competition in elections. Further, the leader or candidate needs to be relatable to the core voter segments (or voter groups) of the party to fare better in elections. The more relatable the leader is to voters, the better the chances of the party. Along with relatability, Smith (2001) identified brand dimensions necessary for a political leader to build a good image with voters, including “capable leader,” “good in a crisis,” and “patriotic,” among others.

The advent of social media augers well for political brand building, as it establishes a direct channel between the leader and voters. In 2008, Barack Obama extensively used social media, which helped create a brand: “… the Obama campaign went beyond simple messaging with one additional advancement in 2008: the building of the ‘Obama brand’” (Speed et al., 2015). Furthermore, it has been observed that after the acute difficult times of COVID-19, social media is among the most used tools for interaction between individuals (Moslehpour et al., 2025).

3.3 Effective direct communication—theoretical underpinning

The literature offers many theories that explain how political brands are built, as well as disintermediation in the process of political brand building through digital technologies. These theories provide an in-depth understanding of the acceptance of these brands by the public at large while also reinforcing how the public “owns” such brands when there is no mediation between the brand and its target audience.

Parasocial relationship theory (Giles, 2002; Horton and Wohl, 1956): Regular, unmediated communication from a political leader, particularly via radio or social media, fosters parasocial interaction. The audience develops a sense of personal acquaintance with the communicator despite the one-directional nature of the channel. This parasocial relationship generates trust, liking, and loyalty that parallel (and may substitute for) direct interpersonal contact. For Modi, the cumulative parasocial capital from direct communication constitutes a durable brand asset.

Framing theory (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Entman, 1993): Modi's direct communication consistently frames issues in terms of national development, individual aspiration, and collective pride. Thus, it aligns with dominant cultural values in post-liberalization India. By controlling the communication channel, the BJP controls the frame, preventing the oppositional reframing that journalistic mediation typically introduces. This frame-control function is central to brand equity maintenance (Keller, 1993).

Symbolic interactionism and political identity (Blumer, 1969; Norris, 2000): Political brands function as identity symbols; supporting Modi becomes an expression of a particular vision of Indian national identity. Direct communication reinforces this symbolic association more effectively than mediated communication because it is unfiltered, personalized, and ritual—the characteristics that strengthen symbolic resonance.

Uses and gratifications theory (Katz et al., 1974; Vaccari and Valeriani, 2021): Audiences seek political media for surveillance (staying informed), social utility (shared political identity), and parasocial companionship. Modi's diverse channel portfolio, i.e., radio for reach, social media for interactivity, and community events for embodied experience, satisfies a broader array of these gratifications than a single media strategy could achieve, thereby maximizing audience engagement and brand reinforcement.

Digital political communication and disintermediation: The emergence of social media has fundamentally restructured the political communication ecosystem. Chadwick (2013) identified a “hybrid media system” in which legacy and new media logics co-exist and compete; more recently, scholars have documented how platforms such as Twitter/X, Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp have enabled politicians to communicate directly with constituents, bypassing editorial mediation (Boulianne, 2020; Enli, 2017).

This phenomenon of political disintermediation has been empirically studied in contexts as diverse as Trump's Twitter presidency (Ott, 2017), Bolsonaro's WhatsApp campaigns (Cesarino, 2020), and Macron's direct-to-citizen YouTube addresses (Lalancette and Raynauld, 2019).

The Indian context introduces a distinctive institutional dimension: a relatively adversarial relationship between the ruling BJP and sections of the English-language press incentivized the adoption of disintermediation as a strategic choice rather than merely a technological opportunity (Mehta, 2022; Neyazi, 2020).

Mediatization and its limits: The mediatization of politics thesis (Esser and Strömbäck, 2014; Strömbäck, 2008) holds that political actors increasingly adapt their behaviour to satisfy the logic of media, such as prioritizing conflict, simplicity, personalization, and novelty. However, recent scholarship has identified conditions under which political actors resist or invert mediatization pressures (Hjarvard, 2013; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011).

Self-mediation (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013): Where political actors possess sufficient brand equity and direct-channel infrastructure, they can bypass media logic entirely, a condition Enli and Skogerbø (2013) termed 'self-mediation' and that Vaccari and Valeriani (2021) analysed in the context of social media political communication. The Modi case represents an extreme manifestation of this self-mediation strategy, warranting theoretical attention.

Populist communication: Populist communication is characterized by appeals to the homogeneous “people,” attacks on corrupt “elites,” and an emotionally charged, simple, repetitive style (Engesser et al., 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Recent quantitative studies have demonstrated that populist communication styles generate higher social media engagement than non-populist messages (Ernst et al., 2017; Hameleers, 2018). Importantly, Moffitt (2016) argued that populist leaders engage in the “performance of crisis,” projecting urgency, decisiveness, and ordinariness to construct a particular political persona. Modi's direct communication programmes display many of these characteristics: the intimate radio address format of Maan Ki Baat enhances accessibility; the Chai Pe Charcha format conveys ordinariness; the repeated nationalist frames convey urgency. This connects political marketing theory with the growing literature on populism as a communicative style rather than merely an ideology.

Platform politics: The concept of platform politics refers to how the technical and commercial logics of digital platforms shape political communication practices (Klinger and Svensson, 2015; Kreiss and McGregor, 2018). Algorithmic amplification, micro-targeting, and data-driven voter segmentation have transformed political campaign strategy globally (Baldwin-Philippi, 2015; Howard and Hussain, 2013). In the Indian context, the BJP was an early and sophisticated adopter of social media-based campaigning described as the most extensive WhatsApp political communication network in the world. More recently, scholars have examined the role of IT cells, coordinated inauthentic behaviour, and viral political memes in the digital ecosystem of the BJP (Pal et al., 2019; Udupa, 2019). These platform-level strategies do not merely amplify Modi's brand messages but also create effective communities of brand advocates who generate secondary content, thereby multiplying reach at negligible marginal cost.

Personal political branding: Personal political branding has attracted growing scholarly attention, particularly in the context of presidentialization and the personalization of politics (Balmas et al., 2014; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). Marland (2016) examined brand management in Canadian federal politics and identified the centralization of the communication strategy as a precondition for effective personal brand management. Nielsen and Vaccari (2013) distinguished between the politician's “brand community” and their broader electoral coalition, arguing that strong personal brands allow politicians to perform better than their party's natural vote share—a phenomenon evident in Modi's sequential electoral performances (2014, 2019, and 2024). Lalancette and Raynauld (2019) examined how political leaders use Instagram to perform “ordinary” and “intimate” leadership. The findings are directly applicable to Modi's social media persona.

4 Findings and analysis

4.1 The Modi way

McCombes et al. (2000) analysed how media would cover a political candidate to conclude that the candidate will be portrayed on five substantive attribute categories by media: (a) political ideology and issue positions; (b) biographical details; (c) perceived qualifications; (d) personality and image; and (e) integrity. Before the 2014 elections, when Mr. Modi was bursting onto the national political scene, Indian media portrayed him in terms of the five attributes mentioned below.

Political ideology and issue positions: The media stated that Mr. Modi was a Kattar (Hindi for hardcore) right-wing politician with deep resentment for Muslims. They highlighted the perceived inaction of Mr. Modi during the 2002 Godhra (a town in Gujarat) riots that resulted in 1,044 deaths, including 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus.⁷ Mr. Modi was the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat during that period and was accused of inciting violence towards Muslims by not ordering police action at the beginning of the riots. Some moved the courts seeking punishment for Mr. Modi. Later, however, courts have acquitted Mr. Modi of the charges. The charges were so strong that the United States denied a visa to Mr. Modi in 2005 for the alleged role in the 2002 violence against Muslims. The Wall Street Journal in 2014 stated, “Narendra Modi is the only person ever denied a US visa based on a little-known law on religious freedom.”⁸ The United Kingdom also imposed a diplomatic ban on Mr. Modi until it was revoked in 2012.

Biographical details: The political orientation of Mr. Modi, as reported by the media, was often characterized as anti-secular. Because he belongs to a right-wing, nationalist, upper-class-dominated party, he has frequently been portrayed in the same manner as his party. Being a nationalist has often been equated with being a fascist, with parallels drawn to Hitler.

Perceived qualifications: Modi's educational qualifications had been a topic of television debates and op-ed articles. Court cases have also been filed, questioning the integrity of the Election Commission over Mr. Modi's educational qualifications. While Mr. Modi publicized his achievements as Gujarat's Chief Minister, the media constantly harped on the Godhra riots.

Personality and image: While his charisma and oratory skills have been acknowledged by all quarters, some have accused him of being a non-democratic, dictatorial, and self-centred leader. His ability to work with those who disagree has been questioned. He has been represented to stifle contrary opinions.

Integrity: While Mr. Modi has not been accused of corruption by the media, political opponents occasionally hurled corruption charges. Although the media has refrained from accusations of personal corruption, the lower-level corruption in his governance has always been an issue, and thus he was accused of failing to eliminate corruption.

One can summarize that the media image of Mr. Modi has not been a great one and that the media always reminded the public about the 2002 riots. A 2007 interview with Karan Thapar is a case in point. The then Chief Minister of Gujarat, Mr. Modi, had to walk out of the interview as Karan Thapar repeatedly asked Mr. Modi to apologize for the riots.⁹ He has seldom interacted with the media since that interview walk-off. Perhaps, Mr. Modi thought the media would never let go of the 2002 riots and charted his own path to reach people by skirting the media. A 2013 opinion piece in The New York Times further supports the notion that the media has not moved on from the 2002 riots. The article reads, “In 2002, rioters in the western Indian state of Gujarat savagely killed nearly 1,000 people, most of whom were part of the Muslim minority. Now, barely a decade later, Narendra Modi, who was the chief minister of Gujarat at the time and still holds the office, is a leading candidate to become Prime Minister of India.”¹⁰

4.2 Rise on to the national politics

Mr. Modi created an image of a progressive, prosperity-oriented Chief Minister by projecting the economic growth of Gujarat during his tenure. As Baumann et al., 2018 observed, “Modi cleverly marketed the economic development of Gujarat as his personal achievement, implying that his ability to deliver governance could bring the whole country forward. By stressing the success of his ‘Gujarat model,’ Modi also tried to take public attention away from accusations of his role as Chief Minister during the Gujarat riots of 2002.” The degree of economic progress in Gujarat has always been contagious, but there has been general consensus on the direction.

4.2.1 Success as the chief minister

Gujarat recorded an economic growth rate of 10.1% between 2004 and 2012, compared to a national average of 7.6%. Heavy investments in infrastructure, a focus on private investment, and an emphasis on e-governance have transformed the state's industrial sector, which grew by 12.65% between 2005 and 2009, up from 3.95% between 2001 and 2004. In agriculture, farmers were promised and provided with 8 h of uninterrupted electricity, while almost all villages received 24/7 power supply. Electricity helped Gujarat achieve the fastest growth in the agricultural sector compared to any other state in the country. Between 2001 and 2010, the agriculture sector of Gujarat expanded at 10.1%. The living conditions of the rural population have improved dramatically.¹¹ e-Governance largely curbed corruption at higher hierarchical levels in the bureaucracy and among elected representatives.¹² Mr. Modi has used these achievements to stake a claim to the Prime Minister’s position.

4.2.2 The groundwork

In 2011, Mr. Modi undertook the Sadbhavana Yatra (roughly translates to “a trip in good faith”) across Gujarat, making his national ambitions amply clear. Almost immediately, in March 2012, he gave a rare interview to Time Magazine and was featured on the magazine cover with the caption “Modi Means Business.” That interview was well received by the Indian public, especially the BJP cadre, and signalled that Mr. Modi would be running for the Prime Ministers in the 2014 elections. Subsequently, the incumbent Congress party targeted Mr. Modi, hurling phrases like Maut Ka Saudagar (merchant of death). This was countered by calling Mr. Rahul Gandhi, Modi's principal opposition, Shezada (prince).

Reuters remarked that by calling Mr. Rahul Gandhi a prince, Mr. Modi highlighted his own background as a tea seller in contrast to the privileged upbringing of his opponent. Further, Reuters analysed that the Congress party was in danger of losing its core voter group, the poor, as Mr. Modi sought to connect with them by highlighting his poor upbringing. This helped nurture a relatable political brand personality; as Harrison et al. (2023) observed, the traits of political brand personality resemble human-like elements mirrored onto a political party and/or a political candidate. Further, the reference to him as a tea seller increases his relatedness with voters. Relatedness is the key component of the Autonomy, Relatedness, and Competence (ARC) framework, which is important for human brands to flourish (Thomson, 2006).

“There is method in his mockery,” quipped Reuters.¹³ The campaign has targeted to establish an emotional connect with the public, as Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, political observer and media veteran, said, “It is a truism that marketing cannot sell a bad product. Irrespective of the money you spend on marketing, if what your selling fails to strike a chord in the minds of a large section of the electorate, all efforts to market Modi would be in vain.”¹⁴

4.2.3 Political idiom

Mr. Modi addressed himself in the third person in his public speeches. Sud (2022) observed that by addressing himself in third person, Mr. Modi tries “to evoke feelings of unquestioned loyalty, and to almost elevate himself above personhood” among his followers. By doing so, he has become above questioning. He ensured that he was relatable to the people; to this end, along with addressing himself in the third person, he spoke to the masses in their language, i.e., Hindi. Using common idioms, metaphors, and catchy slogans, he has been successful in being identified by common people for his ordinariness. He has constantly been reminding people that he is one among them and an embodiment of the people, rather than a representative of the people. This resulted in compelling brand promotions (Vittorini, 2022). By identifying himself with common people, Mr. Modi reminds observers that, unlike the other engaged in “dirty” politics for fame or fortune for themselves and their progeny, he is in politics to serve the public. He often uses the term Seva (service) in his speeches, to such an extent that after becoming the Prime Minister in 2014, he has often described himself as the Pradhan Sevak (prime servant). As a celibate bachelor, he has consistently stated that he has no desire for worldly possessions or fame, remaining totally dedicated to “the people” (Sud, 2022). His loyalty to people has been so pronounced that Time Magazine acknowledged, “in a country where nepotism and dynastic politics are the norm, Modi's family is invisible.”¹⁵

4.2.4 Engagement in political rallies

To engage people, he often asks questions during his speeches to elicit answers. He makes a statement and asks people to switch on the torch on their mobiles if they agree with him. These approaches turn speeches into conversations, with people perceiving themselves as part of the discussion or dialogue rather than passive spectators. He has used phrases such as Chappan Inch Ki Chati (56-inch chest) and Gahr Mein Ghus Ke Marenge (an idiom for forceful and unhesitating retaliation), which evoke a huge uproar from the public, often turning into feverish admiration accompanied by unstoppable “Modi….Modi….Modi” chants from thousands of attendees. While the chants continue, Mr. Modi pauses in his speech. This pause, coupled with the chants, leaves a lasting effect on both the attendees and those watching the live telecast or re-broadcast, making members of the audience feel as though he is speaking directly to each one of them. These phrases serve a dual purpose. First, because they are commonly used by the public, listeners feel as though they are hearing from one of their own. Second, these phrases emphasize certain attributes. For instance, Chappan Inch Ki Chati symbolizes courage.

Another hallmark of his speeches has been his avoidance of the names of his political opponents. He mocks his opposition by smearing them, and people would get who the target is, almost on cue—for instance, using the word Shezada (prince) for Mr. Rahul Gandhi. His oratory skills have established such a connection with people that they can identify the person even if his/her name has not been mentioned. In 2013, addressing a party meeting, he said, “When the time came to form the government, they (the opposing political part—Congress) chose a PM who could do what the family wanted; they chose another nightwatchman.” This was an obvious reference to the former Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, and the Gandhi family, which controls the Congress Party.¹⁶ Further, he mocked Singh's efficiency as Prime Minister with just one word, using an analogy from cricket, in which a nightwatchman has nothing to accomplish and is not expected to. These references soon became part of day-to-day conversations of the public, establishing a deep, subliminal connection with Mr. Modi.

4.2.5 Social media usage

Mr. Modi has also connected with potential voters on online platforms. In 2012, he took questions via webcam from across continents. He addressed a host of questions from around the globe, establishing him as a tech-savvy politician. By 2014, he had more than a million Twitter followers,¹⁷ providing another avenue for direct connection with the public.

By the time he officially filed his nomination papers in 2014, Mr. Modi had established a connection with the general public, especially in the populous north Indian states, commonly called the Hindi belt. The connection has only strengthened during the campaign and afterward.

4.3 The campaign

One of his first rallies after being officially announced as the Prime Minister candidate was in Patna, the capital city of the state of Bihar. The historic Gandhi Maidan of Patna was jam-packed. An estimated 300,000 people attended the rally in the ground, a venue that other political parties “avoided to hide their inability to fill up the ground.” However, that is not why the rally is primarily remembered. A series of low-intensity bombs rocked the surroundings of the ground, yet the massive crowd did not budge. Kanwal (2013), one of the popular TV journalists, opined, “On any other occasion, there would have been a mad scramble to get out of the venue and a stampede would have been highly likely. But despite the blasts, which saw dozens of injured being rushed to nearby hospitals, the crowds didn't move from their place. No mischief-maker was going to come between the crowds and Modi today.”¹⁸ In that rally, Mr. Modi called for Hindus and Muslims to work together, but did not mention the blasts even once.

That rally was the first demonstration of the popularity of Mr. Modi among the masses—not only in terms of numbers but also through steadfastness of the crowd after the blasts, their roaring support throughout Mr. Modi's speech, and the “Modi… Modi…Modi” chants, all testifying to his appeal. He emerged triumphant despite constant media vilification. Even while reporting on the Patna rally blasts, Rajesh Kumar Singh of Reuters referred to the 2002 riots, calling Mr. Modi “…a polarising figure….”¹⁹

4.3.1 Chai Pe Charcha

During the campaign, at least three phrases became so popular that they entered the common lexicon and are still used today by various sections of the public in different contexts. One of them is Chai Pe Charcha (a tête-à-tête over a cup of tea). When an erudite Congress leader, Mr. Mani Shankar Aiyer, mocked Mr. Modi by stating, “Give my word, Modi will never be PM in the 21st century. If he wants to sell tea here (AICC meet), we can arrange for it,”²⁰ Modi's team responded with Chai Pe Charcha, “reaching out to voters using the potent symbolism of Modi's rise from a lowly background” (Sen, 2016). In these conversations, Mr. Modi interacted directly with citizens who could ask questions. As part of the campaign, Mr. Modi participated in over three such events, which were telecast in over 500 cities and towns and at more than 4,000 tea stalls across the country (Price, 2015).

Rajdeep Sardesai, a prominent Indian journalist known for his sharp remarks on Mr. Modi, commended the impact of these charchas. He wrote, “A tea stall where a potential Prime Minister sits with his fellow citizens drinking chai—what could be a greater equalizer?” (Sardesai, 2015). Apart from portraying the journey of Mr. Modi, from poverty to power (Sardesai, 2015), these charchas brought him closer to potential voters. The imagery of a prime ministerial contender sitting at a roadside tea stall and having routine discussions with common people proved deeply endearing and has been etched in public memory. The phrase Chai Pe Charcha has since become a common expression among friends and family for any routine conversation over tea, through which Mr. Modi established a subliminal connection. Even after close to a decade, the phrase instantly evokes his image in the public consciousness.

4.3.2 Achhe Din Aane Waley Hai

The second phrase was Achhe Din Aane Waley Hai (good times are ahead), shortened to achhe din. Mr. Modi focused heavily on the “Gujarat Model” of economic development during his campaign, providing hope to a country whose previous government had been marred by multiple scam allegations. This message of “development” and “hope” was conveyed through a single phrase achhe din. The Economist wrote, “Voters who chanted ‘Modi, Modi, Modi’ often said that one word, ‘Gujarat,’ signified their hopes for similar material gains.”²¹ The Manmohan Singh government had to endure multiple large-scale corruption charges, some involving his cabinet ministers and others against the entire cabinet. Some of the major allegations included the Air India scam (2006), 2G spectrum scam (2008), Commonwealth Games scam (2010), Coal scam (2012), Chopper scam (2012), Tatra truck scam (2012), and Adarsh housing Society scam (2012).²² At the time, the government huffed and puffed to defend itself against these charges.

While these scams were being unearthed and allegations levelled, the Niira Radia scandal shook the entire government, including politicians and top bureaucrats alike. Called the Radia tapes, around 5,000 conversations between lobbyist and entrepreneur Niira Radia and her clients were recorded between 2007 and 2009. Her client list included India's top businessmen, parliamentarians, and cabinet ministers. The major allegations stemming from these tapes were that (a) Ms. Radia was instrumental in securing the appointment of A. Raja as the Minister for Telecommunications and (b) she acted as a power broker in deals between the Telecommunications Ministry and various telecom companies in connection with the 2G spectrum scam. This particular episode resulted in a strong public perception that the Manmohan Singh government was susceptible to external pressures and that the interests of a few powerful people overruled the interests of the nation. Against this backdrop, achhe din acquired an additional meaning: that in the days to come, the country's interests will be protected. Sen (2016) summarized, “If development was an overarching theme of the electoral campaign, Modi was also able to connect to the mood of the voters by resorting to pithy slogans. One such powerful slogan was ‘Achhe Din Aane Waley Hai (Good times are coming).’” The phrase went viral across both social media and conventional media (Kaur, 2015) to such an extent that Swapan Dasgupta, an erudite journalist-turned-politician leaning towards the BJP, stated that “achhe din has been decisive in BJP's victory.”²³ Nearly a decade after its coinage, the phrase still evokes Mr. Modi's image in 2024.

4.3.3 Sabka Sath, Sabka Vikas

The third phrase that stuck with people is Sabka Sath, Sabka Vikas (translating to together with all, development for all). While many pundits interpreted this slogan as an outreach effort towards the Muslim community, some opined that its appeal was much broader, designed to reach every corner of the country, every community, every region, every subterrain, and every subaltern section. This phrase, centred around vikas (development), captured the imagination of the public at large, specifically urban youth, at a time when the incumbent government's economic policy leaned towards rural development. As widely reported, the slogan was instrumental in influencing neutral voters to vote for Mr. Modi.

Other influential phrases were also used, such as Ab ki Baar, Modi Sarkar (this time, a Modi government), to reach out to the public. On analysing these slogans, one finds a distinct pattern. They draw from the language of the common person, are easy to remember, are highly contextual, carry deep meaning, offer hope, evoke positive feelings about the future, and are easy to pronounce. All of these qualities, especially the last one, faciliated a quick and effective word-of-mouth advertisement. This people-to-people spread was important to the candidacy of Mr. Modi' as he has not been offered a positive image by the media.

Cornfield (2021) formulates 10 elements of a speech that can help convince voters to favour a particular leader. These include (1) an orienting welcome; (2) a onerous personal backstory; (3) shout-outs to (some) personal benefactors and role models; (4) credentials for the office; (5) a signature alert; (6) favourable contrasts; (7) conduct pledges and policy promises; (8) magic words: the declaration sentence (and “The American Dream”); (9) perorations; and (10) theme songs. Of these 10, Mr. Modi has ticked many.

4.3.4 Hindutva and his personality

Mr. Modi has been associated with the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) since childhood. The RSS, a non-political organization (Curran, 1950), was founded in 1925 by Baliram Hedgewar (1889–1940), a physician, to fight against British rule. The RSS ideology centres on the creation of a “Hindu nation” through the protection of Hindu political, cultural, and religious interests (Atkins, 2004). Following independence, the RSS developed into an influential Hindu nationalist umbrella organization, with affiliate bodies running schools, charities, labour unions, youth wings, and several other clubs to spread its ideology. By the end of 2024, the RSS had 72,354 shakhas²⁴ (literally meaning branches, referring to a place where local congregations happen) spread across the country, with over 5 million swayamsevaks²⁵ (volunteers) organizing regular events dedicated to upholding Hindu culture.

The RSS, according to its publications, has been working towards the restoration of Hindu pride after centuries of self-effacement. Anyone associated with RSS has likewise been perceived as working towards this same cause. Consequently, Mr. Modi was viewed as upholding the Hindu cause in the Hindu-majority country, and the RSS started promoting his candidature through its network. His image as a man fighting for the Hindu cause steadily grew through his constant references to Veer Savarkar in his speeches. Veer Savarkar, a controversial figure during the Indian freedom struggle, was castigated by the independent Indian Government over allegations that he was a prime conspirator in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, among others—accusations that Hindu ideologues have always challenged since independence. Anyone who dares to take Savarkar's name publicly has been viewed as a staunch Hindu ideologue.

The much-politicized religious undercurrents in Indian society helped Mr. Modi become recognized as a Hindu leader in no time, especially in North Indian states where religious friction had been apparent since the 1990s. This image of Mr. Modi as a Hindu ideologue, combined with his promotional campaigns, made him popular among the masses.

In 1980, the RSS started its political wing, the BJP, and thus any BJP candidate would be promoted by the RSS. However, with Mr. Modi, the relationship has been much deeper, as he himself is an RSS Pracharak. As Shani (2021) noted, Pracharaks are full-time RSS appointees who are highly disciplined and dedicated to the cause, forsaking family life and remaining unmarried. This aspect of Mr. Modi's persona is highly respected by the Indian mass, as traditional Indian society holds profound reverence for those who make personal sacrifices for a greater cause. Mr. Modi has thus been viewed as an individual who surrendered his personal life for the nation. When Time magazine commented that Mr. Modi's family is nowhere to be seen, it reflects the reality that he severed ties with his family.

During the 2014 election campaign, Mr. Modi used the phrase “Desh Ko Parivar Bana Diya” (made the nation his family) to subtly remind that he has no personal family while also making a sly reference to family-oriented political parties often perceived as corrupt. He has been portrayed as a selfless leader devoid of any personal ambition and dedicated to the service of his country (Mitra, 2021). By referring to the entire country as a family, he has identified himself with the masses and established a clean image.

Along with the family reference and a clean image, the connection between Mr. Modi and voters has strengthened. For a caste-obsessed society, Mr. Modi is the first strong national leader to represent a lower caste, allowing him to immediately establish a bond with the masses. The fact that he comes from a political party long dominated by upper castes made this bond stronger. Modi has successfully appealed to diverse sections of Indian society, including lower-caste Hindus who were historically hostile to the BJP due to its identification with the interests of upper-caste Hindus (Shani, 2021). His impoverished background further strengthened this bond, and he has been widely seen as the embodiment of the burgeoning middle class’s aspirations (Jaffrelot, 2014). This might have translated into votes for the BJP, as Holloway and Hendrie (2025) observed that party leaders act as heuristic devices, providing voters with a way to judge a political party based on the character of a person, i.e., its leader.

Mr. Modi made 5,827 appearances across India during the campaign before the 2014 elections, which included rallies, events, and appearances through a three-dimensional hologram (Baishya, 2015).

4.3.5 The results

The Economist acclaimed, “The storm broke, marking a national political shift as big as any since independence in 1947. Mr Modi smashed the long domination of Congress.”²⁶ The BJP secured a 31% vote share, which translated into 282 seats out of 543. When included its allies, the tally rose to 336 seats. Congress garnered a 19% vote share and won 44 seats. This marked the first time that a single party outnumbered Congress—a feat not achieved by any single party since 1984,, making it a landmark mandate in Indian democracy, as The Economist observed, “Mr Modi's victory has disproved an article of political faith from the past three decades: that India's messy democracy, cursed by strong regional and caste-based parties, could produce only fragmented outcomes and weak coalition governments.”²⁷

4.3.6 The Prime Minister who speaks to people

The goodwill that Mr. Modi accumulated during the campaign phase has helped garner a positive image, even during difficult times for the common person. On the evening of 6 November 2018, the Prime Minister announced the demonetization of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 notes. He stated that the move was intended to curb black money. Suddenly, small- and medium-scale businesses across the country felt a severe negative impact as close to 86% of the money in circulation lost its legal tender status. Consequently, for months together, all economic activity came to a screeching halt, millions lost their livelihood, and citizens were forced to stand in never-ending queues outside banks. Even in those times of massive distress, the common public did not blame the Prime Minister. Singh et al. (2018), through sentiment analysis after demonetization, concluded that, “The result of our analysis shows that a large share of Indian people was happy with this policy. During the initial days the sentiment was more towards the negative side as the common man had to suffer many hardships. Ultimately, as the new banknotes were made available, the overall sentiment of the people became positive.” Hordes of newspaper articles and videos express similar sentiments, with the common public believing that these troubles are temporary and that curbing black money will help them in the long run.

As Prime Minister, Mr. Modi's inclination to speak to people directly has taken new approaches. Months after assuming office, the Prime Minister launched a new radio programme named Mann Ki Baat (straight from the heart) on 3 October 2017. The 20–30-min episode, broadcast on radio on the last Sunday of each month, has become an instant hit with the masses. In his addresses, the Prime Minister talks about a wide variety of topics, ranging from motivation, national security, sports, and cleanliness to government policies, the eradication of tuberculosis, the valour of soldiers, and Indian heritage. Through a website, ideas are sought from the general public on what should be included in the speech of the Prime Minister.

Business Standard reported that the first 15 episodes attracted over 61,000 ideas from the public, indicating the popularity of the talk show. The All India Radio that telecasts the show has sold the advertising slots at the highest price of any programme. A 10-s advertisement slot cost Rs. 200,000 during the programme, compared to the most-listened sports program, the India–Pakistan cricket world cup match, which usually attracted Rs 10,000–Rs 15,000.²⁸ According to a study by the Indian Institute of Management, Rohtak, Mann Ki Baat has close to 230 million regular listeners and another 410 million occasional listeners; at least a billion people have listened to the program at least once.²⁹ On the impact of Mann Ki Baat, Tariq Mansoor et al. (2023) observed, “Few would disagree that Prime Minister Modi has established himself as an iconic leader in terms of his ability to connect with the masses. Mann Ki Baat has reinforced this in a unique way—it didn't just build an intimate connection between the Prime Minister and Indians but also reinforced ideals enshrined in the Constitution.”³⁰

Another avenue through which the Prime Minister connects with people, especially children and youth, is Pariksha Pe Charcha (discussion over exams). Held annually at the beginning of the examination season, the Prime Minister interacts with children and young adults in schools and colleges, with the primary theme of reducing examination stress. While thousands of students attend the event physically, millions more participate virtually across the country. The Prime Minister takes questions from the attendees. For instance, over 3.9 million students registered for the event organized on 27 January 2023.³¹ The impact of this event extends far beyond the student community. Eager parents also participate in the event to hear what the Prime Minister has to say to their wards, thus creating a unique experience.

The festivity that follows the visits of the Prime Minister to any city in any country has been another element in building relations without media mediation. In every country, expatriates attend public gatherings with the Prime Minister in droves. The Washington Post critiqued, “From Australia to Canada, from the United Kingdom to the United States, from Dubai to Israel, no foreign leader has courted his country's diaspora as assiduously as Modi. His rallies often include the country's national leader—President Trump joined him in Houston, and British Prime Minister David Cameron accompanied Modi for a 2015 speech to 60,000 members of the Indian diaspora at Wembley Stadium in London.”³² These huge crowds in foreign countries embolden the supporters of the Prime Minister and are expected to stand as testimony to his popularity, thereby thwarting the cynical arguments, without providing a press briefing.

The Prime Minister secured a second term in 2019 with an even larger majority than in 2014, and his popularity increased in the second term. His ingenuity in connecting with people has been on display during the campaign. For instance, Mr. Modi called himself Chowkidar (security man) during the campaign. His principal opponent, Mr. Rahul Gandhi, accused Mr. Modi of corruption and stated Chowkidar Hi Chor Hai (the security man is a thief). “Modi sprung a surprise when he initiated the ‘Main Bhi Chowkidar’ campaign on 16 March. BJP leaders and ministers across the country used the ‘Chowkidar’ prefix on their Twitter handles.”³³ The campaign “#MainbhiChowkidar” was used a record 3.2 million times in tweets on 18 March 2019, alone.³⁴ Although his seat share and voter share saw a decline in the 2024 election, Mr. Modi succeeded in forming a government for a third consecutive term. He became only the second prime minister, after Jawaharlal Nehru, to form three successive cabinets.

The third-term success is particularly significant given that the country had to navigate two waves of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns during 2020 and 2021. Much like demonetization in 2018, the economic consequences of the national lockdowns were severe for the middle class and the poor. Unable to sustain lives in the closed-down cities, millions of migrant workers traversed the vast expanse of India on foot during the first lockdown of 2020. The following lockdown in 2021 resulted in an unprecedented scale of deaths as an inadequate healthcare system could not handle the pandemic, generating public anger. Time Magazine noted, “That anger and helplessness may well have political repercussions. It is India's middle class who forms much of the base of support for Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—and who poll watchers say are now beginning to turn against him.”³⁵

While the Modi government introduced food security and other welfare guarantee schemes for the poor, the vast middle class was left lurking, as The Hindu opined, “In India, while rural and poor households received a marginal increase in direct cash transfers as part of an existing employment guarantee scheme, and organised businesses in affected sectors received a government-backed line of credit, the average working classes—the middle and upper-middle class Indians—were left to fend for themselves.”³⁶

5 Conclusion

Drawing on four theoretical traditions, this study proposes an integrative framework for understanding how political actors build brand equity outside the mainstream media ecosystem. These four constructs are treated as complementary rather than competing: The BJP presented Mr. Modi as its prime ministerial candidate during the 2014 Indian election. In accordance with Harrop's (1990) idea that party image and policies are communicated through political marketing, the BJP offered the electorate a nationalistic, right-oriented, non-dynastic, and anti-corruption party, paired with a candidate whose personal identity aligned with the party's propositions. This is also in accordance with the observations of Farrell and Wortmann (1987) and Worcester and Mortimore (2005) that party image and leader image form the core product. It can be argued that the public was offered a strong product during the 2014 election, particularly against the backdrop of an environment rife with corruption scandals involving the incumbent government. Furthermore, as Newman (1994) opined, all political marketing focuses on establishing a leader's image that resonates across critical voter segments while effectively countering the image of opponents. Mr. Modi not only succeeded in creating an image that cut across voter segments but also created a comparative difference with his prime contender, Rahul Gandhi, by calling the latter “Shehzada.”

• (i) Political brand identity (Kapferer, 2012; Needham and Smith, 2015): Brand identity encompasses the sender-controlled signals—name, visual identity, narrative, personality, values, and relational promise—that a political actor deliberately projects. This study operationalizes brand identity through Modi's persona construction across three electoral cycles.
• (ii) Mediatization and disintermediation (Enli, 2017; Strömbäck, 2008): Mediatization theory posits that political actors adapt their behaviour to media logic (Altheide and Snow, 1979). Disintermediation reverses this dependency: actors build direct channels to citizens, reducing reliance on journalistic gatekeepers. Modi's Maan Ki Baat and social media presence exemplify disintermediated political communication.
• (iii) Populist communication style (Engesser et al., 2017; Hameleers, 2018): Populist communication involves an appeal to “the people” against corrupt elites and operates through simplification, emotionality, and vox populi rhetoric. The present study analyses how Modi's direct-communication programmes deploy populist stylistics to strengthen brand authenticity.
• (iv) Platform politics and micro-targeting (Kreiss and McGregor, 2018; Vaccari and Valeriani, 2021): Political actors now leverage platform affordances, including algorithmic reach, user-generated amplification, and targeted advertising, to build granular audience relationships. This dimension examines how the BJP's digital ecosystem amplified Modi's personal brand far beyond traditional broadcast.

According to Reid (1988), voting is perceived as a “psychological purchase”; often, consumers would want to opt for a comparatively less risky product. The BJP's prime ministerial candidate appealed to this public sentiment with the slogan Achhe Din Aane Wale Hai. Through the slogan, Mr. Modi built public confidence to influence voting by focusing on the marketing of ideas, attitudes, and solutions. One of the reasons the slogan Acche Din Aane Wale Hai caught the public imagination is that it reflected their sentiments.

As Harris et al. (2000) stated that political marketing can be ideological, propaganda, and rhetoric, Mr. Modi did lean on all three at some point in his campaign. His talk of nationalism, religion, and acquisitions regarding the incumbent government falls in this category. Further, he did offer an alternative policy in his bid for the prime ministership, as Schattschneider (1975) described the democratic process. His campaign seemed to concur with the established views.

However, the campaign did deviate in the media usage segment. He completely avoided giving interviews and appearing on television talk shows as a prime ministerial candidate. Perhaps nowhere in the world's democratic nations did a significant contender for the top post of the country skirt journalists. The literature has established that media messages have a high impact on voters (Lewis, 2002; O’Shaugnessy and O’Shaughnessy, 2003). Newman (1994) opined that the media is being extensively used in political marketing. O’Shaughnessy (1990) suggested that television has a greater impact. Yet, Mr. Modi has, by and large, not given interviews to the media.

Carr (2009) argued that democracy requires active public engagement, which is driven by political and media literacy. Mr. Modi, faced with hostile media that has indulged in adverse reporting, engaged with the public in his own way. He used public rallies to engage in conversation with the people rather than just address them. He used technology, oratory, language, rhetoric, and his humble background to engage with his audience. Often, these engagement methods were so novel (for instance, using hologram technology to address multiple gatherings simultaneously) that the methods themselves have become a talking point among the public, establishing a connection with Mr. Modi. This finding is in accordance with Lucarelli et al. (2021), who argued, “information technologies work as generic political products in which different topics/agendas – debated both inside the movement but also in traditional and social media geared towards voters – unfold from the interaction among members and voter-consumers.”

Needham (2006), Smith (2001), Cutlip (1994), and Kaid and Holtz-Bacha (1995) emphasized the role of the image of a leader in influencing voting decisions. It should be noted that Mr. Modi succeeded in portraying a favourable image. He has built his administrative credentials by citing the Gujarat growth example; he has established a clean image by emphasizing his severed ties with his family. He cultivated a pro-development image as a leader and connected with job-seeking youth, promising good times ahead.

Scammell (1995) and Popkin (1991) opined that the image of a leader, coupled with reputation, trustworthiness, and credibility, exerts a positive impact on voters. Mr. Modi cultivated all of these qualities through a carefully curated campaign strategy. Moreover, by projecting these attributes strongly into the public sphere, he succeeded in winning the elections twice. Also, he has ticked all the boxes in the framework proposed by Pitch et al. (2020).

5.1 Critical perspectives and alternative interpretations

While the preceding analysis demonstrates the strategic effectiveness of Modi's disintermediated communication approach in building brand equity, this section introduces critical and alternative scholarly perspectives that complicate a straightforwardly celebratory reading. A balanced assessment requires engagement with three sets of concerns: the democratic implications of media bypassing, the normative critique of populist communication, and the contested empirical claims about the actual reach and depth of direct communication channels. This study examined Modi's disintermediated political communication strategy primarily through the lens of political brand equity, and the findings confirm its effectiveness in building durable brand salience, perceived authenticity, and voter loyalty across three electoral cycles. However, effectiveness as a branding outcome is analytically distinct from desirability as a democratic practice. The same communicative mechanisms that generate brand equity, repetition without adversarial challenge, emotional resonance without deliberative engagement, parasocial intimacy without journalistic accountability also carry risks for the health of democratic institutions (Curran, 2011; McNair, 2017). This study does not adjudicate between these readings; it is a study in political marketing, not normative democratic theory. Nevertheless, future research should integrate both dimensions and examine whether the brand equity gains associated with disintermediated political communication come at measurable costs to media pluralism, political trust, and minority political inclusion.

• (a) Democratic implications of media bypassing. The normative political communication literature cautions that direct political communication, while efficient as a branding mechanism, may undermine the accountability functions that independent journalism performs in liberal democracies (McNair, 2017; Rosen, 2010). When political actors systematically bypass editorial mediation, they also bypass the adversarial questioning, fact-checking, and oppositional framing that constitute journalism's democratic watchdog role (Curran, 2011; Norris, 2000). Reporters Without Borders' successive downgrading of India's press freedom ranking, from 140th in 2014 to 159th in 2023, reflects a structural shift in the government–media relationship, which many press freedom scholars read as a consequence, at least in part, of the governing party's disintermediation strategy (Mehta, 2022; RSF, 2023). From this perspective, what this study frames as 'strategic communicative sovereignty' may simultaneously be read as a deliberate erosion of the intermediary institutions that sustain democratic deliberation. Acknowledging this tension is essential for a theoretically complete account.
• (b) The dark side of populist communication. The populist communication literature documents not only the electoral effectiveness of populist messaging but also its corrosive effects on political pluralism and minority representation. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) distinguished between the “inclusive” populism of Latin American left movements and the “exclusive” populism characteristic of right-wing movements in Europe and Asia, which constructs the “people” in ethnically or culturally bounded terms. Critics of the BJP's political communication, including Jaffrelot (2021) and Tharoor (2018), argued that the construction of a Hindu nationalist “people” in Modi's messaging functions to exclude religious minorities from the imagined community of the brand's target constituency. The affective communities constructed through populist political branding may thus simultaneously strengthen in-group solidarity and deepen intergroup polarization (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018; Hameleers, 2018). This study does not independently test this claim, but intellectual honesty requires acknowledging it as a competing interpretation of the same communicative strategies that this manuscript frames through the lens of brand equity.
• (c) Contested claims about reach and depth. A third critical perspective concerns the empirical reach and audience engagement of the direct communication programmes celebrated in this manuscript. The listenership figures of Maan Ki Baat, although government-reported as substantial, have been questioned by independent researchers, who note the limited audited data available on sustained audience engagement with the programme (Mehta, 2022). Similarly, WhatsApp-based political communication, while extensive in distribution, operates through “dark social” channels that are difficult to audit for reach, credibility impact, or persuasion effects (Bradshaw and Howard, 2019; Howard and Hussain, 2013). Social media follower counts routinely cited as evidence of political brand strength are also methodologically problematic, given documented concerns about inauthentic amplification (Pal et al., 2019; Udupa, 2019). This paper acknowledges these measurement limitations and resists conflating platform-level activity metrics with demonstrated voter attitude change, which would require survey or experimental evidence not available in a case study design.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Graciela Padilla, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain

Reviewed by: Eglée Ortega Fernández, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain

Rangga Galura Gumelar, Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa University, Indonesia

Footnotes

¹These popularity ratings have been taken from various sources. Although compiled every month, yearly ratings have been taken as indicative of the entire year. Data for 2023, 2022, and 2001 (September) are from the Morning Consult tracker. Data for 2021 (January), 2020, and 2017 are from the India Today tracker. Data for 2019 are from the Economic Times tracker. Data for 2017 are from The Times of India, and the remaining data, i.e., 2016, 2015, and 2014, are from Pew Research.

²For 2023, the Morning Consult poll surveyed 22 global leaders for the ratings, including US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Australian PM Anthony Albanese, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, among others.

³The Economist (2023). Narendra Modi is the world's most popular leader. June 2023.

⁴Rajesh Roy, Brendan Moran and Gordon Fairclough, “India's Modi Sees Unprecedented Trust with U.S., Touts New Delhi's Leadership Role,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/indias-modi-sees-unprecedented-trust-with-u-s-touts-new-delhis-leadership-role-35e151b4, 20 June 2023.

⁵Akhilesh Sharma, “Why Modi's Third Victory Is Unique Not Only in India But Also Globally”, https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/why-modis-third-victory-is-unique-not-only-in-india-but-also-globally-5847443, 8 June 2024.

⁶This technique, in particular, originated in American politics after the tired and drawn appearance of President Nixon in a televised debate caused him to lose considerable political ground in his race against the relatively young and vibrant-looking John F. Kennedy. Since then, the televisual presence and aura of a candidate have been recognized as key determinants of party success, and candidates are managed as brands to build a sense of reassurance and foster identification between the candidate and the potential voter.

⁷“Gujarat: After Naroda Gam Massacre Acquittal, Here Is How Other Gujarat Riot Cases Stand,” https://www.outlookindia.com/national/gujarat-after-naroda-gam-massacre-acquittal-here-is-how-other-gujarat-riot-cases-stand-news-280252, 21 April 2023.

⁸James Mann, “Why Narendra Modi Was Banned from the U.S.,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-narendra-modi-was-banned-from-the-u-s-1399062010, 2 May 2014.

⁹“Modi Won't Talk Godhra, Walks Out of Interview” https://countercurrents.org/thapar221007.htm, 22 October 2007.

¹⁰“Narendra Modi's Rise in India,” https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/opinion/sunday/narendra-modis-rise-in-india.html, 26 October 2013.

¹¹Uday Mahurkar, Kaushik Deka, and Jayant Sriram, “From the archives (2014) | When Modi's ‘Gujarat Model’ inspired India”, https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/from-the-archives-2014-when-modi-s-gujarat-model-inspired-india-1985266-2022-08-08, 8 August 2022.

¹²Jyoti Thottam, “Why Narendra Modi is India's Most Loved and Loathed Politician,” https://world.time.com/2012/03/16/why-narendra-modi-is-indias-most-loved-and-loathed-politician/, 16 March 2012.

¹³Sruthi Gottipati and Mike Collett-White, “Congress stumbles as opponent Modi marches on,” https://www.reuters.com/article/india-elections-congress-narendramodi-idINDEE9B800420131209, 9 December 2013.

¹⁴Shamni Pande, “The strategy and tactics behind the creation of Brand Modi,” https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/case-study/story/case-study-strategy-tactics-behind-creation-of-brand-narendra-modi-46222-2014-05-19, 8 June 2014.

¹⁵Jyoti Thottam, “Boy from the Backyard,” https://time.com/102768/narendra-modi-boy-from-the-backyard/, 26 March 2012.

¹⁶“Narendra Modi says Manmohan Singh just a night watchman,” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/narendra-modi-says-manmohan-singh-just-a-night-watchman/articleshow/18783607.cms, 4 March 2013.

¹⁷Rakesh Chandra, “The rise and rise of Narendra Modi,” https://www.indiatoday.in/featured/story/narendra-modi-modi-as-pm-bjp-gujarat-210885-2013-09-12, 14 September 2013.

¹⁸Rahul Kanwal, “Narendra Modi rocks Patna, record crowd at Hunkar rally,” https://www.indiatoday.in/india/east/story/narendra-modi-namo-hunkar-rally-patna-gandhi-maidan-bjp-bihar-politics-215673-2013-10-26, 28 October 2013.

¹⁹Rajesh Kumar Singh, “Blasts kill five at Narendra Modi's rally in Patna,” https://www.reuters.com/article/india-politics-blasts-patna-narendramodi-idINDEE99Q01Q20131027, 27 October 2013.

²⁰“Mani Shankar Aiyar: Modi will never be PM; can sell tea at AICC meet,” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/mani-shankar-aiyar-modi-will-never-be-pm-can-sell-tea-at-aicc-meet/articleshow/28934941.cms?from=mdr, 17 January 2014.

²¹“Promising the good times,” https://www.economist.com/briefing/2014/05/22/promising-the-good-times, 22 May 2014.

²²UPA report card: Nine years, nine scams, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/photo/upa-govt-9-years-9-scams-sonia-manmohan-369868-2013-05-22/4

²³Swapan Dasgupta, “To realise goals, Modi must become leader above politics,” https://web.archive.org/web/20140806211038/http://www.hindustantimes.com/comment/analysis/to-realise-goals-modi-must-become-leader-above-politics/article1-1220915.aspx, 19 May 2014.

²⁴Arun Anand, “RSS prepares for centenary year with organisational growth and outreach,” https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/rss-prepares-for-centenary-year-with-organisational-growth-and-outreach-12900667.html, 31 December 2024.

²⁵“Inside the RSS, the world's most powerful volunteer group,” https://www.economist.com/christmas-specials/2024/12/19/inside-the-rss-the-worlds-most-powerful-volunteer-group, 19 December 2024.

²⁶“Promising the good times,” https://www.economist.com/briefing/2014/05/22/promising-the-good-times, 24 May 2014.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸“What is Mann Ki Baat?,” https://www.business-standard.com/about/what-is-mann-ki-baat/

²⁹Sukriti Vats, “1 in 4 Indians listen to PM Modi's Mann Ki Baat regularly, finds IIM-Rohtak survey,” https://theprint.in/india/1-in-4-indians-listen-to-pm-modis-mann-ki-baat-regularly-finds-iim-rohtak-survey/1536822/, 24 April 2023.

³⁰Tariq Mansoor et al., “How PM Narendra Modi's ‘Mann Ki Baat’ sparked national pride and unity among citizens,” https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-pm-narendra-modis-mann-ki-baat-sparked-national-pride-and-unity-among-citizens-12536062.html, 2 May 2023.

³¹Sounak Mukhopadhyay, “PM Modi tells students, ‘Dreams change over generations at a micro-level,’” https://www.livemint.com/news/india/watch-pm-modi-interacts-with-students-in-pariksha-pe-charcha-11674801255300.html, 27 January 2023.

³²Devesh Kapur, “The Indian Prime Minister and Trump addressed a Houston rally. Who was signaling what?,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/29/prime-minister-modi-india-donald-trump-addressed-huge-houston-rally-who-was-signaling-what/, 29 September 2019.

³³Rakesh Mohan Chaturvedi and Kumar Anshuman “Chowkidar beats chor hai: Modi uses insults to his advantage,” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/lok-sabha/india/chowkidar-beats-chor-hai-modi-uses-insults-to-his-advantage/articleshow/69474044.cms, 24 May 2019.

³⁴“Main bhi Chowkidar’ was way ahead of ‘Chowkidar Chor Hai’ campaign online,” https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/nation/-main-bhi-chowkidar-was-way-ahead-of-chowkidar-chor-hai-campaign-online-780043, 29 May 2019.

³⁵Nilanjana Bhowmick, “‘How Can Modi Be Forgiven?’ India's COVID-19 Crisis May Be Turning the Middle Class Against the Prime Minister,” https://time.com/6046580/india-covid-19-middle-class-modi/, 7 May 2021.

³⁶Kabeer Shrivastava, “India's working classes bear the brunt of the Narendra Modi government's economic policies,” https://frontline.thehindu.com/economy/the-widening-gap-india-working-classes-bear-the-brunt-of-the-narendra-modi-government-economic-policies/article37256330.ece, 7 November 2021.