Quantum sovereignty and constitutional asymmetry: mapping the sovereignty gap in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic

1 Introduction

The global digital landscape is approaching a profound technological inflection point driven by the accelerating development of quantum computing. While much of the public discourse frames quantum technologies as a frontier of scientific innovation, their geopolitical implications are far more consequential. The anticipated “Q Day”—the moment when quantum algorithms will be capable of breaking widely used cryptographic standards—signals not only a technical disruption but a structural reordering of global power (Křelina, 2022). Indeed, quantum technologies are increasingly shaping the future of technological sovereignty and national competitive advantage. Estimates suggest they will contribute more than USD 1 trillion to the global economy by 2035 (The Quantum Insider, 2024). While artificial intelligence (AI) continues to dominate academic and policy discourse, the implications of quantum technologies demand immediate governmental action and proactive risk management. Knowledge gaps or misinformation about quantum computing can have detrimental consequences not only for governance but also for societal well-being, underscoring the urgency of integrating quantum readiness into national strategies. In this emerging landscape, Quantum Sovereignty becomes a foundational requirement for national security, economic stability, and the capacity of states to govern their own digital infrastructures. As Castelvecchi (2022) warns, the world is witnessing the formation of a new quantum divide, where countries lacking the capital-intensive infrastructure and specialized human capital required for quantum readiness risk falling into deeper forms of technological dependency. The World Economic Forum (WEF) similarly warns that unequal access to quantum technologies is accelerating the emergence of a global quantum divide, with profound implications for cybersecurity, defense, healthcare, finance, and industrial competitiveness. According to the Quantum Economy Blueprint (WEF, 2024), countries lacking coordinated quantum strategies will face structural vulnerabilities that limit their ability to participate in the emerging quantum economy. Although the Caribbean has not yet institutionalized a formal framework for quantum sovereignty, an emerging regional discourse is taking shape around critical infrastructure, technological dependence, and digital integration (Simmons and Davis, 2024; UNDP, 2024).

For small island states, this transition is particularly consequential. Their structural vulnerabilities—geographical isolation, fragile energy grids, exposure to climate-driven disasters, and dependence on external digital infrastructures—amplify the risks associated with quantum-enabled disruptions. Harutyunyan (2025) argues that while small states are disproportionately exposed to quantum asymmetries, they also possess the potential to leverage quantum technologies as strategic equalizers, particularly in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure optimization. Yet this potential depends on the degree to which their national innovation systems are integrated into global value chains and capable of developing specialized niches, as demonstrated by small-state examples such as Singapore, which has articulated a formal quantum strategy within the Southeast Asia quantum ecosystem (Choong et al., 2025), and Estonia, which has advanced quantum readiness through its integration into the Nordic-Estonian quantum computing infrastructure (Carugno et al., 2025). PR and the DR—two mid-tier Caribbean economies—face the quantum transition from a position of structural fragility. Their insularity, exposure to extreme weather events, and reliance on external cloud infrastructures create a geomorphology of risk that complicates their ability to adopt and govern emerging technologies. Although both jurisdictions have articulated ambitious digital transformation agendas, including PR's Departamento de Desarrollo Económico y Comercio (DDEC, 2022) Strategic Framework and the DR's Agenda Digital 2030, these initiatives remain anchored in a “Digital 2.0” paradigm that does not account for the algorithmic, cryptographic, and infrastructural demands of the quantum era. This misalignment produces what can be described as a Sovereignty Gap: a structural disconnect between national digital strategies and the requirements for quantum-enabled resilience.

The gap is further exacerbated by distinct political-economic constraints. In PR, the framework of Colonial Exclusion (Aponte-García and Orengo-Serra, 2020) continues to limit the island's capacity to define and implement autonomous technological strategies, resulting in heavy reliance on U.S.-based Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) cloud providers and federal regulatory alignment. Recent analyses, however, highlight emerging pathways beyond dependency, including alternative industrial strategies grounded in social and solidarity approaches (Fuentes-Ramírez, 2024). In contrast, the DR has begun experimenting with vertical industrial interventions—most notably through its NVIDIA Memorandum of Understanding—reflecting elements of the Innovation Policy Mix described by Gómez-Valenzuela et al., (2020). Yet despite these divergent trajectories, both territories lack the algorithmic autonomy, post-quantum cryptographic planning, and sovereign data infrastructures required to withstand quantum-enabled threats to their critical systems.

This article argues that Quantum Sovereignty must become the core of a new Strategic Industrial Policy for small island states. Building on the theoretical foundations of latecomer industrialization (Amsden, 2001), systemic resilience (Orengo-Serra, 2022, 2025), and knowledge sovereignty (Tenjo-Patiño et al., 2025), the analysis develops a conceptual framework to evaluate the positioning of PR and the DR in the face of the quantum transition. Through a comparative policy analysis grounded in documentary evidence from 2012 to 2025, the article identifies structural gaps across four dimensions—Systemic Resilience, Infrastructure and Cloud Sovereignty, Regulatory and Post-Quantum Readiness, Knowledge Sovereignty, and Implementation Friction—and examines how these gaps shape the capacity of both jurisdictions to navigate the emerging quantum geopolitical order.

By situating the Caribbean within the broader dynamics of technological power, this article contributes to the growing literature on quantum geopolitics and small-state resilience. It demonstrates that without deliberate, state-led strategies to secure algorithmic control, develop quantum-ready infrastructures, and cultivate specialized human capital, small island states will remain structurally dependent on external actors whose interests may not align with their long-term resilience. The quantum transition is not merely a technological shift; it is a redefinition of sovereignty itself. For PR and the DR, the stakes are existential.

2 Quantum Sovereignty Gap: conceptual boundaries, sovereignty distinctions, regional integration pathways, and quantum opportunities

The Quantum Sovereignty Gap (QSG) refers to the structural misalignment between a jurisdiction's constitutional authority, its digital and scientific capabilities, and the infrastructural, regulatory, and algorithmic requirements of the quantum era. This formulation builds on the WEF's Quantum Economy Blueprint (WEF, 2024), which emphasizes that quantum sovereignty depends not on owning quantum hardware, but on securing a strategic position in the quantum value chain, including access to critical infrastructures, post-quantum cryptographic standards, and specialized human capital (Choong et al., 2025; Trajtenberg, 2023; WEF, 2024). Unlike traditional measures of digital inequality, the QSG captures a deeper form of vulnerability: the inability of a territory to secure algorithmic control, post-quantum cryptographic resilience, and sovereign access to quantum-adjacent infrastructures (Li, 2025; Perrier, 2022; WEF, 2024). In this sense, the QSG is not merely a technological lag but a structural condition shaped by political status, industrial dependency, and the distribution of scientific knowledge, echoing debates on latecomer industrialization (Amsden, 2001), technological dependency (Gu, 2024), and knowledge sovereignty in small states (Tenjo-Patiño et al., 2025).

A strengthened theoretical framing requires distinguishing technological sovereignty from digital sovereignty, two concepts often conflated in policy discourse but analytically distinct. Digital sovereignty refers to a state's ability to govern its digital infrastructures, platforms, and services, ensuring that technological systems align with national regulatory frameworks and democratic values (Bellanova et al., 2022; Pohle and Thiel, 2020). Technological sovereignty, by contrast, encompasses a jurisdiction's capacity to cultivate endogenous technological capabilities, reduce dependency on external providers, and participate strategically in global value chains (Amsden, 2001; Gu, 2024; Teece, 2018). While digital sovereignty focuses on control over data flows, cybersecurity, and digital governance, technological sovereignty addresses deeper structural questions of industrial capability, scientific autonomy, and innovation systems. As Tenjo-Patiño et al. (2025) argue, small states must develop specialized niches in frontier technologies to avoid structural dependency. In the quantum context, this distinction becomes critical: quantum sovereignty requires not only digital control but the ability to secure algorithmic autonomy, post-quantum cryptographic resilience, and sovereign access to quantum-adjacent infrastructures (Li, 2025; Perrier, 2022; WEF, 2024).

2.1 Distinguishing the QSG from adjacent concepts

Clarifying the QSG also requires distinguishing it from adjacent concepts. The digital divide, as defined by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations (UN), refers to disparities in access to connectivity, devices, and basic digital services (Simmons and Davis, 2024; UNDP, 2024). Technological dependency describes reliance on external industrial ecosystems and imported technologies (Gu, 2024), while innovation gaps refer to deficits in Research & Development (R&D) capacity and institutional support for frontier technologies (Amsden, 2001; Teece, 2018). Strategic autonomy focuses on a state's ability to make independent policy decisions within global power structures (Hellmeier and von Scherenberg, 2023). Digital sovereignty, data sovereignty, and cyber sovereignty each address specific layers of control over digital infrastructures, data flows, and network governance (Bellanova et al., 2022; Couture and Toupin, 2019; Matheen et al., 2025; Pohle and Thiel, 2020). None of these frameworks fully capture the quantum-specific vulnerabilities associated with cryptographic collapse, quantum-enabled optimization, or the geopolitical concentration of quantum hardware and cloud infrastructures (Castelvecchi, 2022; Li, 2025; WEF, 2024). As Perrier (2022) argues, quantum governance must be understood as an extension of digital sovereignty into high-risk technological domains, requiring a quantum governance stack that is “responsive based on (a) the state of technology at the time; (b) resource and economic requirements for its development; and (c) assessments and estimates of the near-term and future impacts of such technology.”

Beyond the proposed PR–RD quantum corridor, quantum capability formation in the Caribbean will depend on broader regional integration mechanisms. Regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), and the Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) provide institutional platforms for shared standards, coordinated cybersecurity, and pooled scientific resources. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the UNESCO further support cross-border research ecosystems and harmonized regulatory approaches. These regional mechanisms align with the broader principles outlined in the OECD's Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2023 (OECD, 2023), which emphasizes the importance of coordinated innovation systems, international cooperation, and documentary analysis to enable transitions in times of disruption.

The Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB) Digital Transformation Cluster and the Caribbean Regional Communications Infrastructure Program (CARCIP) offer opportunities for shared cloud infrastructures, regional data governance, and coordinated post-quantum cryptography planning (Sturbin et al., 2024). These mechanisms suggest that quantum readiness in small island jurisdictions will require not only bilateral cooperation but multilateral architectures capable of distributing risk, consolidating expertise, and enabling collective access to quantum-adjacent infrastructures.

2.2 Opportunities and strategic advantages associated with quantum technologies

Quantum technologies introduce a set of opportunities that extend far beyond incremental digital transformation. They offer structural advantages in cybersecurity, critical infrastructure management, scientific innovation, and economic competitiveness. The WEF emphasizes that quantum technologies will reshape national competitiveness by enabling new capabilities in optimization, simulation, and secure communications (WEF, 2024). For small island jurisdictions, these opportunities are particularly salient because they address long-standing vulnerabilities in energy resilience, disaster response, and industrial diversification.

One of the most immediate advantages is quantum-safe cryptography, which provides protection against the anticipated collapse of classical cryptographic systems. As Li (2025) notes, quantum-resistant algorithms are essential for mitigating harvest now, decrypt later risks, ensuring long-term confidentiality for government, financial, and health data. Jurisdictions capable of adopting post-quantum cryptographic standards early will secure a strategic advantage in cybersecurity and digital governance (Perrier, 2022; WEF, 2024).

Quantum technologies also enable quantum–enhanced optimization, which can transform critical infrastructure management. This foundational opportunity is further elaborated in sector–specific contexts later in this section. Building on the foundational opportunity described earlier, quantum optimization has the potential to improve grid stability, optimize logistics networks, and enhance emergency response systems, areas where small island jurisdictions face chronic vulnerabilities due to climate exposure and fragile energy systems (Harutyunyan, 2025). For PR, quantum-enabled optimization could support grid modernization and disaster response planning, while the DR could leverage these capabilities to strengthen port logistics and supply chain resilience.

Quantum technologies offer advantages in secure communications, including Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum-safe network architectures. These capabilities enhance national security, financial stability, and the integrity of critical infrastructures (WEF, 2024). For jurisdictions with limited redundancy in communication networks, quantum-secure channels could provide resilience against cyberattacks and geopolitical disruptions. The opportunities associated with quantum technologies for PR and the DR extend beyond the narrow horizon of hardware development and instead concentrate on sectoral applications, cloud-based services, and quantum-adjacent infrastructures. In both jurisdictions, the most immediate and economically relevant quantum opportunities emerge in domains where computational complexity, security requirements, and data-intensive processes already exceed the limits of classical infrastructures.

In cybersecurity, quantum-safe cryptography and quantum key distribution offer protection against the anticipated collapse of classical encryption systems and provide secure channels for financial, governmental, and commercial data flows (Li, 2025; Martín et al., 2021; Raymer and Monroe, 2019). For PR, this aligns with Puerto Rico Innovation and Technology Service's (PRITS) cybersecurity directives (2024), which emphasize modernization of critical digital infrastructure under federal National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards. For the DR, the Oficina Gubernamental de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación's (OGTIC) exponential-technology framework and the Agenda Digital 2030 (OGTIC, 2021) prioritize secure digital transformation, making quantum-resilient communications a natural extension of existing policy commitments.

In health, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals, quantum simulation promises to accelerate molecular modeling, drug discovery, and diagnostic analytics by enabling high-fidelity representations of complex biochemical interactions (Bova et al., 2021). These capabilities support precision medicine, reduce experimental costs, and expand the range of compounds and therapeutic pathways that can be evaluated computationally. Financial services also stand to benefit from quantum optimization, which enhances risk modeling, portfolio management, and market simulation (López Chamorro, 2024).

Quantum simulation also advances applications in manufacturing and materials science, where it enables the design of novel compounds, optimization of fabrication processes, and improved predictive modeling for industrial systems (Bayerstadler et al., 2021). Beyond industrial applications, quantum sensing and simulation can support climate prediction, resource allocation, and environmental monitoring, strengthening decision-making in agriculture, meteorology, and environmental management Allende López and Da Silva, 2019; Latorre et al., 2025). For jurisdictions seeking to strengthen high-value manufacturing, scientific innovation, and long-term resilience, these capabilities provide a pathway toward competitive differentiation without requiring large-scale quantum hardware deployment.

Energy and resource management constitute another domain where quantum technologies could have transformative impact. Quantum optimization can improve grid stability, resource allocation, and the integration of distributed renewable energy systems (Korzh, 2024). In PR, where the Comité de Expertos y Asesores sobre Cambio Climático's (CEACC) climate mandates require a complete transformation of the electrical grid, quantum-enabled optimization and materials simulation could support the design of resilient smart-grid architectures and next-generation battery technologies. The DR's energy transition goals similarly align with quantum-enhanced modeling of hydrogen catalysis, renewable integration, and agricultural water management.

Additional domains such as logistics, transportation, and telecommunications also present substantial opportunities. Quantum optimization can improve port operations, maritime routing, container distribution, and supply-chain efficiency (Stupnytskyy and Vergun, 2026). Puerto Rico's role as a logistics node in the Caribbean makes quantum-enhanced routing and port management particularly relevant, while the DR's ports at Caucedo and Haina—central to its commercial and tourism economies—are already exploring quantum-adjacent optimization through initiatives linked to the Agenda Digital 2030 (OGTIC, 2021). Quantum-secure telecommunications further reinforce these opportunities by enabling resilient data flows across logistics and tourism networks.

These sectoral opportunities intersect with country-specific policy frameworks: PR's PRITS (2024), PRSTRT (2025), and CEACC climate mandates emphasize cybersecurity modernization, scientific innovation, and energy resilience, while the DR's Agenda Digital 2030, and OGTIC's exponential-technology framework prioritize logistics optimization, secure digital infrastructures, and workforce development through institutions such as Instituto Tecnológico de Las Américas (ITLA) and Ministerio de Educación de la República Dominicana (MINERD, 2025). In both jurisdictions, the most realistic pathway for quantum adoption lies in hybrid models that combine classical computing, artificial intelligence, and cloud-based quantum services, enabling early integration of optimization, simulation, and quantum-secure communications without requiring sovereign hardware. These opportunities demonstrate that quantum technologies offer not only sector-specific advantages but also structural pathways for economic diversification, resilience, and technological upgrading. They reinforce the analytical relevance of the QSG: jurisdictions capable of securing algorithmic autonomy, post-quantum cryptographic resilience, and sovereign access to quantum-adjacent infrastructures will be better positioned to harness the transformative potential of quantum technologies.

3 Literature review

3.1 Quantum governance: global foundations

Research on quantum governance has expanded significantly in recent years, reflecting growing concern about the geopolitical, infrastructural, and regulatory implications of quantum technologies. Existing scholarship examines quantum governance primarily through three lenses: the geopolitics of quantum advantage, the governance of post-quantum cryptography, and the industrial organization of quantum innovation. Studies in quantum geopolitics emphasize the concentration of quantum capabilities in a small number of technologically dominant states and corporations, raising concerns about global asymmetries in access, security, and scientific capacity (Castelvecchi, 2022; Trajtenberg, 2023). Parallel work on post-quantum cryptography highlights the urgency of transitioning to quantum-resilient standards to mitigate long-term vulnerabilities associated with strategies (Li, 2025; Raymer and Monroe, 2019). A third body of literature examines quantum industrial policy, noting that early quantum adoption is likely to occur through cloud-based services, hybrid computational models, and sector-specific applications rather than sovereign hardware development (Bayerstadler et al., 2021; MacQuarrie et al., 2020). These studies underscore that quantum governance is emerging as a multi-layered challenge involving cybersecurity, industrial capability, regulatory coordination, and infrastructural access.

3.2 Sovereignty frameworks in digital and technological governance

A related strand of scholarship examines the forms of sovereignty that structure digital and technological governance.

Digital sovereignty refers to institutional control over digital infrastructures, platforms, and public services, ensuring alignment with national regulatory frameworks and democratic values (Bellanova et al., 2022; Pohle and Thiel, 2020). Countries operationalize this concept differently: China frames digital sovereignty through centralized state control over platforms and cybersecurity architectures, while the European Union emphasizes privacy, democratic oversight, and regulatory harmonization (Pohle and Thiel, 2020). In Latin America, digital sovereignty is increasingly linked to decolonial digital governance and community-centered technological autonomy (Lehuedé, 2024).

Data sovereignty constitutes a distinct dimension focused on the ability to collect, manage, and use critical information through national platforms and institutional mechanisms. Formal ownership of data does not equate to sovereignty; instead, sovereignty requires infrastructural capacity, technical expertise, and institutional capability (Hummel et al., 2021; Matheen et al., 2025). The European Union's Gaia-X initiative exemplifies data sovereignty as cooperative infrastructure designed to reduce dependence on U.S. cloud providers (Pohle and Thiel, 2020), whereas Latin American debates emphasize data governance rooted in community rights and social value (Lehuedé, 2024).

Cyber sovereignty refers to the defensive capacity to protect networks, critical infrastructure, and operational continuity. It is grounded in the normative foundations of cybersecurity and sovereignty in international law, which emphasize state authority over digital borders and the protection of critical systems against external intrusion (Balarabe, 2025). Russia and China adopt cyber sovereignty as territorial control over national cyberspace and defensive autonomy against foreign interference, while the United States emphasizes resilience through distributed cybersecurity standards and multi-stakeholder governance.

Technological sovereignty concerns the industrial and strategic capacity to produce, maintain, and update critical technologies. It includes endogenous innovation, strategic alliances, and participation in global value chains (Brunner, 2026; Rodd, 2020). The European Union defines technological sovereignty as the ability to develop and govern critical infrastructures aligned with regional values (Lehuedé, 2024), whereas U.S. policy frames it through industrial leadership and strategic autonomy in frontier technologies (Teece, 2018). In Latin America, technological sovereignty is often conceptualized as a pathway for reducing dependency on foreign technological ecosystems and strengthening domestic innovation systems (Santaniello, 2026).

These four forms of sovereignty often overlap depending on institutional context: digital and data sovereignty intertwine in territories with limited infrastructure; digital and technological sovereignty converge in microstates with supranational integration; and cyber and data sovereignty intersect where data protection depends on network defense (Couture and Toupin, 2019).

3.3 Sovereignty in Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) navigate sovereignty under conditions of structural vulnerability, offering empirical grounding for how sovereignty manifests across diverse institutional, demographic, and infrastructural contexts.

In the Faroe Islands, digital transformation through the Estonian-derived X-Road system (Heldin) remains constrained by demographic decline, limited technical labor, linguistic requirements, and cultural resistance to digital public services (McBride, 2019). Despite achieving technical interoperability, digital sovereignty emerges as a negotiated and fragile achievement shaped by social and institutional factors rather than technological capability alone.

In Maldives, data sovereignty functions as a critical instrument for climate-vulnerable microstates. Decentralized environmental data collection networks and national platforms enable risk management and policy action, yet these capacities remain precarious due to infrastructural dependency, limited technical expertise, and rapid technological obsolescence (Matheen et al., 2025). The Maldives case illustrates how sovereignty over data requires sustained institutional capability and infrastructural resilience.

Tuvalu represents an alternative pathway. The Te Ataeao Nei/Future Now initiative reframes sovereignty in the Anthropocene by proposing a deterritorialized, digitally preserved state capable of maintaining authority, identity, and cultural continuity under existential climate loss. Virtual statehood emerges not as a technological experiment but as a strategic response grounded in Indigenous epistemologies and supported by global ICT infrastructures (Rothe et al., 2024).

Malta demonstrates how supranational integration can enable small states to overcome scale constraints. Through sustained public investment and alignment with the European Union, Malta has achieved full 5G and Very High Capacity Network coverage, highly interoperable digital public services, and a comprehensive national roadmap for digital transformation (European Commission, 2026). This model shows how microstates can consolidate digital sovereignty through regulatory coherence and infrastructural depth.

Fiji offers yet another trajectory. Engagement with China's Belt and Road Initiative illustrates how small island states can leverage strategic partnerships to access infrastructure, digital systems, and geopolitical support. These partnerships reconfigure dependency into negotiated empowerment, expanding technological capabilities while preserving room for autonomous decision-making (Rodd, 2020).

Across these cases, the literature reveals diverse but viable pathways toward digital and technological sovereignty—virtual statehood, infrastructural consolidation, and strategic alliances. None of these studies address the quantum dimension or consider how quantum technologies may reshape sovereignty, dependency, and infrastructural vulnerability in small island contexts. This absence reinforces the need for a conceptual framework capable of integrating insular structural conditions with emerging quantum technological pressures.

4 Conceptual approach and methods

4.1 Policy Gap Audit (PGA)

This article employs a conceptual analysis grounded in a qualitative Policy Gap Audit (PGA) to evaluate the alignment between national digital strategies and the infrastructural, regulatory, and knowledge demands of the quantum era. Following Bardach and Patashnik (2020), PGA provides a systematic framework for identifying discrepancies between a “Target State”—derived from global benchmarks—and the “Current State” of national implementation. To define the “Target State,” this study incorporates the nine themes and building blocks of the WEF Quantum Economy Blueprint (WEF, 2024), which provide a modular framework for assessing national quantum readiness.

The Blueprint organizes quantum readiness through qualitative building blocks and five ordinal maturity phases, ranging from discovery to full strategic implementation. Because the Blueprint does not provide quantitative metrics or scoring systems, these qualitative structures form the foundation for deriving the operational indicators used in this study. This approach is particularly suited for analyzing latecomer economies (Amsden, 2001), as it reveals capability failures (Teece, 2018) before significant capital is committed. The analysis draws on comparative evidence from successful quantum-ready ecosystems, including Singapore (Choong et al., 2025), Estonia (Carugno et al., 2025), and Israel (Trajtenberg, 2023), which appears in the WEF Blueprint as a country with significant quantum investment. These countries therefore constitute the quantum-readiness benchmarks for the PGA. In contrast, the small island cases examined in Section 3—Faroe Islands, Maldives, Tuvalu, Malta, and Fiji—serve a different analytical purpose: they illustrate diverse trajectories of digital, data, cyber, and technological sovereignty in structurally constrained jurisdictions, providing contextual depth for understanding how quantum governance would emerge in small island settings.

The WEF's Quantum Economy Blueprint (WEF, 2024) emphasizes that quantum sovereignty does not require developing sovereign quantum hardware. Instead, it requires defining a strategic position within the quantum value chain, ensuring access to critical infrastructures, and developing the regulatory and workforce capabilities necessary for quantum-ready governance. This perspective is particularly relevant for small island economies such as PR and the DR.

4.2 Documentary research strategy

The study follows a structured documentary research strategy, focusing on primary policy instruments and legislative acts published between 2012 and 2025, a range defined by the earliest foundational document (Ley 1-12) and the most recent policy and ecosystem assessments available for both jurisdictions. For the DR, the analysis examines the Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo 2030 (Ley 1-12), the Agenda Digital 2030, recent assessments of the technological ecosystem (Guridi, 2024), and the Mecanismo de Revisión Independiente (MRI) (Gabinete de Innovación, n.d.). For PR, the review includes the PRITS Government Strategy (2020), the DDEC Strategic Framework (2022), Ley 40-2024 (Gobierno de Puerto Rico, 2024), PRITS (2024), and PRSTRT (2025). A three-stage systematic search using keywords associated with Algorithmic Autonomy, Infrastructure, Regulatory Frameworks, and Knowledge Sovereignty enables the extraction of evidence distinguishing superficial innovation discourse from concrete quantum-ready intent.

Documentary analysis is a foundational method in early-stage policy gap assessments conducted by international organizations such as the UNDP, OECD, WEF, ECLAC, and UNESCO. These institutions employ documentary review to systematically evaluate formal strategies, regulatory frameworks, and institutional capacities before fieldwork is conducted, establishing an evidentiary baseline for identifying structural gaps in national digital governance and for assessing the extent to which Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic exhibit quantum-ready intent (Greene and Herakleous, 2025; Guridi, 2024; OECD, 2023; UNDP, 2024; WEF, 2024; ECLAC, 2022).

4.3 Operationalization of quantum readiness indicators

To translate the Blueprint's qualitative architecture into an evaluative framework, the study derives explicit indicators from its building blocks and maturity phases. Each of the nine Blueprint themes contains specific building blocks—such as supply-chain mapping, value-chain analysis, talent pipelines, regulatory alignment, quantum-safe cybersecurity, responsible innovation, and standardization strategies—that were converted into operational indicators for assessing national quantum readiness. The Blueprint's five ordinal maturity phases provide a qualitative progression that aligns with the scoring logic used in this study. Indicators were derived directly from the Blueprint's building blocks to ensure systematic, transparent, and reproducible assessment across both jurisdictions. The PGA employs a three-point ordinal scale (0–2) to assess readiness. A score of 0 indicates the absence of strategic intent or capability; 1 reflects partial, emerging, or fragmented development; and 2 denotes coherent, actionable, or institutionally anchored progress. This scoring system supports both a horizontal comparison between PR and the DR and a vertical assessment of internal weaknesses within each jurisdiction's Strategic Industrial Policy (SIP). The scoring rationale and documentary evidence supporting Table 1 are detailed in Supplementary Appendix B (Qualitative Evidence Audit Trail). The evaluation framework was fully defined prior to applying the scoring system, ensuring methodological coherence and preventing inversion of the analytical sequence. Future iterations of the PGA will incorporate inter-coder reliability testing to strengthen methodological robustness and reduce interpretive bias.

Table 1. Comparative Policy Gap Audit for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic across five dimensions of quantum sovereignty.

The bold values correspond to the ordinal scoring system used in the Policy Gap Audit (PGA). Their meaning is as follows: A score of 0 indicates the absence of strategic intent or capability; 1 reflects partial, emerging, or fragmented development; and 2 denotes coherent, actionable, or institutionally anchored progress. This scoring system operationalizes the comparative assessment across the five dimensions of quantum sovereignty.

4.4 Triangulation and validity strategy

Credibility and internal validity were strengthened through multi-layer triangulation: These triangulation layers provide methodological coherence and ensure that the PGA rests on a transparent, reproducible, and conceptually grounded evaluative.

• Policy Instrument Triangulation ensured consistency across national digital agendas, industrial strategies, and legislative frameworks.
• Theoretical Triangulation interpreted gaps through complementary lenses of systemic resilience, technological sovereignty, and quantum geopolitics.
• Benchmarking Triangulation validated identified failures against established quantum readiness trajectories documented in the literature.

With the evaluative framework fully defined, the next section applies the Policy Gap Audit (PGA) to examine how structural conditions shape the quantum-ready intent of Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.

5 PGA: structural conditions shaping readiness

The quantum transition exposes structural asymmetries that have long shaped the development trajectories of PR and the DR. Although both territories share geographic proximity, exposure to climate-driven shocks, and the constraints typical of small island economies, their institutional architectures, industrial policy orientations, and technological ecosystems have evolved along markedly different paths. These divergences shape their respective capacities to develop the algorithmic autonomy, infrastructural sovereignty, and knowledge ecosystems required for quantum readiness.

To evaluate these conditions, the PGA operationalizes the conceptual framework through five analytical dimensions: Systemic Resilience, Infrastructure and Cloud Sovereignty, Regulatory and Post-Quantum Readiness, Knowledge Sovereignty, and Implementation Friction and Performance. Each dimension is assessed using specific evidence markers derived from the WEF Quantum Economy Blueprint (2024), which provide measurable criteria for identifying structural gaps in quantum-ready intent. Table 2 details the Blueprint building blocks used to derive these indicators, including their definitions and alignment with each PGA dimension, while Supplementary Appendix B documents the qualitative evidence audit trail supporting every score assigned to PR and DR.

Table 2. WEF quantum economy blueprint building blocks operationalization.

The PGA evaluates the extent to which both jurisdictions exhibit quantum-ready intent across these five dimensions. The findings presented below are descriptive and evidence-based, consolidating the documentary evidence markers summarized in Supplementary Appendix B. Figure 1 presents the Quantum Readiness Polygon derived from the PGA, illustrating the relative maturity of each dimension across PR and DR. The polygon makes visible the structural pattern identified in Table 1: both territories exhibit similar baseline readiness levels, with the DR showing slightly higher maturity in infrastructure development, while PR demonstrates stronger alignment with regulatory standards. Despite these differences, neither jurisdiction has yet articulated a coherent or fully institutionalized quantum strategy, underscoring the early-stage nature of quantum-ready intent across all five dimensions.

5.1 Systemic resilience

PGA scores: PR = 1; DR = 1.

The first dimension examines whether PR and the DR demonstrate quantum-relevant capabilities for anticipating, absorbing, and recovering from disruptions to critical infrastructures. Both jurisdictions show partial development in disaster management and continuity planning; however, neither integrates quantum-enabled optimization or high-performance computational modeling into resilience strategies. PR's policy instruments emphasize continuity and recovery but lack advanced algorithmic tools for grid collapse prediction. The DR's national development framework prioritizes physical risk management but does not incorporate quantum-adjacent simulation capabilities.

5.2 Infrastructure sovereignty

PGA scores: PR = 1; DR = 2.

Transitioning to infrastructure sovereignty, the PGA reveals a marked divergence between the two jurisdictions. PR relies heavily on U.S.-based Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) cloud providers, which ensures compliance with federal cybersecurity standards but limits the development of autonomous quantum-ready nodes. In contrast, the DR's NVIDIA Memorandum of Understanding explicitly mandates the creation of Sovereign AI infrastructure and local data hosting, signaling early movement toward computational autonomy.

5.3 Regulatory readiness

PGA scores: PR = 1; DR = 1.

The third dimension assesses alignment with emerging post-quantum cryptographic standards and regulatory preparedness for “QDay.” PR's Law 40-2024 mandates NIST-standard encryption but does not define a timeline for PQC migration. The DR's National Cybersecurity Strategy (CNCS, n.d.) prioritizes cryptography but omits quantum-resistant protocols. Both jurisdictions lack a national PQC transition roadmap, representing a critical vulnerability given global store-now-decrypt-later risks.

5.4 Knowledge sovereignty

PGA scores: PR = 0; DR = 1.

Knowledge sovereignty evaluates the capacity of each jurisdiction to cultivate and retain specialized technical expertise aligned with quantum-relevant fields. PR's industrial policy remains oriented toward external funding and multinational corporate needs, with limited endogenous quantum R&D. The DR demonstrates emerging capability formation through the NVIDIA Academy and targeted training pathways, though these remain in early stages.

5.5 Implementation friction

PGA scores: PR = 1; DR = 1.

The Implementation Friction & Performance dimension captures the persistent gap between policy design and execution. It is interesting—but not surprising—to observe that PR exhibits chronic coordination failures and administrative fragmentation; discrepancies between U.S. federal legal frameworks and local Puerto Rican statutes often delay, complicate, or dilute industrial policy execution, as the literature on Puerto Rican political economy consistently suggests. These structural frictions limit PR's ability to operationalize quantum-relevant initiatives. The DR also faces bureaucratic constraints, as presented in the Mecanismo de Revisión Independiente (MRI) (Gabinete de Innovación, n.d.), yet recent digital transformation efforts demonstrate a comparatively stronger capacity for coordinated action.

PR and the DR remain in early phases of quantum-ready intent, as the PGA shows. Their partial progress across resilience, infrastructure, regulation, knowledge formation, and implementation reflects structurally divergent pathways: PR demonstrates stronger alignment with federal standards but lacks infrastructural autonomy, while the DR shows emerging sovereignty through vertical industrial interventions. Despite these differences, neither jurisdiction has articulated a coherent or fully institutionalized quantum strategy—revealing a foundational misalignment between existing digital agendas and the systemic requirements of quantum-era governance.

6 Discussion: interpreting the Quantum Sovereignty Gap (QSG)

The PGA indicates that PR and the DR enter the quantum transition with structural vulnerabilities that cannot be resolved through incremental digital reforms. Their partial progress across resilience, infrastructure, regulation, knowledge formation, and implementation reflects a deeper misalignment between existing digital transformation agendas and the systemic requirements of quantum-era governance. This pattern aligns with Paglieri et al., (2025), who show that small and mid-sized states often articulate declarative strategies without developing the institutional, infrastructural, and regulatory capacities required for quantum technological autonomy.

Interpreting these findings requires situating PR and DR within broader frameworks of quantum governance. Perrier's Quantum Governance Stack (2022) underscores that quantum technologies demand multi-level governance architectures capable of coordinating state, industrial, academic, and civil society actors. Neither PR nor DR has articulated governance instruments, stakeholder coordination mechanisms, or anticipatory regulatory structures aligned with quantum information technologies (QIT). This absence is particularly consequential for small states, which—as Harutyunyan (2025) argues—face disproportionate geopolitical exposure in emerging “quantum wars,” where computational asymmetries amplify existing structural dependencies. The PGA findings therefore indicate that PR and DR's readiness gaps are not isolated deficiencies but manifestations of a broader QSG: a multidimensional disconnect between the capabilities required for quantum resilience and the policy frameworks currently governing both territories.

At its core, the QSG reflects a condition of algorithmic dependency. Amoore (2020) demonstrates how algorithmic infrastructures mediate sovereignty by determining who can compute, simulate, and optimize at scale. Rouvroy and Berns (2013) similarly argue that algorithmic governance produces forms of “gubernamentalidad sin sujeto,” where decision-making power shifts toward opaque computational architectures. In PR and DR, this dynamic manifests through reliance on external computational infrastructures—U.S. Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) clouds in PR and multinational technology partnerships in DR—to perform the algorithmic functions underpinning their digital economies. As quantum technologies mature, this dependency becomes existential: quantum-safe cryptography, quantum-enhanced simulation, and quantum optimization require sovereign control over data, cloud architectures, and high-performance computing (HPC). It is important to clarify, however, that post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration does not require sovereign quantum infrastructure. PQC adoption depends primarily on institutional readiness, regulatory coordination, and the modernization of existing public-key infrastructures. What sovereign control does influence is the degree of autonomy with which jurisdictions can implement, govern, and secure these transitions. In this sense, algorithmic dependency does not prevent PQC migration, but it constrains the ability of PR and DR to execute it without relying on external cloud providers, foreign standards, or non-sovereign computational architectures. Without such control, PR and DR risk becoming passive recipients of quantum technologies rather than active participants in shaping their deployment.

Although PR and DR share structural constraints typical of small island economies, their sovereignty trajectories diverge significantly. PR's digital ecosystem is deeply embedded within U.S. federal architectures, producing high compliance but limited autonomy. Its reliance on FedRAMP cloud infrastructures ensures alignment with NIST, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) standards, yet externalizes algorithmic accountability—a dynamic consistent with Elish and Boyd’s (2018) analysis of “accountability gaps” in distributed computational systems. Fuentes-Ramírez (2024) further shows that externally oriented industrial architectures constrain the development of endogenous technological sovereignty in Caribbean and Latin American contexts, reinforcing dependency cycles. In contrast, the DR has begun constructing early-stage computational autonomy through vertical industrial interventions, though foundational constraints remain. As Dalporto et al., (2026) demonstrate, the country lacks semiconductor manufacturing capacity, relying instead on assembly, testing, and limited fabless design. These constraints limit the DR's ability to develop quantum-relevant hardware ecosystems, reinforcing the need for targeted capability formation rather than full-stack replication. Both trajectories illustrate how historical dependency, industrial policy orientation, and institutional architectures shape the contours of the QSG.

Knowledge asymmetries constitute one of the most consequential dimensions of the QSG. They emerge from the uneven distribution, retention, and strategic deployment of specialized scientific and technical expertise across small island economies. Figure 2¹ illustrates this divergence through the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) brain drain trajectories of Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, revealing that the Caribbean's talent leakage is no longer a single phenomenon but a dual mechanism of intellectual extraction.

Puerto Rico maintains one of the strongest STEM talent pipelines in the Caribbean, producing between 10,000 and 12,000 graduates annually (NSB and NCSES, 2024). The University of Puerto Rico—particularly its Mayagüez and Río Piedras campuses—accounts for more than 60 % of academic R&D expenditure and graduates 1,500–2,000 engineers and computer scientists per year (UPRM, 2025). Yet, as shown in Figure 2, 25–35 % of this high-skill cohort migrates annually to U.S. national laboratories, federal agencies, and deep-tech industries. This classical, physical brain drain intensifies after systemic shocks such as Hurricane María (2017–2018), when outward migration surged from 380 to 520 graduates per year (Instituto de Estadísticas de PR, 2024). Despite a temporary pandemic-related slowdown, the exodus stabilized above 600 specialized professionals annually by 2025. The result is a paradox of excellence: PR generates quantum-relevant talent but lacks the industrial absorptive capacity to retain it, reinforcing algorithmic dependency on external federal infrastructures.

In contrast, the DR exhibits a more contemporary modality—intangible or virtual brain drain. STEM programs represent only 15–18 % of total university enrollment, and the country has fewer than 100 full-time equivalent researchers per million inhabitants (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2023). Physical migration remains modest (170–350 graduates annually), yet since 2021 a permanent block of cross-border remote digital work has emerged. High-tier developers and data scientists, while physically located in Santo Domingo, are contracted exclusively by foreign multinationals (Ministerio de Educación Superior, Ciencia y Tecnología, MESCYT, n.d.). Their labor, code, and intellectual property strengthen external innovation ecosystems without contributing to domestic R&D, taxation, or intellectual-property registers. This intangible extraction mirrors the structural asymmetry of Caribbean digital economies: Puerto Rico loses bodies and infrastructure; the Dominican Republic loses value and intellectual sovereignty.

These trajectories define the Quantum Workforce Gap (QWG)—a widening divide in absorptive capacity and specialization potential. PR possesses medium-to-high quantum absorptive potential but suffers from structural talent leakage; the DR remains in an early stage of capability formation with limited high-specialization human capital. In consequence, both conditions directly constrain algorithmic autonomy, post-quantum cryptographic transitions, and participation in quantum-enabled industrial niches.

Regulatory misalignment constitutes another critical dimension of the QSG. Regulatory misalignment refers to the disconnect between existing legal frameworks and the requirements of quantum-era security. PR's Law 40-2024 mandates NIST-aligned encryption but lacks a roadmap for transitioning to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The DR's National Cybersecurity Strategy (CNCS, n.d.) recognizes the importance of cryptography, yet it does not address the adoption of quantum-resistant protocols.. Neither jurisdiction has articulated timelines, institutional coordination mechanisms, or technical requirements for PQC migration. These gaps reflect a pattern in which both jurisdictions exhibit partial alignment with classical cybersecurity frameworks but no alignment with PQC requirements. This omission is significant given global “store-now-decrypt-later” (SNDL) risks. As Křelina (2022) and Paglieri et al., (2025) show, quantum-enabled decryption poses immediate threats to national security, critical infrastructure, and financial systems.

Infrastructural vulnerability further exacerbates the QSG. Infrastructural vulnerability captures the fragility of physical and digital systems required for quantum continuity. The Digital Infrastructure Vulnerability Matrix (Figure 3) shows that PR and DR outperform other Caribbean SIDS in redundancy and connectivity, yet remain exposed to energy fragility and extreme-event disruptions. PR and DR are the only Caribbean territories with full tridiversity—redundant submarine cables, terrestrial fiber loops, and satellite gateways—as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. FLE Tri-diversity assessment for Caribbean SIDS.

Fiber diversity (F)—number and independence of submarine cable systems Land-Based Redundancy (L)—terrestrial microwave, inter-island links, domestic fiber loops Earth-Station Diversity (E)—satellite gateways, VSAT networks, GEO/MEO/LEO access Quantum Sovereignty Interpretation—ability to sustain quantum-enabled continuity. Adapted and expanded from Greene and Herakleous (2025).

However, the continuity thresholds in Table 4 reveal that neither territory meets sub-minute failover requirements for mission-critical systems. Extreme events such as Hurricanes María, Georges, and Fiona—documented in Table 5: Digital Disruption and Economic Losses—demonstrate that blackout and black-sky conditions can disable physical infrastructure for days or weeks, undermining continuity thresholds required for quantum-safe replication and QKD. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) refers to cryptographic protocols that use quantum mechanical properties to distribute encryption keys with security guarantees unattainable through classical methods. These infrastructural constraints reinforce algorithmic dependency: PR relies on U.S. federal cloud infrastructures, while the DR depends on multinational partnerships. Without sovereign computational nodes, neither territory can deploy quantum-safe protocols or leverage quantum-enhanced modeling for disaster response, energy management, or supply chain resilience. Figure 3 reveals that PR and the DR occupy comparatively stronger positions within the Caribbean SIDS landscape, particularly in terms of connectivity and network redundancy. However, both jurisdictions remain structurally exposed to energy fragility and extreme-event disruptions, which continue to undermine continuity thresholds required for quantum-safe replication and QKD. Their higher levels of fiber diversity and terrestrial redundancy do not compensate for the persistent vulnerability of power systems, nor for the prolonged restoration timelines documented in Table 5. As a result, even relatively advanced infrastructural profiles fail to meet the sub-minute failover requirements outlined in Table 4, reinforcing the broader pattern of algorithmic dependency.

Table 4. Recovery performance objectives (RTO/RPO) by service tier.

RTO/RPO levels are classified qualitatively following UNDP (2024) regional diagnostics and ISO/NIST continuity standards. “High” corresponds to mission-critical systems with sub-minute failover and multi-layer redundancy; “Moderate” reflects essential services with partial redundancy and restoration within 24–72 hours; “Low” indicates non-critical services with minimal redundancy and recovery times exceeding 72 hours. These equivalences align with the report's service-tier framework and established definitions for blackout and black-sky events. Conceptual framing for sovereign digital infrastructure and data-embassy resilience follows Greene and Herakleous (2025).

Table 5. Empirical economic losses and digital disruption from extreme events in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.

Empirical data for Table 5 were obtained from official disaster and infrastructure reports, including the U.S. Department of Energy's CESER Situation Reports (DOE, n.d.), the Federal Communications Commission's DIRS reports (FCC, 2017), the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2018) hurricane assessment, and national sources for the Dominican Republic such as the Banco Central (1998), CEPAL (1998), NOAA (2022), OCHA (2022), and ETED (2022).

The quantum transition thus represents a structural inflection point for small island states. Strategic implications include the need to adopt industrial policies that prioritize algorithmic autonomy, data sovereignty, and quantum-ready infrastructures. The OSI and GCI comparative charts (Figures 4, 5) underscore that digital maturity alone does not translate into quantum readiness, and that sovereignty gaps persist even among the region's most advanced jurisdictions. Sovereign cloud architectures, hybrid HPC nodes, and PQC roadmaps are prerequisites for resilience. Knowledge sovereignty requires cultivating specialized niches—quantum-safe cybersecurity, quantum-enhanced logistics, and software-based quantum simulation—rather than attempting full ecosystem replication. Regional consortia for PQC, shared HPC infrastructures, and coordinated regulatory frameworks could provide the scale and expertise required to navigate the quantum era.

Seen through the lens of quantum governance, these dynamics show that the QSG emerges from intertwined structural forces—algorithmic dependency, regulatory misalignment, knowledge asymmetries, and infrastructural vulnerability—that delimit the technological agency of small island jurisdictions.

7 Conclusion

The quantum transition reveals a structural tension for small jurisdictions: emerging computational paradigms will not simply deepen existing digital divides, but will redefine the distribution of technological agency itself. For PR and the DR, this tension materializes through the QSG—manifested in algorithmic dependency, regulatory misalignment, knowledge asymmetries, and infrastructural vulnerability. These conditions expose the limits of development models built around external infrastructures, foreign investment, and imported technological standards. Yet they also illuminate a set of opportunities that, if strategically mobilized, could reposition both territories within the evolving quantum landscape.

Although PR and the DR differ in constitutional status, institutional maturity, and industrial history, their trajectories converge around a shared challenge: building the foundational capabilities required to participate in quantum-enabled systems. PR benefits from alignment with U.S. federal standards and access to national research ecosystems, but this integration has not translated into autonomous infrastructure or sustained retention of advanced technical talent. The DR, meanwhile, has articulated ambitious digital strategies but continues to face implementation delays and limited absorptive capacity. In both cases, quantum readiness will depend less on formal sovereignty and more on the ability to mobilize talent, govern data, and finance resilient computational infrastructures.

Recent developments in both jurisdictions demonstrate that financing mechanisms for frontier technologies are beginning to emerge. In PR, venture capital flows from Silicon Valley have materialized through investments from Softbank and 305 Ventures, which jointly allocated approximately one million dollars to local startups Raincoat and Beauty911 (NIMB Staff, 2025) Platforms such as Parallel18, Endeavor, and the Bravo Family Foundation have expanded access to global investment networks, while founders with experience in Google and Microsoft have begun to channel technical expertise back to the island (Hartman, 2026). The trajectory of BrainHi—recognized as the first Puerto Rican startup to enter Y Combinator—illustrates how diaspora-linked networks can accelerate the maturation of local innovation ecosystems (Montalbán Ríos, 2026; NewsPR, 2026). These cases show that PR's emerging entrepreneurial ecosystem is capable of attracting external capital when credible technical teams and scalable products exist.

Beyond entrepreneurial activity, recent scientific developments also reinforce PR's capacity to participate in frontier quantum research. The Department of Physics at the UPRM hosts state-of-the-art experimental facilities, including the Quantum Materials Dynamics Laboratory, where a faculty member secured a US$1 million Army Research Office grant to investigate ultrafast control of quantum phases in superconducting materials—work with direct applications in quantum information science (CienciaPR Team, 2025). This achievement demonstrates that the island possesses not only advanced human capital but also the experimental infrastructure required for quantum-relevant research. A parallel scientific foundation is emerging in the DR. A recent national diagnostic on semiconductor physics and applied electronics outlines the country's growing academic and technological capacities, including university programs in physics and electrical engineering, early development of microelectronic laboratories, and strategic proposals for fabless design, OSAT-based manufacturing, and cleanroom infrastructure (Dalporto et al., 2026). These developments indicate that the DR is beginning to build the scientific and industrial base necessary to engage with semiconductor-driven quantum technologies. Together, these trajectories show that both jurisdictions contribute distinct but complementary scientific assets to any regional quantum initiative.

In comparative terms, quantum sovereignty would entail distinct strategic pathways for PR and the DR. For PR, sovereignty in the quantum era would center on securing access to critical infrastructures, leveraging existing scientific assets such as the Quantum Materials Dynamics Laboratory, and aligning regulatory frameworks with post-quantum cryptography to reduce dependency on external federal timelines. For the DR, quantum sovereignty would require strengthening foundational scientific and industrial capabilities, consolidating semiconductor-related initiatives, and developing regulatory and institutional mechanisms capable of supporting quantum-adjacent industries. While both jurisdictions face structural constraints, their trajectories reveal complementary strengths: PR contributes advanced research capacity and regulatory proximity to U.S. standards, whereas the DR contributes emerging industrial capabilities and a dynamic innovation ecosystem. Together, these differences illustrate that quantum sovereignty is not a uniform condition but a differentiated strategic horizon shaped by each jurisdiction's infrastructural, regulatory, and scientific baselines.

The role of the diaspora is therefore not incidental. Across both jurisdictions, professionals with experience in frontier technology firms have begun to serve as bridges between Silicon Valley and Caribbean development needs. Puerto Rican founders behind IslaIA and BrainHi, Dominican innovators leading platforms such as Glass Government Ecosystems (Gómez García, 2022), and investors connected to Thoma Bravo—whose founder Orlando Bravo has been profiled as one of the most influential Puerto Rican figures in global technology finance (Jack y Tsjeng, 2025)—illustrate how dispersed technical communities can mobilize capital, expertise, and mentorship in ways that strengthen regional technological autonomy. These networks—informal yet increasingly influential—constitute an underutilized asset for quantum capability formation. Their participation could accelerate the creation of specialized training pathways, support the deployment of secure computational infrastructure, and reduce the structural dependency that has historically constrained both territories.

Against this backdrop, the proposal for a PR–RD Quantum Corridor acquires renewed significance (Figure 6). Rather than a symbolic gesture, it represents a pragmatic governance experiment: a binational platform capable of coordinating investment, harmonizing regulatory approaches, and pooling scientific and industrial capabilities. PR's research infrastructure and diaspora-linked venture networks, combined with the DR's emerging digital industrial strategy and expanding entrepreneurial ecosystem, create complementary strengths that neither jurisdiction possesses alone. A corridor of this nature would not eliminate structural constraints, but it could provide a regional anchor for quantum-safe cybersecurity, sovereign cloud architectures, and high-performance computing nodes designed for Caribbean resilience.

Ultimately, the quantum transition is not merely a technological shift; it is a test of institutional imagination. For PR and the DR, the question is not whether they can replicate the quantum ecosystems of large economies, but whether they can mobilize their scientific communities, diasporic networks, and industrial actors to build the sovereign capabilities required to shape their own digital futures. The evidence suggests that the foundations exist. What remains is the deliberate construction of financing mechanisms, governance arrangements, and cross-border collaborations capable of transforming these foundations into durable quantum capacity. The PR–RD Quantum Corridor offers one such pathway—an opportunity for regional leadership grounded not in aspiration, but in the strategic alignment of talent, infrastructure, and collective agency.

As with any research endeavor, these findings carry theoretical, practical, and policy implications, as well as limitations that open space for future investigation.

Theoretical implications. The findings suggest that quantum readiness in small island jurisdictions cannot be understood solely through traditional models of digital development or latecomer industrialization. Instead, quantum capability formation emerges from the interaction between diasporic networks, scientific infrastructure, and policy architectures—an interplay that challenges linear assumptions about technological sovereignty and peripheral innovation.

Practical and policy implications. For policymakers, the results highlight the need to invest in secure computational infrastructure, strengthen data governance, and cultivate specialized technical talent. Blended financing models, diaspora-linked venture networks, and mission-driven funds could support quantum-safe cybersecurity, sovereign cloud architectures, and high-performance computing nodes. Regional collaboration—particularly through the PR–RD Quantum Corridor—offers a viable pathway for pooling resources and reducing structural dependency.

Limitations. As a documentary analysis, this study cannot fully capture implementation dynamics, organizational culture, informal practices, or the lived experiences of public officials and technical personnel. It may also overlook discrepancies between policy design and execution, as well as internal institutional tensions that shape real-world outcomes. For these reasons, the scoring process necessarily involves qualitative judgment, which could benefit from inter-coder reliability in future iterations. Multi-coder validation—using tools such as NVivo, ATLAS.ti, or MAXQDA—would strengthen consistency and reduce interpretive bias.

Future research. Subsequent studies should expand the PGA into a multi-method assessment. In-depth interviews with policymakers, technical experts, and industry stakeholders would provide insight into implementation challenges and institutional constraints. Focus groups could capture cross-sectoral perspectives, while surveys of technical personnel could illuminate workforce readiness and organizational capacity. These methods would complement the documentary phase and enable a more comprehensive evaluation of quantum governance readiness in small island jurisdictions.

Recent policy signals in both jurisdictions reinforce this trajectory toward regional technological agency. During the Tercera Cumbre Ministerial sobre la Ética de la Inteligencia Artificial, held in Santo Domingo in June 2026, ministers and high-level authorities from across Latin America and the Caribbean approved the Declaración de Santo Domingo and the regional Hoja de Ruta 2026–2027, reaffirming a collective commitment to ethical, responsible, and human-centered AI governance (Tercera Cumbre Ministerial, 2026). The declaration emphasizes cooperation, interoperable governance mechanisms, talent development, robust and sustainable technological infrastructure, and coordinated regulatory approaches—precisely the institutional conditions required for quantum-ready governance. In Puerto Rico, although Proyecto del Senado 769 (Senado de Puerto Rico, 2025) was ultimately vetoed for fiscal reasons, its legislative passage in the Senate signaled an emerging institutional recognition of the need for coordinated AI and digital governance. The measure outlined a unified governance architecture linking DDEC, UPR, the PRSTRT, InvestPR, and Engine 4, providing a blueprint for future policy efforts aimed at addressing the coordination failures identified in the PGA and advancing the interoperability required for regional technological sovereignty.

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Supplementary material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-dynamics/articles/10.3389/fhumd.2026.1885922/full#supplementary-material

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Footnotes

Edited by: Abdullahi Yusuf, Sokoto State University, Nigeria

Reviewed by: Geeta Sandeep Nadella, University of the Cumberlands, United States

Harutyunyan Gayane, Public Administration Academy of the Republic of Armenia, Armenia

Footnotes

¹Data points for Puerto Rico were harmonized using institutional placement archives from University of Puerto Rico Mayaguez (UPRM) alongside the American Community Survey (ACS) microdata for STEM occupations. Data points for the Dominican Republic data sources include Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC). graduate tracking registries, Ministerio de Educación Superior, Ciencia y Tecnología’s (MESCYT) Dominican Republic include the Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas de Exportación’s (CNZFE, 2025) annual BPO sector employment indexes.

²Access to this report requires a commercial subscription to The Quantum Insider.