Rethinking Germany’s energy transition: a role for nuclear power to meet climate targets and keep economic competitiveness

1 Introduction

It may be some time before Germany rejoins the group of states that make peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, a shift in thinking is underway that could reopen the debate about nuclear power and its role in a future low-carbon energy system.

Germany is undergoing a profound policy reassessment. Concerns about the erosion of prosperity and social security, driven by visible signs of deindustrialisation, have moved to the centre of political debate. Alone between 2024 and 2025, Germany lost 114,000 jobs, with the highest loss in the automobile industry at 51,000 jobs – not least because of exceptionally high energy costs by international standards (€0.3835 per kWh) (EY Deutschland, 2025; Eurostat, 2025). Although external shocks – including the wars in Ukraine and Iran and disruptions to global trade associated with U.S. tariff policies – have contributed to this development, Germany's relative loss of competitiveness compared with other advanced industrial economies has become increasingly apparent.

This situation is undermining the legitimacy of an economic and energy policy approach that, over the past two decades, has been shaped primarily by climate policy considerations. At the same time, global developments point to a renewed expansion of nuclear energy, driven by technological innovation and rising electricity demand. In an increasingly conflict-shaped geopolitical environment, nuclear energy also offers a pathway toward greater strategic autonomy: it can reduce dependence both on fossil fuel imports and on climate technologies, in which China holds an extremely dominant position.

The following paper examines Germany's shifting attitudes toward nuclear energy, global developments in the sector, and the potential role of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in addressing Germany's future energy challenges.

2 Changing attitudes in Germany

Germany has, for a long time, led the anti-nuclear movement, dating back to local initiatives in the 1970s and exacerbated by Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. Fearing accident risks, waste storage and weaponisation of nuclear technologies, Germany was home to the world’s strongest anti-nuclear movement, out of which the world’s then strongest Green Party partially arose (Moraal and Shan, 2023). In 2011, Germany became one of the first countries to decide on a nuclear phase-out, with early agreements as early as 2002 (Knopf et al., 2014, p. 2). The phase-out was achieved on 15 April 2023, when its last three reactors were shut down (Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung, 2026a).

Against today’s backdrop of Germany’s climate- and energy-political challenges, as well as global geopolitical tensions, the country’s nuclear power debate is experiencing a significant shift. At the 2026 CERAWeek in Houston, the German Economics Minister, Katherina Reiche, criticised Germany’s nuclear phase-out and stated that she is “very” supportive of returning to nuclear technologies (Meyer, 2026). The recent Nuclear Energy Summit on 10 March 2026, similarly reaffirmed the global rethinking of nuclear energy, where the German President of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, declared it a “strategic mistake” and announced 200 million Euros for new nuclear technologies (Tagesschau, 2026). These statements echo sentiments expressed by Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz 2 months prior (WeltDie, 2026). Such recognition, however, holds little weight for the near future: Merz called the mistake “irreversible”, while his coalition partner, the Social Democrats, resist a nuclear comeback (Tagesschau, 2026).

What could be more important is the lack of public or media outcry following Reiche’s, von der Leyen’s and Merz’s statements. On the contrary: within the political establishment in Berlin, important politicians, like the spokesman of Mr. Merz’ parliament group for Economic and Energy Affairs, Andreas Lenz (CDU/CSU) believes that a new generation of nuclear could be a realistic option in coming years (Kiermeier and Schäfer, 2026). The powerful Bavarian Minister President, Markus Söder, even went further, explicitly announcing that Bavaria would reengage in what he called “Nuclear 2.0” and move forward to build SMR (DIE ZEIT, 2026). A German Federal State cannot take such a decision independently, nevertheless his statement, especially in the context of Reiche’s statement, sent a strong message–immediately repudiated though by the Social Democrats (DIE ZEIT, 2026).

Also, opinion polls demonstrate that attitudes towards nuclear energy in Germany are changing. A survey by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IfD) shows a dwindling support of Germany’s nuclear phase-out, with supporters comprising 73% in 2012, down to 56% in 2021 (Nuklearforum Schweiz, 2021). This development aligns with the most recent survey by Innofact/Verivox from April 2025, which, as seen in Figure 1, shows that 55% of respondents favour a return to nuclear energy (Neubauer, 2025).

This obvious attitude change is remarkable, as there is a very limited awareness that the question is not to return to the old ‘Atommeiler’, but to a new generation of SMRs, which are decentralized, carry less risk and could become affordable (when scaled up). If SMR frontrunners in the U.S., Canada, UK, Scandinavia, China or elsewhere can soon prove that SMRs will become a business-case and produce affordable and reliable energy–this will have a strong impact on the German mindset.

3 Unprecedented future energy demand

The reignited interest in nuclear energy partly reflects the rapid increase in national and global electricity demand. This shift toward electrification is driven largely by electric vehicles, heat pumps, air-conditioning and, increasingly, data centres to power AI. The latter, which has not been understood in its whole dimension yet, has especially skyrocketed projections of future demand. The International Energy Agency (International Energy Agency, 2025) predicts that electricity consumption from data centres will double to 945 TWh by 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2026a, p.14). This 15% annual growth is four times larger than that of total electricity consumption from all other sectors (International Energy Agency, 2026b, p.63).

Germany is no exception: The Network Development Plan projects that electricity demand will reach 1000 TWh by 2037 and up to 1300 TWh by 2045 (Übertragungsnetzbetreiber, 2025, p.69). The latter 150% increase would especially occur if Germany experiences an AI-boom (Rupprecht, 2025). Taking into account data centre projects planned until 2027, electricity demand of data centres is projected to reach 34 TWh in 2030 and even 51 TWh in 2035 (McKinsey and Company, 2025, p. 30). Given these figures, a central question becomes whether Germany’s current strategy is equipped to meet this demand.

4 Discussion

4.1 Energy addition, not energy transition

In 2024, a report by the Energy Institute confirmed that fossil fuels continue to account for 87% of the global energy mix (Energy Institute, 2025, p.6). This is from the same year called “the warmest year on record” (World Meteorological Organization, 2025). Despite the remarkable speed at which renewable energy has expanded, accounting for 30% of global electricity in 2023, it has not been able to match the growth of global energy demand (Ember, 2024). We are not witnessing an energy transition, but an “energy addition” (Yergin et al., 2025). Rather than replacing fossil fuels, renewable energy sources are added to the mix.

A similar pattern is observed in Germany, which in 2024 had a 77.8% fossil-based energy mix (IEA, 2026a). Despite successfully achieving 60% renewable electricity production, Germany’s Energiewende, is stifled by its own ambitious climate targets and its narrow focus renewable energy (IEA, 2026b; Pflüger, 2024). With 23.5% of Germany’s electricity production still deriving from coal, the country has a long way to go before its planned 2038 coal phase-out, mandated by the Coal Phase-out Act (KVBG) (IEA, 2026b; Bundesnetzagentur, 2021). While the world aims for net zero emissions by 2050, Germany went a step further and committed to 2045. Part of achieving this goal is making Germany’s electricity sector 80% renewable by 2030 (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2025, p. 12). To achieve this, Germany aims to increase solar power generation from 90 GW to 215 GW, onshore wind power from 68 GW to 115 GW and offshore wind power from 9.7 GW to 30 GW (Bundesnetzagentur, 2026a; Stiftung Offshore-Windenergie, 2026). The latter will have to increase by 20.3 GW in 4 years, despite having achieved only 9.7 GW in the last 26 years since the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) (Germany, 2017). The illusion that these targets are realistic has until recently prevented any serious (re-)consideration of the role that nuclear power and other low-carbon technologies can play in meeting future electricity demand. This will change. As Germany has put its political climate targets into a legal, even constitutional framework, it has almost no other chance but to turn back to nuclear as an additional source of clean energy. It will be especially interesting to see how the Green Party will position itself in the coming years–whether it will soften the targets or accept a new role for a new generation of nuclear power.

This path of increasingly unrealistic goals has produced the opposite effect: a recent German Environment Agency (UBA) study found that that 65% of Germans, and 80% of those aged 18–22, feel umweltmüde (‘climate-fatigued’) and resent being told how to live (Gelinsky, 2026). Yet, even if these targets were achievable, the underlying problem is the assumption that renewables alone should decarbonise Germany’s electricity sector. Although renewable energy plays a critical role in Germany’s energy transition, there are three challenges for which nuclear power might offer a solution: Germany’s electricity demand is expected to significantly increase by 2045, and the attempt to cover this demand with only renewable energy will 1) leave majority of the German electricity production subject to weather patterns, 2) further strain Germany’s underdeveloped transmission grids and 3) increase dependence on China for critical components.

A key challenge is the grid bottlenecks and price spikes caused by Dunkelflauten–periods with neither sufficient sun nor wind. In such cases, national electricity demand is covered by back-up gas plants and imports–a challenge exacerbated by underdeveloped transmission grids, which hinder surplus wind energy generated in the north from reaching high-demand southern regions (Bundesnetzagentur, 2026b). These Starkwind-Starklast-Zeiten lead to bottlenecks that strain the grid and its operators. The main response has been grid-scale battery storages, which plays an important role by storing renewable energy. However, the flood of almost 10,000 connection applications for grid-scale battery storages is beyond the grid’s demand and capacity (Bundesnetzagentur, 2025).

Furthermore, German and European dependence on China for components required for solar panel and wind turbine production highlights the importance of diversifying Germany’s electricity generation. The European solar panel industry is dominated by Chinese vendors, with 70% of solar inverters, needed for any photo-voltaic system, coming from Huawei and SunGrow (European Solar Manufacturing Council, 2025). While European wind turbines remain largely locally manufactured, more than 90% of the permanent magnets critical for wind turbines are produced by China (BalticWind, 2025; Hanke, 2025). Such dependence on a single country for an energy source that is intended to cover majority of German and European electricity supply needs to be countered with true diversity of supply. Strengthening Germany’s ability to compete and make use of its own resources (even “fracking”, to exploit the country’s own gas reserves, has recently been proposed by a group of advisors to Reiche) (Tagesschau, 2026). Additionally, this will likely lead to an openness towards new technologies, including SMRs.

4.2 A global nuclear renaissance

While the German government made no mention of nuclear energy in its coalition agreement, global nuclear development is expanding rapidly. At COP28, 26 countries agreed to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2023). Overall, seven European countries, including Poland, Romania and Czech Republic, already conveyed SMR-interest (Lindinger, 2026). The interest extends to over 40 nations expanding into nuclear energy for the first time, hinting at a potential “nuclear renaissance” (Todorović, 2025; Dotson and Hochman, 2023, p.90). This recognition of the role that nuclear power can play in meeting energy demand is being matched by increasing global investment. Today, global investment in nuclear energy stands at around 65 billion USD annually, while future projections reach 150 billion USD by 2030, leaving interest in nuclear energy at the highest levels since the 1970s oil crises (IEA, 2024, p.43; p.2). Correspondingly, global nuclear capacity is expected to double by 2050, driven largely by China, which is set to overtake the U.S. and France as the largest nuclear producer by 2030 (Shifotoka, 2025). The previous frontrunners are also lagging technologically: 92% of reactors in construction since 2017 are Chinese- or Russian-designed (Climate Home News, 2025).

4.3 The role of small modular reactors (SMRs)

A central driver of this global interest is the emergence of a new generation of reactors–Small Modular Reactors. Their gradually renewed attention has been driven largely by increased AI usage and subsequent electricity demand rise from data centres. By 2050, global SMR capacity could expand to between 40 GW and 120 GW, with cumulative investment potentially rising to around USD 670 billion (IEA, 2024, p. 43). Their small land footprint, high energy-output-to-surface ratio, modular design, potential for factory-production, flexible deployment and lower cooling requirements make SMRs well-suited to integrate into energy hubs, stabilise renewable-heavy grids, produce hydrogen and replace coal-fired plants (European Commission, 2026).

Given that Germany still generates a quarter of its electricity from coal, and considering the structural challenges posed by a renewable-heavy grid, SMRs could step in as a reliable partner of renewables in the attempt to meet future electricity demand (IEA, 2026b). SMRs’ ability to dispatch carbon-free electricity to specifically targeted locations stabilises the grid by reducing dependence on long-distance transmission. Unlike solar and wind power, SMRs operate independent of weather patterns and can thereby mitigate supply volatility. Further, SMRs’ modular nature allows power supply to adaptably scale alongside data centre expansion. Major tech companies recognise the need for co-developing AI and SMRs and are investing in nuclear-backed data centres. Meta, for example, has signed three nuclear agreements in January 2026 – the same month it announced a doubling of AI spending (Hays, 2026; Meta, 2026). Among Meta’s partners is Oklo, which expressed interest in the German market, provided that “logic triumphs fear” (Soares, 2026). For Germany’s hard-to-abate sectors, micro-SMRs would be particularly beneficial, as they could offer “dedicated and reliable” clean energy supply for isolated industrial usage without grid-connection (NEA, 2025, p. 24). This convergence is also emerging in Europe, where Sweden’s Kärnfull Next is developing SMR-campuses for co-location with data centres (World Nuclear News, 2025).

Even more relevant for the German case, however, is the potential of SMRs to replace coal-fired plants and thereby cut greenhouse gas emissions and reduce air pollution. In addition to securing a just transition by creating high-paying jobs in regions that were historically dependent on coal mining, a transition to nuclear can reuse the same infrastructure, as well as cooling and environmental permits, and ultimately repurpose the grid connection (NEA, 2025). The analysis highlights the scale of this transition’s potential: by 2050, 450 GWe out of the 2.2 TWe of global coal power could be transitioned to nuclear power (NEA, 2025, p.10). The technological and system-wide advantages of SMRs can therefore uniquely address the Energiewende’s current challenges and future-proof its strategy to meet electricity demand.

Furthermore, a decisive question for the future of SMRs is financing. In Germany, initial seed funding will likely be necessary, however nuclear power should not become a permanent state responsibility. While Sweden has recently opted for a strongly state-backed financing model, with loans of nearly 20 billion euros and two-way Contracts for Difference, the U.S.’ Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) exemplifies the “initial funding” approach through its 160 million USD for “cost-shared partnerships” with industry (Kraev, 2025; U.S. Department of Energy, 2020). The success of Germany’s SMR programme would depend on how well it integrates lessons from different models seen abroad. Combining Sweden’s political commitment with the U.S.’ market-based financing could be a promising approach.

4.4 Final repository and partitioning and transmutation (P&T)

Despite these technological developments, one of the most persistent arguments against nuclear energy in Germany is the long-term management of nuclear waste, of which Germany has 17,000 tonnes currently stored in interim storages in old nuclear power plant sites (Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung, 2026b). Given the lengthy process of site selection, approval and construction, mandated by the 2017 Repository Selection Law (Standortauswahlgesetz) a permanent repository is unlikely to be operational before the 22nd century, let alone before the first interim storage license expires in 2034 (StandAG, 2017; Bundesamt für die Sicherheit der nuklearen Entsorgung, 2026a). Yet, this debate is also being reshaped by innovative solutions in the nuclear field, particularly through the process of Partitioning and Transmutation. This form of ‘nuclear waste recycling’, developed by a Swiss company TRANSMUTEX, could significantly reduce both the volume and lifetime of high-level radioactive waste. The process promises to shorten radioactive lifetimes from one million years to less than 1000 years and could cut Germany’s nuclear waste quantities by 90% (Wetzel, 2025). The potential of this innovation does not dismiss the persisting risks of nuclear waste. However, a reduction of radioactivity from geological timescales to several centuries allows humans to have greater, more predictable, agency over the management of these reposits.

4.5 Ten policy recommendations for Germany

This analysis and the following recommendations draw on the authour’s long-standing experience as a German politician and now as a senior practitioner at the intersection of government, industry and academia in European and transatlantic energy landscapes. His practical expertise is complemented by current policy statements, pre-compiled data and international case studies. Having demonstrated that Germany’s energy transition cannot rely on renewable energy alone, these recommendations arise from four interconnected imperatives: political backing of diverse energy sources; legislative reform to attract investment; working with existing institutions and industrial capacities; and future-oriented investment in research and higher-education, partly to address youth disengagement in climate issues.

• Continue to expand renewable energy sources, nevertheless with a much better coordination and a realistic build-up of grid- and storage expansion.
• Unleash all climate friendly technologies, such as clean hydrogen, biomethane, synthetic methane, RFNBOs, Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage (CCUS), fusion, geothermal power and many others.
• Revise the Atomic Energy Act (Atomgesetz) to allow research, license assessment and potential deployment of new nuclear technologies, such as SMRs. Regulatory authourities should have an avenue and established process through which they can assess new reactor designs. Part of this revision should be a formulation of a national strategy for advanced nuclear reactors.
• Retain and possibly speed-up the Coal Phase-Out to the extent that parallel baseload energies, like gas-, hydrogen power plants or SMR, serve as a secure replacement.
• Commission a National Feasibility Study, either by the Ministry for Economics (BMWE) or the Ministry of Environment (BMUKN) to evaluate how viable SMR deployment in Germany is. Partners should include grid operators, coal plant operators, data centre developers, and companies responsible for the deconstruction of Germany’s last nuclear power plants.
• Keep and enhance existing nuclear sites and capabilities in Germany: centrifuge manufacturing and uranium enrichment in Gronau (Urenco, Framatome), research reactors and institutions as in Garching, Greifswald, Karlsruhe (KIT), Rossendorf, Jülich and others. Examine the possibility to use the existing nuclear reactor in Lingen, Germany, to foster research, development and training for a new generation of nuclear power.
• Invest in nuclear sciences and engineering to strengthen nuclear expertise in Germany, both for research in SMR technologies and for the benefits that nuclear competencies produce for fusion research and defence technologies.
• Commission a third-party-validated financial analysis to compare different financing models for SMRs and assess which best suits Germany’s market design and political context.
• Support research into Partitioning and Transmutation by allowing for demonstration reactors - to openly, realistically and pragmatically address the national final repository question.
• Identify potential deployment regions by establishing cooperation between federal and state actors. Former nuclear power plants, locations in coal regions, industrial clusters and data-centre operators should receive particular attention.

5 Conclusion

Reconsidering nuclear energy offers Germany a chance to secure its energy transition and reclaim strategic autonomy in an increasingly volatile global energy arena. Though the debate has long been dominated by anti-nuclear sentiments, peaking after Chernobyl and Fukushima, the nearing climate deadlines, loss of economic competitiveness and the need for energy diversification, have positively shifted Germany’s public attitudes towards nuclear energy–a development which should be taken advantage of. Given the rising electricity demand and Germany’s dependencies on fossil imports and vulnerabilities in clean-tech supply chains, a diversified energy system, where renewables, SMRs and other low-carbon technologies complement each other, is essential. By stepping away from the opposition between renewables and nuclear, the analysis and recommendations offer a potential path for Germany to re-enter the nuclear space in a pragmatic manner.

Generative AI statement

The author(s) declared that generative AI was used in the creation of this manuscript. Visualisation of Figure 2 was generated using Claude Sonnet 4.6.

Any alternative text (alt text) provided alongside figures in this article has been generated by Frontiers with the support of artificial intelligence and reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, including review by the authors wherever possible. If you identify any issues, please contact us.

Publisher’s note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Footnotes

Edited by: Mark D. DeHart, Abilene Christian University, United States

Reviewed by: Nina Wessberg, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd., Finland

Mikołaj Oettingen, Faculty of Energy and Fuels, Poland