Salience, legitimacy and credibility of the Scientific and Technical Body to the BBNJ agreement: precedents, best practices and trade-offs

1 Introduction

The Agreement on biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement)¹, was adopted in 2023 as the third implementing agreement to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). It entered into force on 17 January 2026 and addresses four main issues: marine genetic resources, including the fair and equitable sharing of benefits; measures such as area-based management tools, including marine protected areas (MPAs); environmental impact assessments (EIAs), and capacity building and the transfer of marine technology. It also addresses a number of cross-cutting issues, establishes a funding mechanism and sets up institutional arrangements, including a Conference of the Parties and subsidiary bodies. Article 49 establishes a Scientific and Technical Body (STB), whose functions mostly related to MPAs and EIAs, and tasks the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP1) with deciding its terms of reference (ToRs) and modalities of operation.

Previous research has evaluated institutional designs of scientific advisory bodies and identified benefits, challenges and changing roles (Andresen et al., 2018; Crowley and Head, 2017; De Donà and Linke, 2023; Doubleday and Wilson, 2013; Gopinathan et al., 2018; Kennedy, 2018; Seibicke, 2025). Behdinan et al. (2018); Acosta et al. (2022); Groux et al. (2018) and Hoffman et al. (2018) conducted meta-analyses of recurrent themes on scientific advisory bodies, proposed typologies and identified determinants of their effectiveness. Hassanali et al. (2025) specifically identified precedents for the BBNJ STB based on experiences with the Legal and Technical Commission under the International Seabed Authority. The present research adds to previous work through a comparative analysis of ToRs and modalities of operation of similar advisory bodies under 12 institutions, along with interviews with experts to explore their views on those bodies' strengths and limitations. To complement previous research and to profit from experiences with a wide variety of scientific advisory bodies with several decades of operational history, we focus on bodies under non-marine institutions.

An effective science advisory body generates robust, inclusive, integrated, dynamic and timely policy relevant advice, which creates shared perceptions of salience, legitimacy, and credibility among actors and stakeholders. Such effectiveness enhances the likelihood that advice is adopted by governing bodies (e.g., CoPs) and guides activities of concerned stakeholders. However, there are trade-offs between these attributes, which are perceived with subjectively or culturally determined differences. It is therefore hard to simultaneously achieve all of them in the view of all stakeholders (Cash et al., 2002; Cash and Belloy, 2020; Hitziger et al., 2018, 2019, 2024). (Heink et al. 2015); (Gopinathan et al. 2018); (Sarkki et al. 2025) highlight trade-offs between quality, relevance and legitimacy. The present research identifies trade-offs between these concepts within ToRs, RoPs and modalities of operation of scientific advisory bodies under 12 reviewed institutions.

This analysis reviewed precedents in scientific advisory bodies under 12 intergovernmental institutions to identify institutional characteristics (ToRs, Rules of Procedures (RoPs), modalities of operation), that enable the STB to effectively fulfill its roles under the BBNJ Agreement with salient, credible, and legitimate advice. We reference language in governing documents of key precedents to inform the negotiations of the STBs ToRs and modalities of operation that are to be adopted at CoP1 in accordance with Article 49 of the BBNJ Agreement.

2 Methods

2.1 Key analytic themes for the structure and operation of scientific advisory bodies

We identified 17 analytic themes that describe key aspects of ToRs, RoPs and modalities of operation in scientific advisory bodies, based on a review of relevant literature, along with institutional experience and expertise of the author, and in consultation with experts from the Pew Charitable Trusts (Table 1).

Table 1. Analytic themes used for the present analysis, and aspects that each theme covers.

2.2 Review of ToRs and modalities of operation of relevant precedents

We selected a sample of science-policy bodies and processes under 12 non-marine institutions with a view to gaining insight from diverse precedents:

• a) Seven organizations with legal, administrative and organizational similarities to the STB (in particular, intergovernmental Conventions with a CoP, Secretariat, and one or several scientific and/or technical advisory bodies). To understand how these scientific advisory bodies are structured and operate, we analyzed each of them with regard to all themes in Table 1, using information from their respective governing documents (ToRs, RoPs, modalities of operations, or similar). Table 2 contains an overview of these seven institutions, their respective advisory bodies included in the analysis, and their key governing documents containing the backbone of assessed factual information.
• b) Five additional science-policy instruments and bodies were also considered, even though they differ from the STB in fundamental ways (e.g., as self-administered science-policy organizations, or as national, rather than international organizations). These instruments and bodies were considered without a complete analysis of their ToRs, procedures, and modalities, but in as far as specific characteristics are deemed to hold valuable complementary insight to those contained in Table 2. Table 3 contains on overview of these science-policy bodies, and key elements and references reviewed.

Table 2. Advisory bodies comprehensively reviewed under a) and their key governing documents.

All key governing documents are fully referenced in the reference section.

Table 3. Science-policy bodies, and their key elements reviewed under b).

All key sources are fully referenced in the reference section.

2.3 Identification of best practice in providing salient, credible and legitimate advice

Twelve semi-structured expert interviews (ca. 1 h each) were conducted online during January and February 2025 to understand the effectiveness of the precedents (Tables 2, 3) in formulating salient, credible, and legitimate advice (interview guide contained in Supplementary material 1). Experts were selected with a view to having deep professional exposure to these institutions, as members of their respective Secretariats, Committee members or Chairs, national focal points, or researchers. Contacts were drawn from the author's network, by snowball referrals, and through direct requests to the respective Secretariats. Key areas of experience and key roles of the 12 experts are summarized in Table 4. Findings were additionally discussed and recommendations were additionally refined in response to discussions on the present study during the side event Scientific/Technical Body: Lessons from international agreements chaired by Vanuatu during the 1^st session of the preparatory Commission of the BBNJ Agreement (PrepCom1, New York, 24 April 2025).

Table 4. Key areas of expertise and roles of interviewed experts.

Supplementary material 2 compiles information from analysis of governing documents and expert interviews on each case study as described under sections 3.1 to 3.3. Table 5 contains best practice recommendations and references to key language in governing documents of relevant precedents, to support negotiations regarding the BBNJ STB set up and operations to be defined at CoP1 in accordance with Article 49 of the BBNJ Agreement. Key findings and recommendations are summarized in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Figure 1 summarizes key steps of the applied methodology.

Table 5. Summary of recommendations and suitable precedent language for STB governing documents.

3 Results: key considerations and trade-offs related to the STB's ToRs and modalities of operation

3.1 Decision-making: voting procedures incentivize efficient formulation of timely, clear and effective advice

The STB's mandate has narrowly defined technical advisory functions that are legally required steps in multi-stage procedures mandated by the MPA and EIA sections of the Agreement. Clear, timely, and precise STB advice is crucial to ensure successful BBNJ outputs. Reviewed bodies with similar legally required functions include committees established under the European Medicines Agency (EMA), scientific advisory bodies under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), and the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP) under the Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat (Ramsar). STB mandates differ from bodies with a mandate to supply more open-ended expert assessments in wider science-policy matters, including the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) under the Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD) and Assessment Panels under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (MP).

All reviewed advisory bodies strive for consensus decision-making as defined by the United Nations, under which silence is implied as agreement, and which does not exclude minority opinions from being voiced and included in meeting reports. Explicit rules can require minority views to be transparently reflected in official meeting reports². Some bodies additionally have voting procedures for situations where consensus cannot be reached. Most reviewed bodies also have a quorum requirement for decision making. The level of quorum, and whether it applies to formal debate or only to decision making varies.

Reviewed bodies with narrowly defined technical mandates similar to the STP (less salience) tend to have optional voting (CITES, Ramsar, EMA, Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)), while those tasked with more general science-policy advice (higher salience) seem to operate on a consensus basis (MP Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP), CBD). The strictest quorums are found in bodies with optional voting. EMA Committees require 2/3 of members present for adoption of opinions, CITES Committees require 6/10 of members from 4/6 regions present to merely open debate.

A synthesis of expert interviews suggests that:

• - Consensus and voting procedures can command high legitimacy and credibility, when managed well. Both can be politicized when members do not act on the best available knowledge. Both should be able to reflect deviating minority opinions transparently, for example in meeting reports.
• - Consensus procedures, as observed in SBSTTA, tend to lead to lengthy negotiations and often unclear advice that can hamper clarity and progress—especially as follow-up steps in agreeing MPAs and EIAs under the BBNJ Agreement are legally dependent on the provision of STB advice.
• - Voting procedures, to the contrary, incentivize clarity, concision and timeliness of advice, but require strict quorums to ensure legitimacy, and to discourage reopening of debates at CoPs.
• - An option to vote does not imply that voting is regularly exercised. To the contrary, CITES and Ramsar scientific advisory bodies operate on de-facto consensus procedures, even though their RoPs do allow voting.
• - Even where not regularly applied in practice, possibility of voting in these bodies is seen as encouraging constructive and outcome-oriented negotiation strategies, and fostering clear and timely formulation of advice, as is required to fulfill the STB's functions under the BBNJ Agreement.
• - Where a CoP also operates under voting procedures, reopening of debates at CoP by individual Parties dissatisfied with advice provided by scientific advisory bodies is disincentivized if debates in scientific advisory bodies are perceived as balanced, comprehensive, conducted with high participation, and agreed by a clear majority.
• - If not fully functional from the beginning of the STB, agreeing on voting procedures in an STB running under consensus procedures could be impossible, as was observed in the case of SBSTTA.

3.2 Internal structure and organization: a member-based STB with conflict-of-interest safeguards that balances science and implementation

The reviewed scientific advisory bodies vary considerable with regard to their internal structure, the formalization and nature of their RoPs, the degree of control they have over the information and expertise they can call upon, and the availability of internal resources. Procedures for bridging perspectives, resolving conflicts, and building shared perspectives show similarities, including standard routines for repeated meetings during each intersessional cycle, provisions for temporary subsidiary bodies or working groups, and side events at the margins of official meetings, which offer informal venues for discussions or initiatives. Innovative practices that enhance legitimacy and credibility include remote participation options, including for voting members (implemented at the sessional Committee of the CMS Science Council (ScC) and EMA Committees, discussed but not regularly available in CITES Committees), and a range of procedures to ensure highest standards of transparency, credibility and legitimacy of outputs:

• - EMA requirements for Chairs to promptly respond to inquiries from any member of the general public.
• - EMA provisions for enhanced scrutiny and objectivity through optional duplicate assessments by different teams.
• - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental science-policy Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) provisions for calibrated language to indicate the strength of scientific agreement.
• - IPCC and IPBES procedures to afford outputs with differential degrees of government endorsement.
• - International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) “no-blame” procedures to differentiate factual analysis of complex causal chains from attribution of juridical or political responsibility.

Three considerations emerged from expert interviews:

• - The size and resources of the STB, and the degree to which it can control the research and information compilation on which its advice rests, are important determinants of effectiveness. Larger bodies such as IPCC, IPBES, TEAP, the International Atomic Energy Agency ((IAEA) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) have internal procedures and resources to exert considerable control over information compilation and assessment. Smaller bodies, such as CITES scientific advisory bodies, the sessional Committee of the CMS ScC, and MP's Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP) and Environmental Effects Assessment Panel (EEAP) are reliant on external resources and capacity. Transparent information compilation and analysis is key to ensure legitimacy and credibility of advice. Given the lack of strong support structures for the STB in the BBNJ agreement, substantial external resources will be required to make information and analytic capacity available to it—through a strong Secretariat, extended expert networks, and funding for external work to support its deliberations. Experience from bodies that are anticipated to be similar to the STB (CMS ScC, CITES Committees, Ramsar), suggests that such resources may need to come from a strong ecosystem of Parties, IGOs and NGOs.
• - The balance between (1) insulating the STB from political influence to safeguard its credibility, and (2) alignment with national views and policy processes in member States, is important to ensure buy-in and legitimacy, practicality and implementation of its advice. Experts emphasize that there can be not only too much political interference, but also “too much insulation,” in which a science body may lose alignment with national implementation processes and thus hamper the uptake of its advice. Balancing this trade-off depends on explicit and implicit incentives and safeguards set through governing documents and overall “corporate culture.” It is advantageous for members to possess independent scientific expertise in relevant fields, and be additionally acquainted with national implementation procedures, for example through current or previous affiliation with national implementation agencies.
• - Monetary and non-monetary interests in decisions where the STB's advice will play a significant role will be high. It is therefore important that the STB be subject to strong conflict of interest procedures, such as mandatory disclosure of financial and relational ties to relevant industries or government entities that stand to gain (or lose) as a result of STB advice.

3.3 Composition: a small member-based STB with fixed tenures and possibility of renomination

Reviewed organizations charged with compiling comprehensive “big pictures” of large topics (incl. IPCC, IPBES, MP Assessment Panels), typically lack formal members and tend be based on extensive collaboration of a wide networks of contributing authors. Committees that are mandated to provide specific advice at specific stages of decision making, similar to the STB (including CITES, CMS ScC, EMA, Ramsar) tend to have between 10 and 30 voting members, often plus alternates and with additional participation of non-voting expert and Party observers. Most, but not all scientific advisory bodies stipulate that members shall act on the basis of their expertise rather than representing national or institutional interests. Committee Chairs are mostly appointed or elected with approval of governing bodies. Typically, tenures last for two intersessional cycles, with possibility of subsequent renomination and reelection. SBSSTA is an exception to these latter aspects. Similar to CoPs, it consists of government delegates and its governing documents contain only extremely limited provisions regarding their qualifications and tenures.

Among the reviewed bodies, there is no example of a successful Committee of the Whole to address technical questions similar to those required from the STB. To the contrary, CMS ScC is the remarkable example of a smaller size expert Committee akin to those under Ramsar, CITES, and others, which has evolved from a larger body similar to a Committee of a Whole as result of a reform process. Experts have described this reform process as having addressed many shortcomings of the previous format of CMS's Science Council. Experts also consistently indicated weaknesses of SBSTTA, the closest example of a Committee of the Whole among the reviewed bodies, and consider the STB should align with smaller, member-based Committees.

3.4 Member selection: a CoP-appointed STB of party-nominated experts, with implementation experience, acting in personal capacity

Members of most scientific advisory bodies are nominated by Parties. There typically exist provisions for regional consultations in a set period before CoP meetings, and/or for consultations with the respective Secretariats. Selected candidates are then formally appointed by governing bodies. Selection criteria consistently include relevant expertise (ensures credibility of advice) and geographical balance (ensures diversity, salience and legitimacy in all regions represented in the body).

TEAP and EMA have particularly strict safeguards to ensure member's expertise. In CMS ScC, Ramsar STRP and CITES, certain Committee positions are selected with an emphasis on regional representation, and others are selected with a focus on personal expertise. The nature of required expertise is often proposed by the Secretariat (for example in form of a matrix) and agreed by governing bodies (Ramsar STRP, CMS ScC, EMA). SBSTTA consists of nationally appointed delegates and observers and does not have a member selection procedure.

Experts emphasize with reference to IPCC, CITES and other reviewed bodies, that matters related to natural sciences tend to be least controversial, whereas matters related to socio-economic and societal aspects are crucial, but can lead to protracted and more ideologically framed and politically charged discussions. Yet, examples under ICAO's Article 13 procedures regarding accident investigations illustrate the value of considering scientific and technological problems within a societal and organizational frame. It therefore seems best practice to not restrict STB membership to natural science experts only, but to include relevant social sciences, humanities and systems sciences.

3.5 Inclusiveness: a geographically balanced STB

A geographically balanced membership is at the heart of most scientific advisory bodies, and is usually accomplished by balancing representation of sometimes different definitions of geographical regions. Gender balance tends to be less solidly implemented, but can be referred to in RoPs as one consideration for member selection (Ramsar), or may be expressed in subordinate strategies and goals (CITES). The inclusion of traditional-, local-, industry- or practitioner knowledge (required for the STB through Article 49 of the BBNJ agreement) is implemented to varying degrees, for example through guidance or working groups, or potentially through representatives of indigenous people on national delegations. Among reviewed bodies, only the Committee on the status of endangered wildlife's aboriginal traditional knowledge sub-committee (COSEWIC-ATK) formally requires participation of representatives of, and experts on, traditional knowledge and communities. Some EMA Committees provide for the inclusion of stakeholder groups.

Experts concur that it is common practice and politically advantageous to organize the STB in accordance with regional groups. While inclusion of stakeholder groups among appointed Committee members has some precedent, biodiversity Conventions usually include stakeholders as observers. Unless preeminent stakeholder groups related to the STB mandates warrant a different approach, experts agree that including stakeholders as observers is a straightforward, flexible, and uncontroversial way forward.

3.6 External participation modalities: the STB as central node in an ecosystem of expert observers

Participation of observers by non-Party states, intergovernmental organizations, international and national NGOs, individual experts or expert institutions is a common practice in non-self-implementing biodiversity Conventions. In most of their scientific advisory bodies, members cannot undertake data collection, analysis and compilation as the amount and complexity of required work would exceed the capacity of the typically small expert Committees without large support infrastructures. Much of the actual implementation is instead achieved through assigned national Authorities. In addition, many NGOs have country offices and field operations that exceed the staff, resources, and expertise available to government Authorities. Outside expert information and capacity is thus crucial to biodiversity Conventions, and much Committee advice is based on information that is either volunteered by external experts or commissioned out to them. Some scientific advisory bodies outside the biodiversity realm differ from the above model. Notably, EMA Committees largely prohibit observer attendance, and its governing documents set out strict controls over all aspects of Committee proceedings concerning the highly sensitive matter of assessing and approving medicines.

Experts concur that most substantive work in scientific advisory bodies to biodiversity Conventions is contributed by outside experts and suggest that based on their field experience, these experts also contribute much of the Convention's innovative potential. As such experts also represent interests, and could benefit from opportunities to influence discussions, they should be subject to the same conflict of interest requirements that apply to STB members. In addition, wide and transparent participation is crucial to ensure a diversity of reflected perspectives that enhances transparency, credibility, legitimacy and salience of Committee advice. Various aspects of RoP's (under CITES concerning seating arrangements, document submission, speaking rights, working groups participation and uninterrupted voting procedures), are designed to safeguard unbiased and objective Committee reflections.

Advisory bodies have a variety of additional modalities to connect to external experts. These include Memorandums of understanding, consultancies, submission portals, expert working groups, or consultations. MP Panels, IPCC, IPBES and the EMA have developed dedicated modalities to assemble teams of authors and reviewers for specific reports or assessments. The SAP and EEAP under the MP afford appointed leads wide discretion to assemble author teams and to define procedures of their work. In contrast, IPCC, IPBES and EMA developed detailed standardized procedures to ensure transparency, participation, excellence and balance in author teams, and for iterative cycles of reviews.

The ToRs of the STB focus on MPA proposals and EIAs submitted by national Authorities, and on formulating criteria and guidance related to these. Similar to biodiversity Conventions, the geographic and thematic scope of the Agreement, and the commercial and industrial interests touched by it will be large, while internal resources within the BBNJ framework may be limited. As MPAs and EIAs have not been implemented on the high seas, and as activities impacting the high seas are challenging to monitor, MPAs and EIAs are likely to be contested on scientific, legal, and practical grounds. Based on precedent from all biodiversity Conventions, an STB with open and flexible observer participation and close operational partnerships with external expert institutions may be considered best practice to ensure that the STB facilitates coalitions between competent actors, enables collaboration despite competing interests and challenging external circumstances, and builds ownership and commitment among Parties that encourages compliance. To navigate the contested “waters,” high levels of transparency should be sought, while noting that EMA standards of control over all aspects of proceedings might, in the global context of the BBNJ Agreement, be desirable but not practical.

4 Discussion

This research adds to a wide body of literature on scientific advisory bodies, in particular to previous studies discussing institutional designs of scientific advisory bodies (Andresen et al., 2018; Behdinan et al., 2018; Hoffman et al., 2018; Seibicke, 2025). It adds to literature on the salience, credibility and legitimacy of science-policy processes (Bauer et al., 2016; Gopinathan et al., 2018; Heink et al., 2015; Sarkki et al., 2025), by describing precise examples of trade-offs between these concepts in specific elements of the ToRs, RoPs and modalities of operation of scientific advisory bodies under the reviewed institutions. Three trade-offs appear to be particularly relevant for the functioning of the STB, and are key questions to be resolved during the negotiations on the definition of its ToRs and modalities of operation as mandated under article 49 of the BBNJ Agreement.

A first trade-off revolves around the qualifications and independence of members of scientific advisory bodies. Purely scientific qualifications and complete independence of STB members could be seen as affording STB advice highest credibility, as reflected in Table 3 of Hassanali et al., (2025), who derive their recommended expertise of STB members purely from an assessment of academic disciplines related to the functions of the body. However, our findings suggest that this degree of credibility can come at a cost. There can as well be “too much insulation”: experts with purely scientific background may not always be best placed to ensure advice is aligned with national implementation procedures, which is required to ensure uptake of recommendations—Parties may consider such advice as less salient, legitimate (and practical), which constitutes a delicate balance for the STB. De Donà and Linke (2023) expressed this viewpoint excellently in their article titled “Close but not too close”—experiences of science-policy bridging in three international advisory organizations. Jasanoff (2013) also suggests that in “thorny areas of public policy, where certain knowledge is difficult to come by, science advisers can offer at best educated guesses and reasoned judgments, not unvarnished truth. They can help define plausible strategic choices in the light of realistic assessments of evidence; rarely can they decree the precise paths that society should follow”. The ability to identify wise options under highly uncertain circumstances as those to be expected in the context of developing MPAs and EIAs at the High Seas, requires implementation insight on top of scientific systems knowledge. The present study therefore recommends that members possess internationally recognized expertise in relevant disciplines and act in personal capacity, plus insight and experience with regional and national implementation processes for MPAs and EIAs. This combination of key qualifications may be most suitable for STB advice to be aligned with the needs of the agreement, to find Party ownership, and to effectively support regional and global BBNJ implementation.

A second trade-off relates to the role of observers (Parties, IGOs, NGOs) at Committee meetings. To ensure highest legitimacy of proceedings and credibility of advice, meetings of EMA Committees are largely closed to external observers, except upon special invitation, and subject to rigorous procedural safeguards (EMA, 2024a) According to Hassanali et al. (2025), the same is the case at the International Seabed Authority. To the contrary, meetings of scientific advisory bodies to biodiversity Conventions are routinely open to observers. At CITES scientific advisory body meetings, observer Party, IGO and NGO participants routinely exceed the number of Committee members 20–40 fold, and they tend to have the most direct experience and largest presence in implementation activities. Committee proceedings often depend on their crucial information, networks and capacities. This is why experts widely commend observer contributions, which, increases the salience and buy-in of scientific advice and, in turn, leads to recommendations being more likely to be adopted by COPs. Differentiated roles, functions and status afforded to observers, particularly those in CITES Committee RoPs (CITES, 2018a,b), are a source of dissatisfaction to observer organizations, given their undisputed contributions to Committee proceedings and to the implementation of the Convention. However, these procedural differences serve to ensure legitimacy and ownership of procedures by Parties—to avoid the appearance that outcomes are driven by non-governmental interests. As CITES is legally binding, with compliance procedures at State level and individual violations of national implementing laws being subject to enforcement procedures (Heid and Márquez-Ramos, 2023; Vasquez, 2003), government ownership, the ability to implement outcomes smoothly, and collective willingness to abide by compliance procedures are of particular importance and constitute highly valuable intangible capital of this Convention. This view of a Committee as central node in an ecosystem of differentiated observers also aligns with findings that some scientific advisory bodies are increasingly taking the role of boundary organizations by engaging with a range of perspectives across broad policy domains, and by harnessing not only scientific knowledge but also lay knowledge and explicitly value-laden perspectives (Crowley and Head, 2017). Considering the similarity of the STB and biodiversity Conventions in terms of their mandates and institutional context, findings suggest that modalities of observer participation aligned with other biodiversity Conventions may well enhance the salience and credibility of STB advice.

The third key trade-off relates related to voting procedures in the STB. It triggered lively discussions during the side event on Scientific/Technical Body: Lessons from international agreements in the framework of the 1^st session of the preparatory Commission of the BBNJ Agreement (PrepCom1, New York, 24 April 2025). In particular, delegates considered whether decision making by vote would render STB recommendations less legitimate, credible, contested and thus vulnerable to reopening STB debates in governing bodies. Based on the reviewed precedents, in particular CITES and CMS scientific advisory bodies, and in line with observations by Hassanali et al. (2025), decision making that strives for consensus, but allows voting where consensus cannot be reached, enables constructive negotiations that lead to clear, concise and timely advice. Where only consensus procedures are provided for, minority views or negotiation strategies can block consensus, cause delays, require resumed sessions, or result in complex, lengthy, and ambiguous advice that aims to fully encompass all views. In contrast, findings suggest that voting options incentivize delegates to aim for compromise outputs that reflect their views to satisfactory degrees, which in turn only rarely requires decisions taken by vote among the reviewed scientific advisory bodies. A need to ensure legitimacy of outputs taken by vote may require a high quorum, and include an option to challenge agreed recommendation in governing bodies. However, where scientific discussions are perceived to be thorough, balanced and inclusive, where minority views or critics are appropriately reflected in meeting reports (or as in the case of EMA, even through parallel assessments by a second assessment team), and where governing bodies are also able to take decisions by majority vote, experience suggests that lengthy discussions of scientific advice in governing bodies are disincentivized and rare, and the credibility, legitimacy and salience of adopted advice is high. These recommendations align with Hulme (2013), who suggests that consensus is not required to carry authority, which can instead be achieved by agreed procedure, respect for dissent and acceptance of outcomes. In the words of Dan Sarewitz as quoted by Hulme:

“Science would provide better value to politics if it articulated the broadest set of plausible interpretations, options and perspectives, imagined by the best experts, rather than forcing convergence to an allegedly unified voice”.

5 Conclusion

Our analysis of precedents relevant to the STB's institutional design and procedures is based on governing documents of scientific advisory bodies under 12 intergovernmental institutions, and experience with their practical functioning and effectiveness documented in 12 expert interviews. The analysis of precedents gains relevance through its evaluation of not only the specific language of various bodies' ToRs and modalities, but also through access to decades of professional inside experience regarding the practical functioning and the effectiveness of those ToRs and modalities and the provided scientific advice. Specific recommendations for all analytic themes along with references to key language in governing documents could inform negotiations of STB ToRs and modalities of operation that are to be decided at CoP1.

We highlight key trade-offs and best practice to foster the salience, credibility, and legitimacy of the STB's advice. Key trade-offs illustrate that the perception of salience, credibility and legitimacy is subjective and context-dependent. More importantly, even minor or subtle formulations in governing documents determine how the these trade-offs are resolved, at times with great relevance for the operational functioning and effectiveness of scientific advisory bodies. The analysis converges toward a concise vision of an effective STB:

• 1) A small expert body of 10–30 regionally nominated members with scientific training and experience in implementation procedures for marine MPAs and EIAs, participating in their personal capacity and subject to strong safeguards against conflicts of interest. Tenure periods should enable members to grow into their roles and to mentor younger peers. Among the reviewed bodies, there is no example of a successful Committee of the Whole (CoW) to address technical questions similar to those required from the STB.
• 2) Decision making procedures should enable efficient formulation of effective advice, while striving for consensus and reflecting all views. Voting procedures enhance the clarity, concision and timeliness of scientific advice, as they incentivize compromise in building consensus–which is why scientific advisory bodies rarely need to exercise them. Where deliberations are science-based, balanced, inclusive, transparent, and agreed by a clear majority, and where governing bodies also operate with voting procedures, most scientific advice is respected by CoPs.
• 3) Openness of proceedings to Parties and non-government expert institutions with speaking rights (observers) harnesses external capacity, information and perspectives required to fulfill the STB's mandate. Information compilation, analysis and presentation of information by observers should follow scientifically robust, transparent, and multilaterally agreed methods.

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Supplementary material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/focsu.2026.1837491/full#supplementary-material

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Footnotes

Edited by: Sebastian Christoph Alexander Ferse, IPB University, Indonesia

Reviewed by: Marcus Polette, Universidade do Vale do Itajaí, Brazil

Jinlong Feng, Xiamen University, China

Footnotes

Its official title is Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond national jurisdiction.

Reservations are not required under consensus procedures and the governing documents of most scientific advisory bodies do not provide for them given the generally non-binding nature of their agenda items.