Friends in deed? How connections with corruption perpetrators shape whistleblowing intentions and corruption tolerance in group members

Corruption control in collectivist contexts with strong social ties is challenging, as ingroup loyalty can suppress whistleblowing and increase tolerance for misconduct. Yet, empirical evidence on how information about social affiliation affects these behaviors is limited. This study addressed this gap using an experimental vignette design to examine how social affiliation with perpetrators influences whistleblowing intentions and tolerance for corruption. A sample of 384 respondents (227 females, 157 males; mean age = 31.17 years) completed measures of these constructs. Results showed that whistleblowing intentions declined significantly when group members tacitly supported corruption. Participants exposed to perpetrators portrayed as rivals reported the highest intentions to whistleblow, whereas those with strong social affiliations exhibited greater tolerance for corruption. These findings underscore the role of group dynamics in shaping ethical behavior. Accordingly, organizations should implement diversity and inclusion policies, alongside targeted training, to help employees navigate group-based moral dilemmas and strengthen collective resistance to corruption.

Whistleblowing and intolerance of corruption have been recognized as effective anti-corruption tools (Ogungbamila et al., 2024) because they enhance the detection, investigation, prosecution, and prevention of workplace corruption (Pillay et al., 2015). This may be because whistleblowers play pivotal roles in uncovering corruption, reducing financial loss, and restoring integrity in the workplace (Iwai et al., 2021). Consequently, whistleblowing and intolerance of corruption may indirectly encourage transparent, prudent, and accountable management of resources and work-related opportunities, fostering individual and organizational development (Transparency International, 2010). Hence, there has been renewed research interest in identifying factors that foster whistleblowing on the one hand, and in identifying aggregate variables that may reduce tolerance for corruption and discourage employees from disclosing wrongdoing in the workplace, on the other. However, most research appears to focus on predictors of whistleblowing and corruption tolerance at the individual level, with little attention to how social affiliation with a group may directly or indirectly coerce individual members to give tacit approval to or report corruption in the workplace. Identifying additional psychological factors underlying whistleblowing and corruption tolerance in group settings has implications for formulating policies that may promote whistleblowing and reduce corruption tolerance, especially in collectivistic societies, where the soft dictates and informational atmosphere of social or work groups may shape employees' tolerance for or intentions to report acts of corruption (Asawo and Blue-Jack, 2016).

This study recognizes that corruption, regardless of its form, undermines the rule of law and justice, erodes public trust, and hampers economic activity and the fair distribution of resources. These effects ultimately threaten the wellbeing of the organization, its members, and the broader community. All forms of corruption—including bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, extortion, kickbacks, money laundering, fraud, and conflicts of interest—are relevant, whether petty, grand, or systemic. However, the focus here is primarily on workplace corruption, which involves dishonest acts within the organization committed by its members or in collusion with outsiders. Whistleblowing is categorized as internal or external, based on the reporting channel used. Organizations may regulate whistleblowing by requiring reports to be directed to authorities rather than external bodies or by encouraging anonymous reporting to protect whistleblowers. These individuals can be classified as advocates for the public, retail whistleblowers for customers, or corporate whistleblowers for the organization. Although the study addresses all whistleblowing processes, its main focus is on employees reporting workplace corruption through different channels.

The current study examines workplace corruption and whistleblowing among group members in Nigeria. Research indicates that corruption is widespread in Nigeria's public and private sectors, with bribery, fraud, and favoritism weakening institutions and public confidence (Olabimitan, 2025; Aruoren and Oboreh, 2020). Despite the 2016 whistleblowing policy, employees remain hesitant to report misconduct because of fears of retaliation, ostracism, and transfers, compounded by the lack of specific legal protections for whistleblowers (Taiwo, 2015; Eyongndi and Opara, 2022; Akinkugbe, 2018; Ayamba, 2019). Employees' tolerance of corruption is linked to lower whistleblowing intentions, but moral intelligence and life satisfaction can mitigate this tolerance (Ogungbamila et al., 2024; Ogungbamila and Ajayi, 2024). Beyond morality, informal social networks and group cohesion also influence reporting behavior. Studies show that people are less likely to blow the whistle when the offender is a group member, as loyalty and concern for the group's reputation discourage reporting (Akinkugbe, 2018; Bergemann and Aven, 2023). Cultural norms that view whistleblowing as betrayal further reinforce silence, especially in close-knit groups where misconduct is tolerated to protect group harmony (Clemente et al., 2024; Bergemann and Aven, 2023; Vian et al., 2022). These social dynamics reveal that ties to perpetrators function as “friends,” not morally, but by shielding them from accountability and promoting tolerance of corruption within groups (Olabimitan, 2025; Bergemann and Aven, 2023).

This study examined how altering information about a group's social ties to corruption perpetrators affects members' willingness to report corruption and their tolerance for it. Demonstrating that social ties to corrupt individuals can motivate either disclosure or acceptance of misconduct may help improve strategies for managing corruption-related information and encourage anti-corruption activism. The findings could deepen understanding of how group membership shapes whistleblowing and corruption tolerance, especially in organizations and societies where social bonds strongly influence judgments and anti-corruption efforts. Although rooted in industrial and organizational psychology, the results are relevant across social psychology, business ethics, organizational behavior, and corruption research. Unlike most studies that assume responses depend on the act itself, this research suggests that decisions about corruption are shaped by who commits the act and by the relationship between the actor and the individual. Therefore, tolerance and whistleblowing are influenced not only by morality but also by social identity, loyalty, solidarity, and the perceived repercussions of exposing someone with whom one has a social connection. These insights are valuable for managers, leaders, policymakers, compliance officers, anti-corruption agencies, researchers, trainers, and employees across both public and private sectors.

Literature review and hypotheses

Turner et al.'s (1979) social identity theory (SIT) aligns well with this study because it explains whistleblowing and corruption tolerance as behaviors intrinsically linked to group membership. While organizational research has traditionally emphasized individual and structural factors in these issues, it often overlooks the influence of group memberships and social identities—gaps that SIT uniquely addresses (Anvari et al., 2019). According to SIT, a person's self-concept, reflected in thoughts and actions, is shaped as much by internalized group affiliations as by personal traits (Anvari et al., 2019). This means that the choice to report or condone ingroup misconduct is closely tied to loyalty, belonging, and identification with the group. Outgroups, especially rivals, are more likely to face discrimination and punishment (Turner et al., 1979). For instance, Chen and Li (2009) found that social ties foster prosocial and altruistic behaviors and reduce punishment for misbehavior. Zheng et al. (2021) also demonstrated that social ties increase favoritism in experiments. Thus, social identity and ties with perpetrators can influence group members' intentions to blow the whistle or tolerate corruption. Nieuwenboer and Kaptein (2008) argued that social identity may reinforce corruption and inhibit whistleblowing by initiating social spirals that establish norms supporting corrupt practices, pressuring members to conform, and creating opportunities for corruption. These spirals, driven by social influence, can amplify corruption by encouraging group support, especially when reinforced by ingroup loyalty and outgroup rivalry (Cubel et al., 2022). Bergemann (2024) noted that social influence from group members can exert both direct and indirect pressures, thereby affecting whether individuals choose to report or tolerate corrupt practices.

Social identity and whistleblowing

Whistleblowing, a key counter to corruption, involves revealing illegal or unethical activities to relevant individuals or authorities inside or outside the organization to instigate change (Near and Miceli, 1985). Its antecedents are broadly divided into personal and environmental factors (Pillay et al., 2015). Personal traits linked to whistleblowing include age, gender, education (Cassematis and Wortley, 2013; Ogungbamila et al., 2024), personality (Culiberg and Mihelic, 2017), moral intelligence (Ogungbamila and Ajayi, 2024), and overall life orientation (Park et al., 2014), which influence individuals' willingness to report misconduct. Environmental factors encompass the wider social, structural, and policy contexts affecting whistleblowing, such as organizational responses to corruption (Ellemers et al., 2025), national corruption culture (Obschonka et al., 2023), fear of retaliation (Near and Miceli, 1986), and whistleblower protection laws (Stubbs and Tong, 2026), which can either encourage or deter reporting. Both personal and situational factors act as barriers or motivators for whistleblowing. Despite numerous studies on individual whistleblowing intentions, there is a notable lack of tools measuring these intentions among members of groups. Few research efforts have explored how social identity influences such intentions within group settings. To address this gap, the current study introduced the Group Member Whistleblowing Intentions Scale (GMWIS) to assess how group members' willingness to report workplace corruption aligns with perceived social expectations.

While studies have generally supported the individual and the combined influence of personal and situational factors in whistleblowing, there is strong empirical evidence of the overriding importance of situational variables over personal factors on whistleblowing (Cassematis and Wortley, 2013; Iwai et al., 2021). Therefore, social identity and group loyalty may downplay individuals' personal dispositions, create a moral dilemma (either by choosing to be loyal to and protect the ingroup or reporting and punishing the outgroup) in a whistleblowing situation, and affect the general anti-corruption ecosystem (Waytz et al., 2013). This is because information that highlights the social affiliation, or otherwise, with the perpetrators of a corrupt act could change the intentions of group members to report or tolerate corruption, especially where organizational and national cultures promote collectivism rather than individualism (Connelly and Ones, 2008; Obschonka et al., 2023).

Based on social identity, collectivistic drives (Kvidal, 2022) and group loyalty (Anvari et al., 2019; Hildreth et al., 2016) may, therefore, frustrate whistleblowing intentions and increase group members' tolerance of corruption, especially in multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria (Martini, 2014), where corruption-related decisions and actions may be driven more by social affiliation and the need to protect the ingroup than by the facts of the case (Smith, 2001). However, information that emphasizes social rivalry may encourage whistleblowing against perpetrators who are members of an outgroup (Waytz et al., 2013). In a series of experiments, Rullo et al. (2023) found that when the perpetrators of corruption shared a different national identity with the participants (an outgroup situation), the rates of direct and indirect whistleblowing were higher than when the perpetrators shared the same national identity with the participants (an ingroup situation), especially when the participants had no opportunity to engage in corruption. Consequently, it was hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 1: Members of the group whose perpetrators of corruption belong to a rival group will report significantly higher whistleblowing intentions than individuals in the other groups.

Social identity and corruption tolerance

Corruption tolerance seems to occupy the opposite end of the corruption spectrum. Pozsgai-Alvarez (2022) defined corruption tolerance as employees' moral approval of wrongdoing, irrespective of the magnitude of the corrupt act and the latitude enjoyed by the perpetrators in a particular situation. Corruption tolerance may therefore slow whistleblowing and frustrate other anti-corruption efforts. Recently, corruption tolerance has attracted considerable research attention. For example, personal factors such as age, gender, and educational qualifications have been associated with the extent to which employees tacitly approve corrupt behavior (Ogungbamila et al., 2024). Studies exploring the psychological factors underlying corruption tolerance have identified morality (Ogungbamila and Ajayi, 2024) and fear of punishment (Ogungbamila et al., 2024) as psychological predictors of corruption tolerance.

Most of these studies focus on predictors of corruption tolerance at the individual level. Less research has explored what motivates people to condone or support corruption when loyalty to an ingroup or punishment of an outgroup comes into play. Understanding group influences on corruption tolerance is crucial because individuals often face a dilemma between being fair to all or favoring their ingroup due to social ties or loyalty (Iwai et al., 2021; Waytz et al., 2013). This suggests that intolerance of corruption can signify justice and fairness, supporting anti-corruption efforts for the common good. Conversely, it can also signal betrayal and weaken group loyalty in cases where the ingroup is involved (Dungan et al., 2015). Research indicates that loyalty to the ingroup increases corruption, while fairness promotes intolerance of corruption (Hildreth et al., 2016; Porkess, 2011; Waytz et al., 2013). However, Hafid et al. (2025) proposed that social detachment might heighten personal gain concerns, diminish moral obligations, and foster corruption. High morality is linked to lower corruption tolerance (Ogungbamila and Ajayi, 2024), implying that morality may dissuade group members from supporting corrupt acts within their group. Nevertheless, Haynes and Rašković (2021) found that social identity enables individuals to detach from moral codes that oppose corruption, especially when their social identity is limited (Pisor and Gurven, 2015).

This may not hold in corruption-prevalent societies, especially when individuals attribute their social and economic deprivations to corruption. In such cases, group identity or loyalty may not pressure individuals to tolerate corruption. Aurelia et al. (2025), in two experiments comparing Indonesia (a high-corruption-prevalent country) and the Netherlands (a low-corruption-prevalent country), found that Indonesians were less permissive, more angered by, and more disappointed by corrupt acts than their Dutch counterparts. This implies that individuals tend to permit corruption when it promotes the interests of the group and its members, rather than when they see corruption as responsible for the ingroup's individual and collective socioeconomic challenges. In fact, based on the results of a 3-in-1 study, Neville et al. (2025) reported that individuals were more likely to support and tolerate corrupt behaviors that serve the interests of an organization or a group they identify with. Other studies that adopted an indirect approach to studying corruption using vignettes reported that social ties or identity increased tolerance for corruption (Zheng et al., 2021). By extension, individuals may become more intolerant of corruption perpetrated by members of an outgroup than by members of an ingroup because of rivalry and competition. It was, therefore, expected that:

Hypothesis 2: Individuals in the group that has a strong social identity with the perpetrators of corruption will report the highest level of tolerance for corruption compared with those in other groups.

Design and participants

This study employed a fully randomized, multiple-group experimental vignette design. The independent variable was the type of information regarding participants' social affiliation with the perpetrators, categorized into four conditions: (A) no information on social affiliation (control), (B) perpetrators had no social affiliation with the group, (C) perpetrators were rivals of the group, and (D) perpetrators had a strong social affiliation with the group. The dependent variables were participants' total scores on measures of group members' whistleblowing intentions and corruption tolerance.

Participants were 384 employees (227, or 59.1%, female; 157, or 40.9%, male) who enrolled in weekend part-time programs at a public university in Nigeria. Their ages ranged from 21 to 56 years (M age = 31.17 years; SD age = 6.74).

Material

Four versions of a vignette on financial fraud perpetrated by a group of individuals in an organization were developed. The respondents, who were a group of employees in the organization, detected the financial fraud during a routine check. The vignette highlighted how disclosure of the fraud would benefit employees and the organization. It was also indicated in the vignette that the organization provided necessary logistics and gave employees legal and institutional protections for reporting fraud. All versions of the vignette had the same basic information. The vignette, however, varied based on information that highlighted the type of social affiliation the detectors had with the perpetrators of the fraud. The participants were instructed to vividly imagine themselves in the situation described in the story assigned to their group and respond honestly to items on the questionnaire. Here are the 4 versions of the vignette.

Scenario A: no information on social affiliation with the perpetrators

While conducting a routine financial review of an organization, your group uncovered a major financial fraud involving several million naira. Using the available evidence, processes, and channels within and outside the organization to ensure that those involved in the fraud return the stolen money and are reported would save the organization from bankruptcy, enable it to pay the salaries for the 10 months it owed its employees, keep many employees employed, and expand the organization's operations. The organization specifically encourages and provides the necessary legal and institutional protection for those who report corruption.

Scenario B: group members have no social affiliation with the perpetrators

While conducting a routine financial review of an organization, your group uncovered a major financial fraud involving several million naira. Using the available evidence, processes, and channels within and outside the organization to ensure that those involved in the fraud return the stolen money and are reported would save the organization from bankruptcy, enable it to pay the salaries for the 10 months it owed its employees, keep many employees employed, and expand the organization's operations. The organization specifically encourages and provides the necessary legal and institutional protection for those who report corruption. From the grapevine, your group learned that those involved in the financial fraud have no social affiliation with your group.

Scenario C: the perpetrators belong to a rival group

While conducting a routine financial review of an organization, your group uncovered a major financial fraud involving several million naira. Using the available evidence, processes, and channels within and outside the organization to ensure that those involved in the fraud return the stolen money and are reported would save the organization from bankruptcy, enable it to pay the salaries for the 10 months it owed its employees, keep many employees employed, and expand the organization's operations. The organization specifically encourages and provides the necessary legal and institutional protection for those who report corruption. From the grapevine, your group learned that those involved in the fraud are a rival of your group.

Scenario D: group members have strong social affiliation with the perpetrators

While conducting a routine financial review of an organization, your group uncovered a major financial fraud involving several million naira. Using the available evidence, processes, and channels within and outside the organization to ensure that those involved in the fraud return the stolen money and are reported would save the organization from bankruptcy, enable it to pay the salaries for the 10 months it owed its employees, keep many employees employed, and expand the organization's operations. The organization specifically encourages and provides the necessary legal and institutional protection for those who report corruption. From the grapevine, your group learned that those involved in the fraud had strong social ties to your group.

Measures

Group members' whistleblowing intentions were evaluated with the Group Member Whistleblowing Intentions Scale (GMWIS). It was developed to measure group members' proclivity to disclose workplace corruption in accordance with the group's perceived social expectations.

Development and validation of the group member whistleblowing intentions scale

To generate items for GMWIS, 5 employees (3 from the public sector; 2 from the private sector) were recruited. The primary inclusion criterion was that the individual had been part of a group that witnessed, detected, or reported at least one instance of unethical behavior, including corruption, in their workplace within the past 6 months. Participants were asked to state, in three sentences, how they reacted to such unethical behavior or corruption as a member of the group. Because the instrument was designed to measure group members' whistleblowing intentions in response to a hypothetical corruption situation, the tense of the 15 sentences was changed from past to future. The 15 sentences were reviewed by four subject-matter experts. To pass the face validity test and be included in the preliminary scale, a sentence had to be judged by at least 3 of the 4 experts as reflecting group-related whistleblowing activity. Of the 15 sentences, 9 passed the test.

During the item analysis and construct validity phase, the 9 items were rated on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = Not at all; 1 = Not sure; 2 = Sure; 3 = Very sure). These items were tested with 66 public sector employees. Participants also completed Near and Jensen's (1983) Internal Whistleblowing Intention Scale (IWIS) and Ogungbamila et al.'s (in review) group version of the Corruption Tolerance Inventory (CTI-G). Three GMWIS items were found to lack sufficient validity and were thus omitted from further analysis and the final scale. Removing these three items raised the scale's Cronbach's alpha from 0.63 to 0.70. Concerning construct validity, the 6-item GMWIS correlated significantly with IWIS [ r (64) = 0.58, p < 0.01], suggesting both scales measure a similar construct. Additionally, Ogungbamila et al.'s (in review) CTI-G showed a strong inverse correlation with GMWIS [ r (64) = 0.45, p < 0.01], indicating the two instruments assess opposite but related constructs.

To evaluate the underlying dimensions of the GMWIS, a principal component analysis, using the Direct Oblimin technique, was conducted on the items of the scale. Table 1 shows the results of the factor analysis.

Table 1 indicates that GMWIS was unidimensional. The single dimension explained 42.12% of the variance in group members' whistleblowing intentions.

In the main study, the scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.72. As participants' GMWIS scores increased, so did the group members' intentions to report corruption.

Corruption tolerance among group members was measured using Ogungbamila et al.'s (in review) instrument, designed to assess employees' tendency to condone or overlook acts of corruption committed by members of their occupational or social ingroup. It was the group dimension of the Corruption Tolerance Inventory (CTI) developed by (Ogungbamila and Ajayi 2024), which focused on tolerance for corruption perpetrated by individuals (CTI-I). The Corruption Tolerance Inventory—Group (CTI-G) was an 18-item instrument that assessed tolerance for corruption perpetrated by members of employees' social or work group. CTI-G was rated on a 5-point scale (0 = not at all; 1 = sometimes; 2 = many times; 3 = most of the time; 4 = always). Sample items included: “We feel discouraged from reporting corrupt individuals who are from our region/ state/ locality” and “I don't feel mandated to support individuals from my region/ state/ locality that are involved in corruption” (reverse-scored). Ogungbamila et al.'s (in review) reported a Cronbach's alpha of 0.85 for CTI-G. In this study, CTI-G had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.76. Scores on CTI-G were interpreted such that as scores on the scale increased, so did participants' tendency to overlook corruption perpetrated by members of their social or occupational group.

Ethical considerations

The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Psychology Department of Adekunle Ajasin University (approval number PSYCHREC/24/11/02/006). Specifically, the committee confirmed that the study posed no physical or psychological harm to the participants. In addition, confidentiality was guaranteed, participation was voluntary, and participants were at liberty to withdraw from the study at any stage without consequences. Information on the purpose, procedure, and participants' rights was also provided. After this, the participants completed an Informed Consent Form.

Procedure

Manipulation check

A preliminary study was conducted with 40 randomly selected undergraduates (20 males; 20 females) who were also part-time employees. It aimed to determine whether respondents would respond to the vignette as expected. A between-subjects design was used, and participants were randomly and equally assigned, by ballot, to the four scenarios. Participants were instructed to study the scenarios and actively put themselves in the situations described. To assess the effects of the group's social affiliation with the perpetrators, respondents were asked to indicate “Yes” or “No” to the question, “Will you report the perpetrators of the fraud based on the circumstances painted in the scenario assigned to you?” Results of the manipulation check are shown in Table 2.

All participants (10 or 100%) in the group where the perpetrators were portrayed as rivals were ready to report the fraud. Almost all participants (9 or 90%) in the group with strong affiliation with the perpetrators indicated they would not report the fraud. The majority (7 or 70%) of those in the group with no social affiliation with the perpetrators were ready to report the fraud. Finally, when no information was provided about social identity or the nature of social affiliation with the perpetrators, half of the participants in that group (5 or 50%) indicated they would report the fraud, while the other half (5 or 50%) were not ready to report it. These results showed that information on social affiliation with the perpetrators determined participants' propensity to report the fraud.

Main study

The study targeted undergraduate students enrolled part-time at a Nigerian public university. To qualify, participants needed to have completed at least one semester and be employed, whether full-time or part-time, in any organization. With approval and support from the course instructors and four Research Assistants (RAs), data collection took place during a lecture that included students from various departments. A week prior, instructors notified students of an upcoming test at the lecture's end to motivate attendance.

Through simple balloting, 384 individuals, out of the 415 who met the selection criteria and attended the lecture, were selected for the study. The 384 participants were randomly assigned to 4 groups (A, B, C, and D), with 96 individuals per group. Those in Group A (the control group) were exposed to the version of the vignette in which the group had no information about its social affiliation with the perpetrators of the financial fraud. The individuals in Group B (the first experimental group) were exposed to the version of the vignette in which the perpetrators of the financial fraud had no social affiliation with them. The participants in Group C (the second experimental group) were exposed to the version of the vignette in which the perpetrators of the financial fraud were their rivals. Lastly, members of Group D (the third experimental group) were exposed to the version of the vignette in which the perpetrators of the financial fraud had a strong social affiliation with their group.

The participants were instructed to read the story carefully, vividly imagine themselves in the scenario, and respond to the items on the attached questionnaire. It took an average of 10.5 min to study the vignette and complete the questionnaire on whistleblowing intentions and corruption tolerance. The participants were debriefed after the study.

Relationships among the variables

The results of the relationships among age, gender, whistleblowing intentions, and corruption tolerance of group members are shown in Table 3.

As shown in Table 3, group members' intentions to disclose corruption decreased significantly as they provided tacit support for corruption [ r (382) = −0.38, p < 0.001]. As group members grew older, they tended to condone corruption [ r (382) = 0.16, p < 0.01]. There was no strong relationship between age and group members' whistleblowing intentions [ r (382) = −0.06, p > 0.05]. Significant gender differences were found in group members' intentions to report corruption, with females showing higher intentions than males [ r (382) = −0.16, p < 0.01]. However, there were no gender differences in corruption tolerance among group members [ r (382) = 0.06, p > 0.05].

Evaluation of the hypotheses

The two hypotheses were evaluated using two sets of one-way ANOVA and Tukey (1949) Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test. The results are presented in Table 4.

As shown in Table 4, the nature of social affiliation with perpetrators significantly affected whistleblowing intentions [ F (3, 380) = 24.19, p < 0.001] and group members' tolerance of corruption [ F (3, 380) = 46.99, p < 0.001]. However, these results do not strongly support hypotheses 1 and 2, as the significant F values do not indicate the direction of the effects. Consequently, two sets of Tukey (1949) HSD tests were conducted on the data. The results are shown in Table 5 and are presented graphically in Figures 1, 2.

The results in Tables 4, 5, as well as Figures 1, 2, indicate that social affiliation significantly influenced both whistleblowing intentions and corruption tolerance. Whistleblowing intentions were highest when perpetrators were portrayed as rivals (M = 14.79, SD = 2.40). Participants in this condition reported significantly greater willingness to report corruption than those with no information about social ties (M = 11.80, SD = 3.15; p < 0.01), those with no social affiliation (M = 12.96, SD = 2.48; p < 0.05), and those with strong social affiliation (M = 11.94, SD = 2.89; p < 0.01). Additionally, whistleblowing intentions were significantly higher in the no-affiliation condition than in the no-information and strong-affiliation conditions (p < 0.05), while no significant difference was observed between the no-information and strong-affiliation groups (p > 0.05). Overall, whistleblowing intentions increased with social distance from perpetrators, supporting Hypothesis 1.

In contrast, corruption tolerance showed the opposite trend. Participants with a strong social connection to perpetrators reported the highest tolerance levels (M = 52.67, SD = 10.10), significantly higher than those in the no-information (M = 44.20, SD = 5.57; p < 0.01), no-affiliation (M = 44.88, SD = 5.27; p < 0.01), and rival groups (M = 40.91, SD = 6.40; p < 0.001). Additionally, participants in the no-affiliation and no-information groups demonstrated significantly greater tolerance than those in the rival condition (p < 0.01). There was no significant difference between the no-information and no-affiliation groups (p > 0.05). These results suggest that tolerance for corruption increases with social closeness to perpetrators, supporting Hypothesis 2.

Corruption control in collectivist contexts characterized by strong social affiliations remains particularly challenging. Prior research suggests that social ties (Hildreth et al., 2016; Neville et al., 2025) and collectivist norms (Martini, 2014; Smith, 2001) can foster ingroup loyalty, suppress whistleblowing, and increase tolerance for corruption, as individuals may feel obligated to protect affiliated others (Rullo et al., 2023). However, empirical evidence on how information about social affiliation shapes these outcomes has been limited, particularly in Nigeria, where whistleblowing is largely discouraged. Using an experimental vignette design, this study addressed this research gap.

The findings highlight social identity as a critical determinant of whistleblowing intentions. Consistent with prior research (Waytz et al., 2013; Rullo et al., 2023), strong social identification increased ingroup loyalty and reduced the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing. Whistleblowing intentions declined significantly when perpetrators were strongly affiliated with participants but increased when perpetrators were portrayed as rivals. This suggests that strong social ties suppress reporting by reinforcing ingroup protection, whereas rivalry enhances reporting, possibly by activating outgroup bias or perceived threat.

More broadly, the results indicate that employees are more likely to protect individuals with whom they share favorable or neutral ties than those perceived as threats to their socioeconomic interests. The heightened whistleblowing observed under rivalry conditions may therefore reflect not only ethical concerns but also strategic motives to disadvantage competing groups.

The study also shows that strong social affiliation increases tolerance for corruption. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009; Zheng et al., 2021; Hildreth et al., 2016), ingroup ties foster favoritism and reduce willingness to sanction wrongdoing. Participants strongly affiliated with perpetrators were more tolerant of corruption and less willing to report it, likely to preserve trust and group loyalty (Dungan et al., 2015). This pattern suggests a form of moral disengagement, in which individuals downplay ethical standards when they conflict with ingroup interests (Haynes and Rašković, 2021).

Generally, the findings indicate that social identity shapes ethical behavior by increasing tolerance for ingroup transgression while intensifying censure of outgroup wrongdoing. Neutral conditions, as depicted in the vignette, produced moderate responses, suggesting that even minimal relational cues can influence ethical judgments and reactions. The results of the current study extend social identity theory (Turner et al., 1979) to the study of corruption and whistleblowing in collectivist settings such as Nigeria, where strong group affiliations often direct social and organizational behaviors (Asawo and Blue-Jack, 2016). However, it remains unclear whether increased whistleblowing under rivalry reflects fairness motives or competitive intent. This requires further investigation.

The study makes some important theoretical contributions. Firstly, it extends social identity theory (Turner et al., 1979) by demonstrating that social identity not only influences attitudes toward group membership but also judgments about corruption and accountability. While previous research has largely focused on how social identity promotes teamwork, conformity, and group solidarity and cohesion, the findings of the current study demonstrate that the same mechanisms can weaken anti-corruption efforts by encouraging differential treatment of wrongdoing depending on the social identity of perpetrators.

Secondly, the results of this study add to the literature on corruption tolerance by identifying perpetrator information as an important contextual factor that may shape ethical evaluations. Previous studies generally treated corruption tolerance as a function of personal values, organizational climate, or cultural norms. The present findings suggest that perceptions of corruption are also a function of who commits the wrongdoing (Zheng et al., 2021; Haynes and Rašković, 2021; Hildreth et al., 2016). Consequently, ethical appraisals may be outcomes of relational factors rather than universal variables and applications, particularly in collectivist environments such as Nigeria, where social affiliations play a pivotal role in everyday interactions (Martini, 2014; Smith, 2001).

Apart from that, this study contributes to emerging scholarship on normative approaches to corruption management. Research on norms in corruption settings has generally assumed that anti-corruption norms are applied uniformly across social actors. The present findings challenge this assumption by demonstrating that support for anti-corruption action may be dictated by and vary with the social relationship between observers and perpetrators. This suggests that anti-corruption norming is not merely a moral process but also a social identity process (Waytz et al., 2013; Rullo et al., 2023). The findings, therefore, highlight the need for theoretical models of corruption management to incorporate group identity, social affiliation, and intergroup undercurrents as factors that shape the enforcement of anti-corruption norms.

In addition, the study makes contextual contributions to the growing body of research on corruption in African and other collectivist societies. Much of the existing literature on whistleblowing and anti-corruption efforts has been developed in Western contexts with relatively dominant individualistic values. By focusing on Nigeria, a context characterized by strong social affiliations and collectivist orientations (Martini, 2014; Smith, 2001), the current study provides evidence that anti-corruption behavior may operate differently in settings where obligations to family, ethnic groups, professional networks, and other social groups are highly germane. This contextual contribution enhances the cross-cultural relevance of social identity and whistleblowing theories.

Managerial and practical implications

The findings of this study also have important managerial implications. For example, the study has shown that organizations seeking to strengthen anti-corruption systems should recognize that ethical behavior is influenced not only by formal rules and sanctions but also by informal social relationships. Employees may fail to report wrongdoing when perpetrators are members of valued social networks, regardless of the level of seriousness of the wrongdoing. Consequently, anti-corruption programs should explicitly address the influence of social affiliations on ethical decision-making.

Organizations should invest in ethical training that helps employees recognize and manage ingroup favoritism when evaluating wrongdoing. Such training should help employees navigate ethical dilemmas, emphasize impartial accountability, reinforce the fair application of ethical standards to organization members, and encourage employees to distinguish personal loyalties from professional responsibilities. The training should also include moral role models and robust discussions of how social identity and group loyalty can unintentionally foster tolerance for corruption.

The findings further suggest the need to strengthen whistleblowing systems by reducing the psychological costs associated with reporting corruption. Confidential reporting channels, autonomous investigative systems, and strong protections against retaliation may help employees report wrongdoing without fear of social exclusion or damage to valued social and professional relationships.

Because social affiliations can discourage reporting, organizations should ensure that whistleblowing procedures are perceived as fair, neutral, and insulated from group influence. At the same time, organizations should avoid fostering excessive intergroup rivalry as a strategy to increase whistleblowing and reduce corruption. Although rivalry was associated with higher whistleblowing intentions, such reporting may not always be motivated by ethical concerns. Excessive competition between groups can encourage unscrupulous accusations, interpersonal conflict, and discriminatory enforcement of ethical standards. Organizations should, therefore, implement policies that promote diversity and inclusion and foster a superior organizational identity that encourages employees to prioritize shared organizational values over selfish group interests.

The findings on demographic factors also require managerial attention. The tendency for male and older employees to exhibit a relatively higher level of corruption tolerance and lower whistleblowing intentions suggests that anti-corruption interventions may need to be tailored to specific employee groups. Consequently, organizations may benefit from targeted ethical education, mentoring initiatives, and awareness campaigns that address distinct social and professional experiences and shape ethical decision-making across demographic categories.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study underscores the essential role of social affiliation in shaping tolerance for corruption and intentions to blow the whistle. The findings demonstrate that anti-corruption behavior is influenced not only by moral judgments but also by social identity processes that determine who is protected or sanctioned. Accordingly, effective anti-corruption initiatives, particularly in collectivist environments, require more than formal compliance structures; it also requires deliberate efforts to manage the social dynamics that influence ethical decision-making. By recognizing and addressing these dynamics, organizations may be better positioned to foster consistent accountability and strengthen collective resistance to corruption.

Limitations and directions for future research

These findings should be interpreted with caution given the study's limitations. Although the experimental vignette design enabled causal inference, hypothetical scenarios may not fully capture the emotional, interpersonal, and organizational complexities of real-world corruption incidents. Participants' responses reflected individual perceptions and intentions rather than actual group decisions or observed behaviors. In addition, the study did not directly disentangle the psychological mechanisms underlying the effects of social affiliation. For example, it remains unclear whether increased whistleblowing under rivalry conditions was driven primarily by fairness concerns, competitive motives, perceived socioeconomic threat, or a combination of these factors. Lastly, the respondents were part-time students who also held part-time jobs. Therefore, the outcomes of this study should be generalized with caution because the reactions of full-time employees to group dynamics may differ from those of part-time employees. Consequently, there could be clear differences in corruption tolerance and whistleblowing intentions between full-time and part-time employees.

Consequently, future research should adopt a group-based field study design to examine how social identity processes operate in natural organizational settings. Researchers should also investigate the mediating roles of loyalty, moral disengagement, perceived threat, organizational identification, and perceived justice, particularly among full-time employees. Further studies across industries and cultural contexts would help determine the generalizability of the findings and clarify the conditions under which social affiliations either facilitate or hinder anti-corruption efforts.