Power interplay among actors in the governance of Indonesian film and digital content censorship policy

1 Introduction

Indonesia, as the largest democratic country in Southeast Asia, presents a compelling case for examining how these intersecting forces shape censorship policies. While Indonesia upholds democratic institutions and guarantees freedom of expression under its constitution, its censorship practices remain deeply rooted in a statist and moralist framework of cultural governance (Sen and Hill, 2000). The state frequently justifies censorship as a means to preserve societal morality, religious harmony, and national unity—especially within its diverse and multiethnic context (Sen and Hill, 2000). These justifications, however, often stand in tension with international human rights obligations, including those under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Indonesia is a signatory (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR), 2020).

In Indonesia, censorship policies are a critical issue and remain a contentious topic among various stakeholders, including governmental and non-governmental entities. As Government Regulation No. 18 of 2014 on the Film Censorship Board outlines, the primary stakeholders in the film industry include central and regional governments, film practitioners, film business operators, and the general public. The differing interests of these groups make censorship policies inherently dynamic and, at times, controversial.

The government views censorship as a tool to protect society from the negative impacts of films and television programmes, particularly those considered incompatible with Indonesia’s cultural values. Conversely, filmmakers often see censorship as a barrier to creative freedom, particularly when it involves restricting films from public distribution. Even when a film meets censorship requirements, it may still attract protests from certain community groups due to cultural, religious, or political sensitivities. Such disputes can implicate the filmmakers and the Film Censorship Board (LSF), which holds the authority to issue Film Censorship Certificates.

The challenges censorship oversight bodies face has grown significantly, particularly with the rapid expansion of the broadcasting industry since the New Order era. Research by Khotimah and Kushardiyanti (2022) shows that Indonesia’s number of television stations increased dramatically, from just six in 2008 to 62 in 2013. This rapid growth highlights the increasing complexity of managing censorship in an ever-evolving media landscape (Subramaniam et al., 2023).

The national film industry in Indonesia has shown significant growth over the past 5 years, despite the challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. This positive trend is reflected in the production of 128 films in 2018 and 129 films in 2019, with both years attracting approximately 51.2 million viewers annually. In 2020, film production rose sharply to 289 titles; however, the pandemic caused a decline in viewership to 19 million (Susilo et al., 2023). The industry’s struggles continued in 2021, with only 36 films produced and a viewership of 4.5 million. By 2022, film production increased to 47 titles, alongside a notable recovery in viewership to 24 million.

The expansion of cinemas and cinema screens further underscores the growth of the national film industry, which has generated considerable revenue from film enthusiasts. Currently, Indonesia boasts 517 cinema locations with a total of 2,145 screens distributed across 115 cities and regencies (Alanudin, 2024; Theo Santoso et al., 2024). This rapid development in the broadcasting and film sectors has created a need for comprehensive government oversight, addressed through the enactment of Law No. 32 of 2002 on Broadcasting and Law No. 33 of 2009 on Film.

These laws establish the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) as the authority responsible for censorship and monitoring television content. The division of responsibilities between the two main supervisory bodies is as follows: the Film Censorship Board (LSF) oversees the censorship of films and film advertisements before they are released to the public, as evidenced by the issuance of Film Censorship Certificates (Suyadi, 2019). Meanwhile, KPI conducts post-broadcast monitoring, including assessing television and film content after it has aired.

The Film Censorship Board (LSF) is pivotal in safeguarding society from the potential negative impacts of films, as stipulated by the Film Law. Furthermore, the LSF’s responsibilities have been expanded under the Broadcasting Law to include censorship of broadcast content intended for television. Since films form a significant part of television programming, many television shows frequently feature films as part of their broadcasts (Khotimah and Kushardiyanti, 2022). The censorship process entails assessing films to determine their appropriateness for public viewing, which may involve removing specific visuals or audio based on established censorship guidelines. All films and film advertisements must obtain a Film Censorship Certificate (STLS) before being made available to the public (Erwantoro, 2011).

Performance data from 2024 reveals that 42,331 films and film trailers were censored, indicating that the LSF achieved 102% of its performance target. Over the past 5 years, the LSF has failed to meet its performance targets on only two occasions: in 2019, with a realisation rate of 82%, and in 2022, when the rate was 90%. These statistics highlight a marked increase in the number of films receiving STLS certification during the 2019–2024 period. It is important to clarify that the LSF does not censor live broadcasts or television news programmes.

Various parties are involved in the film censorship policy in Indonesia. These actors comprise the government, the public and the private sector (Sari et al., 2025). The relationship between these three actors requires synergy and mutually reinforcing partnerships in order to build a shared vision of good governance (Dhaoui, 2020). The challenge to achieving good governance stems from the fact that the policy-making process is inextricably linked to the political process. Conflicts over issues arise from the agendas and interests of the actors involved in policy formulation. Each actor seeks to prioritise issues they consider most important, such as populist policies designed to attract public attention (Caiani & Graziano, 2022). The determination of which issues form the basis of a policy is linked to those who hold power or wield significant political influence. The novelty of this study lies in its fresh perspective that the involvement of these actors is not value-free or free from vested interests (Gundersen, 2020). Values are considered important in the study of censorship policy in Indonesia, particularly censorship policies designed to protect citizens from foreign cultures. The experience of censorship under the authoritarian New Order regime reinforces another aspect of values: that the value of harmony forms the basis for the implementation of film censorship policies, thereby limiting the scope of expression in films containing opposition criticism.

Against this backdrop, this study adopts stakeholder analysis to examine how censorship policy in Indonesia is shaped by contestations among state institutions, religious groups, media industry actors, and civil society organisations. By identifying their respective interests and influence, the paper contributes to an IR-informed understanding of domestic policy contestation as embedded within broader geopolitical, normative, and institutional frameworks. It also situates Southeast Asia’s censorship culture within global debates on sovereignty, rights, and cultural regulation.

2 Conceptual framework

From a public administration perspective, the government has the authority to formulate policies in the national interest. Governance is a system of values, policies and institutions through which economic, social and political affairs are managed via interaction between the public, the government and the private sector (Keban, 2004). The structure of governance utilises the concepts of networks, partnerships, co-provision and co-production, which shift away from the concept of bureaucratised governance as a process whereby policy leaders and innovators from government institutions, as well as stakeholders outside the sphere of power, manage public policy. The concept of decentralised governance involves a gradual reduction in the state’s dominance over public policy (Dwiyanto, 2021).

Governance has three dimensions: the institutional dimension, the values dimension and the process dimension. In the institutional dimension, governance is understood as an administrative system involving multiple stakeholders, both from within the government and from outside it. The values dimension encompasses the principles underpinning the exercise of power. These values depend on the nature of the government. The process dimension relates to the manner in which various elements and institutions respond to emerging issues (Dwiyanto, 2007).

The influential state actors within these three dimensions are stakeholders. Stakeholders are any individuals or groups that influence a government programme (Rowlinson and Cheung, 2008). Contestatiom between government censorship agencies and non-governmental actors in implementing censorship policies has significantly improved film quality and maintained television broadcast standards. Performance data from the Film Censorship Board (LSF) indicate that surpassing 100% of performance targets reflects effective governance in the issuance of Film Censorship Certificates (STLS). This achievement underscores the relevance of adopting the concept of collaborative governance to address film censorship policies involving diverse stakeholders (Table 1).

Table 1. Background of key informant.

Ansell and Gash, as cited in Emerson et al. (2012); Selvia (2023), describe collaborative governance as a governance model where public and private actors work together through distinctive processes to establish laws and regulations that ensure the delivery of public goods. This approach analyses cooperation among various parties to formulate public policies. Effective collaborative governance requires the active involvement of communities, civil society organisations, private entities, governments, academics, and other stakeholders. Such participation ensures that stakeholders have adequate access to information, enabling them to make well-informed decisions (Febrian, 2016; Susantyo, 2022). However, challenges may arise from competing interests among stakeholders, particularly in determining whether a film complies with censorship requirements.

This study adopted a multi-stakeholder approach to identify key actors and analyse collaborative processes in formulating and implementing film censorship policies in Indonesia. According to Ackermann and Eden (2011), stakeholder analysis can be guided by an influence and interest matrix. Stakeholders are classified into four categories: key players, who possess high levels of both interest and influence; context setters, who have high influence but low interest; subjects, characterised by high interest but low influence; and crowds, who exhibit low levels of both interest and influence (Ackermann and Eden, 2011).

Several studies have explored stakeholder analysis in Indonesia. For example, Tamrin et al. (2024) investigated the relationships between actors managing the Delegan Beach tourism area in Gresik Regency. Their findings categorised governance actors in the tourism area into three groups: primary actors, supporting actors, and key actors. Similarly, (Rohman and Fitriana, 2024) conducted a stakeholder analysis of the Glagah Beach tourism area in Kulon Progo Regency, identifying seven stakeholders involved in its management. Meanwhile, (Siddik et al., 2024) examined stakeholder analysis in the context of sanitation management in Pontianak’s urban slum areas. This study identified 47 stakeholders engaged in Pontianak’s urban sanitation management policies, grouping them into four categories: subjects, key players, the crowd, and context setters.

In contrast to these studies, research on censorship policy seeks to explore new empirical dimensions. Government censorship policies in Indonesia remain underexplored. This study addresses how the stakeholder configuration is related to Indonesia’s policy of digital media censorship. Public interest in censorship often becomes a contentious issue in the film and broadcasting industries, particularly when the process fails to reflect public aspirations. Good governance provides a theoretical framework for implementing censorship policies for films and new media. A key principle of this approach is that decision-making processes should be democratic, ensuring public participation and creating space for citizens to critique government policies.

3 Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative research approach, utilising interview data gathered from various stakeholders in the film industry, including filmmakers, academics, and film consumers. Kirk and Miller (1986) define qualitative research as a tradition within the social sciences that fundamentally relies on human observation in its social context (Denzin and Linclon, 1995). Data were collected through interviews with film practitioners, experts from various universities in Indonesia, and film consumers from four cities: Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, and Denpasar. In-depth interviews were conducted directly with key informants and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

The selection of informants in this study, for both in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), was conducted using a purposive sampling technique. This method was chosen based on specific criteria to ensure that the informants possessed the capacity, experience, and direct relevance to the research focus. Through this approach, eight key informants were selected for in-depth interviews. Furthermore, to capture and interpret public perceptions regarding the evaluation of broadcasting and film censorship policies, data were collected through FGDs targeting film consumers across four major cities: Medan, Jakarta, Surabaya, and Denpasar. Each FGD session in the respective cities involved 15 participants to ensure the acquisition of rich and comprehensive data.

Although the broader identification of stakeholder groups comprises many different groups, the selection of eight key informants was deemed entirely adequate based on the principle of ‘information power’ (Malterud et al., 2016). This concept emphasises that the more relevant information a key informant possesses, the fewer informants are required. The selected key informants were drawn from government, the private sector and civil society. An evaluation following the seventh interview indicated that the research’s information resources had reached a sufficient level, yielding in-depth findings on patterns of interaction amongst actors within the governance of censorship policy. Methodologically, the in-depth insights from these eight key informants were extensively triangulated with robust empirical data from 60 FGD participants (film consumers) across four major cities. This triangulation across government sectors, film industry stakeholders, and the film consumer community significantly strengthened the overall information power of the research, ensuring that the resulting stakeholder analysis was comprehensive and valid.

The FGD method was used to interpret and capture public perceptions regarding evaluating broadcasting and film censorship policies in these four major cities. The qualitative data collected addressed the research question: how do stakeholders collaborate, and how are they identified within film censorship policies?

The data were analysed comprehensively, integrating findings from both interviews and FGDs. The analysis process employed manual methods. In this study, the researcher used interactive analysis for data processing; the data analysis stage comprised three key components, namely data reduction, data presentation and conclusion (Miles et al., 2014). The qualitative data included verbal statements, non-verbal actions recorded during interviews, and visual descriptions. Furthermore, the study generated visual representations in the form of images and tables, mapping the key stakeholders involved in film censorship policies in alignment with the study’s objectives.

4 Results

This section presents the results of the stakeholder analysis conducted to examine the dynamics of actor contestations in the formulation and implementation of censorship policies in Indonesia. The findings are drawn from qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews with key informants—including government officials, filmmakers, academics, and civil society actors—and focus group discussions with film consumers in four major Indonesian cities. By applying the stakeholder classification framework developed by Ackermann and Eden (2011), the analysis provides a systematic understanding of how influence and interest are distributed among various actors in Indonesia’s censorship ecosystem.

The results are organised into two main parts. The first part focuses on identifying stakeholders involved in the censorship policy process. It outlines the institutional roles and mandates of 18 key stakeholders, grouped into four broad categories: government regulators, private sector representatives, industry associations, and civil society groups. This section also highlights the functional responsibilities of each stakeholder, as well as overlapping jurisdictions and areas of conflict, particularly between the Film Censorship Board (LSF) and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI).

The second part presents the stakeholder classification and quadrant analysis, mapping stakeholders into four categories—key players, context setters, subjects, and the crowd—based on their levels of influence and interest. This mapping provides critical insights into the power dynamics within censorship governance and illustrates the uneven distribution of authority among different actors. The results also identify key challenges to inclusive and participatory policymaking and examine the implications of stakeholder configuration for policy legitimacy, transparency, and accountability.

4.1 Stakeholder identification and policy implementation of censorship in Indonesia

The engagement of diverse stakeholders is essential for effectively implementing public policies. Policies are more likely to achieve their intended outcomes when all relevant parties collaborate to foster good governance. Effective decision-making depends on active stakeholder participation within a collaborative framework that includes three key components: the state, the private sector, and civil society. Good governance hinges on the cooperation of these stakeholders, each fulfilling its distinct roles and responsibilities (Febrian, 2016; Mukhlis and Perdana, 2022; Susantyo, 2022).

In the context of public policy, a stakeholder configuration framework entails the active involvement of the state, the private sector, and civil society. The state is the primary actor, responsible for policy formulation and execution. The private sector supports implementation through investment, technology, and resources. Civil society ensures transparency, accountability, and policy alignment with public needs. Stakeholder participation in decision-making enhances policy quality and strengthens government legitimacy. For example, Osborne et al. (2018) highlighted the importance of fostering stakeholder trust to create a harmonious and productive working environment. Similarly, Jones and Hafner (2021), demonstrate that advancements in communication technology can improve coordination among stakeholders, enabling more efficient sharing of data and resources (Table 2).

Table 2. Identification results of stakeholders.

Source: Compiled and analysed by authors.

Challenges in the governance of film censorship policy often stem from overlapping authorities amongst policymakers. Furthermore, there is a lack of synergy with the private sector—such as producers and film industry stakeholders—as well as public aspirations that are overlooked. This gap between regulatory expectations and practical implementation was highlighted by a key interviewee in an in-depth interview: “Sometimes, coordination should be impactful during the process of censorship, but in reality it is always complex.” (INF 01, In-depth Interview, 2025).

An ideal model of collaboration between bureaucracy and society is underpinned by servant leadership. In this model, public officials carry out their duties with dedication, while the public actively monitors government performance to ensure effective policy implementation. Public policies are developed through regulations grounded in a consensus of shared interests, with careful consideration of their broader impacts. The primary objective of public policies is to provide clear and actionable guidance, aligned with the goals and intentions of policymakers (Widyarta et al., 2022).

Conflicting interests among stakeholders have frequently resulted in ongoing disputes over implementing censorship policies, which often provoke public controversy. Such controversies typically arise from issues related to politics, economics, society, culture, and, in many instances, religion. These conflicts predominantly involve two main groups: the government and non-government actors, including the public, filmmakers, and media or cinema entrepreneurs (Aulia and Kurniawati, 2023).

Censorship policies during the New Order era were particularly intricate. The government imposed stringent censorship regulations primarily to safeguard the interests of those in power. These measures were justified by citing the need for political stability and national security as prerequisites for economic development. Consequently, censorship policies became highly politicised. Censorship agencies, operating with quasi-judicial authority, determined whether a domestic film could be publicly screened.

Under the New Order regime, censorship policies were also used to protect the ruling elite’s interests. The government rationalised tighter censorship regulations by invoking the need for political stability and national security. Although these policies effectively maintained short-term stability, they had long-term adverse effects on freedom of expression and the growth of the creative industry. Concurrently, the government actively promoted importing foreign films to meet the demands of stakeholders seeking to revitalise the film sector. This dual strategy led to inconsistencies in censorship policies. On the one hand, the government allowed a surge in imported films, while on the other, it used censorship as a propaganda tool to protect society from perceived negative influences of foreign media (Erwantoro, 2011; Lutfi Agus, 2013).

Further research by Wijaya and Siregar (2019) reveals that this policy dualism disadvantaged local industry players and amplified the dominance of foreign cultures in Indonesia. These inconsistencies underscore the need for a more cohesive and transparent approach to future censorship policies. Additionally, Rahmawati et al. (2021) suggest that incorporating cultural considerations into censorship policies could help alleviate tensions between local industry stakeholders and the government.

Following the fall of the New Order regime and the transition into the Reformasi era, the duties and functions of the Indonesian Censorship Board, Lembaga Sensor Film (LSF), remained focused on protecting society from harmful film content. However, the LSF’s role evolved from merely censoring inappropriate material to becoming a facilitator. In this capacity, the LSF encouraged the public to develop critical perspectives on media content, particularly films, while promoting the practice of self-censorship (Erwantoro, 2011).

During the Reformasi era, according to Kurnia et al. (2004), a framework for self-censorship in Indonesia was introduced, comprising five categories:

• Ideological censorship targets films with themes such as Marxism, communism, or those related to ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group relations (SARA).
• Physical censorship involves the removal of specific scenes or audio elements.
• Administrative censorship requires filmmakers to obtain letters of recommendation after meeting competency qualifications.
• Hegemonic censorship aligns film content with market preferences and demands.
• Communal censorship is based on public evaluations to ensure content adheres to social norms and moral values.

Communal censorship becomes particularly significant when the state prioritises censoring politically charged films while neglecting content that may violate societal moral values. When public controversies arise over movies or television programmes, community stakeholders often take action to ban content deemed incompatible with Eastern cultural values or immoral. In this context, stakeholders are individuals or groups with vested interests in a particular issue (Martin and Rice, 2015). A key principle of good governance is responsiveness to public aspirations and the concerns of various stakeholders. Good governance refers to transparent and accountable governmental processes and institutions that serve the needs of all stakeholders (D’Agostino et al., 2020).

This study examined the involvement of governmental and non-governmental actors in Indonesia’s censorship policies. It identifies stakeholders who influence decision-making processes and the dynamics of policy implementation. Stakeholders are categorised into five groups: regulators, facilitators, implementers, advocates, and beneficiaries (Ackermann and Eden, 2011; Elgin and Weible, 2013). Within multi-stakeholder collaboration, the stakeholders approach integrates government actors, the film industry, academics, film worker associations, and civil society. This synergy creates a film ecosystem where censorship mechanisms are guided by mutual consensus and local wisdom, protecting society from the negative impacts of low-quality films.

This section delves into stakeholder analysis as a tool for identifying actors who influence or are affected by the implementation of censorship policies in Indonesia. A historical review of Indonesian cinema reveals that censorship has often been a site of contestation among competing interests. Stakeholder analysis provides a framework for understanding governmental and non-governmental actors’ interests, resource needs, and influence. This study draws on multiple data sources to identify stakeholders involved in censorship policy implementation, including expert opinions, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with stakeholders (Filmmakers, Cinema Operators, Government Officials) and secondary data. The research identified 18 key stakeholders involved in Indonesia’s film censorship policies.

Based on the table above, the stakeholder analysis identified several groups of actors involved in Indonesia’s censorship policies. These include government actors, the business sector, film associations, and civil society. The research reveals an imbalance in the distribution of power among these stakeholders. An actor’s success can be assessed on the basis of several factors, including the actor’s participation, the actor’s perspective, the actor’s adaptability, and the determination of their actions. (Wibowo and Rostyaningsih, 2016). However, regarding censorship policies, the government exerts significantly more influence than the other stakeholders, such as film associations and civil society. An ideal power relationship should accommodate shared interests and reflect public concerns about creativity and censorship. However, implementing censorship policies often triggers rational and critical debates, providing stakeholders equal opportunities to influence policy decisions. For example, a common concern is that censorship frequently removes substantial parts of a film’s storyline, resulting in unclear narratives. Ideally, the implementation of censorship policies should involve all sectors and stakeholders in a cohesive and integrated manner. Nonetheless, the government must continue to act as the leading sector to uphold good governance in Indonesia’s film industry. Such an approach would ensure a balanced and inclusive framework for managing censorship policies while effectively addressing the interests and needs of all stakeholders (Figure 1).

4.2 Stakeholder classification

The history of censorship policy in Indonesia reveals significant state intervention, particularly during the New Order era (1967–1998). During this period, the state’s role in implementing film censorship was dominant, despite the issue being of interest to multiple stakeholders, including filmmakers, cinema proprietors, film industry professionals, and civil society. The New Order regime utilised censorship to control the film industry under the pretext of maintaining political stability. The Film Censorship Board (Badan Sensor Film or BSF) played a pivotal role in reinforcing the government’s anti-critical propaganda narrative, aiming to suppress freedom of expression in films that could potentially challenge the legitimacy of the regime’s authority. The implementation of censorship, ostensibly in the public’s interest, was, in fact, an expression of the ruler’s arrogance. For instance, censorship was executed by physically cutting scenes from films deemed capable of causing public disorder or threatening the New Order’s power (Erwantoro, 2011; Heeren, 2007).

Following the Reformasi period, the government shifted its approach, promoting a policy of self-censorship based on age-based classification criteria for audiences. This policy transition indicates a shift in the censorship mechanism from an authoritarian paradigm to a more democratic one. Nevertheless, a censorship body still operates, tasked with ensuring that national cinematography adheres to moral norms and does not endanger state security. Consequently, debates surrounding censorship persist, especially concerning issues directly related to politics, power, economics, society, culture, and religion. The constellation of and contestation among state and non-state actors implement censorship, a compelling area of study. This underscores the analytical significance and academic novelty of this research, which seeks to identify the key actors involved in shaping censorship policy in Indonesia (Khotimah and Kushardiyanti, 2022; Tapsell, 2012).

This study categorised stakeholders based on their levels of interest and influence, using a matrix derived from Ackermann and Eden’s (2011) classification theory. The analysis evaluates two key components: the stakeholders’ interest in and influence over implementing Indonesia’s film censorship policies. The qualitative stakeholder analysis meets the criteria established in Ackerman and Eden’s conceptual framework. The stakeholders are classified into three categories based on their level of influence: high influence; Stakeholders with full authority in decision-making processes, who act as facilitators and exert significant influence on others during policy implementation. Moderate influence: stakeholders have limited authority in policy implementation. Low influence: stakeholders without any authority in policymaking. Stakeholders are also classified into three categories based on their level of interest: high interest, stakeholders who anticipate significant potential benefits from implementing censorship policies. Moderate interest: stakeholders who hold expectations but do not benefit directly from the policies. Low interest: stakeholders who neither expect benefits nor have any significant interest in the policies’ implementation (Ackermann and Eden, 2011; Nurfatriani et al., 2015).

It is worth noting that the first four steps are likely to be of general use for exploring the stakeholder impact of a large set of potential policies or potential modelling outcomes, for example, optimisation efforts, decision analysis etc. These first steps derive from work reported elsewhere (Eden and Ackermann 2021). In the method outlined below, whilst the Group Explorer GSS (group support system) used the causal mapping technique when undertaking the stakeholder modelling, it is important to note that although the qualitative models may look similar to cognitive or causal maps they are not intended to be used, or read, in this way. Instead, the representation system might be seen as a simple directed graph where the arrows (x–y) represent x may mean that y occurs, or x may help deliver y, person x may influence the behaviour of y. In addition, whilst a GSS was used, it is possible to undertake the activities manually.

Identify Possible Stakeholders: that is, those actors able to influence the strategic future of the focal organisation—they are stakeholders because they have a ‘stake’/interest in the behaviour and strategic future of the focal organisation, in particular where the intended strategies impact their own aspirations. These stakeholders may be internal: key departments, groups, unions, operating companies of the focal organisation, as well as external stakeholders, each having an interest in monitoring and influencing the strategy of the focal organisation (e.g., regulators, customers, competitors).

Map the Possible Stakeholders onto a Power-Interest (PI) Grid: use a matrix where the y-axis represents the degree of interest the potential stakeholder has in the. Behaviour and future of the organisation—particularly the strategies being proposed, and the x-axis represents the degree of power the stakeholder has to influence the future of the organisation.

The grid/matrix represents the relative position of each possible stakeholder in terms of their interest and power, reflecting a spectrum. Those actors positioned in the. Top half of the matrix is the stakeholders because they have a high degree of stake (interest) in the future of the organisation and its proposed strategies—they care about its success or failure. They may wish to take action to encourage failure or success.

Those in the top right quadrant are critical to the future of the organisation because they may wish to take action to encourage failure or success and have the power/influence to do so. Others in the bottom right of the grid are actors/context setters who have the power to influence the future of the organisation, but as yet do not have a specific intent to do so, as judged by those participating in the modelling effort.

Stakeholders are those with an interest in the organisation. They may or may not have the power to express their interest through action that will influence the future. Many authors see stakeholder interest as a key criterion when considering stakeholders. Frooman (1999) notes the need to consider stakeholder interest and influence, as do Mitchell and colleagues (Mitchell et al., 1997). Considering who is interested is one means of not only identifying stakeholders but also prioritising them. Moreover, understanding the motivation which defines the stake of a stakeholder is also of value (Eskerod & Lund, 2013). Deliverable clarity about who the stakeholders are, and those who might unintentionally affect the future of the organisation—they are context setters (Figure 2).

Based on the interview findings, the researchers identified an imbalance of power amongst stakeholders. The government’s relationship with other stakeholders indicates that the government wields greater power in terms of its level of importance and influence. Three academic informants explained that the KPI and the LSF are key actors in Indonesia’s censorship policy (INF 06; INF 07; INF 08, In-depth Interview, 2025). This view is supported by an informant from the Indonesian Film Board (BPI), who stated that “Censorship policies play a key role in regulating television and the distribution of films. The KPI oversees television broadcasts, whilst the LSF has the authority to issue certificates of censorship approval for films”. (INF 02, In-depth Interview, 2025).

Here is another interview excerpt that reinforces the view that the LSF is a key player (Quadrant 1): “Filmmakers face the greatest challenges when it comes to censorship policies, particularly regarding religious films. So the LSF wields considerable authority” (INF 05, In-depth Interview, 2025). Another informant added: “As cinema operators, we always display the LSF’s certificate of approval before a film is screened in our cinemas. Film censorship policy is indeed the remit of the LSF” (INF 04, In-depth Interview, 2025).

There is also a compilation of interviews indicating that the Ministry of Culture (Kemenbud) represents the government and acts as a key player (Quadrant 1). “The LSF falls under the Ministry of Culture (Kemenbud) in terms of both structure and budget; therefore, political support from the Kemenbud is essential to ensure that the LSF functions effectively” (INF 01, In-depth Interview, 2025). Another informant added to this argument. “The LSF’s annual performance report is always submitted to and approved by Kemenbud. Although the relationship between the Ministry of Culture and the LSF is structurally top-down, we place greater emphasis on collaboration in the oversight of Indonesian films” (INF 03, In-depth Interview, 2025).

The results of the informant interviews were validated by 60 FGD participants comprising film consumers from four major cities in Indonesia. The validation process began with a presentation of the interview results, which identified three key players: the Ministry of Culture (Kemenbud), the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), and the Film Censorship Board (LSF). Participants were asked whether these three bodies played an important role in film censorship policy in Indonesia. They were then asked which of the three had the greatest influence. Based on the results of the FGD discussion, participants agreed that the KPI and the LSF are the two main actors in the implementation of film censorship policy in Indonesia. The majority were also satisfied with the performance of these two institutions in supporting the Indonesian film ecosystem.

The stakeholder analysis results in an interest-influence matrix that divides stakeholders into four quadrants. Quadrant 1: Key Players—stakeholders with both high influence and high interest, playing a critical role in the implementation process. Quadrant 2: Context Setters—stakeholders with high influence but low interest, who can shape the policy environment. Quadrant 3: Subjects—stakeholders with high interest but low influence, directly affected by the policies, but lack decision-making power. Quadrant 4: The Crowd—stakeholders with both low influence and low interest, who have minimal involvement in the process. This mapping provides a clear framework for understanding various stakeholders’ roles and levels of influence and interest in implementing Indonesia’s film censorship policies. The quadrant diagram visually represents these dynamics, offering insights into how actors interact within the policy environment.

The stakeholder analysis reveals a deeply hierarchical governance structure in Indonesia’s film censorship landscape, where authority and influence are disproportionately concentrated among a small group of state institutions. Key players—notably the Indonesian Censorship Board (LSF), the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), and the Ministry of Culture—function as institutional gatekeepers with both formal mandates and de facto power in determining what content reaches the public. The LSF’s role in issuing the Surat Tanda Lulus Sensor (STLS) effectively grants it monopolistic control over film circulation. Meanwhile, KPI’s oversight of post-broadcast content, particularly in television, enables it to act as an enforcer of moral and cultural standards long after a film’s initial approval. This bifurcated structure—LSF in pre-distribution censorship and KPI in post-distribution regulation—illustrates a regulatory redundancy that often results in inconsistent policy enforcement and regulatory friction. The case of films cleared by LSF but later blocked by KPI underscores institutional fragmentation and a lack of policy coherence, raising concerns about legal certainty and procedural transparency. The Ministry of Culture, although not directly engaged in daily censorship decisions, exercises structural influence through its supervisory authority over the LSF. Its classification as a key player reflects the vertical nature of bureaucratic control in Indonesia, where ministerial oversight subtly but significantly shapes agency priorities and responsiveness.

In contrast, context setters such as the House of Representatives (DPR) and industry associations like PFN, GPBSI, and ATNI possess significant political or economic leverage but show limited day-to-day engagement with censorship decisions. Their power lies more in setting the agenda through legislation, budget allocation, or industry lobbying than in enforcing censorship. Their low interest in content-specific outcomes indicates a macro-level engagement with the policy environment rather than micro-level implementation, a pattern typical in hybrid governance systems where state and market logics interact.

Subjects, including the Indonesian Film Board (BPI) and professional associations (e.g., KFT, IFDC, Parfi, Aprofi), exhibit high concern about censorship due to its direct impact on their creative freedoms, reputational risks, and market access. However, their low institutional influence reflects the marginalisation of creative voices in the policymaking process. These groups represent the operational heart of the film industry yet remain structurally peripheral, indicating a disjuncture between those who produce content and those who control its public circulation.

Finally, crowd stakeholders, including NGOs, religious groups (MUI, PGI), educators (PGRI), and academics, are largely excluded from formal decision-making processes despite their normative authority and potential to shape public discourse. Their limited role reveals a deficit in participatory governance and underutilised deliberative potential. Although these actors often become vocal during moral or political controversies, their structural position remains weak, mainly confined to reactive interventions rather than proactive engagement (Figure 3).

This stratified configuration suggests a policy environment dominated by hierarchical, state-centric governance, where accountability is upward (to political superiors) rather than outward (to the public or industry). It also highlights the need for integrated, cross-stakeholder mechanisms to address overlaps, improve transparency, and democratise the formulation of censorship policy in Indonesia.

5 Conclusion

This study comprehensively analysed the stakeholder landscape involved in Indonesia’s film censorship policy. Using stakeholder analysis grounded in Ackermann and Eden’s framework, the research identified 18 key stakeholders and categorised them into four distinct groups: key players, context setters, subjects, and the crowd. This classification clarifies the influence and interest dynamics shaping censorship policy implementation in Indonesia’s media and cultural governance landscape.

The key players comprise the Ministry of Culture, the Indonesian Censorship Board (Lembaga Sensor Film or LSF), and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia or KPI). These institutions have formal authority and operational control over the content approval process. LSF is responsible for film censorship and issuing Film Censorship Certificates (Sertifikat Tanda Lulus Sensor or STLS), while KPI exercises regulatory oversight on post-broadcast television content. Their overlapping but distinct mandates place them at the centre of Indonesia’s censorship ecosystem. Their dominant influence, however, also raises questions about regulatory coherence, institutional coordination, and the transparency of their decision-making processes.

The context setters include the House of Representatives (DPR) and industry bodies such as GPBSI, PPHI, and PFN. These actors possess high influence but relatively lower direct interest in enforcing censorship policy. Their influence is often structural or financial, particularly in shaping legislative and budgetary frameworks. Meanwhile, subjects—comprising independent organisations like the Indonesian Film Board (BPI) and five film worker associations—demonstrate high interest in censorship policy but exert limited influence. These stakeholders represent the voices of creative professionals who are often directly affected by censorship decisions but lack institutional access or political leverage to shape them. Finally, the crowd includes academics, NGOs, and religious or community groups that maintain low levels of interest and influence but occasionally mobilise public sentiment in response to controversial content.

This study highlights several critical insights. First, the stakeholder configuration reflects a power asymmetry where state institutions retain disproportionate control over cultural expression, often at the expense of participatory governance. Second, while collaboration exists between state and non-state actors, it is usually ad hoc and top-down, lacking inclusive mechanisms for conflict resolution or dialogue. The dominance of LSF and KPI, although central to policy enforcement, may marginalise industry voices and civil society input, raising concerns about the broader legitimacy and responsiveness of censorship policy.

Inclusive mediation platforms involving all stakeholder groups are needed to improve policy coherence and democratic accountability. These platforms should facilitate open deliberation on censorship decisions’ cultural, legal, and economic implications. Establishing structured consultation processes, publishing clear censorship criteria, and integrating civil society feedback mechanisms can enhance policy transparency and public trust.

While essential for safeguarding societal values, censorship policy in Indonesia must evolve in line with democratic principles and international standards on freedom of expression. From a political perspective, this evolution reflects the broader tension arising from the interplay of interests and power relations between state and non-state actors within the dynamics of global cultural governance. Indonesia, navigates a complex duality: asserting its sovereign right to regulate media content based on national identity and security, while simultaneously engaging with international human rights frameworks and regional commitments such as the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Effective media governance, therefore, requires legal authority, domestic legitimacy, and responsiveness to global normative expectations and transnational cultural flows. The stakeholder dynamics uncovered in this study reveal how local policy contestations are embedded within these broader international structures, where state actors act as both norm makers and norm takers. As such, the future of censorship policy lies in fostering collaborative, multilevel governance that balances the imperatives of national cultural integrity with the universal principles of freedom of expression and public participation. The findings of this study thus contribute not only to the literature on stakeholder governance but also to international debates on how states manage domestic policy under global normative influence, offering lessons for media regulation across global sout.

Generative AI statement

The author(s) declared that Generative AI was used in the creation of this manuscript. Generative AI used to enhance the grammar of Manuscript. While preparing this manuscript, the author(s) utilised various AI-based platforms, including ChatGPT, DeepL and Grammarly, to enhance language quality, clarity, and readability. Subsequently, the author(s) carefully reviewed and edited the content, assuming full responsibility for the publication’s accuracy and clarity.

Any alternative text (alt text) provided alongside figures in this article has been generated by Frontiers with the support of artificial intelligence and reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, including review by the authors wherever possible. If you identify any issues, please contact us.

Publisher’s note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Footnotes

Edited by: Muhammad Saud, Airlangga University, Indonesia

Reviewed by: Irwanto Irwanto, Binus University, Indonesia

Usman Idris, Cenderawasih University, Indonesia