Original Research
Frontiers in Political Science ·
Volume 8 - 2026 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1813236
Can hasty referendums make good neighbors? The legitimacy of the Venezuela’s Guyana referendum
- Nanuli Silagadze1*corresponding author
- Savitri Jetoo2,3
- 1Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSV), Mid Sweden University, Sundsvall, Sweden
- 2Abo Akademi, Turku, Finland
- 3Booth School of Engineering and Public Policy, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada
Abstract
Referendums, often portrayed as direct expressions of popular will, have increasingly been employed by populist and authoritarian leaders to consolidate power and legitimize contentious political decisions. As territorial disputes escalate and global tensions grow over environmental resources, this paper examines the legitimacy of referendums in resolving these disputes through the case of Venezuela’s Guyana referendum. On December 3, 2023, Venezuelans voted in a referendum initiated by President Maduro’s government to claim sovereignty of Essequibo, with Venezuela’s Electoral Council asserting 10.5 million valid votes and over 95% voting in favor. Using a case study approach and document analysis of official statements, media coverage, and institutional reports, we critically examine the referendum’s political context, campaign dynamics, and outcomes. The referendum served as a tool for authoritarian maneuvering, functioning simultaneously as a domestic plebiscite and a geopolitical instrument aimed at bolstering Maduro’s legitimacy while challenging international legal processes. We argue that referendums conducted under authoritarian conditions are unlikely to foster peaceful bilateral cooperation and may instead heighten tensions—hasty referendums do not make good neighbors.
Keywords
1. Introduction
Referendums, often portrayed as direct expressions of popular will, have increasingly been employed by populist and authoritarian leaders to consolidate power and legitimize contentious political decisions. As territorial disputes escalate and global tensions grow over environmental resources, this paper examines the legitimacy of referendums in resolving these disputes. It does this by examining the case study of Venezuela’s Guyana Referendum which took place prior to Venezuela’s elections in 2023. On December 3, 2023, Venezuelans voted in a referendum initiated by President Maduro’s government to claim sovereignty of Essequibo, a county in neighboring Guyana. Venezuela’s Electoral Council asserted that there were 10.5 million valid votes on the five-question referendum, with over 95% voting in favor. This study explores the dual role of referendums as both democratic instruments and tools for authoritarian maneuvering, analyzing the implications of the recent Venezuela’s Guyana referendum for regional stability and international law.
This article is guided by the central question posed in the title ‘can hasty referendums make good neighbours?’ It argues that referendums conducted under authoritarian conditions, particularly those driven by strategic political motives rather than genuine democratic deliberation, are unlikely to foster peaceful bilateral cooperation and may instead lead to heightened tensions. While authoritarian leaders have long used referendums and plebiscites to consolidate power and claim popular legitimacy, the 2023 Venezuela-Guyana referendum represents a distinctive case. Unlike many authoritarian referendums that focus on constitutional change or domestic regime consolidation, the Venezuelan referendum sought public endorsement for a territorial claim directed at a neighboring sovereign state. The case therefore extends existing scholarship by illustrating how authoritarian referendums can be used not only to strengthen domestic political authority but also to challenge ongoing international legal processes and shape interstate territorial disputes.
It begins with a brief history tracing the use of referendums, then presents the methods and context of this research. Through a critical examination of the referendum’s political context, its functions, campaign dynamics, and outcomes, we aim to comprehend its broader ramifications on legitimacy and the geopolitics of territorial disputes. It ends in a discussion and conclusion of the legitimacy of Venezuela’s Guyana referendum.
The historical use of referendums as tools of direct democracy
The modern momentum for referendums began in the 1960s. Referendums are “used twice as frequently today compared with 50 years ago and almost four times more than at the turn of the twentieth century” (Altman, 2011, p. 65). In practice, out of 195 sovereign states, only 65 have never conducted a referendum (Morel and Qvortrup, 2017). Furthermore, instruments of direct democracy have spread not only across countries and regions but also across different levels of government (Ruth et al., 2017). However, not all referendums are created equal. One of the most important distinctions in the literature is between citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy and government-controlled referendums. Altman (2011, 2019) emphasizes that these instruments should not be treated as equivalent, as they differ fundamentally in terms of who controls the political agenda and whose interests they serve. Scholars further distinguish between referendums and plebiscites. Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, a plebiscite is generally understood as a top-down vote initiated by political leaders seeking public endorsement for a policy or political course of action. Historically, plebiscites have been associated with authoritarian and personalist rule, serving as instruments of regime legitimation rather than genuine citizen participation (Altman, 2011, 2019; Penadés and Velasco, 2022).
Historically, some policies have been more popular than others. In Europe, for example, half of all referendums have focused on political or electoral systems and domestic policies. In contrast, referendums on education, media, and health make up only 5% of all popular votes (Silagadze and Gherghina, 2020a, b). Additionally, elements of direct democracy—such as citizen initiatives and referendums—have become established tools in environmental governance (Buček and Smith, 2000). In the United States alone, hundreds of environmental issues, including energy, natural resources, and plastic pollution, have been put to a popular vote (BALLOTPEDIA. Environment on the Ballot, 2024; Silagadze and Jetoo, 2023). Another distinct and frequently voted-upon category of referendum topics is sovereignty referendums, which incorporate ethnonational referendums, referendums on the boundary/identity question, referendums on territorial issues (Mendez and Germann, 2018). A comparative analysis of 18 Latin American countries from 1980 to 2018 reveals that the expansion of mechanisms of direct democracy is often initiated by populist presidents pursuing strategic advantages (Ruth-Lovell and Welp, 2024).
2. Materials and methods
This study makes use of the case study approach and document analysis. The case study approach is an established research method used in a variety of disciplines including social and natural sciences, as it probes into a subject in its natural setting. Whilst in the experimental design the investigator seeks to manipulate the variables of interest, in the naturalistic case study approach explores a subject in the context that it occurs. Case studies can be used to explain, describe, or explore events or phenomena in the everyday contexts in which they are happening (Yin, 2009). The case study approach was used here as it allows for an in depth, critical examination of a complex topic in a real life setting. It allows for the capturing of data on more investigatory questions of the how, what and why of an issue in depth. Whilst there are many approaches to undertaking the case study, this research has drawn on the critical, reflective perspective, considering social and political environmental factors that have shaped the case (Doolin, 1998).
This study uses documents as a source of data to further examine this case study. It systematically reviews and evaluates electronic documents pertaining to the case study in order to develop empirical knowledge. These documents contain words and images that were stored and used by the researchers, without intervention. As noted by Corbin and Strauss (2008), document analysis examines and interprets data in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge. Document selection followed two criteria as follows: relevance to the 2023 referendum and territorial dispute, and recent peer reviewed literature, major international media and official statements. The documents used in this study include media reports, press releases, organizational and institutional reports, event programs, maps and charts, scientific reports, briefing notes and peer reviewed literature. Sources include (1) official government statements, including speeches and declarations by President Nicolás Maduro; (2) international organizational reports; (3) national and international media coverage; and (4) statements from civil society organizations and opposition actors where available. The data analysis consists of finding, selecting, evaluating, and synthesizing the data from these documents. This process yielded data as seen here, excerpts, quotations, that are organized into themes and case examples through content analysis. Excluded materials include unverifiable social media content and sources lacking editorial oversight. The limited visibility of civil society responses is interpreted cautiously, as it may reflect both political disengagement and the effects of repression.
The case study—The Venezuela Guyana referendum
The territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana is two centuries old. When Venezuela gained independence from the Spanish Empire in 1811, the Essequibo region was considered part of the new country. However, 3 years later, the British Empire acquired the colony of Guiana (now Guyana) situated next to Venezuela through a treaty with the Netherlands. The treaty did not clearly define the borders, leading to a dispute over the Essequibo region. In 1841, Venezuela accused Britain of invading its territory, igniting the conflict. Years of international arbitration followed, culminating in an 1889 decision by the Paris Arbitration Court that recognized Essequibo as part of British territory—a ruling that continues to govern Guyana’s borders today. Venezuela has long argued that the Paris court was biased and that Britain unlawfully seized Essequibo in the 19th century (Berezina and Direyeva, 2023). Beyond geopolitical and economic factors, the Essequibo dispute holds deep historical and symbolic significance within Venezuela. Many Venezuelans perceive the 1899 Paris Arbitration Award as unjust, arguing that it was shaped by imperial interests and excluded Venezuelan representation (Strønen, 2017; Trinkunas, 2016). This interpretation has been reinforced through school curricula, official cartography, and repeated political messaging, where the Essequibo region is presented as “Zona en Reclamación” or reclaimed national territory (Delcas, 2023). Over time, this has produced a widely shared sovereignty narrative in which the dispute is not primarily understood as a settled international legal issue, but as an ongoing historical injustice. At the same time, distrust in international arbitration and institutions has further reinforced this perception, particularly given Venezuela’s long-standing position that the 1899 ruling was illegitimate.
In 1966, just before Guyana gained independence from the United Kingdom, Caracas and London signed the Geneva Agreement, acknowledging Venezuela’s claims and seeking practical solutions to settle the dispute. Although the territorial claims remained unresolved, they did not lead to significant conflict during the 20th century. Relations between Venezuela and Guyana were particularly amicable under Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, with Guyana even joining Petrocaribe, an alliance created by Chávez that provided Venezuelan oil at discounted rates. The dispute over Essequibo reignited in 2015 when substantial oil deposits were discovered in the region. The estimated reserves, totaling 11 billion barrels (0.6% of global reserves), were valued at over half a trillion dollars, leading The Economist to dub Guyana the “new oil state of the world” (Berezina & Direyeva, 2023). These newfound resources place Guyana among the top 20 countries in terms of oil potential, on par with nations like Norway and Brazil. Besides, the wealth is to be shared among a relatively small population. Despite being the size of Britain, Guyana has just 800,000 inhabitants, with much of its territory covered by rainforest. This presents a significant opportunity for per capita economic growth, which has already surged. In 2015, when U.S. oil giant Exxon made its first discovery in Guyanese waters, the gross domestic product per capita was $11,000, by 2023, it was estimated to have risen to $60,000 (Long, 2023).
In 2018, Guyana requested the International Court of Justice to finally resolve the territorial dispute, but a decision is still years away. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro accused Guyana, along with the United States and international oil giants, of attempting to rob Venezuela of its land through what he calls “legal colonialism” (Taylor, 2023a). Tensions escalated further in September 2023, when Guyana held an auction in which oil companies bid for exploration licenses in the contested Essequibo waters (Buschschlüter, 2023a).
On Sunday, December 3, Venezuelan voters were asked in a referendum to decide the future of the disputed region. President Maduro, who was serving as Venezuela’s president at the time of the referendum,urged people to turn out in large numbers and vote “five times ‘yes’. The referendum was conducted despite the UN International Court’s directive for Venezuela to refrain from any actions in the territorial dispute with Guyana. Notably, one of the questions in the referendum asked Venezuelans whether they agreed to reject the jurisdiction of the International Court regarding the territorial dispute (Berezina and Direyeva, 2023).
According to officials, voter turnout reached historically high levels, with 10.5 million votes cast in a country of 20.7 million eligible voters. The officially announced turnout was 51%, with over 99% of participants voting in favor of all the questions. However, critics argue that since voters were asked to respond to five questions, the 10.5 million votes actually represent only about 2 million voters. Opposition media and international press reported minimal turnout, noting that polling stations were quiet throughout the day, casting doubt on the government’s claims of high participation. The low turnout led many analysts to accuse the Venezuelan government of falsifying the results, as national and international media observed largely empty voting stations across the country. Despite this, Maduro was quick to declare an “overwhelming victory” (Buschschlüter, 2023a; Taylor, 2023b). Speaking before supporters gathered in Caracas, President Nicolás Maduro declared: “It has been a total success for our country, for our democracy… We have taken the first steps of a new historic stage in the struggle for what belongs to us” (Al Jazeera, 2023). Maduro further argued that the referendum represented a legitimate and peaceful response to what he described as a long-standing injustice: “We are solving through constitutional, peaceful and democratic means an imperial dispossession of 150 years” (Cano and Rueda, 2023). Government officials reinforced this narrative of national unity and democratic legitimacy. In an evening address broadcast on state television, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López described the vote as a reaffirmation of Venezuelan sovereignty, stating: “Today is a day of ratification, of national sovereignty, and the people have done it with flying colors” (France 24, 2023).
At the same time, opposition actors and independent observers challenged the government’s portrayal of the referendum. Opposition representatives claimed that only around 11% of eligible voters had participated, a figure that sharply contradicted official accounts of broad public mobilization (Cano and Rueda, 2023). Opposition leader Henrique Capriles criticized the government’s turnout figures, arguing that authorities had inflated participation by counting the five referendum questions separately rather than individual voters. Writing on X (formerly Twitter), he stated that the authorities “did not dare to say it was 2,110,864 voters,” adding that Maduro had “turned” the referendum into “a resounding failure” (EFE, 2023).
The aftermath of the referendum further highlighted the polarized political climate surrounding the Essequibo issue. Shortly after the vote, Venezuelan authorities issued arrest warrants for several individuals linked to opposition presidential candidate María Corina Machado. Attorney General Tarek William Saab, a close ally of Maduro, announced that prosecutors had uncovered a “international conspiracy” allegedly financed by the US oil company Exxon Mobil to undermine Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo region. Among those targeted were three members of Machado’s political team (Buschschlüter, 2023b; Singer, 2023).
Civil society’s response to the 2023 referendum on the Essequibo dispute was critical, rather than unified or strongly mobilized. For example, a November 2023 statement released from the Catholic Bishops from the Episcopal council of Venezuela called on President Maduro not to use the referendum to “manipulate for political interests” and urged government to focus on solving the country’s crisis in fuel, public services and health (US Embassy in Caracas, 2023).
Analysts suggest that President Maduro’s decision to organize a non-binding referendum was an attempt to mobilize public support by stirring nationalist sentiment and diverting attention from demands for free and fair elections. While the Essequibo dispute is the only issue that unites Venezuelans across the political spectrum, the low turnout indicates that people are more concerned with pressing issues like the economic collapse, which has driven over 7 million people to flee the country (Taylor, 2023a, 2023b).
In terms of military power, Venezuela holds a significant advantage. According to Global Firepower, the Venezuelan armed forces rank 52nd out of 145 in the world, with 137,500 military personnel and 229 tanks. In contrast, the Guyanese army is not included in this ranking, with The Military Balance estimating its forces at just 3,000 soldiers and six tanks (Berezina and Direyeva, 2023). It is also noteworthy that Maduro might have expected support from Russia in this conflict since he had supported Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
3. Results
Functions of referendums
In general, referendums have both direct and indirect effects on politics. Direct effects include the introduction of a new law or policy in the case of a successful “yes” vote or the stabilization of the status quo if a proposal is rejected (Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011; Tsebelis, 1999). Indirect effects are more implicit and occur particularly with bottom-up referendums (initiated by the people). These can include introducing new issues to the political agenda or expanding the boundaries of what is considered politically acceptable or imaginable (Linder, 2012). Referendums can serve “as institutionalized, sporadic safety valves of political pressure” (Altman, 2011, 198). In a democratic context, referendums have the potential of improving the quality of democracy as they include the entire demos into the debate rather than limiting it to the political elite (Geissel and Newton, 2012).
When initiated by the political establishment, referendums can serve various functions within the political realm. The most prominent functions identified in the literature include resolving intra- or inter-institutional disputes, decoupling controversial issues from government elections, advancing the legislative agenda, and enhancing one’s political influence via showing wide popular support for the suggested policy (Altman, 2011; Björklund, 1982; Butler and Ranney, 1994; Morel, 1993; Qvortrup, 2006; Rahat, 2009). Qvortrup (2006) also suggests that referendums may be driven by strategic calculation, with the goal of mobilizing political support for the initiator. A study of recent referendums on interethnic relations in Europe concluded that often there is a strategic calculus of the initiator involved who aim either policy legitimation or agenda-setting (Gherghina and Silagadze, 2018).
One of the most common uses of referendums by political elites is to enhance overall legitimacy, particularly for their policies. Studies indicate that direct democracy, whether on paper or in practice, leads to higher levels of subjective regime legitimacy, or acceptance and support for state authorities (Gherghina, 2017). Policies gain additional legitimacy when approved by the people: “once a policy has overcome the referendum hurdle, it has acquired more credibility because it is not just based on the support of a parliamentary inner circle” (Papadopoulos, 1995, p. 433). For example, research on peace referendums and power-sharing settlements suggests that giving people a say is vital for the legitimacy of new institutions, especially in cases of ethnic conflicts (McEvoy, 2018).
Thus, the motives for holding a referendum vary widely and empirical evidence from around the world confirms that the use of referendums falls on a broad spectrum: from being a tool in the hands of the political elite to making people’s voices count in the decision-making process. Most referendums fall somewhere in between displaying a mix of features that are closer to the manipulative end of the spectrum or the true voice of the populace (Butler and Ranney, 1994; Qvortrup, 2005; Walker, 2003). In the words of Wyller (1996, p. 150), “some have seen in the instrument a last chance for a loser, others a legitimizing factor for the winner.”
In the case of the 2023 Venezuela-Guyana referendum, it is evident that the referendum served multiple functions and leans towards the manipulative end of the spectrum. President Maduro used it as a strategic tool to achieve several objectives: (a) to boost his popularity, which had severely declined due to the country’s dire economic situation; (b) to mobilize political support ahead of the upcoming elections; (c) to secure easy political gains by demonstrating widespread popular support for the policy, as polls indicated that Venezuelans were united on this issue with little controversy; and (d) to legitimize the de facto claim or annexation of the territory, along with any future actions tied to this decision. Ultimately, the referendum was less about genuine public consultation and more about serving as a last resort for a struggling leader amid Maduro’s dwindling support, increased opposition, and upcoming elections, where his rival posed a real threat to his victory.
Use of referendums by authoritarian leaders
In authoritarian contexts, referendums often take the form of plebiscites. According to Penadés and Velasco (2022), plebiscites can be understood as illiberal instruments in the hands of authoritarian rulers, used to overcome internal opposition while simultaneously discouraging external opposition by projecting an image of overwhelming popular support. Historically, plebiscites have frequently produced extraordinarily large majorities in favor of the government, raising concerns about political manipulation and the absence of genuine democratic contestation. Beyond legitimizing decisions already made by political elites, plebiscites may also serve to marginalize and silence opposition by portraying dissenting voices as standing against the expressed will of the people.
Referendums are often hijacked by authoritarian leaders who are far from democratic credentials. Thus, over time, referendums have earned a negative reputation due to their misuse by dictators and autocrats, from Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler to more recent figures like Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Alexander Lukashenko. A key criticism of referendums is their popularity among authoritarian leaders, who have used this tool to seize or consolidate power, often granting themselves extra-constitutional authority (Topaloff, 2017). However, recent research indicates that democratic countries are actually driving the steady growth in the use of referendums: over the past two centuries, the vast majority of referendums have been held in democracies (Silagadze and Gherghina, 2020b).
The level of democracy influences the use of referendums. In the autocratic context, referendum is used serves solely for the purpose of guarding the interests of the ruler, enhancing their power and simultaneously demonstrating their legitimacy, both domestically and internationally (Qvortrup, 2017). Authoritarian leaders have developed an affinity for referendums because, even dictators and autocrats require some degree of popular support, as they can no longer derive their authority from kings or divine blessings. Moreover, in the repressive context, such referendums fulfil a double function—granting the regime legitimacy while simultaneously increasing its control over the citizens (Kobori, 2014, p. 211). Consequently, the topics put to vote are essentially related to the leaders themselves or their political trajectory and there are no citizen-initiated referendums in authoritarian countries. Whereas in democracies, policies subjected to the popular vote is broader and more citizen-oriented, and includes social and labour, health or ethical questions (Silagadze, 2021; Silagadze and Gherghina, 2020a).
The Venezuela-Guyana referendum is a textbook example of an authoritarian referendum and, more specifically, a plebiscite1. At the same time, it differs in important respects from many well-known authoritarian plebiscites. Historically, authoritarian leaders have frequently used referendums to alter constitutions, remove term limits, extend executive authority, or reinforce personal rule. Examples include constitutional referendums under Hugo Chávez, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Alexander Lukashenko, where the primary objective was domestic regime consolidation. The Essequibo referendum also served domestic political purposes, but its central object was external rather than internal. It focused on the sovereignty of a territory administered by another state and sought to generate democratic legitimacy for a claim that was simultaneously under consideration by the International Court of Justice. In this sense, the referendum functioned as both a domestic plebiscite and a geopolitical instrument.
The Venezuela-Guyana was initiated by the executive, conducted in a highly uneven political environment, and served primarily to validate a policy agenda already defined by the government rather than to facilitate genuine public consultation. According to Freedom House, Venezuela is categorized as “not free,” with a Global Freedom score of just 15 out of 100, reflecting a steady deterioration of democratic institutions since 1999 (Freedom House, 2024). Venezuela exhibits several characteristics of authoritarian governance, including the concentration of executive power, repression of political opposition, restrictions on independent media, and politicization of judicial and electoral institutions (Freedom House, 2024; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Participatory mechanisms such as communal councils are often integrated into state structures, limiting independent citizen influence (López Maya, 2011). Recent literature on Venezuela’s political economy and governance emphasizes that state initiatives like the Venezuela-Guyana referendum are typically top down and instrumental, rather than rooted in autonomous civil society mobilization. A recent article in Third World Quarterly argued that Venezuelan governance under the Maduro regime was characterized by centralized, state led political strategies tied to resource nationalism. Within this framework, nationalist claims over resource rich territories like Essequibo are understood as tools of political legitimation linked to extractivism and control of natural resources in an authoritarian regime (Bull, 2026). Civil society is not the primary driver of such initiatives, rather it is structurally marginalized or reactive.
In authoritarian contexts, referendums are designed to serve the interests of the ruling leader rather than function as genuine tools of public consultation. This was clearly the case in Venezuela, where the referendum was used as a strategic instrument to consolidate President Maduro’s power. By orchestrating the referendum, Maduro sought to strengthen his political position, distract from the country’s internal crises, and consolidate his legitimacy.
Thus, the primary function of the referendum was not to resolve public debate, but rather to project an image of broad popular support, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, it allowed Maduro to rally support ahead of upcoming elections, presenting the referendum as a unifying national cause despite growing discontent over Venezuela’s economic collapse. Internationally, it aimed to legitimize his government’s claims over disputed territory, creating a veneer of democratic endorsement to counter external criticism.
Populism and referendums
The Venezuela-Guyana referendum fits the defining characteristics of a populist referendum. President Maduro, a textbook populist leader, leveraged the referendum as a tool to advance his personal and political agenda, as discussed earlier. President Nicolás Maduro can be characterized as a populist leader based on three core dimensions: (1) people centrism, reflected in frequent appeals to “el pueblo” as the source of legitimacy; (2) anti elitism directed at domestic opponents, international institutions, and foreign corporations; and (3) the framing of politics as a moral struggle between the virtuous people and corrupt elites (Mudde, 2004; Hawkins, 2010). As is common with populist strategies, the referendum was held under favorable conditions where a favorable outcome could be predicted (Gherghina and Silagadze, 2020). The issue at hand tapped into nationalistic sentiment and enjoyed broad support across the political spectrum, making it a “safe bet” to bolster his legitimacy without risking political backlash. Additionally, by projecting himself as a strong leader defending national interests and sovereignty, Maduro reinforced his populist image of being the protector of the people against external threats, further consolidating his power.
Given the definition of populism, which is grounded in three core ideas—people-centrism, anti-elitism, and the antagonistic relationship between the “virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014) —it’s understandable why populists would gravitate towards direct democracy. Indeed, according to the literature, populists often regard referendums as a normatively superior method of decision-making, though the relationship is not straightforward (Taggart, 2000). It was the American Populist Party and its allies that fought successfully to establish and spread referendum and initiative at the turn of the twentieth century (Piott, 2004). However, a recent study of party manifestos in 27 EU Member States from 1994 to 2018 confirmed that, while no populist party manifesto explicitly opposes referendums, nearly half make no mention of them at all. This suggests that referendums do not dominate the populist agenda compared to non-populist parties. Additionally, many non-populist parties also support referendums, and in several countries, they make the most claims about their use (Gherghina and Pilet, 2021). This can be attributed to the fact that populism often emphasizes not just popular rule but also strong leadership. Consequently, referendums are typically promoted only when they serve the leader’s interests (Taggart, 2000).
A recent empirical study on the actual use of referendums highlights this ambiguity. Populists initiated a quarter of national-level referendums in Europe over the past two decades, and the number of referendums called by populists has not increased over time. In fact, in the most recent decade, populists have called significantly fewer referendums compared to the previous decade. This suggests that populists are more likely to call referendums in the early stages of gaining political power, but as they become more integrated into the system of representative democracy, their reliance on referendums diminishes. In contrast, non-populist parties initiated approximately 60 percent of referendums between 2010 and 2019 (Gherghina and Silagadze, 2020). Similarly, a recent study drawing on V-Dem data spanning 30 years and 29 countries finds that populist parties are not particularly committed to direct democracy, at least not to a greater extent than non-populist parties. The study shows that populist parties are more likely to promote or support referendums when they are in opposition rather than when they are in government (Angelucci et al., 2024).
These findings illustrate a mismatch between populists’ declared enthusiasm for referendums and their actual use. Populism is characterized by the centralization of power around a leader such as President Maduro, making referendums another tool for consolidating power once populists hold a governing majority (Van Crombrugge, 2021). Moreover, populists tend to favor binding over non-binding referendums and are more likely to initiate referendums in authoritarian regimes, transitional countries, or new democracies, while non-populists initiate more referendums in established democracies. This supports the assumption that populists use referendums strategically—only when they have a good chance of winning or when the issue is salient enough to mobilize a majority that supports their viewpoint (Gherghina and Silagadze, 2020).
4. Discussion
Returning to the central question of whether hasty referendums can make good neighbors, the evidence suggests that they cannot. The Venezuelan referendum neither facilitated dialogue with Guyana nor contributed to conflict resolution. Instead, it entrenched unilateral claims and heightened tensions.
Nicolás Maduro, who served as president of Venezuela during the 2023 Essequibo referendum but is no longer in office at the time of writing, can be characterized, like his predecessor Hugo Chávez, as a textbook populist (Friedman, 2017). However, due to Venezuela’s stagnant economy and triple-digit inflation, Maduro was often referred to as a populist without popularity (Oner, 2021). The 2023 Venezuelan referendum, which asserted claims over the oil-rich Guayana Esequiba region, seems to be a desperate attempt by Maduro to project strength and mobilize support ahead of the elections, amid economic turmoil and dire conditions. Although the outcome of this referendum remains uncertain, previous research suggests that such referendums lead to peaceful outcomes only when both parties—Venezuela and Guyana—agree on the referendum’s legitimacy, and when the international community accepts the result (Qvortrup, 2014).
Our study further fuels the debate on the effectiveness of referendums as a policymaking tool and their strategic use by populist leaders. While scholarship offers differing views on the impact of referendums (Qvortrup, 2005; Silagadze and Gherghina, 2018; Williams and Hume, 2010), the outcome can be measured in two key ways: first, whether a referendum is successful—either adopted or rejected; and second, whether the decision is actually implemented. In this case the outcome was symbolic and not binding.
In March 2024, the Venezuelan National Assembly passed a law establishing a new state called Guayana Esequiba, effectively declaring Venezuela’s unilateral incorporation of the disputed Essequibo region. Despite the political theatre surrounding the law, the measure did not alter the on-the-ground reality. Diplomatically, the dispute has remained at an impasse. Although regional actors have called for negotiation and mediation, neither side has shifted its core position, and the case before the International Court of Justice continues to define the formal legal arena for the conflict. Crucially, no change in administrative control has occurred: Guyana continues to govern Essequibo, and Venezuela’s new maps, declarations and legislative actions have not resulted in recognized international authority or effective occupation. In this sense, the post-referendum developments highlight that the referendum’s outcomes were largely symbolic and lacked binding force in practice.
5. Conclusions
More broadly, the Venezuela-Guyana referendum highlights a less studied use of authoritarian referendums. Unlike many authoritarian plebiscites that focus on changing constitutions or strengthening domestic political control, this referendum sought public support for a territorial claim against another state. In doing so, it linked domestic political legitimation to an ongoing international dispute. The case shows that authoritarian referendums can be used not only to strengthen leaders at home but also to support foreign policy goals and territorial claims, particularly when nationalist narratives and valuable natural resources are involved.
This study demonstrates that hasty referendums do not make good neighbors. Rather than fostering cooperation, such referendums, especially when conducted unilaterally and under authoritarian conditions, risk escalating tensions, undermining international legal processes, and reinforcing zero sum territorial claims. Let us now turn to a more normative question: what constitutes a ‘good’ referendum? Admittedly, labeling referendums as simply “good” or “bad” is overly simplistic, given the complex interplay of various factors and actors involved. However, for the purposes of this case study, a ‘good’ referendum can be defined as one that fosters democratic engagement, adheres to key democratic principles, and is conducted under conditions that ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.
A good referendum must first ensure a free and fair process, allowing all eligible voters to participate without the risk of manipulation or fraud. The referendum question itself should be clear, unambiguous, and easy to understand, so that voters can make informed decisions. The transparency and legitimacy of the process are also crucial, meaning it should be free from political interference, and international observers should be allowed to monitor the vote. Furthermore, an informed public debate is essential, where voters have access to balanced information through media coverage that gives equal airtime to both proponents and opponents of the issue at hand. Finally, the legal impact of the referendum—whether it is binding or non-binding—along with the subsequent implementation of its results, should be considered in evaluating its long-term effectiveness and overall legitimacy.
However, the most important thing to consider when it comes to evaluating referendums is that they do not take place in a vacuum. They are always shaped by the political systems in which they take place. In the case of the Venezuela-Guyana referendum, it is clear that the political context—a highly autocratic regime—made it impossible to guarantee a free and fair process due to widespread political repression. The absence of a free press also meant that voters were denied access to unbiased and balanced information, which is essential for informed decision-making. This referendum was widely criticized for numerous violations, a lack of transparency, and even allegations of fraud. The five bulky questions were difficult to comprehend, and rather than encouraging a nuanced debate on each issue, voters were urged to simply vote “yes” on all five. The only formal criterion this referendum met was allowing all eligible voters to cast their vote, but this is far from sufficient. In this context, the referendum became merely an extension of the autocratic machinery, serving only to advance the leader’s agenda and strengthen his position, rather than facilitating genuine public consultation.
Thus, this referendum does not qualify as democratic, legitimate, or “good.” While its long-term consequences remain uncertain, it is evident that it has not contributed to improving relations with Guyana, as neither Guyana nor the international community has recognized its legitimacy. Furthermore, this referendum has done nothing to advance international law. It was conducted in defiance of the UN International Court’s directives and disregarded the ongoing territorial dispute being handled by the International Court of Justice. Crucially, when a referendum concerns the fate of another country, that country should be included in the decision-making process. One of the key criticisms of referendums is the risk of the “tyranny of the majority,” (Moeckli, 2018) and this case clearly demonstrates that danger, especially given the disproportion in population between the two countries.
In democratic systems, referendum questions must typically be approved by a constitutional court, and questions that infringe on minority rights are often not permitted to be voted on. However, in autocratic regimes, even the courts become extensions of the government, eroding the system of checks and balances that is vital for democratic legitimacy.
Statements
- Conflict of interest
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
- Funding
The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.
- Data availability
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
- Author contributions
NS: Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. SJ: Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.
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Citation
Silagadze, N. & Jetoo, S. (2026). Can hasty referendums make good neighbors? The legitimacy of the Venezuela’s Guyana referendum. Frontiers in Political Science, Volume 8. https://doi.org/
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- 8 - 2026
Copyright
Copyright © 2026 Silagadze and Jetoo.
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
*Correspondence: Nanuli Silagadze
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