Political discourse and crimmigration in South America: a comparative study

1 Introduction and context

Over the past decade, intraregional migration in South America has experienced sustained growth and has shaped new social, political, and legal landscapes. According to the International Organization for Migration (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), 2022; Organización Internacional para las Migraciones and Foro Especializado Migratorio del MERCOSUR y Estados Asociados, 2023), the current situation reflects three patterns: the emigration of South American nationals outside the region, intraregional immigration, and extra regional immigration. Between 2015 and 2020, the total number of emigrants of South American origin worldwide increased by 5.8 million, rising from 11.8 million to 17.6 million, representing a 49% increase (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), 2022).

Intraregional migration within South America accounts for 79% of migratory movements in the region (UN DESA, 2020). The three countries compared in this study are part of South–South migration, understood as “a traditional livelihood strategy for millions of people in the global South” (International Organization of Migration – IOM, 2013) In terms of population, Argentina has 2.3 million migrants; Chile, 1.6 million; and Ecuador, 1.3 million. In relative terms, these figures amount to 8.6% of the population in Chile, 5% in Argentina, and 4.4% in Ecuador, according to Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) (2024).

In these countries, among the last 3 years, this quantitative phenomenon is directly correlated with political debate and discourse, as there is a tendency to link migration to security issues and rising crime rates. Migration, therefore, as a central theme of political debate in the Southern Cone, invites reflection on electoral discourses grounded in paradigms of sovereignty and national security, in which “the production and reproduction of the political meaning of migration […]” and both paradigms function as “pillars of the modern understanding of the phenomenon of migration” (Bassa Mercado and González Pérez, 2021, p. 455).

Based on these paradigms, “we have witnessed the intensification of the use of migration as a political tool […], particularly in Europe, where the outcomes of some national elections revolved around issues of opposition to immigration […]” (McAuliffe and Oucho, 2024, p. 3). This has also been evident in the hemisphere, especially in the early 21st century in the United States and is no stranger to the countries under study in recent years. For this reason, it is possible to frame the concept of “crimmigration,” which instrumentalizes penal populism as a tool of electoral propaganda in the South American countries under study.

In countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile—characterized by constitutional frameworks that grant varying degrees of rights to people on the move—we observe the emergence of political discourses that, despite their contextual differences, share a common thread: the association of migration with insecurity and control. It is important to note that while in all three countries this is primarily a rhetorical strategy, it is also used as the basis which build the idea of migrants as a threat. In this regard, the influx of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans over the past 10 years—which has intensified since 2018—has led to greater obstacles in migration processes. This is not limited to a single nationality. For example, in Argentina, Bolivian and Paraguayan migrants are similarly disadvantaged in accessing rights that were guaranteed until the Milei administration. In Chile, we can highlight Haitian and Colombian citizens who face difficulties in regularizing their status and are consequently criminalized due to delays in processing and pending asylum applications.

Consequently, this study proposes a comparative analysis of the mentioned countries through the concept of “crimmigration”—conceptualized in academic literature as the technical and ideological symbiosis between immigration control and the criminal justice system (Stumpf, 2006)—which allows for the incorporation of punitive logics into the management of human mobility.

Thus, beyond the normative dimension, crimmigration can be expressed at the level of discourse through narratives that portray migrants as figures associated with risk, threat, or criminality, thereby allowing for the incorporation of punitive logics into the management of human mobility.

In line with this thought, the research question is: How is crimmigration expressed in political discourses in Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile?

Before answering, it is worth noting that the concept was developed in USA¹, so, it underlays differences when examining this phenomenon in Latin America. One can find significant differences, both in the way migrants are defined as “the other” and in the way control mechanisms operate (Dufraix Tapia et al., 2021).

Based on the conceptualization of crimmigration and the need to explore how this theoretical construct manifests itself—or is reconfigured—in the Latin American context, this hypothesis is that the reality of migration is a phenomenon that affects all structures and has ceased to be an emerging issue, instead, migration has become one of the main concerns of public debate and, public policy. Thus, in Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile, crimmigration is expressed in political discourse through the link between migration and crime, framing migrants as a threat in order to legitimize the use of punitive approaches in the management of human mobility.

The current context shows that, over the past decade, the management of migration flows in the Southern Cone, and the Andean region has ceased to be an administrative matter and has become the epicenter of the public and discursive national security agenda. Some recent studies show that, for instance, there is an ongoing process of crimmigration under construction and an instrumental use of penal control for migration purposes in the Peruvian reality. As Prado Manrique (2025) states, this idea has become established in the popular imaginary and has motivated many South American governments to adopt measures aimed at strengthening migration control. These measures are characterized by intensifying surveillance over foreign individuals (Domenech, 2017). Other perspectives in the region state that the intersection between criminal law and migration control in the Chilean scenario is deepened through the mediatization of collective expulsions, in which migrant bodies appear racialized and associated with criminality (Córdova-Rivera, 2025).

Thus, in the 2023–2025 electoral context, this convergence has reached a new peak in which migrants are discursively constructed as the “internal enemy.” This character appears as necessary to legitimize promises of order, control, and security.

To support this assertion, it is worth referring to Teun van Dijk (2009), who, in Discourse and Power and Discourse and Context: A Sociocognitive Approach (2012), outlines the contours of a disciplinary perspective that he calls Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). In this vein, his proposal centers on the perspective that the analyst must adopt. Besides, it involves a type of analytical research on discourse and […] the ways in which the abuse of social power, domination, and inequality are practiced and reproduced through texts and speech in social and political contexts (Aguilar Peña, 2013).

In this regard, Chile, Argentina, and Ecuador, in their power struggles, have resorted to exploiting fear and promising a “cleanup” of immigration policies. While in Chile the debate centers on the militarization of borders and administrative deportations, in Argentina the discourse shifts toward revoking residency on suspicion, and in Ecuador, the internal security crisis blurs the distinction between migrants and criminals. In order to understand which, discourse we are referring to, in the theoretical approach we present some differences between political/electoral discourse and governmental discourse.

2 Methodological framework

This study adopts a descriptive qualitative approach, since, according to Hernández-Sampieri and Mendoza (2018), qualitative studies seek to understand social phenomena by interpreting meanings, discourses, and practices within their specific contexts, while the descriptive scope allows for the identification and characterization of the properties and manifestations of a given phenomenon. Thus, the study seeks to describe and interpret the manifestations of migration constructed in political discourses and their relationship to the processes of crimmigration in the South American countries under study.

The analysis is based on the government platforms of Javier Milei (Argentina), Daniel Noboa (Ecuador), and José Antonio Kast (Chile), understanding these documents as programmatic frameworks that condense political narratives—primarily those concerning migration and proposals for state intervention in this area. The selection of these cases is based on a theoretical and intentional criterion aimed at identifying different expressions of “crimmigration” in political discourses, given that all three figures were key players in recent electoral processes (2023–2025) in which migration played a significant role in their proposals regarding public safety, border control, and the strengthening of state authority.

In this regard, the selection of Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile is based on three criteria: temporal proximity—that is, the period during which the electoral processes under examination took place; the availability of government programs that allow for the creation of a comparable body of documentation; and the presence of the issue of migration within those government programs related to security, borders, and state control. Therefore, the selection is not based on the size of the migrant population in each country nor does it aim to constitute a statistically representative sample of South America.

However, in the countries under study, the comparison is particularly relevant because, despite their institutional and contextual differences, all three cases demonstrate processes of the politicization of migration based on discourses or narratives that link human mobility to crime and insecurity. In Chile, these discourses have focused on strengthening borders and deportation measures; in Argentina, on the association between migration, crime, and restrictions on residency; and in Ecuador, on the link between human mobility, the security crisis, and organized crime.

In this regard, these elements allow us to examine how different national contexts converge in the discursive construction of migrants as a potential threat. At the same time, the differences between their constitutional and immigration frameworks allow us to observe how these discursive constructions unfold in distinct legal contexts.

Based on this definition, the research’s documentary corpus consists of the government platforms corresponding to the three aforementioned candidates, selected because they serve as the programmatic agenda of a political proposal—in which priorities are established and the proposals that the candidates intend to implement through government action are formulated. Furthermore, using them as a common source for all three cases ensures a consistent documentary standard for comparison.

Consequently, statements from interviews, social media, campaign events, or electoral debates—as well as other documents not included in the analyzed programs—were not included in the corpus, as their inclusion would have diverted the research from its objective. Although the inclusion of other instances of discourse production, circulation, or reception—such as parliamentary debates, presidential speeches, the media, or public opinion—exceeds the scope of this study, analyzing them would allow future research to broaden the triangulation and examine the processes of circulation and reception of the identified narratives.

Within the government platforms, the segments included in the analysis were those referring to migration, foreign nationals, irregular migration status, security, crime, borders, sovereignty, deportation, surveillance, territorial control, and public order. Content unrelated to migration or to the study’s analytical categories was excluded. Thus, the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the corpus combined a documentary delimitation—the government program as the common primary source—and a thematic delimitation—the presence of content relevant to the research problem.

Similarly, the constitutional texts and current immigration regulations in each country are examined in order to compare political discourses with the legal frameworks for the protection of rights. These are used not to expand the main body of analysis, but to provide another level of analysis that allows for a comparison of electoral proposals with the respective regulatory frameworks and to observe whether there is continuity, discrepancies, or correspondence with certain subsequent government actions.

The methodological strategy and interpretation of the findings are based on critical discourse analysis (CDA) developed by Van Dijk, (2008) whose contributions on discourse, power, and the representation of social groups guide the analytical procedure of this research. From this perspective, the study examines how political discourse can construct differentiated representations of social groups and how certain attributes, problems, or threats are discursively associated with them. In the context of migration, this approach allows us to observe the ways in which migrants may be represented through associations with irregularity, insecurity, criminality, or threat, as well as the control measures that are legitimized in response to such representations. Along these lines, Rodríguez (2019), drawing on the work of Van Dijk, demonstrates the usefulness of ACD in analyzing discursive mechanisms of the criminalization of immigration, particularly through thematic associations and representations linked to illegality, crime, and threat.

This approach is complemented by Foucault’s perspective²,which helps us understand that language constitutes a social practice capable of producing and legitimizing power relations. In this sense, it becomes evident how discourses not only reflect certain ideological positions but also produce regimes of truth that shape institutional action. Thus, while Van Dijk provides the main framework for examining strategies of discursive representation, Foucault offers an interpretive perspective on the relationships between discourse, truth, and power.

Through discourse analysis, we identify the statements, categories, and argumentative strategies through which migration is represented in political programs, paying special attention to their connection to notions of security, crime, border control, and public order. Accordingly, the unit of analysis consists of those statements, assessments, arguments, and programmatic proposals in which migration, migrants, or state intervention regarding human mobility are represented. Identifying these elements does not imply that every reference to security, sovereignty, or border control constitutes, in and of itself, an instance of criminalization; their interpretation depends on the role they play within the discourse and the way in which they construct both the migrant subject and the state’s response.

The analysis procedure was carried out using a coding system based on the categories developed in the theoretical framework. In the first phase, the relevant segments of each government program were identified and selected according to the specified criteria. In the second phase, these segments were examined based on five analytical dimensions: (1) the framing of migration or migrants as a threat, risk, or security problem; (2) the association between migration, irregularity, delinquency, or criminality; (3) the securitization of migration through references to sovereignty, borders, surveillance, or territorial control; (4) the formulation of punitive or restrictive responses, such as deportation, entry bans, criminal records, criminalization, or other control mechanisms; and (5) the presence of statements related to the protection of rights, inclusion, equality, regularization, or non-discrimination.

This last dimension allows us to identify formulations that contradict, qualify, or coexist with the identified securitizing manifestations and prevents us from assuming that every migration regulation or border control policy constitutes a manifestation of “crimmigration.” Consequently, the interpretation focuses on the way in which these proposals are discursively justified and, especially, on their potential articulation with categories of dangerousness, criminality, or threat.

Similarly, drawing on Stumpf’s (2006) concept of “crimmigration,” the analysis aims to identify analogous processes between immigration control and criminal justice logics, as well as expressions of criminal populism (Pratt, 2007) present in the electoral proposals examined. These categories come into play during an interpretive stage that follows the identification and coding of discursive segments. In this way, “crimmigration” allows us to examine the analogy between immigration control mechanisms and logics specific to the criminal justice sphere, while “criminal populism” enables us to interpret those constructions in which the tightening of control, punishment, or the restoration of order are presented as responses to situations constructed through discourse in terms of insecurity or threat.

Finally, through a comparison of the cases studied, we assess the correspondence or tension between these discourses and the constitutional principles of equality, non-discrimination, and the protection of migrants’ rights.

3 Theoretical framework

In order to examine the instrumentalization of penal populism as a tool of electoral propaganda that reinforces a discourse capable of eroding fundamental guarantees, it is necessary to delve deeper into the conceptualization and very brief history of penal populism and into the concept of “crimmigration,” which is associated with that of the “useful enemy.” In the same vein, and given the influence of the understanding of power and its link to discourse, it is essential to incorporate Foucault’s perspective, whose theories delve into knowledge-power and power-knowledge (Foucault, 2002), which allows us to understand that penal populism manifests itself not only as a political strategy but also as a discursive practice that limits positive discourse on migration and exacerbates and criminalizes the migrant subject.

The concept of punitive populism originated in England and spread to other countries such as Australia, New Zealand (Bottoms, 1995; Wood, 2014), and the United States (Pratt, 2007). Particularly interesting in this discussion is the analysis proposed by Wood (2014), who notes that “Punitive populism refers to the idea that public support for more severe criminal justice policies (most specifically incarceration) has become a primary driver of policy making, as well as of political election cycles.” For the author, the term “punitive” “refers to the use of criminal justice sanctions for purposes of punishment” (2013, p. 1). So, it would be worth to clear, once more, that the main concept is penal populism or punitive populism and not populism as theoretical category.

To strength this nexus, in Spain, Silva Sánchez has argued for “the existence of a clearly dominant trend in the legislation of all countries toward the introduction of new criminal offenses, as well as the aggravation of existing ones” (Silva Sánchez, 2001, p. 20). The author highlights the “introduction of crimes against the socioeconomic order or the new regulation of crimes related to land-use planning […]” (pp. 20–21), an element directly linked to internal security and sovereignty, themes central to current xenophobic discourses and the escalation of anti-immigration sentiment.

It is in this vein that the concept of “crimmigration” is addressed—a framework developed by Juliet Stumpf in 2006, when, based on her study of immigrants, crime, and sovereign power in the United States, she proposed a unifying theory to clarify how and why criminal law and immigration law converge in a troubling manner.

Stumpf argued that “the fusion of the two branches, in both substantive and procedural terms, has created parallel systems in which immigration law and the criminal justice system are separated only formally” (2006, p. 376). Authors who take up the thesis of “crimmigration” in the region (Brandariz, 2024; Cociña Cholaky, 2022; Menjívar et al., 2018; Flax, 2019) agree that the boundaries between these two areas of law have become blurred and acknowledge that, although immigration law (administrative law) and criminal law are two distinct branches of the legal system and are only loosely related, they are used to undermine the enforcement of migrants’ human rights. In the same line, authors like Dufraix Tapia et al. (2021), as mentioned before establish the differences of the concept of crimmigration in the Global North and in South America.

As noted earlier, this convergence has reached a new peak, identifying migrants as the “internal enemy” necessary to legitimize promises of order and control.

In this regard, in 2006, Zaffaroni asserted that the current state of the planet reveals a phenomenon that “highlights as never before (…) the absolutist rift in the constitutional rule of law, introducing into its framework a corrosive element that, at some tragic moment, would come to be called (…) the doctrine of national security […]” (p. 4). Among the four hypotheses he proposes, ³ the second is of particular interest, as it points out that “in political theory, the differential treatment of human beings deprived of their status as persons (enemies of society)” is a defining feature of the absolute state. In this reflection, that internal enemy is recognized in the figure of the migrant, who is criminalized in political and electoral discourse on account of that very condition—which, in turn, serves as a tool for exploiting fear to gain electoral advantage.

Thus, the migrant/“useful enemy” appears in electoral proposals, revealing a common rhetoric worldwide. At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe, in the context of the migration crisis, was taken as an “example of the securitization of migration and asylum” (Fernández Bessa, 2008; Huysmans, 2006, in Brandariz, 2024, p. 147), by reviving the discourse of national security and sovereignty. At the same time, while criminological migration analyses were developing in the United States, in South America, “and more specifically within MERCOSUR, transformations began to occur regarding migration policies, from a human rights perspective for migrants” (Etchegaray, 2022, p. 25).

In this context, we can recall that in 2003, Argentina was among the first countries to modernize its immigration law with a human rights approach, and in 2008, Ecuador enshrined human mobility and universal citizenship in its constitution, an approach grounded in the universal and Inter-American human rights systems³. Within this timeframe, proposals emerged to challenge security-focused perspectives.⁴ and strengthen new studies in the criminal field from the crimmigratory analysis proposed by Stumpf.

However, all the above can be further explored through Foucault’s ideas on discourse, since they allow us to understand that penal populism, crimmigration, and the construction of the useful enemy operate not only in the normative or political sphere, but also in discursive practice.

Foucault emphasizes that, in every society, the production of discourse is “controlled, selected, and redistributed by a number of procedures whose function is to combine its powers and dangers” (2005, p. 14). This reflection expands on Foucault’s ideas about discourse and the representation of language, especially when he analyzes the role that such discourse plays in the ways of ordering power.

Accordingly, political discourses on migration, in the context of electoral processes, can be understood as those that seek to establish or determine which statements are legitimate, that is, how certain subjects are represented. In this case, migrants are portrayed as “the other,” as the enemy. In this way, migration is linked to insecurity, crime, or threats to sovereignty.

On the other hand, this discourse can also function as a system of exclusion, for example, in the case of migrants’ human rights. Similarly, Foucault’s discussion of the will to truth helps explain how these discourses can appear objective by drawing on technical or legal information, thereby concealing their emergent nature and their connection to power relations (2005, pp. 22–24).

Finally, penal populism, as applied to migration, not only reflects a political orientation but also functions as a discursive mechanism capable of producing subjects, defining threats, and legitimizing punitive interventions, based on the idea that discourse “is not simply that which reflects struggles or systems of domination, but rather that for which, and through which, one struggles, that power one seeks to seize.” (Foucault, 2005, p. 15).

For the reasons outlined, discourse should not only be analyzed as a linguistic structure, but also as a set of strategic practices, “strategic games of action and reaction, of question and answer, of domination and retreat, and also of struggle,” which allows us to understand its connection to power relations (Foucault, 2011, p. 4).

4 Populist penal discourse in electoral contexts in Argentina, Ecuador and Chile

Although punitive power has always discriminated against human beings and “subjected them to punitive treatment that was not befitting their status as persons, by considering them dangerous, harmful, or undesirable” (Zaffaroni, 2006); or, as Wood states, “populist support for punishment is not new, nor is the idea that politicians may capitalize on crime to serve their own ends” (2014, p. 1), this framework is useful in these pages for analyzing the populist discourse on crime evident in the recent elections in Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile.

To establish the relationship between the architecture of punitive power, as Foucault has examined in Discipline and Punish, we distinguish the State, or, in this case, the “gaze of the State” proposed by political discourses, from “a certain spatial and social arrangement of individuals, in which all are subjected to a single form of surveillance” (Foucault, 2002, p. 53), just as it occurred in the gaze of panopticons.

In that sense, political discourses, as van Dijk explains, reproduce power, domination, and ideologies, as said before. This type of discourses political o electoral respond to the rhetoric characteristic of penal populism. As Velásquez (2024) notes, this concept “has been frequently used over the past 5 years to refer to various phenomena linked—in essence—to the use of criminal law for political (especially electoral) purposes by the leadership of contemporary social organizations” (pp. 1031–1,032). The governmental discourse take place, once the electoral proposal is traduced in public policies. So, itencompasses decrees and legislative policies.

To take it a step further, we turn to Ruth Wodak, who affirms, Political speech, in particular, is strategically planned to be convincing, to appeal to the emotions of voters, to portray a particular political point of view, and to ‘construct alliances and membership’.(Wodak, 2004, p. 204;) and its electoral retribution is strategically planned to be convincing, to appeal to the emotions of voters.

From this theoretical perspective, it makes sense to focus on these three countries, where political discourse revolves around this spatial arrangement, one in which power, situated at the center, can exercise control over migrants and their exclusion. Building on this, and to support the legal and discursive analysis, this reflection focuses on three points of convergence: constitutional frameworks, the similarity in the use of punitive propaganda, and the chronological overlap of their electoral processes (2023–2025). It begins with a brief commentary on the temporal coincidence of the most recent elections; it then describes the discursive approach to electoral propaganda, concluding, in each case, with a critical examination of the constitutional frameworks.

4.1 Elections 2023–2025

The presidential elections in Argentina resulted in Javier Milei’s victory in the runoff on December 10, 2023, with a term running through 2027. In Ecuador, the runoff election was held on April 13, 2025, and Daniel Noboa was elected for the 2025–2029 term. The most recent election took place on December 14, 2025, in Chile, where José Antonio Kast won the runoff and will serve as president until 2030.

In the short span of 2 years, the parallels in the contexts are evident: a political shift toward the liberal and far right, as evidenced by the government proposals of the three presidents-elect; a migration context that is difficult to manage, marked by intraregional migration; and a common punitive discourse on migration.

Based on these elements, these pages focus on the theory of “crimmigration” because “it has opened up new perspectives for analysis and revitalized academic discussions on immigration control, detention, deportation, and […] the legal response to crimes committed by foreign nationals” (Brandariz, 2024, p. 146). Furthermore, because it is part of the theoretical frameworks that enable a more critical dialogue between the principles of criminal law, legal safeguards, and the fundamental rights of people on the move.

It is precisely within this framework that the three electoral proposals are analyzed, in line with Zaffaroni’s argument that “the enemy of society or the outsider, that is, the human being regarded as a dangerous or harmful entity rather than as a person with ethical autonomy—is, from a political theory perspective, compatible only with a model of an absolute, totalitarian state; and, consequently, that concessions made by criminal law have ultimately been absolutist obstacles that criminal doctrine has placed as stumbling blocks on the path toward the realization of constitutional states governed by the rule of law.” (2006, p. 6).

4.2 Argentina

Milei’s government proposal, from La Libertad Avanza, registered with the National Electoral Chamber⁵ the document “Bases for political action and national electoral platform” (La Libertad Avanza, 2023) is a narrative document that contains a diagnosis and an electoral platform that condenses economic, tax and labor reforms, and adds six programmatic points⁶. The sixth one corresponds to national security and judicial reform, and is the most extensive in the plan, with 47 objectives.

The introduction of this section highlights, among other issues, the permeability of the borders and the lack of radar systems “along nearly all of the country’s borders (land and maritime) (…) the inadequacy or precariousness of security and (…) the spread of drug trafficking to unexpected places” as the causes of the country’s security forces “being mired in a profound process of discredit and widespread demoralization” (La Libertad Avanza, 2023). In this regard, the plan proposes five guidelines grouped into three areas of analysis, linked to the objective of this study and in relation to the proposed theoretical framework. Namely: i) the modernization and optimization of border control⁷ to “prevent complex crimes and monitor borders remotely”; ii) the sovereign assertion of territorial integrity and territorial security; and iii) the prohibition and restrictions on entry into the country for foreigners with criminal records.

These themes allow us to assert that they criminalize migration. As part of the electoral platform, according to Wood, “include the growth of voter initiatives on crime control, the increase in legislative decision-making over criminal sentencing and corrections” (2014, p. 1). They aim to foster a discourse of fear for electoral purposes, fueled by exaggerated media coverage and a political agenda on migration and crime rooted in penal populism and the identification of a “useful enemy.” As a result, these themes cease to function as a mere description and become a diagnosis that produces a specific interpretation of reality, in which migration, insecurity, and crime are presented as self-evident truths.

In this regard, the impact on human rights was initially reflected in the electoral proposal to tighten citizenship requirements and, consequently, in various restrictions on fundamental rights that have taken the form of legislative and public policy changes.

In this regard, the IACHR’s, 2024 Human Rights Report raised concerns about reforms that restrict the rights of refugees and stated that “matters that are not unlawful were included as criminal offenses, but which can now be used to deny rights […] changes that, in the IACHR’s view, would violate the principle of the presumption of innocence.” (CELS, 2024).

These points have been part of the election debates⁸, widely publicized by the media and social media. These proposals can be identified, in Silva Sánchez’s words, as the result of “[…] a social demand for punishment, more or less shaped by the media.” Otherwise, “one would not truly understand the expansive proposals for criminal legislation put forward by political parties that govern—or seek to govern—with opinion polls as their sole axiological reference.” (2001, p. 22).

In this vein, the media is identified as bearing responsibility for the devaluation of migration and the rise of xenophobic sentiment in a country with an undeniable tradition of migration. This highlights how certain discourses, once institutionalized, acquire the status of truth and enable punitive measures that define the boundaries of what is permitted and what may be subject to sanctions.

This electoral victory clearly comes amid a drastic shift in Argentina’s political landscape, as the population has embraced a libertarian and conservative agenda. Although this is just one aspect of the political plan, it is clear that it has indeed yielded the expected political returns at the polls.

Now that the presidential term has reached its three-year mark, the policies restricting migrants’ rights can be identified as the result of penal populism. In structural terms, Milei revives the state’s security paradigm, as it was understood in the 1970s during the dictatorship, when public safety was associated with the notion of national security. At that time, security was synonymous with state security, and threats were perceived through the lens of political trends.

In terms of discourse, “crimmigration” is rooted in the insecurity and fear associated with the presence of migrants, who are treated through a punitive criminal justice framework; following the elections, measures demonstrating continuity with some of these discursive elements can be identified within the government sphere, as seen in the decrees examined. In public policy, this is tangibly expressed in the decrees summarized below.

In July 2024, Decree (Decreto 584/2024, 2024) DNU 584/2024 increased immigration fees by 1,500%, hindering “the regularization of residency and primarily affecting the most vulnerable migrants” (Argentine Commission for Refugees and Migrants [CAREF], 2024). This regulation hinders Argentina’s immigration policy, which has historically been effective in regularizing and controlling migrants within its territory.

In May 2025, immigration reform⁹, Established by Emergency Decree No. 366/2025, it amends four laws: the Migration Law No. 25871, the Citizenship Law No. 346, the Higher Education Law No. 24521, and the National Education Law No. 26206.

This “far-reaching reform […] aims to improve control over those entering the country, prevent abuses of the social welfare and educational systems, and promote foreign investment through incentives such as citizenship by investment” (Emergency Decree 366/2025, 2025). This reflects a discourse of restrictive sovereignty, exclusionary citizenship, and the materialization of a punitive discourse on migration.

However, in analyzing the punitive discourse on migration in Argentina, it is worth noting that the proposals and changes implemented by the current administration conflict with the Argentine Constitution, whose Article 14 establishes, among other things: “All inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights […] to enter, remain in, transit through, and leave Argentine territory” (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 1994, Art. 14). The article in question refers to “all inhabitants,” meaning it makes no distinction between nationals and non-nationals—an element that has been violated by the aforementioned decrees.

If freedom of movement is interpreted as a right linked to citizenship, Article 20 recognizes that “Foreigners enjoy […] all the civil rights of citizens; they may engage in industry, commerce, and their profession; and own real property […]” (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 1994, Art. 20).

Furthermore, Article 25 of the Constitution states that “the federal government shall promote European immigration,” but it is not limited to Europeans when it adds that “it may not restrict, limit, or impose any tax on the entry into Argentine territory of foreigners whose purpose is to cultivate the land, improve industries, and introduce and teach the sciences and the arts” (Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 1994, Art. 25). As can be seen, Articles 14, 20, and 25 reveal a potential conflict with the executive order that tightens restrictions on citizenship, requiring immigrants to spend two uninterrupted years in Argentina or make a significant financial investment in the country to obtain an Argentine passport.

Finally, the rhetoric used in the drafting of DNU 366/2025 is entirely security-driven, reflecting an authoritarian approach rooted in a 1970s-era perspective of sovereign protection, with restrictions on access to citizenship and the passport, arguing that this “involves multiple security aspects that must be addressed” and that […] “it is necessary to modify the conditions under which Argentine citizenship may be obtained, in order to improve security measures and prevent any risk of its abusive use” (Decree of Necessity and Urgency 366/2025, 2025).

The alleged abuse of this status also reflects the identification of a “useful enemy” that continues to underpin the xenophobic discourse that criminalizes immigrants and their access to rights.

4.3 Ecuador

The (2025–2029)¹⁰, Government Plan of National Democratic Action (ADN), registered with the National Electoral Council (Acción Democrática Nacional, 2024), the party’s platform emphasizes security, crime, and organized crime as the core of its political agenda from the outset. In its multi-year work plan, the party presents five pillars, the fourth of which is the Social Pillar, titled “Security, Development, and Well-being for All Ecuadorians.” This pillar includes an entire section on emigration and immigration (pp. 77–78) devoted almost exclusively to emigrants and returnees. However, it adds one point: “Implement policies for the inclusion and protection of migrants, fostering respect and understanding of other cultures and preventing xenophobia.” This rights-based proposal contrasts with the proposals that follow in the “Security, Peace, and Social Equity” section, where the following objectives are proposed:

design and implement public safety policies, in accordance with the current risk and threat landscape, to prevent and control the crime and violence plaguing the country; strengthen and develop measures to combat organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking […]; and carry out actions through the Security Task Force to contain and reduce criminal violence.

This section is identified as the core of the punitive discourse on migration, as it exemplifies the “crimmigration” framework by subsuming the phenomenon of human mobility under securitized rhetoric. It identifies a risk scenario linked to organized crime and drug trafficking—a connection widely disseminated in the media as inextricably tied to current migratory movements. It also promotes the securitization of borders and the strengthening of a security apparatus in response to social problems.

Within this same narrative, it conflates human trafficking, drug trafficking, and criminal violence, presenting a discourse that symbolically equates migrants with criminal threats; furthermore, it positions migrants as subjects of control and as a category subject to punitive intervention. This demonstrates that this government plan legitimizes the use of criminal law tools to manage migration, both in terms of public policy and in shaping public opinion. This discursive construct creates tensions with the rights-based and human mobility approach recognized in the Ecuadorian Constitution and may affect the necessary conditions for social cohesion.

Then, it can be argued, that “crimmigration” shifts the human rights approach mentioned earlier toward a policy of security and sovereign control. In this policy, public safety is constructed through the exclusion and punishment of the “other”—the dangerous one, the “useful enemy.” This reduces people on the move—whose right to mobility is recognized in the country’s own Constitution—to a category of risk to public order. This risk serves to stoke fear and sustain public governance.

We speak of “sustaining” because Noboa’s first presidency (November 2023–May 2025), fueled by the same rhetoric, implemented a reform to the Organic Law on Human Mobility in June 2024 with the aim of “strengthening internal security.” Among the changes introduced at that time were the expedited deportation process, the implementation of background checks, and stricter requirements for all categories of residency, to name the most significant ones.

In 2025, a new reform consolidated these provisions and “provides for expedited deportation in cases of serious risk, with a reasoned decision and judicial oversight, as well as the extension of the re-entry ban period to up to 40 years for those who pose threats to national security” (Ley Orgánica Reformatoria a la Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana, 2025). In addition, the reform includes a requirement for apostilled criminal records (Art. 17 of the Reform, points 1 and 2); new immigration categories, such as “transient” (Art. 18 of the Reform); and visas for commercial activities and other purposes (Art. 16 of the Reform). Other criminalizing provisions are found in Article 26, “if the applicant is considered a threat or risk to public and structural security of the State,” and Article 27, “in accordance with the official ruling issued by the security authority” (Organic Law Amending the Organic Law on Human Mobility, 2025).

As demonstrated, even the governance of immigration management is shifting into the realm of security, making it clear that certain statements are acquiring institutional legitimacy and becoming established as operational truths within the state apparatus. Thus, it appears that the government, “by focusing its attention on the migrant population as one of the main sources of insecurity […] could be […] fueling a narrative that does not resolve its underlying problem” (Chaves-González, 2025) and clearly generating a discourse that criminalizes migration. Consequently, it becomes plausible that Ecuador’s internal security crisis equates migrants with transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.

Now, in Ecuador it is absolutely relevant to point out that it is the first country to constitutionalize the fundamental human right to migrate, recognized in its article 40¹¹, which states: “The right of persons to migrate is recognized. No human being shall be identified or considered illegal on the basis of their immigration status” (Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, Art. 40). This explicit, broad recognition of open borders now stands in contradiction to the reforms introduced in 2024 and 2025 by the Noboa administration.

Furthermore, the Constitution is founded on the principles of equality and non-discrimination, recognizing that “All persons are equal and shall enjoy the same rights, duties, and opportunities” and stipulating that no one may be discriminated against, among other grounds, “on the basis of place of birth or immigration status” (Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, Art. 11, No. 2). These constitutional provisions reveal tensions with the restrictive orientation of some of the reforms introduced in 2024 and 2025 by the Noboa administration.

In this regard, the reorganization of visa categories and the introduction of the “transient” category raise questions concerning their compatibility with the constitutional scope of equality and non-discrimination, particularly insofar as they intensify control mechanisms over migratory flows into Ecuador.

In accordance with the provisions, it is considered that, in the Ecuadorian context, fear is being exploited to win votes and to sustain a political agenda based on the criminalization of migrants, despite a broad constitutional framework and an Organic Law on Human Mobility that, at the time of its enactment (2017), was recognized as landmark legislation.

4.4 Chile

The “Programmatic Bases of the Government of Change”¹² José Antonio Kast’s campaign materials, filed with the Chilean Electoral Service for the second round, serve as a political introduction to the campaign. Framed as a call to action, they propose three key areas of focus, the first of which calls for “restoring order and a sense of authority.” The presentation of this priority states: “In less than a decade, Chile has gone from being a safe and peaceful country to becoming a territory dominated by violence, organized crime, and illegal immigration”—issues directly linked to the fact that “hundreds of thousands of people have entered the country illegally” (Kast Rist, 2025, p. 19).

Thus, this narrative reinforces “the effectiveness of this ‘tough on crime’ stance taken by political candidates […] as ‘the politicization of crime control’” (Garland, 2001, in Wood, 2014), which is evident in rhetoric that asserts that “the border became an open door, and with it came gangs that now operate in every corner of Chile” (Kast Rist, 2025, p. 19). These formulations function as statements of truth that admit of no nuance, presenting a direct and naturalized association between migration and insecurity.

The plan aims to restore “security, bring peace back to families, and eradicate the culture of impunity that has taken root in our streets, borders, and prisons” and goes on to aim “to put an end to the uncontrolled migration that threatens our sovereignty and to close the door to illegal entry.” Therefore, it maintains that it is making a categorical commitment “not to promote mass regularizations of illegal immigrants.” Thus, even before addressing the objectives of the security pillar prioritized by the president-elect, it concludes by emphasizing the strengthening of “territorial control, secure borders, and prisons that truly punish rather than create criminals” (Kast Rist, 2025, p. 19).

Among the 11 measures proposed under this pillar, those relevant to this analysis are summarized in the second one, which, in this interpretation, constitutes a manual for the implementation of criminalized immigration policies and penal populism when it proposes the implementation of “a National Policy to Close the Borders to illegal immigration, to reinforce sovereignty throughout the national territory […],” and which also expressly proposes “the criminalization of irregular migration,” which will be subject to criminal prosecution.

Expanding on the previous point, the text states that, once criminal prosecution has begun, “it may be suspended, subject to the deportation of the undocumented migrant [and] if the undocumented migrant re-enters the country, criminal prosecution will effectively resume, and the migrant will not be eligible for prison benefits” (Kast Rist, 2025, pp. 19–20).

It is evident that this narrative constitutes a true “culture of control” that acts as “a means of incapacitation and punishment that satisfies the popular political demand for retribution and public safety” (Garland, 2005, p. 51), while also representing a proposal for “governance through crime” (Simon, 2011, p. 14), revealing “the politicization and electoral exploitation of issues inherent to the criminal justice system and crime,” in this case directly linked to irregular migration and “prison as a means of incapacitating the offender” (Velásquez, 2024).

From a criminal law perspective, it is evident that the proposal positions the management of the criminal justice system not as a means of seeking justice or rehabilitation, but rather as an auxiliary mechanism for border control, which distorts criminal law and its principles. Furthermore, criminalizing re-entry constitutes a harsher punishment that would potentially deprive irregular migrants of benefits, which could give rise to tensions regarding the principle of equality recognized by the Chilean Constitution (Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 2005, Art. 19, No. 2).

Another aspect of the plan involves “National Security and the Militarization of the Border,” where this imaginary line drawn to protect national sovereignty is transformed from a space of control into one of military operation to “combat”—if the term is appropriate—this “useful enemy” so evident in the discourse.

When contrasted with Article 19, paragraph 7, of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, the proposal states that “it guarantees to all persons the right to personal liberty and individual security […] Every person has the right to reside and remain in any part of the Republic, to move from one place to another, and to enter and leave its territory, provided that the rules established by law are observed […]” (Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 2005, Art. 19, para. 7, subpara. a). Kast’s proposal to criminalize irregular entry raises questions regarding the principle of proportionality in criminal law, insofar as it proposes shifting conduct linked to irregular migration into the criminal sphere. Even when the law stablishes the principle of not criminalization.

Thus, the use of incarceration not as a last resort but as a tool for border control raises tensions regarding constitutional guarantees and the principle of legality, as it criminalizes a migratory status rather than conduct that harms a protected legal interest.

Regarding the exercise of foreigners’ rights, Article 19 provides that “Every person has the right to freely enter into employment contracts and to freely choose their work with fair compensation. Any discrimination is prohibited […] without prejudice to the law’s right to require Chilean nationality […]” (Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 2005, Art. 19, No. 16, subpar. a).

Furthermore, the way in which Chile recognizes sovereignty in Article 5 of the Constitution is relevant to this discussion. “Sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. It is exercised by the people […] The exercise of sovereignty is subject to the limitation of respect for the essential rights inherent in human nature” (Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 2005, Art. 5). Based on this interpretation, the recognition of natural rights allows us to critically examine the conception of sovereignty grounded in migration restrictions. While this does not imply the existence of a right to immigrate, it does enable an examination of the limits that rights impose on the state’s exercise of migration control.

Based on the foregoing, it can be argued that this electoral platform exaggerates visibility of the irregular migrant as the central driver of national insecurity, while overlooking other structural issues. In doing so, it finds in the “useful enemy” a perfect point of articulation between penal populism and crimmigration. The discourse thus establishes a selective centrality that redefines the public problem and directs state action toward a specific subject: the migrant.

In sum, this narrative not only advocates for a tougher border management regime but also instrumentalizes penal populism as part of an electoral strategy that redefines the foreigner as an enemy. In this sense, the programmatic proposal crystallizes the phenomenon of crimmigration by seeking to transform administrative irregularity into a specific criminal offense, which makes it possible to identify tensions between the proposal and the protection standards derived from international human rights instruments and the principles recognized in the Constitution. Moreover, it conditions the suspension of criminal prosecution on deportation, effectively distorting the Chilean criminal justice system by renouncing its function of delivering justice and reducing it to a mechanism of punitive control.

From this perspective, an analysis of this platform raises questions regarding its compatibility with the principles of equality and due process, as it not only denies prison benefits based exclusively on foreign national status but also—through the militarization of borders and restrictions on remittances—appears to validate Stumpf’s thesis concerning the blurring of boundaries between immigration control and criminal punishment.

The Chilean context, following the recent inauguration of President Kast, does not yet allow for a clear assessment of how these proposals will be translated into public policy or what specific legislative and regulatory changes may follow. Nevertheless, it is important to note that¹³,within the first hours of his term as President of the Republic, having taken office on March 11, 2026, he signed six executive decrees primarily focused on security, migration control, and public spending management. In other words, these measures addressed the very issues that had been prioritized throughout the electoral campaign that ultimately secured his victory at the polls.

The media quickly highlighted these actions, noting, for example, that “minutes before delivering his first presidential address at La Moneda, José Antonio Kast signed a series of measures that mark the beginning of his administration and aim to implement the so-called ‘emergency government’ announced during the campaign” (Carrere, 2026). Regarding the significance of both the discourse and these initial actions, it has been argued that, as a continuation of the Government Plan and as the “political and programmatic backbone of his administration (…), he signed the first decrees and directives of his mandate, focused on migration control, security, and regulatory permitting” (Izquierdo, 2026).

According to Izquierdo (2026), the first two decrees form part of the national border closure policy unveiled under the name Border Shield (Escudo Fronterizo), while the second concerns the appointment of the Commissioner for the Northern Macrozone.

According to official information released by the Government of Chile on March 16, the Border Shield Plan (Plan Escudo Fronterizo) implemented by the administration of President José Antonio Kast “seeks to address in a concrete manner the unprecedented migration crisis facing our country.” Among its most significant measures are “the complete closure of the border to illegal immigration, the sealing of unauthorized crossing points, severe sanctions, and an unprecedented military and police deployment” (Government of Chile, 2026).

In direct connection with the electoral discourse examined in this article, authorities also announced that “an impenetrable physical and technological containment system will be established, combining 5-meter-high security walls/fences, motion sensors, and drone surveillance (…)” (Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, 2026).

Moreover, the plan includes “3-meter-deep trenches in areas with high migratory traffic (.), electrified perimeter fences,” together with “constant patrols by the Armed Forces and Carabineros in areas surrounding official border crossings and unauthorized routes that have been closed” (Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, 2026).

From a discursive perspective, these initial measures reflect the construction of a narrative that frames migration as a threat to national security, where crimmigration and penal populism converge, paving the way for exclusionary and security-oriented public policies. In this regard, the emphasis on expressions such as “unprecedented migration crisis,” “total closure,” and “impenetrable system” not only constructs the migrant as a useful enemy through whom state authority is legitimized, but also symbolically enables the adoption of exceptional mechanisms of control.

This description of the first decree is by no means an exaggeration. It is worth noting that the Border Shield Plan also incorporates “surveillance towers and thermal radar systems, allowing for the immediate detection of suspicious movements” (Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, 2026). This measure is directly linked to the idea of centralized control, akin to the panoptic model proposed by Bentham and the notion of “single surveillance” discussed by Foucault, further reinforced through the use of drones, facial-recognition cameras, infrared technology, and thermal imaging systems. In this sense, the policies derived from the plan can be interpreted as the institutionalization of a narrative that transforms migration governance into a matter of national security, consolidating exclusionary practices that reconfigure a rights-based approach to migration.

According to an analysis published on March 20 by Alarcón (2026), the President’s decisions are grounded in Article 24 of the Constitution, which establishes that “his authority extends to all matters concerning the preservation of public order within the country and the state security of the Republic, in accordance with the Constitution and the laws.” This is directly connected to the discourse of sovereignty, security, and perceived threats, which are discursively projected onto the migrant as a useful enemy.

In this regard, Alarcón argues that “the President of the Republic perceives a particular situation that complicates, above all, the internal and external security of the Republic. This situation is the perception that illegal immigration has become uncontrolled” (2026). He further notes that “the Constitution allows this, but it remains necessary to determine whether the relevant legislation also permits it. In that case, it is essential to examine the legal framework governing the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the regulations applicable to the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Security.”

Regarding the second decree, which appoints a Commissioner for the Northern Macrozone, Carrere reports that “this new position will operate under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and will seek to coordinate actions aimed at defending the border and protecting our fellow citizens” (Carrere, 2026).

Thus, he appointed retired Navy Vice Admiral Alberto Soto as commissioner, who “will not have executive powers; the position, which will report to the Ministry of the Interior, will have a coordinating role in dialogue with the delegations and the Ministries of Defense, Security, and Justice” (Izquierdo, 2026). This is yet another example of how institutional competencies also shape crimmigration, by conflating aspects of justice and rights with those of defense and security, revealing a security-focused perspective, state defense, and sovereignty. This appointment not only reorganizes the functions of the state apparatus regarding human mobility but also defines how migration is conceptualized and managed, thereby reinforcing the idea of the migrant as an object of surveillance and control, rather than as a subject of rights.

The example of Kast’s first days in office shows that administrative interventions with a punitive approach definitely shape the image of the migrant ¹⁴ as a subject of risk and an object of control. Thus, the sample of the first decisions allows us to glimpse that, like the reform of Decree 366/2025 in Argentina and the two Ecuadorian reforms, the new Chilean administration reveal an initial orientation towards a paradigm of security and migration control that will need to be evaluated when these measures are developed and implemented.

On the whole, the findings from the three cases analyzed and systematized in Table 1 reveal that, while political narratives, securitization strategies, and their legal-institutional expressions vary by context, the proposals found in government platforms converge in framing migration as increasingly linked to insecurity, control, and threat. From this perspective, these proposals are not merely expressions of opinion or subjective political discourse; rather, they function as productions of truth, insofar as they help legitimize specific forms of intervention and construct the migrant as a subject of risk and an object of control.

Table 1. Comparative synthesis of the main findings from Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile.

Within this framework, the analytical categories employed allow for the interpretation of various levels: for instance, the construction of the “other” as a useful enemy helps explain the discursive framing of the migrant as a threat; penal populism illustrates how demands for security and punishment can be incorporated into electoral contests; and “crimmigration” enables the identification of the convergence between migration control mechanisms and criminal law. Thus, the association between migration, criminality, and threat does not appear as a given reality, but rather as a discursive construct that can help legitimize restrictive or punitive state responses.

Finally, the proposals examined highlight the significance that rhetorical responses centered on control, surveillance, and the strengthening of state authority acquire during electoral processes. While these measures may align with state prerogatives regarding security, border management, and migration regulation, their framing—linking migration to criminality and threats—allows for a critical examination of the shift in migration management toward punitive approaches.

5 Conclusion

This brief comparative analysis of electoral discourse from the perspective of “crimmigration” and penal populism in Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile (2023 and 2025) confirms that South America is experiencing a sustained regression in rights, driven by “crimmigration” and penal populist discourse as campaign strategies that subsequently translate into political discourse and political governance.

The findings of this research confirm the hypothesis that the reality of migration is a phenomenon that affects all structures and has ceased to be an emerging issue, becoming instead one of the main concerns in public debate and, consequently, in public policy and governmental discourse (including law and decrees).

Recognizing these trends does not mean ignoring the fact that states have the authority to manage their borders, regulate the entry and stay of foreign nationals, and adopt measures designed to protect security and combat organized crime. These powers are part of the exercise of state sovereignty and can justify mechanisms for immigration regulation and control.

However, an analysis of the cases studied shows that when these objectives are linked to discourses that associate migration with crime and insecurity, they introduce mechanisms and rationales typical of criminal control into migration management. In this sense, migration or border control does constitute an expression of “crimmigration.” From the perspective adopted in this study, it arises when the management of mobility converges with punitive logics that construct the migrant as a subject of risk or threat.

In this regard, political practices that take the form of decrees, regulations, or regulatory reforms should not be viewed merely as a rhetorical strategy responding to a specific moment—the electoral context—but rather as a progressive means of consolidating that discourse as truth—through the exercise of power by the presidential administration—since it establishes an association—one that transcends the subjective to become objective—between migration, crime, and insecurity. This is normalized and presented as an unquestionable reality in public opinion. Thus, several specific points can be identified.

These narratives played a significant role in the campaign platforms of the three cases analyzed and helped frame the relationship between migration, security, and control within the electoral contest. All of this takes place within a process made possible by the fact that populist criminal discourse not only polarizes the electorate but also produces common meanings that legitimize exclusion and foster xenophobia and the desire to criminalize “the other”—the “dangerous” one. Thus, it becomes clear that such discourses transform social perceptions into seemingly objective justifications for the adoption of restrictive policies.

In Argentina and Ecuador, policy proposals have already taken concrete form in the form of reforms to immigration laws. In both cases, these changes are causing tensions regarding the constitutional principles and the rights recognized in each country. Nevertheless, they reflect the punitive rhetoric that continues to gain traction among a public opinion skewed by xenophobia and cloaked in the rhetoric of sovereign protection and security.

On the procedural front, in Argentina, these measures translate into administrative costs that are used as a tool to hinder access to rights; in Ecuador, the introduction of new requirements and changes to immigration categories are the main barriers to accessing rights.

Complementarily, at the procedural level, expedited deportation in Ecuador and the re-entry ban—similar to the one proposed in Chile—are further examples of the “crimigratory” discourse being implemented through such measures.

In Ecuador, migrants linked to organized crime and drug trafficking are used as a criminalizing trope to strengthen security, order, border control, and sovereignty. This logic is similar to that used in Kast’s proposal, where the militarization of borders is viewed as an option for administrative management and which, as noted, has already materialized on the first day of his administration. This demonstrates how the discourse links security and migration within a single interpretive framework, in which the perceived danger attributed to migrants does not require empirical verification but rather functions as a truth that justifies exceptional state responses.

A key aspect of the Chilean case is that the country explicitly proposes the criminalization of irregular migration. It also proposes deportation and criminal prosecution, which further include denying irregular migrants access to benefits and refusing them re-entry. This violates constitutional and criminal law principles that, in their time, represented a paradigm shift; as a result, we may be facing not only a normative regression but also the materialization of a discourse that defines what is legally acceptable, setting aside principles of due process to make way for securitization in migration governance. The connection these three proposals have with security, order, and borders takes us back to a discourse from 50 years ago.

This study reveals that, faced with the complexity of intraregional migration flows, the proposals examined prioritize responses focused on control, security, and strengthening the state’s punitive capacity, while the structural dimensions of human mobility receive less attention. Within this logic, penal populism contributes to politically simplifying a complex phenomenon and incorporating it into the security agenda.

Thus, it is evident that, over the past 2 years, the shift toward a conservative/libertarian right in the Southern Cone has revived authoritarian traits from the decades of de facto governments. In this way, the political shift observed in the cases studied reveals a reinforcement of discourses centered on authority, security, and territorial control, creating tensions with the human rights paradigm that had gained prominence in regional migration governance over the preceding decades.

In short, and confirming the usefulness of the theoretical framework for analysis, it can be stated that immigration law is becoming an appendage of the state’s repressive apparatus, transforming human mobility—a recognized human right—into a space of suspicion and criminal prosecution.

Finally, the experiences of Argentina and Ecuador make it possible to identify potential areas of tension that should be monitored as Chilean migration policy evolves. Initial measures adopted in Chile show a focus on strengthening security and border control; however, their scope and impact on the rights of migrants will need to be assessed as these policies are implemented. From a “crimmigration” perspective, it will be particularly important to observe whether the rhetorical link between migration, criminality, and insecurity translates into a growing convergence between migration control and the logic of the penal system.

Author’s note

This article is not limited to an analysis of populism as used in political science, but rather of the compound term “penal populism.” Which is a category specific to criminology, criminal policy, and criminal law, used to describe trends toward the irrational expansion of punitive power and the use of criminal law for electoral gain.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Narcisa Medranda - Morales, Universidad Politecnica Salesiana - Sede Quito, Ecuador

Reviewed by: Cecilia Melella, National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), Argentina

Jorge Antonio Breceda Pérez, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, Mexico

Footnotes

As Dufraix Tapia et al. (2025) remember, “la formulación original de Stumpf surge del análisis del impacto de las reformas jurídicas y políticas aplicadas en EE.UU. en las décadas de 1990 y 2000” and su capacidad explicativa ha llevado a que el concepto sea empleado para analizar procesos similares en otros países. Sin embargo, al explorar el fenómeno en América Latina es posible encontrar importantes diferencias.

The translation used was that of the work whose original title is L’ordre du discours, from 1970, published by Tusquets Editores, S. A., in its reprint of February 2005.

The American Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families establish guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, and due process applicable to migrants. Within the Inter-American system, these standards have been developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights—particularly in Advisory Opinions OC-18/03 and OC-21/14—which reinforce state obligations regarding the protection of rights in contexts of human mobility.

Among the most relevant studies for the approach presented here are the following: in Argentina, Eduardo Domenech (2013, 2017); in Ecuador, Valle Franco et al. (2018), and Ramírez Gallegos (2018); and, in Chile, Roberto Dufraix Tapia et al. (2021), and Cociña Cholaky (2022).

The narrative document has 13 pages, without an index or internal numbering.

The points are: Technology and infrastructure (19 objectives); Agriculture, livestock and fishing (15 objectives); Human capital, only descriptive and without programmatic objectives; Health (28 objectives); Education (9 objectives); and National security and judicial reform (47 objectives).

Point 21: Incorporate mobile sensors, vehicles, drones, satellites and all necessary equipment […]. Point 22: Optimize the operation of border crossings.

Due to the length of this work, it is not possible to delve into an analysis of these debates. This information will be supplemented in a second phase of this reflection.

The media-electoral objective of this reform was part of Milei’s speech at the close of the 2025 legislative campaign, when he argued that “these drastic measures against immigration with a decree seek to make Argentina great again” (AP, 2025).

120-page document divided into Introduction, Objectives, Diagnosis, Multi-year work plan and Accountability mechanisms.

Article 40 is complemented by two other articles, the one recognizing the rights of asylum and refuge and the one prohibiting arbitrary displacement (articles 41 and 42 respectively).

The document contains 38 pages, a letter to the citizens, a preamble, and the proposal for “The Emergency Government,” which contains three lines of action: “1) To confront the security emergency in order to restore order and a sense of authority”; “2) To confront the economic emergency in order to recover progress”; and “3) To confront the social emergency, let us recover freedom, justice, and dignity” (Kast Rist, 2025).

At the time of writing these ideas, only a few days had passed since the presidential inauguration, which took place on March 11, 2026, which is why information gathered from the press and from the first analyses carried out by academia is included.

Although the decree specifically refers to irregular migrants, that aspect does not eliminate the criminalization of migration.