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Original Research

Frontiers in Political Science ·

Volume 8 - 2026 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2026.1940781

Rethinking neutrality in Europe: a cluster-analysis of Austrian attitudes toward neutrality and non-alignment

  • Rita Phillips1*corresponding author
  • Wolfgang H. Prinz2
  • Gloria Ch. Straub2
  1. 1University of Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria
  2. 2Federal Ministry of Defence, Republic of Austria, Vienna, Austria
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Abstract

Austria’s military neutrality has been an important part of its post-World War II identity, closely associated with sovereignty, political independence, and peace. However, changes in the European security environment have raised questions about the role of neutrality today. This study examines how the Austrian public understands and evaluates neutrality in the context of rising security concerns. Open-ended survey responses of 1,400 participants surrounding advantages and disadvantages of neutrality were examined and analyzed using thematic coding and statistical methods. Respondents identified particularly its contribution to political independence and the avoidance of involvement in armed conflicts as advantages of neutrality. The main disadvantages concerned Austria’s limited military capabilities and the absence of formal security alliances. Importantly, a high proportion of responses also suggested that neither advantages nor disadvantages could be determined. A hierarchical cluster analysis revealed three distinct profiles: “Security-Focused Pragmatists” (46.8%), who consider both the advantages and potential risks of neutrality, “Impartial Bystanders” (30%), who show relatively low engagement with the issue, and “Military Neutral Optimists” (23.3%), who tend to emphasize the benefits of neutrality while paying less attention to its possible disadvantages. Multinomial logistic regression further indicates that sociodemographic and political characteristics are significantly associated with membership in these groups. Overall, the findings suggest that attitudes toward neutrality are not uniform. They reflect practical assessments of Austria’s security position and a broader symbolic attachment to neutrality. This provides insight into policy relevant discussions on how the Austrian neutrality may be enacted in a changing European security environment.

Keywords

1. Introduction

Neutrality is a defining core element in the theory and practice of Austrian foreign policies that contributes to avoid military entanglement and protects national interests (Zyhlarz-Shaw, 1993; Schwarz and Urosevic, 2023; Bischof and Karlhofer, 2013). As a constituting pillar of Austria’s international relations, neutrality has aided in fostering long-term peace and stability by ensuring national sovereignty and independence (Bischof et al., 2018; Popławski, 2020). However, with increasing international tensions and shifting alliances, it is questionable to which extent neutrality remains to be perceived as a feasible strategy to address these challenges by the Austrian public. Public opinions on foreign policies are important as these may guide and constrain foreign policy guidelines in democratic nations. This is exemplified by research highlighting the role of public perceptions in relation to military deployments (Gelpi et al., 2007; Mueller, 1973), foreign economic policies (Milner and Tingley, 2011), diplomatic relations (Holsti, 1992; Jost and Kertzer, 2023; Duncombe, 2019) and ethical norms and standards that governments are pressured to uphold (Finnemore, 2013; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Given the significance of public perceptions in foreign policies, it is surprising that little research has examined Austrian public perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality in the contemporary context. This paper addresses this gap in knowledge by investigating these perceptions inductively and examining their influence on foreign policy attitudes with a representative sample of Austrian adults.

Recent geopolitical developments have challenging traditional perspectives on the viability of neutrality, specifically in European nation states. Examples therefore are the Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO membership in 2023 and 2024, respectively (Kanniainen, 2022; ABDI, 2021; ABDI, 2022; Der Pragmaticus, 2024; NATO, 2024). In response to the war in Ukraine, both countries redefined their security policies and pursued NATO membership in order to strengthen their national security and ensure regional stability (Alberque and Schreer, 2022; Forsberg, 2023; Seyaz, 2024). In this sense, public threat perceptions contributed to shifting opinions towards neutrality (Seyaz, 2024) and highlighting the dynamic relationship between national perceptions towards security and the formulation of foreign policies. In this sense, the Finnish and Swedish adaptation in neutral foreign policies reflects a broader trend in the European security landscape, where boundaries between non-alignment and collective security defence have become increasingly blurred (Greminger and Rickli, 2023; Radoman, 2021).

Austrian neutrality in its geopolitical and national context

However, while Swedish neutrality represented a long-lasting policy stance to preserve national stability (Schmidl, 2016) and Finnish neutrality was shaped by Soviet influence during the Cold War, particularly following the Winter War (1939–1940) and the Continuation War (1941–1944) (Alvarino, 2024; Christiansson, 2024; Spohr, 2024), Austria’s neutrality emerged as a geopolitical necessity post WW2. Specifically, Austria’s neutrality was shaped by securing national independence, extricating itself from the Allied occupation through the State Treaty in 1955. This Treaty that guaranteed permanent independence and national sovereignty while explicitly precluding Austria from forging military alliances and allowing foreign military bases on its territory (Ferring, 1968). As such, Austria’s neutrality emerged as a response to the exigencies of the post-WW2 occupation highlighting a clear distinction from the Swedish and Finnish neutrality stances.

These historical differences are reflected in public attitudes towards the Austrian neutrality, suggesting its deep integration into national identity. Empirical and theoretical studies highlight how the Austrian neutrality has been established as a publicly accepted norm among the Austrian population (Kovács and Wodak, 2003; Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (ÖGfE), 2022; NATO, 2023; Lottaz, 2024; Gärtner, 2022; Gehler and Bischof, 2017; Schlesinger, 1967). For example, the significance of the Austrian neutrality for national identity is not only highlighted by its enshrinement in a constitutional framework and support by international law (Lottaz, 2024; Gärtner, 2022) but is also by its influence on the selection of national holidays.

While several dates were discussed for Austria’s national holiday (e.g., 12th November 1918 - the day of the proclamation of the 1st Republic, 27th of April 1945 - the day of the proclamation of Austria’s independence through the formation of a provisional government, 15th May 1955 - the day of the signing of the State Treaty), it was a political decision to focus on the Austrian neutrality. In the preamble to the federal law of 28th June 1967 on the Austrian national holiday, the relevance of Austria’s neutrality is emphasized in order “[...] to be able to make a valuable contribution to peace in the world as a permanently neutral state” (um “[…] als dauernd neutraler Staat einen wertvollen Beitrag zum Frieden in der Welt leisten zu können”; Bundesgesetz über den österreichischen Nationalfeiertag, 1967). Similarly, the political elite frames the Austrian neutrality as an important “principle” that provides orientation for Austria and therefore has “high value” (cf. van der Bellen, 2022; Tanner, 2022). This positive attitude towards the Austrian neutrality is reflected in nationally representative opinion polls and surveys. These polls outline the majority of the surveyed population to perceive the Austrian neutrality as an important part of national identity that contributes to European and world peace [Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (ÖGfE), 2022; NATO, 2023]. To this day Austria’s neutrality receives strong public backing [Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (ÖGfE), 2022; NATO, 2023]. In this sense, the Austrian neutrality might be deeply intertwined with national identity and therefore represent an unquestioned cultural assumption that constitutes a culturally produced ‘taken-for-granted’ (Jovchelovitch, 2001; Bhabha, 1994; Geertz, 1993; Lévi-Bruhl, 1985; Said, 1978). As such, perceptions of neutrality may also be reproduced through informal processes of socialization rather than exclusively through formal political institutions. Family conversations, intergenerational memories, commemorative practices, school experiences, and everyday narratives about Austria’s post-war history may contribute to the transmission of shared understandings of Austria as a neutral state (cf. Jovchelovitch, 2001; Liu and Hilton, 2005). Research on collective memory and banal forms of national identity suggests that national meanings can be reproduced through ordinary routines and interpersonal communication rather than solely through explicit political instruction (Connerton, 1989; Billig, 1995; Olick and Robbins, 1998). In the Austrian context, neutrality may therefore persist not only because citizens actively evaluate its strategic benefits, but also because it is embedded in familiar narratives concerning Austria’s independence, post-war reconstruction, peace orientation, and international role.

Similarly, the Austrian media environment may provide additional interpretational frameworks that convey specific representations of neutrality that individuals in society may reproduce. Austria has a strong public-service broadcasting sector alongside a comparatively concentrated newspaper market and a historically documented degree of political parallelism in the press (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Seethaler and Melischek, 2006). The ORF (Österreichischer Rundfunk) remains the most widely used and trusted news brand in Austria, while political actors and media owners are widely perceived as influential in shaping news coverage (Sparviero et al., 2026). The framing of security policy in news may therefore contribute to which aspects of neutrality become salient to citizens, for example whether neutrality is presented primarily as a guarantor of peace and independence or as a potential constraint on collective security cooperation. As exemplified in previous research, the selection and emphasis of particular aspects of an issue can influence how citizens interpret political alternatives (Entman, 1993). For example, this issue has been found to be particularly relevant in the context of the war in Ukraine: Although 63% of participants reported trusting Austrian media coverage of the war, substantially fewer considered the reporting independent of the Austrian government, diverse in its presentation of positions, or sufficiently distant from both sides (Gallup Austria, 2022). While no causal effect of media coverage on neutrality attitudes can be established, the findings indicate that media framing may constitute an important contextual factor in the interpretation of neutrality and security policy.

However, although public perceptions of neutrality and their relationship with national identity have been extensively documented [Lottaz, 2024; Gärtner, 2022; Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (ÖGfE), 2022], little is known about public opinions on advantages and disadvantages associated with the Austrian neutrality. This is particularly relevant as neutrality has been a controversially debated concept in literature, highlighting a variety of advantages and disadvantages (Graf-Steiner and Ruggenthaler, 2024; Moyer and Kornegay, 2024; Popławski, 2020; Harrod, 2010; Cramer and Franke, 2021).

Advantages and disadvantages of neutral foreign policies

Historically, the most apparent advantage of neutrality was also considered as the most relevant, being the “right of a nation to be at peace with other nations” (Brown, 1939, p. 726; cf. Davis, 1914; Karsh, 2012). Neutrality contributes to the preservation of national sovereignty and autonomy as a mechanism that safeguards the ability of states to independently shape foreign policies (Keating, 2021; Moyer and Kornegay, 2024). In doing so it creates symbolic distance to geopolitical tensions and contributes to maintaining national independence by preventing military obligations that may lead to entanglement in international warfare (Jackson, 2013). Besides reinforcing national autonomy, neutrality can therefore be used as a strategic instrument that helps to navigate complex geopolitical landscapes. This is demonstrated by Austria’s position during the Cold War. While engaging in diplomatic relations with the Western countries and the Eastern Bloc, Austria’s neutrality served as a tool to maintain sovereignty while facilitating diplomatic discussions between competing superpowers (Popławski, 2020). Neutral states can therefore be essential for international stability by fostering diplomatic engagements without military involvement.

This highlights an additional advantage of neutral states as potential mediators in international conflicts. Neutral states can provide a platform for negotiation between rivalry states and offer diplomatic channels that might otherwise be unavailable in complex geopolitical environments (Götschel, 2020; Zartman and Touval, 1985; Gärtner, 2015). With their unique neutral stance, neutral nations can provide neutral space for negotiations and so help to de-escalate volatile situations (Götschel, 2020; Graf-Steiner and Ruggenthaler, 2024). Austria has demonstrated this by taking on mediating roles in various international conflicts, hosting diplomatic negotiations. For example, during the Cold War Austria offered mediation services as part of the “N + N group” to promote détente, especially between the East and West (Gärtner, 2015). Austria continued with these functions after the Cold War, taking on mediating roles in the Yugoslavian wars, the Middle East conflicts, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Iranian nuclear program. These roles did not only bolster Austria’s international reputation as an internationally respected mediator in precarious situations but also contributed to economic growth while reducing the costs of militarization. By avoiding political and military alliances, neutral states can pursue multilateral economic strategies, fostering trade agreements and thereby sustaining national economic growth (Bernauer, 2022; Keohane, 2005). In this sense, neutrality can help to establish robust economic partnerships even in complex geopolitical environments (Nye, 2004). For example, during the Cold War Austria’s neutrality facilitated strong trade relations with both, Western countries and the Eastern bloc, attracting foreign capital and ensuring economic stability in times of international crisis (Chickering and Förster, 2003). This demonstrates how neutrality can provide significant economic flexibility by mitigating the costs of militarization and the constraints of military alliances (Keohane, 2005).

Despite the strategic advantages of neutrality, there are relevant drawbacks and limitations. Neutrality is no “free ride” but very costly and policy demanding, demanding highest levels of public support (Kruzel and Haltzel, 1989, p. xix). As such issues with neutral policies highlight security vulnerabilities as a result of abstaining from military alliances. This can contribute to reduced military preparedness making neutral countries potentially more vulnerable to military aggression (Holsti, 1992; Mattern, 2005). For example, Raymond (1997) explores how neutrality is only viable in well-balanced power-systems. If power is asymmetrically distributed and alliances become polarized, neutrality may exacerbate national security risks as military superpowers are unlikely to respect the sovereignty of neutral states. Neutrality therefore requires strong public consensus and support in order to impose the strategic constraints that prevent joining military alliances (Tsebenko and Shymchuk, 2017). In the case of Austria, this challenge is particularly pronounced as Austria is surrounded by NATO members. In this sense, Austria profits from NATO’s security architecture drawing on protection through the collective defence of its NATO neighbours. This may explain low levels of Austrian public support for full NATO membership, reflecting the long-standing commitment to the neutral policy (NATO, 2023; Der Pragmaticus, 2024; NATO, 2024). However, with the evolving nature of warfare shifting to complex hybrid and cyber warfare, it remains questionable whether increasing security risks related to neutral policies remain publicly unnoticed.

This is further evidenced in practical issues surrounding the implementation of and integration in of international security in neutral countries. A prominent example therefore is the participation of neutral countries in intelligence-sharing networks. Austria’s neutrality has historically led to reservations among Western countries about Austria’s integration into critical intelligence-sharing arrangements. This excludes increases Austria’s vulnerability as lacking intelligence coordination and real-time information when compared to full NATO members (Finnemore, 2013). In this sense, Austria’s exclusion from significant defence and intelligence structures may restrict rapid responses to emerging security threats (Waltz, 2010).

Another major limitation relates to limited political influences neutral states may exert in international security policies. In the absence of military coalitions, neutral states are endangered to be sidelined in discussions surrounding international security issues. In this sense, neutral countries’ international positions might be inherently weakened as failing to contribute to international security policies (Snyder, 1993). The absence of military coalitions may therefore result in limited capacities to steer international discussions surrounding international defence agreements. Neutral countries may find themselves in marginalized positions, unable to exert influence on global security arrangements and being excluded from strategic decision-making processes (Waltz, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2003). This is further elaborated by Keohane (2005), who highlights how neutral policies may undermine neutral countries’ leverage on multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, by limiting their capacity to advocate for policies that reflect their national interests. This is exemplified in Austria’s diplomatic positioning. While Austria is member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and supports international peacebuilding missions, Austria’s influence within the UN is limited, especially in military and strategic discussions. Being no permanent member of the UN Security Council, Austria is excluded from critical aspects of military planning and high-level discussions that are held exclusively with the UN Security Council’s permanent members (Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 2010). This demonstrates Austria’s limited ability to contribute to shaping international security policies due to its neutral stance.

In conclusion, neutrality provides nations with the opportunity to maintain sovereignty, to avoid military entanglements and contribute to long-lasting international peace by drawing on diplomatic efforts. However, security vulnerabilities with limited military preparedness due to the absence of strong partners and less leverage in multilateral organizations are concerns highlighted in literature. As such, Austria’s neutrality may have advantages and disadvantages in ensuring national and international stability and security. Yet, little is known how these benefits and challenges are perceived by the public.

Public opinion and security policy attitudes

Importantly, public attitudes toward foreign and security policy are shaped by how citizens interpret risks, costs, and potential benefits associated with alternative policy choices. Research on public opinion and foreign policy has demonstrated that citizens do not necessarily evaluate international issues as isolated events but rely on broader political values, ideological orientations, and perceptions of national interest (Holsti, 1992; Foyle, 2017; Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). In this sense, citizens often possess meaningful and internally consistent orientations toward international affairs.

For example, political-psychological research suggests that attitudes toward foreign and security policy are influenced by citizens’ evaluations of perceived threats, anticipated costs and perceived benefits of international engagement. In consequence, support for military involvement is influenced not exclusively by perceived threats but also by expectations regarding casualties, material costs, the likelihood of policy success, and the consequences of non-intervention (e.g., Gelpi et al., 2007; Tomz and Weeks, 2021; Johns and Davies, 2019). Individuals may therefore differ in prioritizing protection through military cooperation, alliance commitments, and international engagement, or through avoidance of conflict, and non-intervention. Such differences have been described in research on foreign policy orientations, including distinctions between more interventionist and more cooperative or restraint-oriented approaches (Holsti, 1992; Gravelle et al., 2017).

Applied to neutrality, this perspective suggests that support for neutrality need not reflect a single political orientation. Rather, neutrality may be valued because it is perceived as reducing the costs and risks of military involvement, preserving national autonomy, limiting international obligations, or alternatively because it is considered compatible with broader preferences for restraint in foreign policy. Conversely, citizens who prioritize collective security and international cooperation may perceive neutrality as imposing security-related costs through limited alliance commitments and reduced access to external military support. These competing evaluations provide a theoretical basis for expecting heterogeneous patterns of neutrality perceptions within the population.

Rationale and research questions

This gap in knowledge is particularly critical with international shifts in power-relations, increasing geopolitical tensions and evolving threats in the European security landscape. Given the historical significance of the Austrian neutrality and its strong public backing, it is essential to understand how perceptions are shaped in a contemporary context. As public attitudes towards foreign policies are not monolithic but shaped by sociodemographic factors and broader sociopolitical attitudes, it is crucial examine how these factors may interrelate with individual views on neutrality. As prior research on public perceptions of advantages and disadvantages are limited, the present study conducts an exploratory approach to answer two main research questions: What are the primary advantages and disadvantages of neutrality perceived by the population?

Which perceptual patterns can be identified in publicly pertinent advantages and disadvantages of neutrality?

Which influence may sociodemographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes exert on the perceptual patterns?

By addressing these research questions, the present study will contribute valuable insight on how neutrality is perceived and how these perceptions relate. The discussion will interpret the findings in the light of current geopolitical developments and so highlight the finding’s policy implications.

2. Materials and methods

Participants, recruitment and sample

From August 26th to September 29th 2024 the market research organization IPSOS administered the cross-sectional “Security and Defence Policy Opinion Survey 2024” (“Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitsches Meinungsbild 2024”). This annual study has been commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence since 2019 and is based on a cooperation with the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences as well as the Swiss Military Academy at ETH Zurich. The present paper’s survey questions were additionally included in the study. The study combined 36% Computer Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI), based on a probability-based representative sample of the Austrian population, and 64% Computer Assisted Web Interviews (CAWI). Participants who took part in the CAWIs were recruited from an access panel. Partial weightings for the individual characteristics gender, age, county of residence and education were calculated based on the representative distribution within the Austrian population. This ensures that the sample accurately reflected the population. The final weightings were calculated by drawing on the partial weightings and the mean of partial weightings using the equation:

This was done to normalize the average weighting to 1, preventing the overall weighting from distorting the sample size while maintaining the original distribution of the data. In a final step, the weighting factor was adjusted to scale the original number of responses (N = 1,402) to the targeted sample size of N = 1,400. This allowed to standardize the dataset, improving comparability and avoid oversampling bias.

Measures

The survey data utilized for the present study includes open questions, sociodemographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes that were integrated to understand common perceptions of advantages and disadvantages of the Austrian neutrality. The dependent variables of interest were ‘perceptions of the advantages of Austria’s neutrality’ and ‘perceptions of the disadvantages of Austrian neutrality’. The dependent variables were open-ended responses, asking participants to describe benefits and disadvantages of the Austrian neutrality (“Welche Vorteile bringt Ihrer Meinung nach Österreichs Neutralität mit sich” [What do you think are advantages of Austria’s Neutrality?]/“Welche Nachteile bringt Ihrer Meinung nach Österreichs Neutralität mit sich?” [What do you think are disadvantages of Austria’s Neutrality?]). The independent variables were sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, education, income, place of residency (county), EU place identity, Austrian place identity) and sociopolitical attitudes (political affiliation, political interest, perception of NATO, attitude towards providing Austrian military aid to EU countries, attitudes towards receiving EU military help from EU countries, perception of the Austrian neutrality’s protective function, importance of the Austrian neutrality). The variables Austrian place identity and EU place identity were collated by drawing on items referring to identification with the hometown, the county, Austria (Austrian place identity), the European Union and Europe (European identity), after checking Cronbach alpha for Austrian place identity (α = 0.85) and Pearson correlation scores for European place identity (r = 0.66, p < 0.001, N = 1,400). An overview of the variables included in the present study in relation to their participants can be found in Table 1.

Predictor selection was guided by established research on public opinion toward foreign and security policy, political ideology, and identity. Previous research indicates that foreign-policy attitudes are structured by both individual characteristics and broader political orientations, including sociodemographic factors, ideology, gender, and political engagement (Eichenberg, 2016; Gravelle et al., 2017). Accordingly, age, gender, education, income, and region were included as sociodemographic characteristics that may capture systematic differences in political and security-policy attitudes across population groups. Political orientation and political interest were included because citizens’ ideological predispositions and engagement with politics influence how they process and evaluate foreign-policy and international issues (Eichenberg, 2016; Gravelle et al., 2017). Identity-related variables were selected based on previous research highlighting the role of foreign- and security-policy attitudes in broader conceptions of national belonging and political identity (e.g., Baciu, 2023; Moise and Wang, 2025; Phillips et al., 2026). Identity related predictors are particularly relevant in the Austrian context, where neutrality has historically functioned not only as a security-policy principle but also as an important component of political narratives and national self-understanding (Baciu, 2023; Phillips et al., 2026). Attitudes toward the importance and protective function of neutrality, cooperation with NATO, and military assistance were included as they represent substantively relevant dimensions of contemporary security-policy evaluation. These measures capture different ways in which respondents may assess neutrality, representing a mechanism of security and protection, an expression of political autonomy, or in relation to Austria’s engagement with broader European and international security structures (Gallouët, 2024; Wang and Moise 2023; Phillips et al., 2026). Their inclusion therefore allows the analysis to assess whether distinct neutrality profiles are associated with broader evaluations of Austria’s security-policy orientation.

Cluster formation was based exclusively on respondents’ spontaneous open-ended responses concerning perceived advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. These responses were coded thematically and subsequently used to identify groups with distinct patterns of neutrality perceptions. In contrast, the regression predictors were based on structured survey questions assessing broader political, identity-related, and security-policy attitudes, including the perceived importance and protective function of neutrality, attitudes toward NATO, and attitudes toward providing or receiving EU military assistance. Thus, although some predictors address themes that are substantively related to the content expressed in the open-ended responses, they were not used as indicators in the cluster formation and represent independently administered, closed-ended measures. The variables used to construct the composite identity measures were additionally assessed for internal consistency or inter-item association, with Austrian place identity showing satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.85) and European place identity showing a substantial Pearson correlation between its constituent items (r = 0.66, p < 0.001). These examinations concerned the construction of the identity measures rather than overlap between cluster indicators and regression predictors. The multinomial logistic regression was subsequently conducted as an exploratory analysis of whether broader sociodemographic, political, identity-related, and security-policy characteristics were associated with membership in the identified perceptual profiles. The coefficients should be interpreted as associations rather than as evidence of independent causal effects.

Data analyses

To predict neutrality conceptualizations with statistically concise models, several analytical steps were followed utilizing SPSS 29.0.2.0 for descriptive and inferential analyses. The following will give an overview the data preparation and further analyses.

Theme based content analysis of neutrality advantages and disadvantages

A content based Thematic Analysis (Bardin, 1977) was conducted to systematically examine and categorize the open-ended responses of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of Austrian neutrality. The questions were deliberately formulated as free-text questions to allow the respondents to express their own understanding of neutrality without being constrained by predefined response categories. Thematic Analysis is a particular suitable method to analyse free-text responses as this type of analysis is commonly utilized when quantifying qualitative data as it allows aggregate data and prepare it for inferential statistical testing. Semantically similar answers were grouped together to make the corpus of data more uniform and less ambiguous (i.e., Bolasco et al., 1999; Sarrica and Wachelke, 2010). Responses that expressed the same semantic content and differed only in grammatical form, expression, spelling or upper or lower cases were grouped and relevant literature on advantages and disadvantages of neutrality were utilized to create succinct categories. The coding process was conducted iteratively across the 1,400 responses to the question on the advantages of neutrality and the 1,400 responses to the question on the disadvantages of neutrality. Through successive rounds of coding, semantically related responses were consolidated, and the coding framework was refined to produce a coherent and mutually interpretable set of categories.

Hierarchical cluster analysis

A hierarchical Cluster Analysis with the Ward minimum-variance method was performed using SPSS 29.0.2.0. The Ward minimum-variance method identifies relatively compact and internally homogenous groups by investigating response (Everitt et al., 2011; Ward, 1963). This was appropriate for the present study as the aim was to examine recurring combinations of perceived advantages and disadvantages rather than classifying individual responses. Squared Euclidian distances were utilized as these are consistent with Ward’s variance-minimizing criterion and allow differences across several binary indicators to be considered simultaneously (Murtagh and Legendre, 2014). The appropriate number of clusters was determined by examining substantial increases in the coefficients of the agglomeration schedule and by inspecting the resulting dendrogram. To examine whether the identified clusters differed systematically in their responses, cluster membership scores were saved and a chi squared test of independence run. Effect sizes were reported with Cramer’s V.

Multinomial logistic regression models

To observe how sociodemographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes may influence cluster membership, a multinomial logistic regression was computed. In this sense, logistic regression models allow to determine whether the clusters identified in the cluster analysis represent systematically different proportions in society. Predictors included sociodemographic characteristics, political orientation, identity and attitudinal variables as these factors are theoretically relevant for security-policy positions. Multinomial logistic regressions was an appropriate method as cluster membership comprised more than two nominal categories. The model estimates the relative likelihood of membership in each cluster compared with a reference cluster. Regression coefficients are reported in odds ratio, with values >1 indicating higher likelihood of membership relative to the reference category. Overall, the model significance is assessed using the likelihood-ratio chi-squared test and pseudo- R 2 measures indicating model performance.

3. Results

Theme based content analysis of neutrality advantages and disadvantages

Categories for perceptions of neutrality advantages and disadvantages were generated by combining inductive and deductive approaches. Literature on preeminent benefits and drawbacks of neutrality, such as promoting long lasting peace or reducing international leverage, where utilized to construct categories deductively. Further categories were developed inductively by examining the perceptions advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. A consistent and cohesive coding system was generated by the iterative coding procedure of 1,400 perceptions of advantages and 1,400 perceptions of disadvantages. After collapsing and clustering meaningful codes, a cohesive and consistent codebook was produced (see Tables 2, 3).

Inter-rater reliability was confirmed with two senior education-science students, specialized in qualitative analysis. A randomized subset of 20% of neutrality advantage responses and 20% (N = 280) of neutrality disadvantage responses (N = 280) was drawn of which a total of 94.21% (1,055 of 1,120) responses were accurately categorized. The number of accurate categorization was slightly higher for neutrality advantage responses with 94.82% (531 accurate categorizations; Rater 1 = 90.36%, 253 accurate categorizations; Rater 2 = 99.29%, 278 of 280 accurate categorizations) while 93.57% was of the neutrality disadvantage responses were accurately categorizes (524 accurate categorizations, Rater 1 = 91.79%, 257 accurate categorizations; Rater 2 = 95.26%, 267 accurate categorizations). This suggests high levels of categorization-consistency, suggesting that the coding framework captured the thematic categories successfully.

As outlined in Table 2, perceptions of the advantages of neutrality can be categorized into the following categories: National Security and Peace (43%), Diplomacy and Political Autonomy (14.3%) Unknowing/Unawareness (32.5%) and Other (10.3%), whereby other equated to random utterances. The results suggest that the largest proportion respondents therefore perceive neutrality as a strategic advantage for sustaining security and peace by abstaining from military alliances. A smaller group (14.3%) perceives the benefits of neutrality to be rooted in Austria’s autonomy and national sovereignty that allows Austria to play key roles in international mediation and conflict management. However, a large proportion of respondents (42.7%) is unsure about the advantages of Austria’s neutrality and was not able to identify an advantage to answer this inductive question with a free-text answer. This might reflect either critical attitudes towards neutrality or a lack of understanding and indifference towards the Austrian neutrality.

Table 3 outlines perceived disadvantages of neutrality, highlighting that these can be categorized into four main themes: Absence of Allies (22%), Little Political Leverage (3.5%), Insufficient Defence Spending (3.1%), Unknowing/Unawareness (62.2%) and again the category Other (8.9%) with random utterances. The main disadvantage that the respondents perceived (22%) related to the absence of international military support structures in case of a military crisis, highlighting concerns about international isolation. Smaller proportions of respondents highlighted issues surrounding limited political influence in relation to neutrality (3.5%) and the impact of limited defence spending leading to inadequate defensive capabilities (3.1%). Notably, the overwhelming majority of participants expressed unawareness surrounding disadvantages of neutrality, highlighting either limited knowledge surrounding Austria’s neutral stance, or indifference towards disadvantages of neutrality.

Illustrative responses further demonstrate the diversity of these perceptions and the distinctiveness in category membership. For example, participants who associated the advantages of neutrality with security and peace used brief formulations such as “no war,” “peace,” “not being dragged into wars” and “if other nations go to war, Austria doesn’t.” Participants who emphasized political autonomy and diplomacy as main advantages, referred to Austria as being able to act as a mediator or to retain its “own country,” “have own rules”, “being independent” and holding high “regards for own national interests.” Perceived disadvantages were similarly framed in concrete security terms, including “no help from outside,” “having no one to depend on”, “we’re by ourself and wouldn’t get help,” and “left to our own devices in case of military attack.” Other participants were concerned about little political leverage by pointing out that Austria’s neutral stance may make Austria “unimportant from an international perspective” with “no one [who] listens to Austria” and “no influence on others”. Further concerns illustrate issues surrounding limited military spending, highlighting that participant concerns surrounding “no money for the military”, “too little funding”, and “no budget for arms”. However, at the same time, a substantial proportion of participants provided minimal responses towards concerns and advantages by explaining they had “no clue”, “no idea” or simply stating “x” or “?”

These examples highlight that respondents did not invoke a single, uniform understanding surrounding benefits, suggesting balanced perceptions towards Austria’s neutrality. Austria is viewed positively, particularly due to sustaining national security and autonomy but also negatively as the absence of military alliances may contribute to national security vulnerability. Further inferential examinations of advantages and disadvantages are, however, is pivotal as this can elucidate and unravel underlying patterns and drives in the relationship of the advantages and benefits of neutrality.

Hierarchical cluster analysis

To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between perceptions of advantages and disadvantages of neutrality, Hierarchical Cluster Analysis was employed. This allows to identify distinct groups within the population based on perceptual patterns. The categorization of respondents in accordance with their shared characteristics in their attitudes towards advantages and disadvantages of neutrality allows to understand how these may interact. As the variables perceived advantages and disadvantages of neutrality are categorical, one-hot coding was performed. The agglomeration schedule highlighted large breaks in the coefficient scores, suggesting a substantial reduction in the within-cluster homogeneity after the formation of three clusters. The dendrogram visually confirmed a three-cluster solution, balancing the within-cluster similarity and the between-cluster distinctiveness. To assess the robustness and cluster-distinctiveness of the three-cluster solution, a Chi-Squared Test of Independence was performed on cluster allocation membership. The results suggest that the clusters identified represent meaningful and stable groups as cluster allocation and perception of advantages [ χ 2 (4) = 771.42; p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.53] and disadvantages [ χ 2 (6) = 642.09; p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.48] both yielded significant results with moderate to large effect sizes. Further examination also validated distinct response patterns and interpretative validity. As demonstrated in Table 4, the cluster analysis highlighted a complex interplay between security, autonomy, general awareness and perceived risks.

Cluster 1: security-focused pragmatists

The first cluster represents the largest group, with a total of 46.8% falling into this cluster. This cluster is characterised by the emphasis on security and peace (42.9%) as representing the main advantage of neutrality and benefits in relation to national autonomy (73%). This may demonstrate how neutrality is considered as essential safeguard to avoid international military confrontations. The prominence of national security as a central characteristic of this cluster is highlighted by the belief that neutrality can contribute to avoiding military confrontations and therefore protect national sovereignty as a consequence thereof.

However, because security considerations characterize this cluster, it is notable that the absence of military alliances (54.3%) and insufficient military spending (7.7%) were also identified as disadvantages. This combination suggests that respondents in this cluster simultaneously recognized neutrality as a means of avoiding military confrontation and identified the absence of external military support as a potential security limitation. Rather than indicating a specific preference for military alliances, these responses point to a pragmatic evaluation in which the perceived benefits of neutrality coexist with awareness of its possible security costs. However, the data does not allow to determine which forms of international military cooperation respondents would support.

Cluster 2: impartial bystander

Cluster 2 is the second largest cluster (30%) and is characterised by a neutral or indifferent stand towards the Austrian neutrality. While cluster 1 is focused on security concerns and cluster 3 on military neutrality, cluster 2 is characterized by a lacking opinions in relation to the advantages (66%) and disadvantages (100%) of the Austrian neutrality. While national security and peace (27.1%) and diplomacy and political autonomy (72.9%) were recognized, this does not imply strong endorsement. Rather diplomacy and political autonomy may be explained by reiterating national narratives about Austria’s role as mediator or a general recognition of Austria’s diplomatic role in historical conflicts. In this sense, the group does not display similar levels of convictions as evidenced in group 1 and group 3, suggesting a lack of engagement with neutrality.

In this sense, respondents in Cluster 2 displayed comparatively little substantive elaboration regarding both the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. This pattern may indicate lower salience or lower engagement with the issue, although the cross-sectional data do not allow to distinguish between political disengagement, limited knowledge, indifference, or other explanations. The recognition of diplomacy and political autonomy nevertheless suggests that neutrality-related ideas remain present even where respondents do not articulate extensive evaluations. Accordingly, this cluster is best interpreted as reflecting limited elaboration of neutrality rather than as demonstrating a specific political position.

Cluster 3: military neutral optimists

Cluster 3 accounts for 23.3% of respondents and is characterized primarily by references to national security and peace (53.9%), with very limited mention of diplomacy and political autonomy. The low frequency of identified disadvantages may indicate that respondents in this group predominantly associate neutrality with its perceived security and peace-related benefits. However, the open-ended responses do not establish whether this reflects strong normative commitment, limited awareness of potential disadvantages, or simply the salience of positive associations when respondents were asked to identify advantages. The cluster can therefore be interpreted as displaying a predominantly positive security-oriented understanding of neutrality rather than as demonstrating an objectively “optimistic” or “idealised” position.

In conclusion, the cluster analysis suggests that the underlying motivations to support neutrality may differ while the disadvantages remain similar across clusters. Respondents in cluster 1 may have the most fully-fledged understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality, balancing security concerns with a pragmatic view of disadvantages. In comparison, respondents of cluster 2 remain largely impartial, showing little awareness for the benefits as well as the drawbacks of neutrality. This may suggest little critical engagement with neutrality. Respondents in cluster 3 may hold idealized perspectives on the Austrian neutrality, emphasizing security benefits while overlooking potential security issues. To further understand factors shaping these perceptions, the impact of sociodemographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes will be examined.

Multinomial logistic regression

To understand how sociodemographic factors and sociopolitical attitudes may affect the odds of observing each response category’s likelihood of cluster membership relative to the reference category, a multinomial logistic regression model is applied. Cluster 1 (Security-Focused Pragmatists) was specified as the reference category. Odds ratios are reported to indicate the relative likelihood of membership in Clusters 2 and 3 compared with Cluster 1, and predicted probabilities are reported to provide an intuitive representation of the model-estimated likelihood of cluster membership. Based on the EPV criterion and the total sample size of 1,400 with the smallest cluster (Cluster 3) with 326 cases, the number of predictors that could be included is 32 predictors. The 14 sociodemographic factors and sociopolitical attitudes outlined in Table 1 (age, gender, education, income, place of residency (county), Austrian place identity, European place identity, interest in politics, political affiliation, appreciation for NATO, attitudes towards providing military aid for EU countries, attitudes towards receiving military help from EU countries, perception of Austrian the Austrian neutrality’s protective function and the importance of Austria’s neutrality) could therefore be utilized in the multinomial logistic regression model. Cluster 1 (Security-Focused Pragmatists) was utilized as reference category as it represents the largest and most fully-fledged group with respondents having a balanced and nuanced understanding of both, the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality.

The multinomial logistic regression model with cluster membership as dependent variable and sociodemographic factors and sociopolitical attitudes as independent variables indicates the model containing only the intercept data to improve with the integration of the predictor variables, χ 2 (46) = 218.81, p < 0.001; R 2 = 0.23 (Cox-Snell), 0.27 (Nagelkerke).

Table 5 highlights significant coefficient scores, examining factors that differentiate cluster membership between Security-Focused Pragmatists, Impartial Bystanders and Military Neutrality Optimists. Several key factors were identified comparing Impartial Bystanders and Security-Focused Pragmatists. The results suggest that males are less likely to be in the Impartial Bystander cluster, when compared to females (OR = 0.62, CI 0.44, 0.89). Similarly, those education plays a role suggesting that those with vocational training are more likely to be Impartial Bystanders when compared to those with A Levels or equivalent (OR = 2, CI 1.28, 3.1). Geographically, those who reside in Lower Austria or in Vorarlberg are more likely to be in the Impartial Bystander cluster, when compared to those living in Vienna (OR = 1.81, CI 1.04, 3.14; OR = 3.29, CI 1.37, 7.9 respectively). Further, those who perceive neutrality as important or protective are more likely to be Impartial Bystanders (OR = 1.42, CI 1.15, 1.77, OR = 1.26, CI 1.07, 1.49). Political attitudes are also relevant with those, exhibiting more nationalistic, right wing attitudes being more likely to fall into the Impartial Bystander cluster (OR = 0.12, CI 1.01, 1.31). Lastly those who do not appreciate EU military aid in Austrian military crisis are more likely to belong to this group (OR = 0.74, CI 0.6–0.91).

The comparison between Military Optimists and Security-Focused Pragmatists outlined similar sociodemographic factors and sociopolitical attitudes to be relevant in predicting cluster membership. Again, men were identifies as less to be in the Military Optimist group when compared to females (OR = 0.63, CI 0.44–0.95). Also, Lower Austria was again a significant predictor, outlining that those from Lower Austria to be more likely to fall into the Military Optimist cluster when compared to those living in Vienna (OR = 1.94, CI 1.05, 3.59). In addition, respondents who believed in the importance protective function of Austria’s neutrality to a higher extent were more likely to fall into the Military Optimist cluster (OR = 1.86, CI 1.39, 2.51 and OR = 1.33, CI 1.1, 1.6 respectively). Lastly, those who were less favourable towards delivering Austrian military support to EU nations in times of crisis were more likely to be in the Military Optimist cluster (OR = 0.72, CI 0.59, 0.88).

In conclusion, the multinomial regression results highlight that gender, education, place of county residency, political attitudes and perceptions of foreign policies are significantly related with differences in cluster membership. In this sense, the findings further illustrate the model’s baseline classification pattern with the reference profile showing the highest estimated profile membership in the Security-Focused pragmatist cluster. As such, the findings demonstrate the multifaceted nature of neutrality preferences and their relationship with demographic characteristics, political ideology and identity and attitudinal variables.

4. Discussion

The present study combined inductive and deductive approaches to understand publicly pertinent perceptions of advantages and disadvantages of the Austrian neutrality, how these may relate and how sociodemographic and sociopolitical factors may predict perceptual patterns. Free word responses from a nationally representative sample with 1,400 respondents were analysed, which allowed to develop a structured and consistent framework to holistically understand public perceptions of neutrality. In doing so, the present study answered three main research questions: What are the primary advantages and disadvantages of neutrality perceived by the population?

The findings suggest that neutrality is publicly appreciated for its contribution to long-lasting peace and national security. In this sense, neutrality was found to be associated with its role in preventing direct involvement in military conflicts. This is important as it highlights how the perceived value of neutrality relates to fostering stability and maintaining national sovereignty. Public perceptions therefore reflect how neutral stances may be perceived as reinforcing Austria’s role as a credible mediator in international conflicts. This reflects existing literature that highlights beneficial views of neutrality to be commonly related to stability, peace and national sovereignty (Buchanan, 2004; Schwarz and Urosevic, 2023). This is also reflected in public perceptions surrounding diplomacy and political autonomy as being further defining feature of Austria’s neutrality.

However, a high proportion of respondents was unable to identify possible benefits of neutrality. This may be explained by general unawareness surrounding neutrality, reflecting unquestioned cultural assumptions that constitute a culturally produced ‘taken-for-granted’ and therefore cannot be justified when prompted (Jovchelovitch, 2001; Bhabha, 1994; Geertz, 1993; Lévi-Bruhl, 1985; Said, 1978). As discussed by Jovchelovitch (2001) and Bhabha (1994), long-standing policies may become so ingrained in the national consciousness that they are rarely consciously perceived, scrutinized or questioned. Alternatively, respondents might have a critical stance towards neutrality, particularly in uncertain contemporary geopolitical environments, reflecting national security concerns.

This is reflected in responses surrounding the disadvantages of neutrality. Here, one of the most preeminent disadvantages was the absence of strong military partners and alliances. Such concerns resonate with literature underscoring the challenges that neutral countries may face in shifting global landscapes (Kruzel and Haltzel, 1989; Moyer and Kornegay, 2024). This may therefore highlight public concern regarding security vulnerabilities in relation to national defence, leading to scepticism surrounding neutrality. While insufficient military budget and little political leverage represented concerns that were only voiced by few, the majority of the respondents was unable to identify disadvantages. This can be explained by a sense of idealism surrounding the concept of neutrality, suggesting that respondents may perceive it as a morally sound position that decreases the risk of military entanglements with military superpowers. In addition, the complexity of global politics, where neutrality may be a strength and a limitation, may not be fully grasped, leading to an overemphasis on benefits, while underestimating potential disadvantages.

In conclusion, the present findings align with broader theoretical examinations of neutrality, highlighting its purpose in preserving national sovereignty (Buchanan, 2004; Schwarz and Urosevic, 2023) but also raising criticism surrounding security vulnerabilities of neutral states in increasingly complex and unpredictable geopolitical environments (Kruzel and Haltzel, 1989; Moyer and Kornegay, 2024). These findings underscore the dual nature of neutrality as a moral position and a pragmatic strategy that contributes to national sovereignty and security.

The present findings can also be considered against subsequent developments in Austrian defence policy. At the time of data collection in 2024, compulsory military service lasted 6 months. Since then, the issue of military preparedness has become increasingly prominent in Austrian political debate. A representative Gallup survey conducted in 2025 found that 70% of respondents supported retaining general compulsory military service, while 51% supported extending the duration of basic military service beyond six months (Gallup Austria, 2025). More recent evidence similarly indicates that support for neutrality coexists with an emphasis on military preparedness: in 2026, 71% of respondents agreed that Austria, as a neutral state, must be militarily capable of defending itself against external attack (Gallup Austria, 2026). These developments are consistent with the present finding that neutrality can be perceived positively while simultaneously being associated with concerns about defence capacity and the absence of external military support. Importantly, however, the present survey predates these developments and therefore cannot establish whether changing attitudes toward military service have altered public understandings of neutrality. In July 2026, the Austrian government subsequently adopted a reform extending military service by three months through compulsory military exercises, demonstrating the increasing policy salience of defence preparedness. Future longitudinal research should examine whether this development produces changes in the relationship between neutrality, military preparedness, and public security perceptions. Which perceptual patterns can be identified in publicly pertinent advantages and disadvantages of neutrality?

Further analysis of the survey responses suggests distinct perceptual patterns to relate to perceived advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. First, Security-Focused Pragmatists emphasize the advantages of neutrality by focusing on neutrality as a means to safeguard national security. As security considerations represent the main characteristic of this cluster, the main disadvantage was related to an absence of military alliances in times of military crisis. While respondents of this cluster may perceive Austria as capable to address security challenges autonomously, the analysis indicates an appreciation for certain conservative military alliances that would improve national security. This mirrors Waltz (2010) and Snyder’s (1993) critique surrounding neutrality as a strategic disadvantage, limiting national defence in the face of potential threats. While neutrality may offer autonomy, it can ultimately limit the strategic options neutral countries may have with their inability to join collective security arrangements and military alliances (Waltz, 2010; Snyder, 1993).

In comparison, Military Neutral Optimist may perceive neutrality as morally justified and strategic sound position, particularly for smaller states that intend to avoid military confrontations. This optimistic stance is mirrored in literature, highlighting the role of neutrality as an ideal contributing to national security and long-lasting international peace (Brown, 1939, Keating, 2001). This cluster’s perceptions may be intertwined with Austrian national identity and, as tool for peace. This aligns with Gärtner (2015) and Zartman and Touval (1985) who discuss neutrality as opportunity to foster diplomacy and international peace. In this sense, the varying perspectives underscore the dynamic tension between the perceived benefits and disadvantages neutrality may imply.

Lastly, Impartial Bystanders show indifference towards the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. Although the benefits of diplomacy and political autonomy are recognized, these perceptions are not strongly endorsed. The indifference observed in the Impartial Bystander cluster aligns with research on public opinion and foreign policy disengagement (Holsti, 1992; Jost and Kertzer, 2023). Individuals may not fully engage with or critically assess foreign policy positions unless they are directly impacted by them (Jost and Kertzer, 2023). In this sense, Impartial Bystanders may represent individuals with limited interest in foreign policy who passively support existing policies due to their lack of engagement (Kertzer, 2023). Moreover, indifference could also reflect a broader societal tendency to take long-standing policies for granted, echoing Geertz’s (1993) notion of cultural assumptions as ‘taken-for-granted’s’ that individuals rarely question or deeply scrutinize. This is reflected in Duncombe’s (2019) argument, suggesting that public attitudes towards policies remain static unless confronted by external challenges. Which influence may sociodemographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes exert on the perceptual patterns?

The influence of sociodemographic characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes on cluster membership highlight how individual values, political ideologies and regional contexts may interplay with perceptions of advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. Gender, education, geographic location and political leanings all predicted how the respondents viewed advantages and disadvantages of neutrality. For example, men were consistently more likely to prioritize security-related concerns, influencing perceptions of foreign policies such as Austria’s neutral stance. This finding may reflect broader societal norms, where men may be more inclined to favour security-focused perspectives and nationalistic positions, when compared to females (Keating, 2021).

Education represents a further predictor, highlighting that higher education may contribute to a more diversified and nuanced understanding of neutrality. This is evidenced by Tsebenko and Shymchuk, 2017 who suggest that individuals with higher levels of education may approach political policies from a more analytical and global perspective. As such, higher educated individuals may be more cognizant of the nuanced balance between the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality.

Also, regional differences were apparent that suggested specific areas of Austria may hold more traditional views of neutrality. When compared to Vienna, the capital of Austria, individuals in Lower Austria and Vorarlberg were more likely to understand neutrality from non-interventionists or optimistic neutrality stances when compared to security-pragmatist perspectives. As such, regional differences may reflect local narratives or historical experiences with neutrality whereby some areas may closely associate neutrality with national identity, whereas others evaluate its relevance more critically int. the face of emerging security threats (Gärtner, 2022; Gehler and Bischof, 2017).

Lastly, political orientation was found to be significantly associated with cluster membership. These associations should, however, be interpreted cautiously. Political orientation may structure how respondents weigh peace, autonomy, military cooperation, and international integration, but the present analysis does not establish that individuals with ideological orientations necessarily prioritize specific foreign-policy goals. The observed associations are therefore best understood as differences in the probability of belonging to particular perceptual profiles rather than as evidence that political ideology determines how neutrality is understood.

Limitations and conclusions

While the findings provide valuable insights into perceptions the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality, a number of caveats need to be taken into consideration. While the data utilized a large, nationally representative cohort, the reliance on self-reported data may have introduced a possibility of response bias. Given the sensitive nature of the topic in relation to its historical significance and contemporary relevance, some participants may have provided socially desirable answers, leading to an overreporting of politically or socially favourable views.

Secondly, while the study used a large and representative data set of 1,400 Austrian adults, the results may not be generalizable to other nations. As such, the present study may not fully capture the diversity of opinions on neutrality in Europe. Geopolitical considerations in Austria are likely unique due to its historical development. As such, perceptions of neutrality might significantly vary across countries. However, as this exploratory project focused on Austrian perceptions, the present sample was adequate to achieve this aim.

A third limitation represents the selection of predictor variables. While all predictor variables were theoretically justified, future research may adopt additional variables. For example, a further potentially relevant sociodemographic factor may be occupation. Occupation may shape exposure to institutions, political information, socioeconomic interests, and perceptions of defence and security policy, As such, future surveys may therefore want to collect occupational status and employment sector to assess whether neutrality perceptions vary systematically across occupational groups.

Another limitations concerns the coding of the qualitative data and the combination of inductive and deductive approaches. Open-end answers relating to the advantages and disadvantages of neutrality could have been coded with quantitative text analysis techniques. This would have allowed to harness the richness of the data to a greater extent than this could be done with Content Analysis. Gidron and Tichelbaecker (2025) and Zollinger (2024) exemplify this by utilizing quantitative text analysis techniques to process and interpret open-end responses on voters’ ideological perspectives, aiming to uncover the underlying dimensions of political ideologies and cleavage identities. However, quantitative text analysis methods like Latent Semantic Scaling, Word Embedding Models or Structural Topic Modelling would likely have contributed to a higher number of categories when compared with Thematic Content Analysis. While this might have allowed a richer, more detailed understanding of neutrality perceptions, it would have undermined the attempt to generate statistically concise and coherent models to understand how perceptions of advantages and disadvantages relate to each other and could be predicted by sociodemographic and sociopolitical variables. Thematic Content Analysis provided clear, well-defined categorical outcomes, making it directly compatible with bi- und multinomial logistic regressions. For the present research, Thematic Content Analysis was therefore to a better choice. However, future work may want to examine the richness of the qualitative open-end responses further by utilizing quantitative text analysis techniques (e.g., Latent Semantic Scaling, Word Embedding Models or Structural Topic Modelling).

Future research may also want to utilize complementary qualitative approaches, such as focus-group discussions to examine the motivations and meanings underlying different neutrality orientations. While the present study examined brief individual associations, focus groups could facilitate further in-depth discussion of how citizens interpret neutrality, how they reconcile neutrality with military preparedness and European security cooperation, and how family narratives, political identities, media exposure, and experiences with the Austrian Armed Forces shape these understandings. Focus-group research is particularly useful for examining how political meanings are constructed and negotiated collectively, allowing researchers to identify shared narratives as well as disagreement and contestation among participants (Morgan, 1997; Krueger and Casey, 2015) and therefore may be a particularly promising approach for future examinations.

Despite its limitations, the present study provides a nuances exploration of public perception of Austria’s neutrality, highlighting the complex and multifaceted nature inherent to individual perceptual patterns. The varying attitudes towards neutrality highlight that neutrality is not a concept, hegemonically constructed by society, but influenced by a wide range of inherent factors. In this sense, neutrality may be better understood as a multidimensional spectrum than as a binary policy preference. Conceptualized as spectrum, neutrality attitudes may range from restrictive understanding of neutrality, emphasizing non-alignment, avoidance of military commitments, and political distance from military alliances to an acceptance of extensive cooperation with international security structures (Gärtner, 2018; Greminger and Rickli, 2023; Gallouët, 2024). Neutrality, valued as an instrument of national autonomy and conflict avoidance with simultaneous regard for defence preparedness and selected forms of international cooperation may represent a symbolic middle ground between extreme points of the spectrum.

The present findings also outline how national policies can be perceived differently, depending on sociodemographic factors and sociopolitical positions. This highlights the relevance of taking nuanced perspectives on neutrality into account. The results may assist policymakers in addressing public concerns about security while maintaining support for neutrality. To improve public understandings and engagement with neutrality, educational campaigns may be developed to clarify its strategic, political and security dimensions and thereby reduce public misconceptions. This may allow to address public concerns surrounding international isolation and responses to evolving security threats and so ensure further public support for neutral stances. Lastly, the present study opens avenues for future comparative research on neutrality internationally. Future studies may investigate how neutrality can evolve in response to contemporary threats like cyber warfare and global terrorism. In conclusion, the present study enhances the understanding of public attitudes towards neutrality and thereby provides valuable implications for policy development.

Statements

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was received for this work and/or its publication. Open access funding provided by University of Klagenfurt.

Data availability

The data analyzed in this study were collected as part of a pre-existing survey commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence. The authors did not collect the original data. Access to the data is subject to the data-sharing conditions of the original data provider.

Author contributions

RP: Validation, Data curation, Methodology, Conceptualization, Project administration, Visualization, Investigation, Supervision, Resources, Funding acquisition, Writing – review & editing, Software, Formal analysis, Writing – original draft. WP: Data curation, Methodology, Writing – original draft. GS: Writing – original draft, Methodology, Data curation.

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Citation

Phillips, R., et al. (2026). Rethinking neutrality in Europe: a cluster-analysis of Austrian attitudes toward neutrality and non-alignment. Frontiers in Political Science, Volume 8. https://doi.org/
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8 - 2026

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Copyright © 2026 Phillips, Prinz and Straub.

License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

*Correspondence: Rita Phillips

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