Beyond participation: procedural justice, relational legitimacy, and sustained engagement in evaluating the effectiveness of DDR programs

Introduction

Governments and international organizations use Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs as key institutional tools to achieve sustainable peace (Ebiede et al., 2020; Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2005). Over the past two decades, DDR has played a pivotal role in the field of post-conflict reconstruction, not only to remove weapons from circulation and demobilize armed groups, but also to support the political, economic, and social reintegration of former fighters (Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2005; Steenbergen, 2021). In the last few years, a growing body of scholarship argues that such DDR programs are essential parts of peacebuilding and should be used to create disincentives to renew violence and build a platform for durable peace (Al Makhzoumi et al., 2024; Subedi, 2018). Countries such as Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Mali, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, among others, have relied on these initiatives in their peace processes (Ebiede et al., 2020; Muggah, 2005; Nzekani Zena, 2013; Avis, 2024; Steenbergen, 2021).

As the importance of DDR has increased, so has the amount of literature assessing the effectiveness of the programs. Governments, donor agencies, and international organizations have channeled a lot of resources into monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of DDR programs (Binnendijk, 1989; Bollen et al., 2005; Raifman et al., 2018). Most of the evaluation frameworks focus on quantitative aspects such as weapons recovered and combatants demobilized (Muggah, 2005; Subedi, 2018), the level of decrease in violent conflict (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010), the opportunities for reinsertion benefits or vocational training (Seethaler, 2016), and former combatants’ participation (Dzinesa, 2006; Mazurana and Cole, 2013). With their measurable, comparable, and donor-oriented nature, the indicators are now well entrenched in the Operational guidance on integrated DDR standards (African Union, 2018; Odote, 2025; United Nations, 2014).

While these measures offer important insights into how authorities implement DDR programs and their short-term stabilization effects, they offer far less information about the nature of the institutional relationships created and maintained during and after the formal implementation ends and how these relationships contribute to sustained participation and durable peace. For example, a program can be successful in demobilizing thousands of combatants, provide reintegration benefits, and decrease violent conflict in the short term; however, former combatants may continue to mistrust the institution and those implementing the programs (Fujishige, 2022), lose interest in reintegration efforts as incentives expire or die out (Muggah, 2009), and susceptible to re-mobilization during political or economic crises (Banholzer, 2014). Similarly, communities can be involved in DDR but feel marginalized and excluded by implementing authorities (Özerdem, 2026). In such instances, it may appear that traditional metrics of program outputs identify key shortcomings but fail to fully account for how some DDR programs lead to long-term peace, while others lead to only short-term stabilization.

This article argues that the current dilemma in the assessment of DDR is that it overly focuses on “just” participation and not sustained engagement in the programs. While most evaluations assume that program enrolment, attendance, or completion is evidence of successful reintegration, participation indicators may be ambiguous. Someone can participate in the programs because they are offered opportunities for education or training, a stipend, or other physical benefits, rather than a sustained commitment to peace-building institutions. Additionally, incentives could diminish, and institutional arrangements could weaken. Thus, participation may cease if it is largely for material benefits (Muggah, 2009). Therefore, the only way participation-based assessment might be used to measure the effectiveness of DDR is to assume that it translates into long-term commitment. Thus, participation is not a reliable measure of effectiveness unless it is regarded as a basis for sustained commitment. This article suggests that the key measure of the effectiveness of DDR programs is sustained participation rather than “just” participation. I define sustained participation as the ongoing commitment of former combatants and affected communities to work with peacebuilding institutions, to be involved in reintegration processes, in reconciliation initiatives, and to contribute to local governance after the formal program activities have finished. Sustained participation contrasts with “just” participation driven by the main incentive effect, showing evidence of committed engagement through enduring relationships between participants and implementing institutions.

The article adopts a relational legitimacy approach grounded in procedural justice to explain the development of sustained participation. This integrated approach is based on procedural justice theory, which suggests that people assess DDR institutions not on the material outcomes they receive but on the process of how decisions are made (Besley and McComas, 2005; Blader and Tyler, 2015; Hancock, 2012). How people perceive the neutrality of peace forums, the trustworthiness of authority figures, authority figures’ treatment of citizens with dignity and respect, and their opportunities for voice shape their relationship with peacebuilding institutions (Tyler, 2000). Relational legitimacy is anchored in these procedural experiences, shaping people’s perceptions of whether the authorities are legitimate and deserving of voluntary support and cooperation (Jackson et al., 2012).

This research utilizes a qualitative case study of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Program (NDPAP). The program, launched in 2009 by the then Nigerian president Musa Yar’Adua to help tackle the longstanding problem of militant attacks in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, succeeded in making significant strides in curbing attacks on oil infrastructure and promoting massive demobilization (Aghedo, 2013; Ikelegbe, 2010). The overall amnesty package predominantly includes DDR initiatives in addition to community development programming. But concerns about patronage (Folami, 2017), corruption (Obi, 2010; Idemudia, 2017), and exclusion (Ikelegbe and Umukoro, 2016) have long shaped people’s perceptions of the procedural fairness in the DDR programs and the legitimacy of the authority figures implementing the DDR programs. The discussion on who has access to the DDR resources, coupled with the contested institutional relationships shaping the distribution of these resources, makes NDPAP a particularly interesting case for studying the effects of procedural justice and relational legitimacy on sustained participation in the peace process.

The article makes three contributions to the field of peacebuilding scholarship. First, it shifts the focus of DDR evaluation from security outputs and “just” participation to sustained participation as a key measure of longer-term DDR success. Second, it emphasizes that relational legitimacy is anchored in people’s perceptions of procedural justice and demonstrates that legitimacy is not an institutional or structural phenomenon but rather a product of interactions between people and the implementation authorities involved in the peace process. Third, it asserts that sustained participation is the pathway between relational legitimacy and the effectiveness of DDR initiatives. The article provides a new approach to understanding the role of sustained participation in DDR evaluation and why some peacebuilding interventions lead to durable peace, while others struggle to sustain people’s participation after the program has ended.

Literature review

Evaluating procedural justice, relational legitimacy, sustained participation and the effectiveness of DDR programs

This literature review section evaluates the analytical framework of procedural justice, relational legitimacy, sustained participation, and the effectiveness of DDR programs. It highlights those traditional measures of security like the rate of disarmament and demobilization, or measures of violence reduction are not sufficient to measure the effectiveness of DDR programs. Instead, the long-term effectiveness of DDR relies on the extent to which participants view program institutions as fair, trustworthy, respectful, and inclusive, which creates the conditions for relational legitimacy during an interpersonal relationship between citizens and the authority figures, and the citizens’ willingness to continue their active participation in the programs. This section aims to build a conceptual understanding of the interconnection of these concepts to better appreciate their influence on social and economic outcomes, violent conflict, and reconciliation as outcomes of DDR processes.

Evaluating the effectiveness of DDR programs

DDR emerged as a focal point in the process of post-conflict society stabilization. New tools of effectiveness include weapons collected, combatants demobilized, armed groups dissolved, and decreases in violent incidents (Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2009; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Steenbergen, 2021). According to Muggah (2009) and Knight and Özerdem (2004), DDR programs started as security operations, mainly to minimize the danger of re-emerging armed groups by disarming and taking away weapons and integrating former combatants into civilian society. These were not random but rather metrics relevant to the immediate post-conflict needs, offering tangible proof of progress to authorities and donors. This was codified in the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which had the security metrics incorporated into global DDR practice (United Nations, 2014). These security-based indicators had distinct benefits: they were measurable, comparable between contexts, and linked with donors’ requirements to hold the implementers to account. They also had some valuable aspects of immediate stabilization. Thus, these dominant evaluation perspectives influenced scholarly and policy conceptions of the effectiveness of DDR in a way that restricted the conceptual scope of evaluation. As the programs proliferated in Africa and some other parts of the world (Avis, 2024), there were also growing evaluation frameworks, with some of these originating in the security dimensions of the intervention (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Subedi, 2018). As peacebuilding scholarship fully evolved, researchers began to notice that DDR is more than a disarmament and demobilization process (Fujishige, 2022; Rodríguez-Castellón, 2024). They realized that the reintegration program is multifaceted, including socioeconomic and political reintegration (Rodríguez-Castellón, 2024). Therefore, extensive literature review help in the reconceptualization of the effectiveness of DDR as a multidimensional construct comprising of socioeconomic outcomes, which hinge on the employment opportunities, stabilization of the incomes, and empowerment of the citizens in terms of vocational and educational training (Rodríguez-Castellón, 2024); the remobilization risk and level of violence and conflict (Subedi, 2018; Steenbergen, 2021), and the success or failure of community reconciliation (Androff, 2012). In other words, the review of literature indicates that factors beyond an atmosphere of no violence, including community’s economic emancipation and improved community reconciliation, determine the effectiveness of DDR programs.

Evaluating sustained participation and its effects on the effectiveness of DDR programs

One theoretical gap to be filled in DDR evaluation is making a distinction between participation and sustained participation. Current systems assess participation in programs by the number of people participating or completing activities (Banholzer, 2014; Muggah, 2009; Subedi, 2018) and seldom assess whether people continue to participate following the completion of formal requirements and how sustained participation contributes to the effectiveness of the DDR initiatives.

The literature review highlights the current reflections on participation as a means for effective DDR program implementation. In most available literature, participation is strongly associated with success (Bauermeister et al., 2017; Blair, 2004; Panousieris, 2008). Current evaluation shows that DDR scholarship has failed to move past the uncritical assumption that DDR program participation is a sign of genuine engagement with peacebuilding institutions (Dzinesa, 2006; Mazurana and Cole, 2013). For example, DDR is more effective if affected groups participate in planning, implementation, monitoring, and the review of the project; otherwise, there is a risk of resentment and unrealistic expectations undermining reintegration (Kilroy, 2008). However, participation is an observable behavior and tells little about underlying motivations. Former combatants can participate in a reintegration program because there is an educational opportunity (Arango, 2020; Arango-Fernández and Zuilkowski, 2022), because they want to benefit from the stipend being distributed (Subedi, 2014), or because they might lose their benefits if they withdraw from the program (Knight and Özerdem, 2004). In post-conflict situations where people are poor, jobless, and insecure, participation is a rational thing to do. But participation due to material gain is no guarantee that they trust institutions implementing the program and does not indicate their long-term commitment to the peacebuilding process (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007).

However, DDR must involve organizational transformation as well as individual transition to produce durable peace (Knight, 2008). This expands the scope of the evaluation mechanism to include community participation, institutional trust, social acceptance, political inclusion, and long-term livelihood support (Aghedo, 2013; Okonofua, 2016; Subedi, 2018). This transformation was a big shift from a security-only perspective. Although a few indicators were added, the rationale for assessing the effectiveness of the programs did not change significantly (Knight, 2008). According to Knight, long-term commitment to peacebuilding institutions was not directly measured in the reintegration assessment, but rather the observable outputs of education, including vocational training and income generation. So, the reintegration frameworks, even if extended, were still basically techno-centric. They posed questions about programs providing services, rather than whether participants built sustainable relationships with implementing institutions and authorities. The review then concludes that the missing behavioral mechanism of sustained participation creates a gap between the initial implementation of DDR and the long-term peacebuilding outcomes.

In summary, while compliance is important in the initial stages, it is the continued engagement that is essential for long-term DDR success. Just participation can result in thousands of combatants being demobilized and then returning to violence when they lose trust in the institutions they are supposed to interact with or see peacebuilding processes as unfair. On the other hand, programs that inspire sustained participation can achieve continued reintegration and lessen the incentives for remobilization. Although participation is important, sustained participation has rarely been conceptualized as a major criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of DDR initiatives. This is a crucial missing behavioral mechanism.

Procedural justice and relational legitimacy as a foundation for sustained participation

The theory of procedural justice can be a powerful framework to address this gap because it provides an understanding of whether people are willing or unwilling to cooperate with institutions.

Procedural justice is developed through the demonstration of fairness and respect in everyday interactions between people and authority figures (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Thibaut and Walker, 1978; Tyler and Blader, 2000). It is the criterion by which people judge the outcome of the peace process (Tyler, 2000). DDR implementation processes may include various institutional interactions, such as during registration, eligibility determination, training allocation, benefits distribution, and grievance resolution. According to Tyler (2000), people continuously evaluate these interactions for impartiality, sincerity, respectfulness, and inclusivity. These assessments determine whether or not institutions are seen as “trustworthy partners in peacebuilding (Blader and Tyler, 2015). Hence, procedural justice is not only an administrative matter but also a relational tool that can build a long-term commitment to peacebuilding institutions (Hancock, 2012).

Legitimacy is usually defined as an overall trust in the authorities’ right to rule in traditional theories (Stillman, 1974; Suchman, 1995; Suddaby et al., 2017). This definition is useful, but it conceptualizes legitimacy as an institutional feature and not a social process. In post-conflict societies where authority is contested and where people feel marginalized in their interpersonal relationships with authority figures, institutions may have been perceived as responsible for violence, resulting in people distrusting these institutions. Legitimacy, therefore, can be viewed as a recurring relationship between institutions and the people impacted.

The perception of legitimacy of institutions is affected by how they are treated - neutrally, transparently, with respect, and with opportunities to have a voice (Tyler, 2000). This understanding is particularly true in post-conflict environments where there is a lack of trust in the state (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007), strong historical grievances (Obi, 2010), institutions lack legitimacy (Mallinder and McEvoy, 2011), and corruption is rife (Joe-Akunne et al., 2018). Mallinder and McEvoy state that, in such a scenario, institutional authority did not lose authority but its legitimacy. Building upon this literature, this article conceptualizes relational legitimacy as the quality of the relationship between people and institutions during their interpersonal contact with the authority representing these institutions. It is influenced by the extent of impartiality of authority figures, whether they fulfil their commitment, listen to complaints, and are sensitive and respond to people’s needs in a meaningful way. From this relational perspective, the focus of an analysis of institutional design shifts from the institution to interactions that help or hurt the institution in attracting or losing public support.

The literature review makes a more compelling case for relational legitimacy as being anchored on the perception of procedural justice (Tyler, 2000). Procedural justice can then serve as a foundation to build relational legitimacy in the peace process. According to Tyler, people will perceive an institution as legitimate if they experience neutrality of the peace forum, if they trust authority figures and the institutions they represent, and if the authority figures give them respectful treatment and meaningful voice. On the other hand, when they doubt the legitimacy of the system, they point to favoritism (Krampe and Ekman, 2017), corruption (Galtung and Tisné, 2009), disrespectful communication (Tyler, 2000), and exclusion (Obi and Rustad, 2011). So, procedural justice is the relational element around which the meaning of legitimacy is found. Thus, four dimensions of relational legitimacy can be construed as:

• Neutrality – decisions based on transparent, consistently applied principles.
• Trustworthiness – confidence that authorities act sincerely and fulfil commitments.
• Dignity and Respect – recognition and equal treatment.
• Voice – meaningful opportunities to influence decisions.

These are the relational foundations that underpin sustained participation.

Overall, the literature review shows that sustained participation is the missing mechanism linking procedural justice and relational legitimacy to effective DDR initiatives. Sustained participation helps to bolster socioeconomic development, reduce remobilization, and foster reconciliation. Evaluating procedural justice in DDR programs, the relational legitimacy of institutions and authority figures implementing the programs, and people’s sustained participation in the programs is therefore essential to assessing whether DDR promotes durable peace.

Theoretical framework

This study builds a theoretical framework, a single approach, that integrates the main arguments for assessing the effectiveness of DDR (Figure 1). It starts from the understanding that previous evaluations have primarily emphasized security outputs based on security indicators and that program participation is an indicator of successful reintegration. The security indicators of stabilization do not reveal whether peacebuilding institutions foster lasting relationships for long-term peace. Therefore, the core idea of this framework is that the ability of peacebuilding institutions to produce effective DDR lies in how people’s perceptions of procedural justice and relational legitimacy shape their sustained participation within the programs rather than how the programs produce quick-fire output.

Reframing DDR evaluation

The linear logic of traditional DDR evaluation assumes that implementing DDR translates into output, leading to peacebuilding outcomes (Ebiede et al., 2020; Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2005). For example, participation in programs based on the number of people participating or completing activities is considered a form of success (Banholzer, 2014; Muggah, 2009; Subedi, 2018). But participation is often a strategic reaction to incentives, rather than a willingness to invest in peacebuilding institutions (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). In other words, people can accept participating in DDR because there are incentives; for example, a stipend, training, and jobs are available, but not because they believe in or respect the institutions providing these incentives. The theoretical framework in this paper thus moves away from participation toward sustained participation, from the evaluative question ‘Did participants complete program activities?’ to ‘Do participants continue to participate voluntarily in the peacebuilding processes following the removal of incentives?” This transformation shifts the focus from institutional processes to long-term outcomes, emphasizing the relational bases of peacebuilding and the behavioral mechanisms that connect institutional processes with long-term outcomes.

Procedural justice–relational legitimacy–sustained participation framework

The first part of the framework examines how individuals assess authority and the institutions that it serves. This framework draws on Tom Tyler’s theory of procedural justice, which proposes four factors to gauge the effectiveness of peacebuilding institutions: neutrality in decision-making, trust in authority, dignity and respect in interpersonal relationships, and opportunity for substantive engagement (Tyler, 2000). These dimensions together provide the foundation for the concept of relational legitimacy (Bradford and Jackson, 2024; Tyler, 2000). Building on this literature, this paper conceptualizes relational legitimacy as the quality of the relationship between people and institutions. It is a legitimacy built by repeated interactions, while institutional legitimacy is the generalized belief that an institution has the right to rule (Stillman, 1974; Suchman, 1995; Suddaby et al., 2017). Since people judge fairness in procedural processes and the legitimacy of authority figures during their interpersonal relationships with them, these perceptions are not institutional characteristics but an everyday negotiated social interaction shaping people’s willingness to continue participating in the peace process even after it has concluded.

Theoretical contributions

The framework makes three contributions to peacebuilding theory. First, it calls for a shift in the focus of evaluation from program outcomes to institutional relationships, meaning that the way institutions enable long-term participation is a prerequisite for lasting peace. Second, it reconceptualizes procedural justice as relational legitimacy, emphasizing legitimacy as an interactional process. Third, it acknowledges the importance of sustained participation as a means for developing procedural justice and relational legitimacy to improve socioeconomic outcomes, reducing the risk of re-mobilization, and improving community reconciliation.

Methodology

This study utilizes a qualitative case study approach to explore how procedural justice and relational legitimacy contribute to sustained engagement when assessing the effectiveness of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. It shifts the focus of evaluation on effectiveness from security outcomes and participation rates to institutional processes that enable former combatants to sustain participation in DDR programs. This research explores DDR programming within Nigeria’s overall Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Program (NDPAP) package as a case study because of the renewed tensions and problems in sustainable reintegration despite its initial perceived success, making it suitable to analyze the dynamics of the social mechanisms and institutional factors contributing to these problems.

Research design and rationale

The study adopts a qualitative single-case design to examine how stakeholders perceive and experience the Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Program (NDPAP). The study utilized qualitative inquiry because it is the best approach for portraying the complexities of human experiences, particularly in fields where researchers relationally interpret issues of socioeconomic conditions, conflict, and reconciliation. Yin’s (2014) definition of case studies guides the approach, emphasizing the need to investigate a phenomenon within its real-world context. Because the NDPAP is embedded in political (Watts, 2004; Adesanya et al., 2023), ethnic (Folami, 2017; Ojaide and Ojaruega, 2021), and socioeconomic dynamics (Mähler, 2010; Oyedele and Stoddart, 2025), the research design is both explanatory, linking implementation processes to outcomes, and interpretive, focusing on how people make meaning of reintegration, conflict, and community relations.

Study settings and case selection

The study setting is in the three states of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers, commonly referred to as the “core Niger Delta.” I selected these states because they represent the epicenter of oil extraction, resource-control agitation, and militancy, and thus the areas most affected by the NDPAP. They also provide for theoretically relevant variation in participants’ perspectives on political representation and access to the DDR program’s benefits. The case of NDPAP is relevant because it demonstrates how a large-scale peace intervention can reduce armed violence but is unable to deal with the more fundamental socioeconomic and relational factors underlying the causes of conflict. Hence, the unit of analysis is the interpretation and experiences of the participants in the implementation processes. I conducted the interview and focus group discussions online because of heightened insecurity during data collection.

Participant recruitment, sampling strategy, and sample size

The study used purposive sampling to identify information-rich participants with direct or indirect experience of the NDPAP. Purposive or selective sampling is a nonprobability sampling technique whereby researchers deliberately select participants with specific characteristics, knowledge, or relevance to the research objectives (Campbell et al., 2020). Because there was a need for analytical depth and diverse perspectives across relevant viewpoints, purposive sampling was the preferred option over probability sampling. Eligibility required being at least 20 years old, residing or working in one of the three states, and having relevant knowledge of the program. No exclusions were made based on gender, ethnicity, class, or occupation. The final sample, as shown in Table 1 below, included 59 participants drawn from former combatants, community members, government actors, and civil society members. Data saturation, where interviews and focus groups yielded no new themes or variations, determined the sample size. The sample size includes 39 individual interviews and 4 focus-group discussions with 20 participants. Nineteen (19) participants resided in Bayelsa State while 20 participants lived in each of Delta and Rivers States. The focus groups comprised four different panels with 5 participants each. Although focus group discussions have drawbacks, such as the dominance of outspoken participants, difficulties in controlling group dynamics, and the risks of social desirability bias, their advantages make them irreplaceable tools for research (Nyumba et al., 2018).

Table 1. Demographic and stakeholder profile of participants (N = 59).

Participants’ profile

Data collection procedures

I collected the research data through semi-structured interviews and focus-group discussions. A semi-structured interview evaluates thoughts, feelings, and opinions and delves deeply into personal and sometimes sensitive issues (Rubin and Rubin and Rubin, 2011). This approach allowed the gathering of rich data and helped provide credible inferences (Lim, 2025). Unlike one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions allow discussion, debate, and sharing of ideas, thus making the data richer by sharing experiences and opinions (Hennink, 2013). Using a common interview guide, the interviews lasted 30–60 min, while focus groups lasted about 90 min. The common interview guide ensured consistency while allowing probing and exploration of unexpected insights. I conducted the sessions in English or Nigerian Pidgin, recorded them with participants’ consent, and later transcribed them verbatim. NVivo assisted with English transcription, while Pidgin transcripts were manually produced and de-identified. Reflexive notes and contextual observations supplemented the data.

Data analysis

The study employed reflexive thematic analysis and pattern matching. I used a hybrid method for coding, with deductive codes obtained from the research questions, and inductive codes obtained from emergent issues that include stipend dependence, exclusion, and remobilization risks. The research employs pattern matching to compare themes found in the interviews and focus group data with the theoretical propositions, emphasizing convergence, divergence, and discrepancies between stakeholder groups.

Trustworthiness and research quality

I used triangulation (interviews and document analysis), member checking, and comparative analysis of participants’ perspectives to enhance credibility. An audit trail, multiple code-recode cycles, and systematic documentation ensured dependability of the research data. Reflexive notes and consideration of the researcher’s positionality strengthened confirmability. Robust description supported transferability.

Ethical considerations

The study received IRB approval. All participants gave informed consent. I maintained confidentiality using codes and de-identifying data, with the data stored securely and access to it being carefully controlled. Audio recordings of interviews and focus groups will be destroyed after three years, while transcripts will be destroyed after publication.

Methodological limitations

The limitations may arise because of the lack of a representative sample of all participants due to the use of purposive sampling and the geographic location. In addition, the focus group dynamics may prevent the sharing of sensitive information, and the influence of the researcher may be a factor. However, mitigation strategies included probing, triangulation, member checking, reflexive documentation, and an audit trail.

Overall, the findings are generalizable to similar DDR or peacebuilding programs when the contexts are comparable and inform theory on how fair institutional processes can enhance sustained engagement with the long-term impact of DDR with respect to socio-economic development, decreased violence and remobilization, as well as community reconciliation. The study contributes to a process-oriented approach to assessing the effectiveness of DDR, which goes beyond security outcomes and “just” participation-based assessments.

Findings and discussion

Procedural justice shaping relational legitimacy and sustained participation

The empirical findings support the Procedural Justice – Relational Legitimacy Framework developed in the previous sections. In all the interviews, focus group discussions, and documentary evidence, participants’ perceptions of the DDR programming within the Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Program (NDPAP) were not just based on the material support it offered, or the reduction in violent acts that ensued, but on how fair the institutional processes were in which it was implemented and how people perceive the relational legitimacy of the authority figures implementing the DDR programs.

Lack of neutrality, relational legitimacy, and sustained participation

Participants were often concerned about the neutrality of the peace forum. Neutrality of the peace forum requires that individuals in positions of power be honest, unbiased, and objective, ensuring that every individual and community is represented (Tyler, 2000). However, the participants believed that opportunities offered in the reintegration process of the DDR were not allocated fairly and transparently. They raised doubts over the legitimacy of authority figures in their daily interactions with them, particularly in the allocation of reintegration opportunities. Specifically, forty-seven (47) participants believed that their perceptions of fairness in procedural processes and the relational legitimacy of authority figures shaped their unwillingness to continue participating in the intervention program after it had ended. Ten (10) participants believed that their perceptions of fairness in procedural processes and the relational legitimacy of authority figures did not shape their willingness to continue participating in the intervention program. Two (2) people had no comment about the question. One of the participants who believed that their perceptions of the lack of fairness in procedural processes and the relational legitimacy of authority figures shaped their unwillingness to continue participating in the intervention program after it had ended stated that “the program has not been able to mitigate conflict because of the widespread ethnic favoritism in the program. You cannot get employment if you are not part of a recognized group or cannot speak their language” (Civil Servant 1, resident of Bayelsa). Another participant noted that “the authority figures lack legitimacy because they often ignore us if they realize that you are not part of them and give job opportunities for people they are connected with” (Former Combatants 1, resident of Delta). Likewise, another participant argues that “if you are not affiliated with them in one way or the other, you would not have access to the reintegration opportunities. This act discourages us from complying with their directive or engaging with them (Former Combatant 2, resident of Rivers).

I also analyzed some documents. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence from publicly available data on neutrality in the reintegration aspect of the DDR, in particular, and the NDPAP in general. However, the information gathered highlights criticism of exclusion in the program. According to a report,

“After much effort to address the issues, we bring this to your notice on the actions of Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) administrators. There is anger in the region due to abandonment, neglect, and denials of the benefits to the people, which are the purpose and essence of the created Presidential Amnesty Program.” (Ebiere, 2024).

Participants also shared their perceptions of the relational legitimacy of the authority figures and their unwillingness to continue participating in the DDR programs due to their concerns about lack of transparency in the distribution of the reintegration benefits and opportunities. As one of them noted, “the authority figures implementing the reintegration program are not transparent because they had already selected the people that would benefit from empowerment without publishing the conditions for the selections. This issue is discouraging us from continuing to participate in the amnesty program” (Former Combatant 4, resident of Bayelsa). Another participant who benefited from the reintegration confessed that, “the implementation processes lack transparency because as the beneficiaries, we are unsure of the criteria used by authority figures in distributing reintegration benefits” (Former Combatant 5, resident of Delta). Documented reports also show a lack of transparency in the distribution of reintegration benefits. For example, as stated in a report,

“N712 billion was wasted, basically unaccounted for, due to many issues, with corruption being at the fore. This (amnesty) is supposed to be a very committed program for the Federal Government, but it has been facing a crisis of transparency, consistency, and efficient management of resources.” (Monguno, 2022).

“There is inadequate transparency in the running of some aspects of the program, especially in the recruitment and listing of beneficiaries, with the connivance of some former warlords, who, at every opportunity, shortchange their boys, just as names of non-Niger Delta indigenes have found their way into lists of beneficiaries.” (Anonymous, 2022).

The participants’ statements and the report above indicate that favoritism was widespread and there is a lack of transparency in the distribution of the reintegration program. These practices contributed to the disparities in the distribution of reintegration benefits and opportunities, as well as unequal representation of ethnic groups in the decision-making and implementation processes. For example, most of the former combatants spoke of a lack of neutrality in decision-making on overseas education scholarships, vocational training, leadership appointments, and reintegration support. Others stated that the lack of neutrality in the program resulting from exclusion in accessing reintegration benefits subsequently contributed to their unwillingness to continue participating in the program after it had concluded. Some of the community leaders shared with me their concerns about their disproportionate influence in deciding who should benefit from the reintegration program’s resources. Additionally, some of them shared with me that there is a lack of transparency and openness in the program because the authority figures implementing the DDR are secretive in distributing the reintegration benefits and opportunities, and officials embezzle money meant for the program through proxy payments without providing an account of how the funds are spent. In this regard, they hide their wrongdoings to avoid public scrutiny. They stated that the lack of transparency in the distribution of the reintegration benefits contributed to their unwillingness to continue participating in the program even after the program has concluded.

Those who believed that their perceptions of fairness in procedural processes and the relational legitimacy of authority figures did not shape their willingness to continue participating in the intervention program have a contrary explanation for their different perceptions. For example, one of them noted, “the amnesty program was established for those who agitated for resource control and not for everybody. Our leaders distribute resources fairly for us. Since I am part of them, I have to continue participating” (Former Combatant 10, resident of Rivers).

As another participant put it,

I am participating in the program because our leaders are fair and always show their concern for us. Just like you have the Ijaw man as the head now, he favors his people. I believe they will have a better opportunity in the reintegration program when it is their turn (Former Combatant 11, resident of Bayelsa).

These statements highlight the role of ethnic affiliation and sense of belonging to dominant groups in perceptions of fairness in procedural processes and relational legitimacy and the expectations to stand up for and defend in-group members.

Trustworthiness of authority figures, relational legitimacy, and sustained participation

Peace intervention programs, such as an amnesty program, used as an effective tool in conflict management, reconciliation, and reintegrating the former combatant population into society, are based on the credibility of the authority to deliver the desired results (Mallinder, 2009). According to Mallinder, the credibility of those in authority regarding this program is reflected in the sense of fairness, transparency, and consistency demonstrated by program administrators.

Responding to how the trustworthiness of authority figures in the DDR aspect of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Amnesty Program shapes people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of authority figures implementing the DDR programs and their willingness to continue participating in the DDR programs after the programs have concluded, forty (40) participants believed that the authority figures are not trustworthy and lack relational legitimacy. The perceptions of the lack of trustworthiness of authority figures and their relational legitimacy shaped their unwillingness to continue participating in the DDR programs. However, seventeen (17) participants believed otherwise. Two (2) participants did not have an opinion on the matter. As some of the participants who believed that the authority figures are not trustworthy and lack relational legitimacy noted in the interview,

[…] Warlords serving as the authority figures have politicized and taken over the program. So, we cannot trust these people. For example, several members and communities in the Brass area of Bayelsa State, especially in the Nimbuk region, are not benefiting from the program. That is the reason for the high rate of violence in those communities in recent times (Civil Servant 2, resident of Delta).

We do not trust the authority figures managing the reintegration resources because they primarily benefit a select few, while those who initially agitated for it, including minority groups, remain marginalized. They do not care about our feelings and needs (Community leader 1, resident of Delta).

The participants who believed that authority figures are untrustworthy, and whose perceptions of the lack of trustworthiness of authority figures and their relational legitimacy shaped their unwillingness to continue participating in the DDR programs, stated that favoritism and domination practices are widespread, creating unequal representation in the DDR programs. According to the participants, the unequal representation demonstrates a lack of devotion to justice and inclusivity among those in power. They argue that the reintegration program benefits the privileged few instead of society, which hurts the confidence of marginalized stakeholders in the program administrators and undermines the legitimacy of such programs. The perceptions of marginalization in the reintegration program and a lack of listening attitude in their daily interactions with them contribute to participants’ unwillingness to engage in the peace intervention programs over time.

Unfortunately, limited data are available on the issue of the trustworthiness of authority figures in the publicly available report. However, one of the few participants who believed that the authority figures are trustworthy noted that, “trust is about familiarity and relationship. You can only trust someone you are affiliated with. Hence, I trust those in authority with whom I have affiliation” (Unemployed 1, resident of Rivers). Another participant stated that, “ethnicity does affect the whole thing because you can only trust somebody you speak the same language with or share the same culture, relationship, and religion with. So, I understand why some people do not trust our leadership (Civil Servant 3, resident of Delta). These statements indicate that people are expected to support members of their group because those members are expected to take care of in-group members. A few of the participants shared with me that they are expected to support in-group members because their sense of trust is built upon group membership. Hence, they do not consider ill treatment or unfair treatment of outgroup members to be a violation of their trust. Furthermore, it is expected that leaders overseeing projects or programs will favor their group members.

It is evident that the participants who believed that the authority figures were trustworthy judged the fairness of the procedural processes and the legitimacy of the authority figures based on their connections and affiliations with them. These findings validate the argument of those who felt marginalized that the authority figures allowed those who are connected and affiliated with them access to resources, opportunities, and recognition at the expense of others.

Treatment with dignity and respect, relational legitimacy, and sustained participation

Despite the importance of dignity and respect in the implementation processes of peace intervention initiatives and their influence on people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of authority figures, an analysis of whether authority figures treat people with dignity and respect during these processes is conspicuously absent from the academic literature on the Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Program. However, it is crucial to assess how the government interacts with individuals through psychological processes and how people perceive procedural fairness in this context (van den Bos et al., 2014).

In this sense, I asked the participant whether they felt that the authorities of the NDPAP treated them with dignity and respect, and how their views shape how they perceive the legitimacy of the authority figures and their willingness to continue participating in the DDR programs. Thirty-seven (37) participants believed that the authority figures failed to treat them with dignity and respect, while eleven (11) believed that they did so, and eleven (11) did not provide valid responses because they did not have close encounters with the authority figures. Those participants who believed that they were not treated with dignity and respect noted,

I believe the authority figures are illegitimate because they did not treat us with dignity and respect. They treated us like we were not human or did not have needs. If we spoke up about the unequal distribution of resources, they considered us nuisances rather than considering what we had to say. They made us feel unwanted. Their actions discouraged us from continuing participation in the programs (Former Combatant 2, resident of Rivers).

Yes, we were not committed wholeheartedly to the DDR programs because the authority figures did not treat us with dignity and respect. No matter what we tried to say to them about our feelings or needs, they did not care. They only listened to their ethnic group members. They would not ask us for advice. They treat us as nothing more than a means to receive funding from the government (Former Combatant 3, resident of Bayelsa).

Most of the former combatants do not have the privilege of meeting these generals. They only receive stipends in their accounts. They do not have an available room with a round table to meet. However, those who met with them complained that they did not show them the dignity and respect they deserved. They treated them like second-class citizens. (Traditional leader 1, resident of Rivers).

A substantial percentage of participants felt that the authorities were not treating them with dignity and respect. They felt that the authority figures did not respectfully communicate with them. A few participants claimed that the authority figures did not consider their needs and generally ignored them when allocating reintegration benefits because of massive favoritism and domination when accessing the reintegration resources. That is, the listening attitude of authority figures is lacking. They argued that when authorities prioritize interaction with individuals they favor or like, those who are sidelined often feel undervalued and disrespected. Likewise, former combatants, community representatives, and traditional leaders shared with me that government authorities need to recognize community engagement as a key element of peacebuilding, as many communities had experienced political marginalization. Thus, these participants judged institutions based on how officials interacted with them during program implementation. They shared with me that engagement, listening, acknowledging grievances, and providing explanations for decisions made demonstrate that they remained valued members of the community even if they had been involved in violent conflict. Conversely, those who experienced dismissive interactions reaffirmed the notion that program beneficiaries remained subject to administrative control rather than being part of the peacebuilding process.

On the contrary, two participants who believed that the authority figures treated them with dignity and respect noted that “the authority figures always welcome us with an open hand and treat us well. They value us because they stop and hear what we have to say” (Former Combatant 7, resident of Bayelsa). Another participant argued that “the authority figures organize events to meet with the people and always show us love and greet us respectfully” (Civil Servant 4, resident of Bayelsa). However, further evidence shows that the participants who stated that the authority figures treated them with dignity and respect shared familiar and personal connections with the authority figures. Therefore, the statements above show that authority figures treat their ingroup members differently from outgroup members. The statements reveal issues surrounding identity, sense of belonging, and trust as highlighted in the section above.

Opportunity for voice, relational legitimacy, and sustained participation

The final element of procedural justice is an opportunity for voice. People judge procedural processes fair if citizens have meaningful opportunities to voice their opinions in the program’s decision-making and implementation processes (Tyler, 2000). Their experiences in procedural processes play a part in shaping the extent to which participants saw themselves as working with program authorities as legitimate partners in peacebuilding (Hancock, 2012).

In responding to whether there is an opportunity for voice in the NDPAP and how these opportunities shape people’s perceptions of relational legitimacy and their continued participation in the DDR initiatives, fifty-six (56) participants stated that authority figures denied them an opportunity for voice, shaping their negative perceptions of the authority figures’ relational legitimacy and their unwillingness to continue participating in the DDR program. However, three participants argued otherwise. As some of the participants who stated that the authority figures did not allow an opportunity for voice noted, “we cannot contribute our opinions regarding what we want and do not want in the program. I sometimes keep asking myself this question: why must somebody take up a gun before they are listened to? (former combatant 6, resident of Rivers). As another participant put it, “some of us are excluded from participating in the decision-making and implementation processes because of our minority status (Unemployed 2, resident of Delta). Another participant stated that “the generals only interact with their ethnic members. That is how it is. They do not allow us to voice our opinions (Civil Servant 5, resident of Rivers).

The themes emerging from the interviewees’ responses suggest that the Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Program (NDPAP) did not provide individuals or groups with an opportunity to express their opinions in the decision-making and implementation processes, and there is an imbalance of participation in the reintegration program. Frequent complaints by former combatants were that those having familiar and personal connections with the authority figures benefit most from the reintegration opportunities, such as education and vocational training, while other people, especially the minority groups, were marginalized. They stated that preferential treatment of the selected individuals and groups to monopolize resources intended for all community members restricts the openness of other individuals and groups to dialogue, thereby allowing only preferred individuals or groups to gain access, while excluding others. Some participants shared with me that if the authority figures treated them as active rather than passive members of the community, then they would have a positive perception of the legitimacy of the authority figures and would continue to engage with them even after the programs have concluded.

However, the participants who believed that authority figures allowed them to voice their thoughts argued differently. As one of them noted, “the authority figures chose representatives from each community to represent the people. These representatives speak on our behalf. So, we have voices in the amnesty program (Civil Servant 6, resident of Rivers). According to another participant, “Yes, local leaders represent us and they represent us well. Whenever we have concerns to pass on to the government, we meet with them, and they send these messages to the appropriate quarters (Former Combatant 8, resident of Rivers). Equally, these participants were identified as affiliated with the authority figures. Hence, these statements show that authority figures treat their ingroup members differently from outgroup members. The statements also reveal issues surrounding identity, sense of belonging, and trust, as highlighted in the previous sections.

Procedural justice as the relational Foundation of Peacebuilding

The findings above help to inform the wider discussion on legitimacy in peacebuilding scholarship. Although the viewpoint on legitimacy has helped in understanding post-conflict governance, it has failed to address how legitimacy is constructed in societies emerging from violent conflict. Peacebuilding institutions do not typically start by questioning unchecked authority. Instead, they are located in fragile, conflict-affected, and marginalized communities (Ali et al., 2025; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2012).

The findings demonstrate that legitimacy is relational and not institutional. Participants did not portray legitimacy as a general idea of government authority. Instead, they perceive legitimacy as repeated interaction with community participants and authority figures representing government institutions over time. If the authority figures make fair and impartial decisions, people will have greater trust in them. The institutional trust will, in turn, encourage participants’ sustained engagement. Likewise, social recognition would be restored if participants were treated with dignity and respect. Additionally, voice in the decision-making process would enhance perceptions of inclusion in the overall peacebuilding processes.

The findings also support defining relational legitimacy as a concept anchored in procedural justice. It corroborates one of the central arguments in this paper that relational legitimacy is the quality of the relationship between people and the institutions. In other words, it is a legitimacy built by repeated interactions, which differs from Suchman (1995) and Suddaby et al. (2017) definition of institutional legitimacy as the generalized belief that an institution has the right to rule. Since people judge authority figures during their interpersonal relationship with them (Tyler, 2000), their perceptions of authority figures’ legitimacy are not an institutional characteristic, but an everyday negotiated social interaction.

The study proposes that procedural justice is not just one dimension of legitimacy, but rather a mechanism by which people experience legitimacy during procedural interactions. Fair procedures convey inclusion, trust, recognition, and institutional engagement during interpersonal relationships with institutional authorities, thus shifting administrative power to relationships worthy of voluntary support (Tyler and Jackson, 2014). Therefore, peacebuilding is not only about institutional capacity, but also about the quality of interactions between institutions and community members, through which they continuously build public trust.

Sustained participation as a missing behavioral mechanism

Another important finding is that relational legitimacy promotes sustained participation that can influence the effectiveness of peacebuilding process. In other words, relational legitimacy promotes sustained participation, which can serve as a behavioral mechanism that influences the effectiveness of peacebuilding process.

The conventional evaluation approaches tend to assume that program participation is directly linked to peace outcomes. For example, participation in reintegration programs is expected to contribute to improved livelihoods, a decrease in violence, and successful reconciliation (Rodríguez-Castellón, 2024). But often, these frameworks do not detail how a program’s implementation leads to these outcomes. The findings suggest that the lack of sustained participation is the direct missing explanation, shaped by perceptions of procedural justice and the relational legitimacy of the authority figures implementing the peace intervention programs. In other words, participants’ perceptions of procedural justice affect their perceptions of relational legitimacy of the institution and its representatives. Relational legitimacy, in turn, affects participants’ willingness to continue to engage in the peace intervention programs after they have concluded. This behavioral explanation can be very helpful when analyzing how similar administration and resources produce different long-term results for the same DDR programs.

The findings demonstrate that material resources and institutional capacity are inadequate to explain differences in the effectiveness of DDR programs. The effectiveness of the intervention programs can also rely on the institutional capacity to develop relational legitimacy that sustains participants’ engagement even after the program incentives are reduced, or the program ends. In other words, how procedural justice shapes relational legitimacy and sustained participation alone are not the major empirical findings. Additionally, the relationships between relational legitimacy and sustained participation can subsequently shape the effectiveness of the DDR programs.

Relational legitimacy and sustained participation shaping DDR effectiveness

The interplay between relational legitimacy and sustained participation can shape the effectiveness of DDR programs. Therefore, it is essential to explore how the Niger Delta people’s perception of the relational legitimacy of the authority figures in the NDPAP and their willingness to continue engaging in the DDR programs after they have concluded impact the NDPAP’s effectiveness.

I further asked the participants who believed that the DDR programs lacked procedural justice, which contributed to a lack of relational legitimacy of the authority figures and their unwillingness to sustain participation in the program, what their thoughts were on how the relational legitimacy and lack of sustained participation shape the effectiveness of the DDR programs. The themes emanating from the participants’ statements to my probing question indicate that the lack of relational legitimacy between the residents and the authority figures, combined with their unwillingness to continue participating in the DDR programs after the programs have ended, impacts socioeconomic outcomes, renewal of violent conflict, and reconciliation efforts, the three key dimensions of effectiveness of the programs.

On socioeconomic outcomes

I evaluated the effectiveness of the NDPAP based on the themes emanating from the participants’ statements and news reports on the effectiveness of NDPAP. As one of the participants who believed that the NDPAP has been ineffective in providing lasting peace noted, “the authorities failed to properly empower former combatants by providing the necessary capital and resources to help them acquire skills needed to kick-start their development and contribute to socioeconomic development of the region” (Community leader 2, resident of Bayelsa). Another participant stated that “the program is not effective thanks to the unfairness in the program’s resource distribution due to widespread corruption. We still have many unproductive “unemployed” youths who should be paying taxes and contributing to the economy (Traditional leader 2, resident of Bayelsa).

Also, according to a statement from the Guardian newspaper report of November 17, 2019, and credited to Kelvin Ebiri, who is a South–South Bureau Chief,

“Despite the receipt of over N10 trillion from the 13 per cent derivation principle between 2000 and 2018 by the Niger Delta states, the deplorable living conditions in oil-producing communities remain nauseating, raising questions about the application of such a large sum by state governments. While oil money continues to flow into the coffers of these states, paradoxically, most oil-producing communities remain poverty-stricken, plagued by unemployment, and are devoid of basic social amenities like potable water, hospitals, electricity, motorable roads, and a conducive learning environment in their schools.” (Ebiri, 2019).

The findings from the statements above help to inform discussions on economic impact of reintegration programs. While literature review section highlights that the effectiveness of DDR programs is based on the economic perspective of reintegration programs, such as employment and income generation, as well as the number of people enrolled in education and vocational training. The themes emerging from the findings above demonstrate that the effectiveness of DDR and development programs lies not only in empowering citizens through the provision of employment opportunities and skills necessary to improve their social status but also in contributing to community socioeconomic development, for example, through paying taxes for the provision of basic amenities and infrastructural development. These observations are consistent with Nneli (2020) argument that NDPAP’s policy was seen as a temporary measure that only delayed conflict to some extent and did not tackle socio-economic marginalization, unemployment among young people, and relative poverty, which formed the biggest part of the initial agitations. Similarly, the findings also support the argument by Mähler (2010) that socioeconomic measures have not shown significant improvement following the government amnesty program’s initiation in 1999. While these factors continue to be key indicators of successful reintegration, as they weaken the economic incentives to renewed violence and should continue to play an important role in evaluating the program, the research findings in the case of the Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Program (NDPAP) demonstrate that the issue of their inadequacy results from a lack of sustained participation in the reintegration program.

Some former combatants shared with me that they do not simply get into the labor market after completing education and vocational training. They also need to re-establish connections with communities, public institutions, and political authorities. Therefore, sustainable reintegration needs to go beyond creating job opportunities to demonstrate that institutions will continue to rule fairly even after the program implementation has ended. For example, those who had a positive interpretation of the procedural justice of program institutions and the relational legitimacy of the authority figures viewed reintegration as more than just finding a job, but as a reconstruction of identities in the civil world. Social belonging and institutional trust are extended via community organizations and local government. Perceptions of procedural justice and relational legitimacy thus seem to be as important as material opportunity for reintegration. Overall, the findings show that the sustainability of reintegration not only relies on the resources offered by DDR programs but also on the relational legitimacy of the institutions that provide their resources and the participants’ commitment to the successful outcome of the programs.

Reduction in the risks of remobilization and violent conflict

I also evaluated the effectiveness of the NDPAP based on the themes emanating from the participants’ statements and news reports on the effectiveness of NDPAP. As one of the participants noted, “There is violence everywhere in the Niger Delta. Every day, we see cases of kidnapping, group fighting against each other, and political intimidation. These are a result of lack of commitment to successful peace outcomes through DDR engagement” (Former Combatant 4, resident of Bayelsa). As another participant put it, “the reason the DDR programs has not been able to promote lasting peace is that there are still more frequent violent events because people who perceived the authority figures as illegitimate due to how they treated them discontinued their participation and went back to committing those violence” (Community leader 2, resident of Bayelsa). Likewise, another participant stated that, “the DDR programs are not effective because there are rising ethnic and political tensions in our constituencies due to the marginalization and exclusion created by favoritism practices of the authority figures in the distribution of reintegration resources. (Former Combatant 9, resident of Rivers).

Additionally, as highlighted in a news report on the state of violent conflict in the Niger Delta through the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) policy brief and analysis,

“Over 800 fatalities have been recorded in the Niger Delta between January 2014 and December 2024 due to communal conflicts. These conflicts, often rooted in land ownership, access, and usage disputes, have resulted in loss of life and property, disruptions to livelihoods, food security, and investor confidence.” (Amos, 2025).

The study findings from the statements above also expand current knowledge of conflict reduction. The findings demonstrate the remobilization of former combatants and the renewal of violence in recent times. These findings are consistent with Mähler (2010) and Agbiboa (2015) arguments that despite DDR efforts, there has been no significant improvement in the reduction of violence since 1999 and that the existence of symbolic violence within the Niger Delta results in actual violence.

However, while the findings demonstrate violence reduction in the security domain as an indicator for effective programming in helping former combatants become peaceful citizens, the research findings also reveal that trust in the fairness of institutional authority, the relational legitimacy between them, and their willingness to continue participating in the DDR programs are essential for sustainable peace. According to Krampe and Ekman (2017), when beneficiaries feel that access is granted on a personal or ethnic basis rather than on merit, it undermines their faith in the program administrators. Such perceived favoritism can lead to resentment and discouragement toward involvement over time, undermining trust in authority figures and eroding the program’s credibility, which threatens its long-term peacebuilding goals. In this way, the reduction of conflict is related to the legitimacy of institutions in the reintegration process rather than to disarmament and demobilization. For example, participants who perceived the presence of relational legitimacy in the program’s implementation stated that they would be more likely to continue participating in the DDR programs and agreed that they would rather resolve grievances through institutional mechanisms rather than violent means. In other words, positive perceptions of authority figures’ fairness would diminish former combatants’ incentive to return to armed mobilization during grievances, provide an alternative to violence, and lead them to see the authority figures as deserving continued cooperation. Thus, the emphasis on violence reduction does not stem from the disarmament process but rather from fairness in institutional processes, a behavioral effect of institutional legitimacy, and people’s sustained participation in DDR programs.

Community reconciliation

The themes emanating from the participants’ statements and news reports on the effectiveness of NDPAP demonstrate an issue with community reconciliation. According to a statement from one participant,

While the aim of reconciliation after conflict is to bring together those who have suffered harm and those who perpetrated the harm, the historical injustice that continues to this date, even in the implementation of the DDR programs, is affecting this community’s reconciliation and social cohesion efforts (Community leader 3, resident of Rivers).

The politics of exclusion continues to affect the community reconciliation efforts. For instance, a crisis in Warri arose because our people believed that only the former combatants were benefiting from the reintegration resources, leaving us victims marginalized. I believe these factors are significantly affecting our willingness to participate with former combatants in the DDR initiatives (Unemployed 3, resident of Bayelsa).

The authority figures often focus on some groups and communities, discriminating against others. The perceived inequality in distribution of reintegration opportunities and benefits, and the discrimination against these groups, is influencing their disconnection from each other and their disengagement in building community social cohesion (Student 1, resident of Rivers).

There is limited reporting on the establishment of official reconciliation in the NDPAP. However, according to a report noted in the Vanguard newspaper,

“Nigeria cannot continue to paper over decades of accumulated grievances without tangible solutions and expect lasting unity. The time for a deliberate and structured process of reconciliation is now, and this is why establishing a Forum for National Restoration is not just desirable, but necessary. A restoration forum provides a neutral platform for truth-telling, dialogue, and justice, three pillars that sustain national healing” (Kalu Okoronkwo, The Vanguard Newspaper, August 25, 2025).

The statements and reports above highlight the issues surrounding justice and reconciliation in the NDPAP. The themes emerging from the statements and the newspaper reports suggest that the effectiveness of DDR programs lies in their ability to provide successful community reconciliation efforts and promote social cohesion that addresses historical injustices and bridges divisions among ethnic groups. The participants argued that the DDR programs did not promote community reconciliation because the reintegration program favors those who perpetrated violence, leaving out the victims and those who suffered harm because of the violent act. This statement corroborates Aghedo (2013) argument that NDPAP discriminated against returning ex-militants, victims, and innocent citizens who derived little benefit or did not benefit at all from the amnesty resources, while the authority figures implementing the programs directed material benefits to those who had ethnic affiliations or personal connections. Therefore, the victims and those who suffered harm did not commit to the peaceful process.

However, the findings also suggest that reconciliation is not limited to the program itself but extends to a continued social process among participants in peacebuilding programs. Unlike a straightforward and automatic outcome resulting from program participation, reconciliation required continuous commitment and public engagement with institutions and local organizations for collective problem-solving (Tyler and Jackson, 2014). Long-term public engagement may help foster connections among former combatants, communities, and the state. It may also reinforce peacebuilding in the social life of the common people. These indicate that reconciliation cannot be a measure of program delivery alone. Continuous civic engagement helps to maintain a sustained relational process.

Overall implications for DDR evaluation

The broader implication of this study is that the concept of DDR effectiveness needs to be expanded. Key measures such as weapons handed over, demobilized combatants, number of participants enrolled, employment and vocational skills created, and material incentives distributed remain important for evaluating implementation performance. They, however, only offer a partial explanation of peacebuilding effectiveness, as they do not usually evaluate whether programs foster institutional relationships and sustained participation that support peace over time.

Future monitoring and evaluation frameworks should, therefore, include indicators to capture both the process and sustained participation. In addition to traditional measures, measuring mechanisms should evaluate participants’ perceptions of neutrality, trustworthiness, dignity and respect, and opportunities for voice in the program. Most importantly, evaluations should consider whether participants remain connected to community institutions, support peaceful conflict resolution, cooperate with the local government, and commit to reconciliation once the formal implementation process is over. These would enable practitioners to detect injustice in procedural processes and legitimacy problems early enough to help avoid further conflict over the issue. Additionally, the evaluation would give a more holistic picture of why some DDR programs foster lasting peace, while others only provide for temporary stabilization.

In summary, the findings are very consistent with the Procedural Justice – Relational Legitimacy Framework presented in this article. Participants often do not consider legitimacy as a theoretical political issue. They built legitimacy through their everyday interactions with the authority figures implementing the DDR programs. More importantly, participants expressed legitimacy as a behavioral phenomenon rather than just an attitudinal expression. They assessed and evaluated the DDR programs based on the neutrality of the peace forum, trustworthiness of the authority figures, dignified and respectful procedure of the program, and opportunity for voice in the decision-making and implementation processes. They argued that if institutions and authority figures implementing the reintegration program were fairer, they would be more likely to continue engaging in the entire DDR initiatives, trust the authority figures to resolve conflicts and distribute resources fairly, and be involved in community peacebuilding efforts. However, those who participated often discussed that their participation was strategic and temporary because of their perceptions of favoritism, corruption, and exclusion in the reintegration program. Their statements show no sign of ‘real’ institutional commitment. The findings therefore support the central argument of this article: procedural justice creates relational legitimacy, relational legitimacy helps to sustain participation, and sustained participation promotes long-term socioeconomic development, reducing the renewal of conflict and enhancing community reconciliation. The evidence suggests that DDR programs can be effective not just when they are well implemented, but also when they generate relational legitimacy that promotes participants’ commitment to the long-term peace process.

Future research

This framework also opens up several areas for further research. First, future studies should explore how ethnicity (and the expression of ethnic identity through a sense of belonging and trust) interacts with procedural justice and institutional legitimacy to shape the effectiveness of peace intervention programs, since ethnicity and the expression of ethnic identity are crucial issues discussed by the participants. Such an approach would recognize the influence of identity expression and diverse perceptions among majority and minority groups. The findings would contribute to more inclusive and context-sensitive peace intervention policies. The comparative study of various DDR programs would be another step in determining if the relationships found in the Niger Delta are present in other political and cultural contexts. A review of DDR programs from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Colombia, Nepal, or South Sudan would be helpful to evaluate the generalizability of the Procedural Justice–Relational Legitimacy Framework. Third, a longitudinal study would be useful in gaining insight into the emergence of relational legitimacy over time. As peacebuilding is a dynamic process, a participant’s trust in an institution may increase or decrease depending on political realities. Long-term follow-up would enable researchers to study the impact of the procedural experiences on long-term engagement long after the program has been implemented. Fourth, future research should take the evaluation framework a step further to establish valid scales to measure dimensions of procedural justice, relational legitimacy, and sustained participation. Such research might facilitate statistical testing of the behavioral mechanisms proposed here and complement the qualitative evidence that is covered in this article.

Conclusion

This article has shown that current methods of evaluating Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs continue to overemphasize security-based indicators and focus primarily on short-term indicators of program performance. Traditional indicators of stabilization in the aftermath of conflict, such as weapons collection, demobilization of combatants, number of participants that enroll in the programs, and factors that improve the economic status of former combatants, have provided valuable insights into peacebuilding effectiveness. Although these measures are important, they reveal little about the institutional relationships that underpin peace once the formal program has been implemented. The consequence of this revelation is that current methods tend to show what a DDR program can do but fail to elaborate on why some interventions encourage long-term participants’ commitment while others struggle to keep those participants committed after materials and incentives have finished.

To address this challenge, the article developed a novel approach to evaluating DDR based on the Procedural Justice-Relational Legitimacy framework, shifting the focus from program outcome to everyday relationships and sustained participation in peacebuilding initiatives. This study argues that former combatants and conflict-affected communities evaluate implementing institutions based on their perceptions and experiences of neutrality, trustworthiness, dignity and respect, and opportunity for voice in the decision-making and implementation processes of the DDR programs. These procedural experiences are relational in nature, thereby creating relational legitimacy that influences the quality of the relationship between participants and peacebuilding institutions. The article considers legitimacy as an ongoing relational process developed in everyday interactions between authority figures and those impacted by their actions, rather than assuming that legitimacy is a static belief or existing contextual condition. The findings further demonstrate that sustained participation in DDR implementation is a better predictor of the effectiveness of DDR interventions in fostering lasting peace in postconflict societies.

Overall, the article has three main contributions to the peacebuilding scholarship. First, it challenges the traditional approach to evaluating DDR effectiveness, suggesting that sustained participation be adopted as a standard measure of program effectiveness, in addition to traditional measures of security and socioeconomic outcomes. Second, it argues that relational legitimacy is anchored in perceptions of procedural justice, demonstrating that legitimacy emerges from the lived experience of participants in their everyday interaction with authority figures and the institutions they represent. Third, it draws a link between procedural justice, relational legitimacy, and sustained participation as a behavioral pathway that provides greater insights into long-term peacebuilding outcomes.

This argument is not limited to the Niger Delta issue. It can be generalized to other DDR settings where there is distrust in institutions and perceived exclusion and marginalization. Sustainable peace would require establishing institutions that are perceived as fair, trustworthy, respectful, and inclusive, as well as disarming and demobilizing combatants and providing reintegration support for them in such contexts. Peacebuilding institutions that can produce relational legitimacy are more likely to engage in collaborative participation, increase civic participation, and sustain people’s participation over time after the conclusion of the formal implementation processes.

Finally, future monitoring and evaluation systems need to be more than output-oriented; they should address whether DDR interventions foster the relational conditions that help to maintain peace over time. Researchers should assess procedural justice, relational legitimacy, and sustained participation along with traditional measures of stabilization. This would allow practitioners to detect the early signs of legitimacy deficits that can result in losing peacebuilding momentum and give a fuller understanding of how some DDR programs achieve durable peace while others only offer temporary stability.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Andreas Velthuizen, Thabo Mbeki African School for Public and International Affairs, South Africa

Reviewed by: Enock Ndawana, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

Harrison Idowu, Adekunle Ajasin University, Nigeria