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Mini Review

Frontiers in Public Health ·

Volume 14 - 2026 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2026.1875406

Emerging henipaviruses and future pandemic preparedness: diagnostic delays, zoonotic spillover, and One Health challenges

  • Abdeldjalil Zitouni1*corresponding author
  1. Private Dental Practice, Constantine, Algeria
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Abstract

Henipaviruses are among the most concerning emerging zoonotic pathogens because of their high mortality rates, neurological involvement, broad host range, and outbreak potential. This mini review discusses diagnostic limitations, outbreak amplification, zoonotic spillover, surveillance fragmentation, and future pandemic preparedness strategies associated with Nipah, Hendra, and Langya henipaviruses. Unlike previous reviews mainly focused on descriptive virology and epidemiology, this review emphasizes diagnostic preparedness, surveillance weaknesses, outbreak amplification mechanisms, and future One Health response strategies. Current evidence suggests that delayed diagnosis, fragmented surveillance systems, environmental disruption, and limited rapid diagnostic capacities continue to increase future spillover risks. Strengthening One Health preparedness frameworks, rapid diagnostics, genomic surveillance, and international collaboration remains essential for reducing future pandemic threats.

Keywords

1 Introduction

Emerging zoonotic viruses continue to represent a major threat to global public health (1, 2). Henipaviruses have attracted increasing scientific attention because of their elevated mortality rates, neurotropic properties, and epidemic potential (3, 4). Fruit bats of the Pteropus genus are recognized as the primary reservoirs for Nipah and Hendra viruses, while additional unidentified reservoirs may exist for other emerging henipaviruses (3, 4).

More recently, the identification of Langya henipavirus in China renewed concerns regarding future zoonotic spillover events and underrecognized transmission pathways (5, 6).

Unlike previous narrative reviews mainly focused on virology and descriptive epidemiology, the present mini review specifically emphasizes diagnostic preparedness, surveillance fragmentation, outbreak amplification mechanisms, and future pandemic-response vulnerabilities associated with emerging henipaviruses.

2 Emerging henipaviruses

Nipah virus remains the most concerning henipavirus because of mortality rates reaching 40–75% and documented human-to-human transmission in Bangladesh and India (3, 4). Hendra virus continues to represent an important zoonotic threat in Australia despite the availability of veterinary vaccines (3).

Langya henipavirus remains less characterized but highlights the continuing emergence of novel zoonotic henipaviruses capable of infecting humans (5, 6). The discovery of Langya henipavirus also suggests that additional unidentified henipaviruses may already be circulating in animal reservoirs with limited human surveillance (5, 6). This possibility reinforces concerns regarding future zoonotic emergence events and underrecognized spillover transmission (6, 7).

3 Diagnostic and surveillance challenges

A major limitation identified across multiple henipavirus outbreaks is the persistent delay between symptom onset and definitive laboratory confirmation. Clinical manifestations frequently overlap with influenza, pneumonia, and viral encephalitis, increasing the probability of early misdiagnosis (4, 8) (Table 1).

Table 1. Comparison of major emerging henipaviruses.

VirusReservoirMortalityHuman-to-human transmissionGeographic regionAvailability of vaccineMajor challenges
Nipah virusFruit bats40–75%Limited but documentedMalaysia, Bangladesh, IndiaExperimental onlyHigh mortality, delayed diagnosis
Hendra virusFruit bats~57%Not confirmedAustraliaVeterinary vaccine availableAnimal spillover surveillance
Langya virusPossibly shrewsUnknown/limited dataNot confirmedChinaNoneLimited epidemiological data

Diagnostic delay not only affects individual patient outcomes but may also significantly amplify outbreak propagation by delaying isolation measures, contact tracing, and public health responses (2, 4).

Another important challenge involves biosafety constraints. Confirmatory laboratory testing frequently requires high-containment laboratory facilities that remain unavailable in many high-risk regions (1, 8).

Recent advances in portable RT-PCR systems, CRISPR-based diagnostics, and field-deployable biosensors may offer promising future solutions. However, these technologies remain insufficiently implemented in endemic regions (8).

The persistence of fragmented surveillance systems also represents a critical weakness in current preparedness strategies. Human, veterinary, wildlife, and environmental surveillance frequently operate independently rather than through integrated One Health frameworks (1, 9).

4 Outbreak amplification and public health risks

The amplification potential of henipavirus outbreaks extends beyond direct viral transmission alone. Multiple ecological, healthcare, socioeconomic, and environmental factors may collectively increase outbreak severity (7, 10).

Outbreaks occurring in densely populated regions with limited healthcare infrastructure may rapidly overwhelm local systems. Modern transportation networks may theoretically facilitate cross-border dissemination before diagnosis (1, 2).

Environmental disruption, climate change, deforestation, and increasing human encroachment into wildlife habitats may progressively increase zoonotic spillover frequency in the coming decades (7, 10).

5 Future preparedness and One Health strategies

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of proactive preparedness rather than reactive crisis management. Preparedness strategies should include expansion of genomic surveillance networks, strengthening laboratory capacities, rapid outbreak reporting systems, development of portable diagnostics, and multidisciplinary One Health surveillance approaches (1, 2, 9).

Artificial intelligence-assisted surveillance systems, wastewater epidemiology, genomic monitoring, and digital outbreak prediction tools may become increasingly important for identifying early spillover signals and monitoring emerging zoonotic threats (1, 2).

Artificial intelligence and digital epidemiology tools may also contribute to outbreak prediction and surveillance optimization. Public communication strategies remain essential because misinformation and delayed reporting may complicate outbreak management (2).

Investment in vaccine research also remains critical. Although promising preclinical vaccine candidates and monoclonal antibodies have been reported, no widely available human vaccine currently exists for Nipah virus (1, 4).

6 Future directions

Future studies should prioritize integrated genomic surveillance, portable diagnostic development, ecological monitoring of wildlife reservoirs, and predictive modeling of zoonotic spillover risks (1, 7, 8, 10). International preparedness frameworks should also incorporate rapid data-sharing mechanisms and coordinated One Health response systems (1, 2, 9).

7 Limitations

This mini review has several limitations. First, the number of available studies specifically focusing on newly identified henipaviruses such as Langya virus remains relatively limited (5, 6). Second, much of the available evidence originates from observational reports and narrative reviews rather than large prospective studies. Finally, the rapidly evolving nature of emerging zoonotic diseases may lead to continuous changes in epidemiological knowledge and preparedness strategies.

8 Conclusion

Emerging henipaviruses represent a continuing threat to global public health because of their zoonotic origin, elevated mortality rates, and outbreak potential. Strengthening One Health surveillance systems, improving rapid diagnostic capacities, expanding international collaboration, and investing in preparedness strategies are essential to reduce future risks (1, 2, 8, 9).

Continuous monitoring of emerging henipaviruses should remain a global public health priority (1, 2).

Generative AI statement

The author(s) declared that Generative AI was used in the creation of this manuscript. Generative AI tools were used to assist with language polishing, grammar correction, structural organization, and manuscript editing. The author reviewed, verified, and takes full responsibility for all scientific content, interpretations, and conclusions presented in the manuscript.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Tushar Ranjan, Bihar Agricultural University, India

Reviewed by: Noor Saleem, FMH College of Medicine and Dentistry, Pakistan

Kanishk Abhinav, Bhagalpur Agriculture University, India

Statements

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

Author contributions

AZ: Visualization, Investigation, Conceptualization, Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology.

References

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Citation

Zitouni, A. (2026). Emerging henipaviruses and future pandemic preparedness: diagnostic delays, zoonotic spillover, and One Health challenges. Frontiers in Public Health, Volume 14. https://doi.org/
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14 - 2026

Copyright

Copyright © 2026 Zitouni.

License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

*Correspondence: Abdeldjalil Zitouni

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