Government efforts to combat counterfeit seed in Africa: a 50-country comparative analysis

Introduction

Agriculture is foundational to food and nutritional security in Africa, employing over 43% of the labor force and contributing approximately 20% of the continent's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank and ILO, 2023; Addou, 2025). The sector is dominated by smallholder farmers, who account for approximately 85% of agricultural output and supply most food consumed domestically (Shirley, 2021). Despite this central role, much of Africa has yet to experience the productivity gains of the Green Revolution that transformed agricultural systems in Asia and Latin America (Evenson and Gollin, 2003). Substantial yield gaps persist, particularly for key cereal crops, attributed in part to low adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies including improved seed, fertilizer, and mechanization (Lobell et al., 2009; Sheahan and Barrett, 2017). Within this context, the proliferation of counterfeit seed represents a critical but underexamined threat to agricultural productivity and broader development outcomes.

Access to high-quality seed underpins agricultural productivity by determining yield potential and system resilience. Improved seed delivers multiple benefits including higher yields, pest and disease resistance, drought tolerance, enhanced nutrition, and climate adaptability (Pingali, 2012). However, improved seed is visually indistinguishable from ordinary grain despite commanding substantial price premiums, with seed-to-grain price ratios ranging from 1.5 for open-pollinated varieties to over 1:8 for elite maize hybrids (TASAI Country Reports, n.d.). This price differential creates strong incentives for fraud, allowing unscrupulous actors to market ordinary grain as certified seed. The problem has intensified over two decades due to expanding private seed markets, weak regulatory enforcement, and increased access to counterfeiting technologies. Farmers typically discover counterfeit seed only after planting through poor germination or weak crop performance. By then replanting is often impossible, particularly under rainfed conditions, resulting in irreversible yield losses for the season. It is important to note that this issue is not limited to just grain crops; counterfeit seed is also prevalent in high-value vegetables such as tomatoes and peppers, where hybrid seed commands premium market prices.

The circulation of counterfeit seed undermines farmer trust in input markets, discourages adoption of certified seed, and weakens incentives for legitimate producers to invest in research and distribution. At scale, these effects compromise national seed systems and threaten progress toward food security and agricultural transformation. Addressing counterfeit seed is therefore both a consumer protection issue and a structural challenge for agricultural development.

In response, governments across Africa, sometimes in partnership with Seed Trade Associations, have begun to confront the problem of counterfeit seed through a combination of regulatory reform, technological innovation, and stakeholder engagement. Regulatory bodies are enforcing laws to oversee the quality and distribution of seeds while imposing penalties on those engaged in counterfeiting (Westengen et al., 2019). Technological innovations such as seed certification systems and barcode tracking are increasingly used to trace seed origins and verify authenticity [Ethiopian Seed Partnership (ESP), 2025]. These efforts are often complemented by awareness campaigns aimed at helping farmers recognize the risks of counterfeit seed and encouraging the adoption of certified seed (Mwaisoba et al., 2025). Strengthening these combined strategies is essential for protecting farmers and supporting agricultural development.

Drawing on recent data from the Seed Sector Performance Index, this paper examines government responses to counterfeit seed across 50 African countries and assesses the effectiveness of policy frameworks and implementation measures. The paper concludes by identifying key policy and regulatory priorities for strengthening formal seed system integrity across the continent.

Africa's seed sector and challenge of counterfeit seed

Seed sector overview

Seed systems in most African countries are commonly characterized as comprising two interrelated sub-sectors: informal and formal seed systems. The informal seed system encompasses seed that is produced, saved, exchanged, and distributed through non-regulated channels, including farmer-managed seed saving, local exchange among neighbors and relatives, community-based seed production, and sales through informal rural markets. These systems tend to be decentralized and embedded in local social and economic networks, and they often play a critical role in ensuring seed access for smallholder farmers, particularly in remote or resource-constrained settings (McGuire and Sperling, 2016; Wiggins and Keats, 2013). However, seed circulating through informal systems is typically of variable varietal purity and physical and sanitary quality. Because informal seed systems operate largely outside formal regulatory frameworks, the concept of “counterfeit seed” is difficult to define and enforce within these settings.

In contrast, the formal seed system constitutes a structured and regulated value chain for the development, multiplication, certification, and commercialization of improved seed (Ariga et al., 2019). This system involves multiple actors and institutions, including public and private plant breeders, seed companies, contract growers, certification agencies, regulators, and agro-dealers. Each stage of the seed value chain is governed by national seed laws and regulations that specify standards for varietal identity, genetic purity, germination rates, and phytosanitary quality. Seed produced and marketed under these regulatory frameworks is commonly referred to as certified seed and is typically distributed through registered seed companies and licensed agro-dealers.

It is within the formal seed system that the problem of counterfeit seed most acutely arises and is therefore the primary focus of this paper. Certified seed is visually indistinguishable from grain but embodies higher costs associated with breeding, quality control, certification, and distribution. Moreover, certified seed is branded, packaged, and treated with chemical protectants or enhancers designed to improve germination and early crop performance. The resulting price premiums relative to grain create incentives for fraudulent practices that exploit information asymmetries between sellers and farmers. Colored dyes, meant to distinguish treated seed from grain are easily copied by counterfeiters. It is important to note that this analysis focuses on true seed systems, where certification, labeling, and counterfeit risks are more readily defined. Vegetatively propagated crops, mostly characterized by farmer-led recycling of seed over multiple seasons and practices such as positive selection, involve distinct seed system dynamics and therefore fall outside the primary scope of the study.

Counterfeit seed in Africa

Counterfeit seed (commonly referred to as fake seed) can be defined as seed products that deliberately misrepresent their quality, genetic identity, or origin with the intent to deceive buyers (International Seed Federation, 2018). In Zambia, this distinction is made explicitly in seed regulation: counterfeit (or fake) seed refers to seed that has never undergone the official certification process and is often sold with fake or missing labels through informal or unlicensed channels, whereas illegal seed consists of genuinely certified seed that is marketed in violation of seed laws, including unlicensed sales, unauthorized repackaging, or sale after expiry (Sikazwe, unpublished)¹. Together, these forms of non-compliance are commonly encompassed within the broader category of Illegal Seed Practices (ISP), a classification used by regulatory agencies and industry bodies to capture a range of activities that undermine seed quality and market integrity. The International Seed Federation identifies several forms of ISP that undermine seed quality and market integrity, including: (i) grain harvested from hybrid crops and resold as genuine hybrid seed for planting; (ii) seed packages labeled with false or misleading variety names; (iii) seed that fails to meet minimum legal standards for germination, varietal purity, or physical quality; and (iv) seed contaminated with excessive levels of weed seeds or invasive species beyond legally permissible thresholds (International Seed Federation, 2018).

Measuring the scale, sources, and impacts of counterfeit seed is inherently difficult. By design, counterfeit seed is intended to evade detection, particularly by regulatory authorities. Measurement challenges are compounded by the absence of standardized definitions across countries, fragmented reporting across government agencies and seed companies, and the risk of double counting individual cases. Consequently, estimates based on reported cases, values, or volumes almost certainly represent only a small fraction of the true extent of counterfeit seed, with many cases remaining undetected or unreported.

Across Africa, the sale of counterfeit seed has emerged as a major challenge for farmers and formal seed systems, with reports from some countries suggesting that over 50% of crop seed sold to farmers in recent growing seasons fell outside regulated channels or was counterfeit, highlighting the need to distinguish between informal seed systems and fraudulent market activity (World Bank, 2017). National estimates, according to the Uganda National Bureau of Standards, suggest that approximately 30% of seed available on the market may be counterfeit (Access to Seeds Foundation, 2019). The dissemination and sale of counterfeit seed reflects a persistent and large-scale problem that undermines farmer outcomes and weakens the effectiveness of formal seed systems in many African markets.

Complementary data on reported counterfeit seed cases are available in the TASAI Country Reports (n.d.) covering 24 African countries. The number of reported cases varied widely, indicating substantial cross-country differences in reported incidence. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) recorded the highest number of combined cases reported by government authorities and seed companies, with 185 cases in 2016 (Asanzi et al., 2017). In contrast, Ethiopia reported no cases, while South Africa and Niger reported fewer than 10 cases each (Mabaya et al., 2021, 2017, 2022). Overall, the TASAI country reports indicate that counterfeit seed has been reported across much of the continent, although the number of cases reported varies substantially by country and year.

It is important to distinguish counterfeit seed from seed circulating through informal systems. In many African contexts, an estimated 60%−95% of seed is sourced through informal channels (including farm-saved and locally exchanged seed) which operates outside formal certification systems but does not constitute counterfeiting. Counterfeiting is specifically about deliberate misrepresentation: seed that is falsely labeled and packaged as certified when it has never undergone the official certification process. Conflating informal seed supply with counterfeit activity risks mischaracterizing the former and could result in regulatory responses that unintentionally disadvantage the smallholder farmers who depend on farmer-saved or locally sourced seed.

Research objectives

Despite growing recognition of counterfeit seed as a constraint to agricultural development, systematic regional comparisons of policy adequacy remain scarce. Previous assessments have been largely country-specific or focused on narrow aspects of seed regulation. This study fills this gap by providing the first comprehensive regional assessment of government efforts to combat counterfeit seed across all major African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), examining not only policy existence but also legal penalties and implementation measures.

The study is guided by four specific research objectives. First, examine the recency of seed policy and regulatory instruments to determine whether existing frameworks reflect contemporary challenges. Second, analyze punitive measures and legal sanctions, including maximum fines, prison sentences, license withdrawal, and other statutory penalties. Third, evaluate government mitigation measures such as surveillance and inspection systems, awareness creation programs, seed certification and labeling, and other proactive interventions. Fourth, assess expert ratings of government efforts, examining both policy comprehensiveness (de jure) and implementation effectiveness (de facto).

These objectives provide a comprehensive assessment of governmental approaches across 50 countries and eight Regional Economic Communities, while highlighting structural weaknesses that undermine seed system integrity. The intended outcome is to promote evidence-based interventions by government policymakers, the private seed sector, non-governmental organizations, and research institutions.

Methods

Data sources

This study draws on data from the 2025 Seed Sector Performance Index (SSPI), a score-based assessment tool developed by The African Seed Access Index (TASAI) in collaboration with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa AGRA and the African Union Commission's African Seed and Biotechnology Platform (ASBP). The SSPI provides standardized, expert-validated measures of seed sector performance across African countries using a common survey instrument. The 2025 SSPI survey was administered in 50 African countries between January and August 2025 to support the fifth Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Biennial Review, to be released by the African Union Commission in 2026. The survey collects country-level information on seed system structure, regulatory frameworks, inspection and enforcement mechanisms, and market size, through 17 performance indicators.

Administered in Q1 and Q2 of 2025, the survey targeted all 54 African countries that are recognized by the African Union. Only 4 countries, namely Algeria, Mauritius, Morocco, Sao Tome & Principe, out of the 54 countries did not respond. For each country, the survey was completed by nationally recognized seed sector experts with direct knowledge of seed policy, regulatory, and market conditions. The two categories of survey respondents were: (i) government officers from the seed regulatory services or Ministries of Agriculture, or (ii) local researcher with seed sector expertise. Beyond the formal survey, data were often triangulated with other key seed sector informants including representatives from government agencies, agricultural research institutions and the private sector.”

Respondents provided descriptive responses, quantitative ratings, and documentary evidence where available. TASAI applied standardized guidelines to ensure data quality, including checks for completeness, internal consistency, and treatment of missing or non-applicable values. It is important to note that “N/A” values do not indicate the absence of a measure; rather, they reflect that the information was not reported in the SSPI survey. Although the full SSPI covers a broad range of seed sector performance dimensions, this study focuses specifically on government efforts to address counterfeit seed within the formal seed system.

Defining key variables

The analysis was structured around four key dimensions from the SSPI instrument, each of which was post coded to variables indicated below (abbreviation for each variable name is indicated in parentheses):

• Recency of seed policy and regulation instruments: the most recent year in which a country enacted or updated national seed laws or regulatory instruments (MRPY). These instruments may include ministerial decrees and ministerial orders that are commonly used in francophone countries. The focus is on laws and regulations that are specific to the seed sector. As such, instruments that pertain to Plant Variety Protection or the Agriculture/Food sector in general are not considered. For this variable, N/A implies that the country does not have any national seed law/regulations.
• Punitive Measures: the category captures the punitive measures or legal sanctions imposed on individuals or companies for trading in counterfeit seeds. It is divided into the following four variables: the maximum monetary fine in USD (MMF), maximum jail/prison sentence in months (MJT), and withdrawal of business license (WL) and other statutory legal penalties (OLM). These four variables are all clearly stipulated in the country's legal instruments. For the MMF and MJT variables, N/A implies that there is no numerical maximum fine/jail time value documented as per the SSPI data. Currency conversions were conducted between October 11 and October 14, 2025, using exchange rates provided by Google Finance (Google Currency Converter). The WL and OLM variables were coded as binary variables (✔ = yes; ✗ = no) as per the SSPI data that was reported.
• Mitigation measures: this category captures specific measures taken by the government, often in partnership, to mitigate the spread of counterfeit seed. These measures are grouped into four variables: (i) surveillance, monitoring, and inspection (SMI); (ii) awareness creation (AC); (iii) seed certification and labeling (SCL); and (iv) other government-led interventions (OGM) such as registration of seed producers. The variable “AC” captures awareness-creation activities led specifically by national seed authorities, with awareness building encompassing farmer education and outreach, including the dissemination of information to other farmers. For The SMI, AC, SCL, and OGM variables were coded as binary variables (✔ = yes; ✗ = no) as per the SSPI data that was reported.
• Expert rating of government measures: this category captures the opinion rating from local seed sector experts on two related variables. (i) adequacy of existing government policies and regulatory instruments to combat counterfeit seed (De jure), and (ii) effectiveness with which existing measures are implemented and enforced (De facto). Both variables are rated on a 0–10 Likert scale where 0 means completely inadequate and 10 implies completely adequate.

Regional analysis

The paper summarizes findings from 50 African countries. While key indicators are provided for each country, the analysis focuses on the level of regional economic communities (RECs). This regional approach aligns with ongoing efforts to harmonize seed regulation across Africa (Munyi, 2022). Table 1 shows the membership of Africa's eight regional economic communities that are officially recognized by the African Union. They are as follows: UMA (North), ECOWAS (West), EAC (East), IGAD (East, with focus on the horn of Africa), SADC (Southern), COMESA (Southern and eastern), ECCAS (Central), and CEN-SAD (Sahel-Saharan). Note that RECs have overlapping membership, with several countries belonging to multiple RECs [Pan African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PACCI), n.d.].

Table 1. Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Results

Table 2 presents country-level information on policy recency, punitive measures, mitigation measures, and expert assessments related to counterfeit seed across 50 African countries. Table 3 presents a regional comparison of the same indicators.

Table 2. Country level analysis of government efforts to combat counterfeit seed in Africa.

MRPY, most recent year for seed policy instruments; MMF, maximum monetary fine in USD; MJT, maximum jail time in months; WL, withdrawal of business license (yes/no); OLM, other statutory legal penalty (yes/no); SMI, surveillance, monitoring, and inspection (yes/no); AC, awareness creation (yes/no); SCL, seed certification and labeling (yes/no); OGM, other governmental method (yes/no).

Table 3. Regional comparison of government efforts to combat counterfeit seeds.

MRPY, most recent year for seed policy instruments; MMF, maximum monetary fine in USD; MJT, maximum jail time in months; WL, withdrawal of business license (yes/no); OLM, other legal measure (yes/no); SMI, surveillance, monitoring, and inspection (yes/no); AC, awareness creation (yes/no); SCL, seed certification and labeling (yes/no); OGM, other governmental method (yes/no).

Recency of policy and regulatory instruments

Counterfeit seed has emerged as a significant challenge over the past decade, raising concerns about whether existing seed policies and regulatory frameworks are fit for purpose. As shown in Tables 2, 3, there is substantial variation across countries and the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the recency of seed policy and regulatory instruments.

At the country level, the countries with the most updated seed policy instruments include Ethiopia (2025), Somalia (2024), Angola (2024), Gabon (2024), Comoros (2024), and Madagascar (2024). Cameroun is the country with the oldest seed policy instrument, which was passed in 2001. Six countries do not have a national seed law or regulatory instrument in place as per the SSPI data (marked as “N/A” in Table 2). These are the Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Seychelles. The absence of a legal instrument complicates regulation of seed markets and weakens the formal basis for defining, detecting, and enforcing actions against counterfeit seed.

Significant variation is also observed across RECs. IGAD shows the most recent policy activity, with an average policy year of approximately 2020 across member states with available data. SADC and COMESA follow, with an average policy year of approximately 2019. ECCAS follows with an average policy year of approximately 2018. ECOWAS, EAC, and CEN-SAD each show average policy years of roughly 2017. The Arab Maghreb Union averaged the lowest policy year at 2003. Overall, these patterns reflect differences in the historical evolution and maturity of seed sectors across Africa. Some countries with longer-established formal seed sectors, tend to operate under older policy frameworks that may require updating to address emerging challenges like counterfeit seed. In contrast, countries with younger or rapidly evolving seed sectors are more likely to have recently enacted or revised seed policies, creating greater scope to explicitly incorporate provisions that address counterfeit seed.

Punitive measures

Punitive measures, when clearly defined and consistently enforced, can serve as an important deterrent against the production and sale of counterfeit seed. In the absence of regulations that explicitly address counterfeit seed, enforcement is often pursued through general legal provisions such as fraud, false representation, or theft. In such cases, penalties tend to be lenient, allowing offenders to resume illegal activities after paying relatively small fines. Recognizing the long-term risks that counterfeit seed poses to national food security and seed sector credibility, many countries have enacted seed-specific regulations that include explicit punitive measures. These measures commonly include monetary fines, prison sentences, withdrawal of licenses, and other legal sanctions, as summarized in Tables 2, 3.

Monetary fines show substantial variation across countries and regions. Maximum fines range from as high as USD 42,800 in Cape Verde to as low as USD 1 in Zambia. Because fines are typically specified in local currency, their real value often erodes over time due to inflation and currency depreciation, reducing their deterrent effect if not periodically revised. At the regional level, ECOWAS and UMA include countries with the highest reported maximum fines, driven largely by Burkina Faso and Tunisia, respectively. Across RECs, the highest reported maximum statutory fine was Tunisia (USD 17,035) in UMA, Cape Verde (USD 42,800) in ECOWAS, Burkina Faso (USD 35,400) in CEN-SAD, Malawi (USD 29,000) in both COMESA and SADC, Chad (USD 8,850) in ECCAS, Rwanda (USD 3,400) in EAC, and Uganda (USD 2,927) in IGAD.

Prison sentences for counterfeit seed offenses also vary widely across countries and regions. Ethiopia reports the longest maximum prison term at 180 months, while Benin, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Cameroon, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo report maximum sentences of only 3 months. At the regional level, average maximum prison terms range from approximately 10 months in UMA and ECCAS to 65 months in IGAD, based on countries with available data. These differences reflect substantial variation in how seriously counterfeit seed offenses are treated within national legal systems.

In cases where registered seed companies or traders are implicated, withdrawal of licenses or deregistration can be a particularly strong deterrent. Twenty-nine of the 50 countries analyzed include license withdrawal provisions as part of their enforcement framework. Such measures are most prevalent in IGAD and COMESA. Withdrawal-of-license provisions were most prevalent in IGAD, where six out of seven countries with available data include this sanction, followed closely by COMESA (17 out of 20), SADC (12 out of 15), EAC (five out of seven), and UMA (two out of three). In contrast, coverage was substantially lower in CEN-SAD (13 out of 24), ECOWAS (seven out of 15), and was lowest in ECCAS, where only three out of 10 countries with available data provide for withdrawal of license.

Beyond fines, prison terms, and license withdrawal, several countries employ additional legal measures to address counterfeit seed. The most common measure is seizure and destruction of counterfeit seed, practiced in 20 countries including Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda. Other measures include blacklisting and public disclosure of offenders (Djibouti), prohibition of seed certification (Eritrea), stop-sale orders (Tanzania, Nigeria), sealing of premises (Nigeria, Republic of Congo), exclusion from government supply programs (Nigeria, Republic of Congo), temporary or permanent business closure (Gabon, Republic of Congo), forfeiture of goods (The Gambia), and restitution or compensation to affected farmers (Zimbabwe). Withdrawal of license refers to the suspension or revocation of permission to conduct regulated seed activities, whereas deregistration entails the removal of a company from official regulatory registers. These measures are typically grounded in national seed laws, biosecurity regulations, or general fraud legislation, and they complement formal sanctions by expanding the range of enforcement tools available to regulatory authorities.

Mitigation measures

While punitive measures can deter potential criminals, they often fail to protect farmers and seed traders who have already suffered the negative consequences of counterfeit seeds. Due to the public good nature and negative externality of this issue, governments play a critical role in mitigating risks through essential services like surveillance, awareness creation, and seed inspection. These proactive measures are typically implemented in close cooperation with seed companies, often via national seed traders' associations.

Surveillance, monitoring, and inspection provisions are part of the standard seed quality assurance services. As such, services such as seed inspection are expected in all countries that have seed laws or regulations. SMI measures were present in 47 of the 50 countries analyzed. Often conducted by seed services units under ministries of agriculture, these measures were most prevalent in UMA (three out of three), EAC (seven out of seven), IGAD (seven out of seven), SADC (15 out of 15), and COMESA (20 out of 20). Near-universal adoption was observed in ECOWAS (14 out of 15) and CEN-SAD (23 out of 24), while ECCAS showed slightly lower coverage, with such provisions present in eight out of 10 countries with available data.

Awareness creation measures were largely limited, appearing in only 17 of the 50 countries analyzed. Awareness-creation activities were most commonly reported in EAC and IGAD, where four out of seven countries in each REC implement such measures, followed by COMESA (eight out of 20), SADC (six out of 15), and ECOWAS (five out of 15). By contrast, uptake was limited in CEN-SAD (six out of 24) and ECCAS (two out of 10), and absent altogether in UMA, where 0 out of three countries reported awareness-creation initiatives.

Seed certification and labeling provisions are also standard requirements in seed laws and regulations. As such, this was mentioned by most of the countries (44 of the 50 countries analyzed). Seed certification and labeling frameworks were nearly universal across regions, with full coverage in UMA (three out of three), EAC (seven out of seven), and IGAD (seven out of seven), and very high adoption in COMESA (19 out of 20) and SADC (14 out of 15). Slightly lower but still widespread coverage was observed in CEN-SAD (22 out of 24) and ECOWAS (13 out of 15), while ECCAS reported comparatively lower adoption, with seven out of 10 countries having seed certification and labeling provisions in place.

Beyond these core measures, several countries employ additional mitigation measures to address counterfeit seed. Laboratory-based measures include quality control testing (Angola, Libya), mandatory laboratory testing (Guinea-Bissau), and post-control field quality testing of local and imported seed (Egypt). Traceability and authentication technologies include QR codes (Madagascar), scratch-card authentication systems (Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria) unique seed lot numbers (Uganda), and digital seed information management systems (Nigeria). Border and import control measures include seed conformity checks at entry and exit points plus paperwork such as plant import permits and phytosanitary certificates in most countries. Other innovations include regulatory contact information on seed labels for farmer reporting (Ethiopia) and pre-control evaluation of parental line samples (Zimbabwe). These mitigation measures complement formal regulatory frameworks and the target points along the value chain often reflect the suspected primary sources of counterfeit seeds. While most of the additional mitigation measures are supposed to be standard practices under countries laws, they are not always applied.

Expert rating of government efforts

While the presence of punitive measures and mitigation mechanisms provides important insight into government responses, these formal provisions do not necessarily reflect the adequacy of efforts to combat counterfeit seed. Adequacy depends not only on the comprehensiveness of available measures but also on their appropriateness relative to the magnitude and suspected sources of counterfeit seed activity in each country. Moreover, the effectiveness of government efforts hinges on the gap between de jure measures (policies and regulations on paper) and de facto implementation (enforcement and application in practice). To capture these dimensions, the SSPI relies on expert assessments from national seed system specialists who evaluate both the adequacy of formal government measures and the adequacy of their implementation, each rated on a 0–10 scale. These ratings are captured in Tables 2, 3. Figure 1 shows a color-coded map of Africa showing the average of the two opinion ratings for each country.

Expert ratings of government measures reveal substantial regional variation. De jure ratings for government measures ranked from highest to lowest were COMESA (6.1), SADC (5.87), ECOWAS (5.6), EAC (5.43), CEN-SAD (5.42), UMA (5.0), IGAD (4.71), and ECCAS (4.2). These differences are largely aligned with the level of seed sector development by region. Implementation ratings followed a similar but not identical pattern. De facto implementation ratings ranked from highest to lowest were COMESA (5.55), followed by ECOWAS (4.93), SADC (4.87), EAC (4.86), CEN-SAD (4.71), IGAD (4.43), UMA (4.33), and ECCAS (3.30). The correlation between adequacy of measures and adequacy of implementation was strong and positive (r = 0.82), indicating that countries with stronger policy frameworks generally demonstrate stronger enforcement capacity. However, notable implementation gaps emerged in several countries. The largest discrepancies between de jure and de facto ratings were observed in Angola (gap = 5), Cote d'Ivoire (gap = 4) and Egypt (gap = 4), suggesting that strong regulatory frameworks do not always translate into effective enforcement. In contrast, several countries showed close alignment between policy and practice, including Eritrea, Eswatini, and Malawi (gap = 0), underscoring the importance of enforcement capacity and institutional commitment.

Discussion

This study reveals substantial variation in government responses to counterfeit seed across 50 African countries and eight Regional Economic Communities. Four key findings emerge from the analysis.

First, policy instruments vary markedly in both recency and comprehensiveness. IGAD, SADC, and COMESA demonstrate more recent regulatory activity, with average most recent policy instrument of 2020 and 2019, respectively, while UMA relies on older frameworks averaging 2003. However, policy recency alone does not determine effectiveness. Countries with longer-established seed sectors, such as those in SADC and COMESA, often operate under older policies yet demonstrate relatively strong adequacy ratings, suggesting that institutional maturity and enforcement capacity may compensate for less recent regulatory updates. Conversely, some countries lack formal seed policies entirely, fundamentally constraining their ability to define, detect, and penalize counterfeit seed activities.

Second, punitive measures show wide variation in severity and comprehensiveness. Maximum fines range from USD 1 (Zambia) to USD 42,800 (Cape Verde), while maximum prison sentences span from 3 to 180 months. However, these statutory penalties do not consistently predict adequacy ratings. For instance, ECOWAS and CEN-SAD report among the highest maximum fines yet receive moderate adequacy scores, suggesting that penalty severity matters less than consistent enforcement. License withdrawal provisions, present in only 29 of 50 countries, appear concentrated in IGAD and COMESA, though their deterrent effect remains difficult to isolate from other enforcement mechanisms.

Third, government mitigation measures show uneven adoption and significant regional disparities. Surveillance, monitoring, and inspection mechanisms are most widespread in UMA, EAC, IGAD, SADC, and COMESA (all at 100% of countries with available data), suggesting these regions prioritize active detection over reactive punishment. In contrast, awareness creation programs remain severely underdeveloped, present in only 17 of 50 countries. This gap is particularly concerning given evidence that farmer education can prevent counterfeit seed purchases more cost-effectively than post-sale enforcement. Seed certification and labeling systems show substantial adoption (44 of 50 countries), with highest prevalence in UMA, EAC, and IGAD. The deployment of innovative technologies—including QR codes, scratch-card authentication, and digital traceability systems—remains concentrated in a small number of countries, suggesting significant potential for knowledge transfer and regional coordination. The limited adoption of proactive mitigation measures may partially explain why regions with strong punitive frameworks do not always achieve correspondingly high adequacy ratings.

Fourth, implementation capacity emerges as a critical determinant of effectiveness. The strong correlation between policy adequacy and implementation adequacy (r = 0.82, r² = 0.67) indicates that countries with comprehensive regulatory frameworks typically also possess stronger enforcement capacity. However, notable exceptions exist. Côte d'Ivoire and Egypt demonstrate four-point gaps between policy adequacy and implementation, indicating that strong de jure frameworks do not guarantee de facto enforcement. These gaps likely reflect resource constraints, competing priorities, or insufficient coordination between regulatory authorities and enforcement agencies. In contrast, countries showing alignment between policy and implementation (Eritrea, Eswatini, Malawi) suggest that modest but well-enforced frameworks may outperform ambitious but under-resourced regulatory systems.

The regional analysis reveals that higher-performing RECs such as COMESA, SADC, and ECOWAS combine recent or regularly updated policies with multiple enforcement tools and operational programs including surveillance, inspection, and certification. Lower-performing regions, particularly ECCAS, show older policy frameworks, limited coverage of mitigation measures, and weaker implementation capacity. These patterns suggest that effective counterfeit seed control requires coordinated investment across regulatory design, enforcement infrastructure, and stakeholder engagement rather than isolated policy reforms.

While this study focuses on supply-side responses to counterfeit seed, it is important to recognize the role of demand-side dynamics in sustaining these markets. In many African contexts, the high cost of certified seed relative to farmer incomes can discourage adoption and push farmers toward local, recycled, or lower-cost seed alternatives, which can potentially include counterfeit seed as well. Consequently, even robust regulatory and enforcement frameworks may have limited effectiveness if the underlying affordability and access constraints are not appropriately addressed. Future research examining farmer decision-making, would be paramount for effectively understanding the demand-side drivers of counterfeit seed and for designing more effective, comprehensive policy responses.

Recommendations

Strengthen measurement and reporting of counterfeit seed

Governments must treat measurement of counterfeit seed as a priority rather than an afterthought, making it a core indicator that is actively and routinely tracked. Clear, centralized reporting systems that capture information from both government agencies and seed companies are needed to ensure that cases are consistently recorded and monitored. High counterfeit seed case counts in countries such as DRC, Zimbabwe, and Uganda may reflect stronger detection and reporting systems rather than higher prevalence. In the absence of consistent measurement and coordinated reporting, countries are likely to underestimate the scale of counterfeit seed activity and misjudge the adequacy of their regulatory responses. Strengthened surveillance and improved data transparency are essential to accurately assess the scope of the problem and evaluate the effectiveness of interventions. Moreover, countries must pair clear and enforceable penalties with real consequences that make non-compliance costly, ensuring that sanctions are implemented rather than remaining symbolic.

Private sector involvement is key

Private sector involvement in combating counterfeit seed should be treated as a central strategy rather than a secondary measure. Formal public-private partnerships that allow seed companies to report suspected cases, contribute to certification and labeling systems, and assist with surveillance can significantly strengthen detection while helping governments address information gaps they cannot easily close on their own. Technology-driven initiatives illustrate how public-private partnerships can strengthen counterfeit seed control. In Uganda, company-led solutions such as Kakasa, a mobile-based e-verification platform that allows farmers to authenticate seed using scratch codes and SMS, complement government surveillance and reporting systems (Access to Seeds Foundation, 2019). These efforts are reinforced by government action, as the Ministry of Agriculture established a legal framework, led farmer awareness campaigns, and deployed the Seed Tracking and Traceability System in 2021 with private-sector participation through the Uganda Seed Trade Association (Mabaya et al., 2023).

Kenya's experience demonstrates how structured public-private partnerships can reduce counterfeit seed prevalence. Collaboration between the Seed Trade Association of Kenya (STAK) and the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS) integrates private-sector outreach with government-led regulation, surveillance, and enforcement. A key component is the adoption of technology-enabled solutions, such as CSM Tech's Digital Seed Certification System, which allows seed companies and regulators to jointly strengthen inspection, traceability, and verification (CSM Technologies, 2025). Evidence from TASAI country reports suggests these collaborative approaches are associated with declining reported cases in Kenya: annual counts declined from 36 cases in 2013 to 30 in 2017, 18 in 2019, and just six in 2021 (Mburu et al., 2022). This trend has been attributed to initiatives jointly supported by public and private actors, including certification labels, strengthened penalties, and farmer awareness campaigns led by STAK and other industry partners (Mburu et al., 2022). These private-sector-supported efforts are reinforced by KEPHIS field surveillance, spot checks, and reporting mechanisms that encourage farmers to flag suspected counterfeit seed (Mburu et al., 2022). Embedding private-sector innovation within formal regulatory frameworks is critical to strengthening enforcement, improving transparency, and safeguarding seed system integrity.

Raise awareness

Awareness creation must be treated as a priority instrument in efforts to combat counterfeit seed. When farmers lack clear understanding of certification systems, labeling, and reporting pathways, they become significantly more vulnerable to counterfeit seed, particularly in informal markets with limited oversight (Spielman et al., 2015). Educating farmers about the risks of counterfeit and poor-quality seed, and how to identify and purchase legitimate seed, is a key strategy for protecting both farmers and the broader agricultural value chain (Keller and Csörgo, 2024). Awareness creation can be implemented cost-effectively by building on existing extension services, farmer cooperatives, and agro-dealer networks, yielding high benefits at low additional cost by leveraging trusted structures that already reach farmers. Awareness efforts should prioritize clear, direct, and practical guidance, including how to identify certified seed and how to report suspected counterfeit products, as this can mitigate farmer losses and close enforcement gaps with minimal additional cost. Scalable tools such as SMS, radio services, and mobile applications can disseminate awareness at large scale and at very low marginal cost, ultimately strengthening the integrity of the seed sector overall.

Conclusion, limitations and future research

This study reveals pronounced regional disparities in government responses to counterfeit seed across 50 African countries. Countries with comprehensive regulatory frameworks, recent policy updates, robust legal sanctions, and active enforcement mechanisms consistently receive higher adequacy ratings from national seed experts. However, policy reform alone is insufficient. Effective control of counterfeit seed requires simultaneous strengthening of measurement systems, formal public-private partnerships, and farmer awareness programs. Regional disparities in policy frameworks and implementation capacity necessitate tailored interventions that address both regulatory modernization and enforcement capacity to protect seed system integrity across Africa.

Several limitations should be noted. First, the analysis relies on expert-reported SSPI data which, despite standardized criteria, may be subject to reporting bias and variable data completeness across countries. Second, the cross-sectional design limits causal inference and does not directly capture the effects of government interventions on agricultural productivity or farmer livelihoods. Third, reported counterfeit seed cases likely underestimate true prevalence due to limited surveillance capacity and fragmented reporting systems, while aggregation of cases over time masks country-specific temporal trends in counterfeit seed activity.

Several promising research directions emerge from this study. First, analyzing linkages between counterfeit seed control measures and other SSPI indicators such as market competitiveness, could reveal broader systemic relationships and inform integrated policy interventions. Second, deeper investigation into policy and regulatory measures through comparative case studies could identify critical enabling factors such as institutional coordination, resource allocation, and political commitment that explain why certain countries successfully implement policies while others with similar frameworks struggle. Third, identifying and classifying different sources of counterfeit seed would enable targeted remedial actions matched to specific sources, as each requires distinct responses. Fourth, measuring the economic harm caused by counterfeit seed to both the seed industry and farmers through primary data collection would strengthen the economic case for investment in counterfeit seed control and enable cost-benefit analysis of alternative interventions. A further area warranting investigation is the practical enforceability of existing legal sanctions. Even where seed laws prescribe meaningful penalties, the ability of regulatory authorities and seed companies to successfully prosecute counterfeiters can be constrained by challenges in gathering admissible evidence, difficulties in quantifying economic harm, limited awareness of seed offenses within police services, and slow judicial processes. Understanding the conditions under which enforcement actions are successfully pursued would meaningfully strengthen the evidence base for counterfeit seed control. Finally, longitudinal studies using future SSPI cycles could determine whether changes in specific policy measures lead to measurable shifts in adequacy ratings over time, enabling rigorous evaluation of policy effectiveness and refinement of recommended interventions.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Edérson Dos-Santos Alves, University of Malaga, Spain

Reviewed by: Pepijn Schreinemachers, World Vegetable Center, Thailand

Zephania Nyirenda, MwAPATA Institute, Malawi

Footnotes

Sikazwe (unpublished). Counterfeit/Fake Seed in Zambia. Lusaka: Ministry of Agriculture. unpublished presentation/PowerPoint.