Hybrid governance of urban food Markets in Tanzania: contested power and uneven participation

1 Introduction

Food markets in most African cities are governed through hybrid structures that bring together state and non-state actors (Mwagike, 2015). These markets are vital in addressing food shortages, reducing malnutrition, and providing employment opportunities (FAO, 2024; NBS, 2025). However, their governance arrangements frequently face deep-rooted institutional, political, and operational challenges (Motadi and Sikhwari, 2024; Zhong et al., 2019). While the roles of actors within these systems may be evident, questions remain about how power is negotiated and exercised, and how this affects participation, accountability, and equity in everyday market management (Wegerif and Hebinck, 2016; Kiaka et al., 2021; Halpern, 2008). This question is especially important because hybrid governance is often assumed to broaden participation, even though the coexistence of state and non-state actors does not necessarily mean that authority is shared equally or that traders have meaningful influence over decisions. In East Africa, food markets involve a wide spectrum of actors ranging from street vendors to farmers, hawkers, public markets, supermarkets, and residential shops. However, little is known regarding the nature of their governance dynamics. Recent studies indicate that food markets governed under hybrid structures often produce contested distributions of influence, voice, and authority among actors (Howard, 2021; Van den Broeck et al., 2021). This has limited traders, particularly those from marginalized groups, from participating in governance and influencing key decisions affecting their livelihoods.

While definitions of food governance are often entangled with normative notions of “good governance” and an excessive focus on what should be, rather than what actually exists, some scholars have taken a more analytical approach (Davies et al., 2022; Moragues-Faus et al., 2024; Neumann, 2009; Resnick, 2017). They examine the relationships between and within government and civil society actors, as well as the range of political, organizational, and administrative processes through which food stakeholders show their interests, exercise their legal rights, make decisions, and mediate their differences (Mende, 2023; Motadi and Sikhwari, 2024; Smit, 2016). Although conceptualisations vary, hybrid governance generally refers to arrangements that combine public (state) authority with private and other non-state forms of coordination (Black, 2001; Carriedo et al., 2022; Levi-Faur, 2012; Zhong et al., 2019). These arrangements encompass diverse actors, including private entities, civil society organizations, community groups, and informal institutions. While the involvement of multiple actors may create opportunities for collaboration and representation, their coexistence does not necessarily imply equal authority, shared decision-making, or equitable participation. This study advances existing conceptualisations by examining not only the coexistence of multiple actors but also the uneven distribution of authority within hybrid governance arrangements. Specifically, it defines hybrid governance as a system in which municipal authorities, trader associations, and informal actors interact within shared governance arrangements. Rather than assuming that authority is equally distributed, this study examines how decision-making power is negotiated and often remains asymmetrically concentrated within municipal structures, while non-state actors participate through limited and delegated spaces. Accordingly, hybrid governance is treated as a dynamic and continually negotiated arrangement rather than a stable institutional settlement. It excludes arrangements operating exclusively under municipal authority or through trader self-regulation. Hybridity may also include a combination of other actors such as faith-based organizations, social movements, and food activists. These debates on hybrid governance also apply in Tanzania, where public food markets are made up of formal municipal authorities with trader associations and informal actors (Wegerif and Wiskerke, 2017). As shown by Nisbett et al. (2022), hybrid structures play a crucial role in supporting the businesses of many food vendors, overseeing core market activities, and ensuring food is readily accessible to urban residents. The key issue, therefore, is not only that hybrid structures support market functioning, but also how authority is distributed within them, who controls participatory spaces, and whether formal inclusion translates into meaningful influence over decisions.

Power is one of the central and most contested elements of hybrid governance (Mulatu et al., 2025; Carriedo et al., 2022). This is due to the complex and often ambiguous distribution of authority between state and non-state actors. Power dictates who makes key decisions, who sets the rules, and who influences the development and implementation of food policies (Howard, 2021; Swinburn, 2019). To better understand how power is negotiated within hybrid structures, this study is grounded in Gaventa’s Power Cube framework (Gaventa, 2006, 2019). This framework provides a multi-dimensional tool for examining visible, hidden, and invisible forms of power that shape participation in hybrid governance contexts. Within this analytical lens, participation in food governance is treated not only as a procedural requirement but also as a contested arena in which voice, representation, and authority are negotiated. Beyond active involvement, this perspective emphasizes the redistribution of power and voice within food governance structures.

Against this broader debate on hybrid governance and power, the urban food system of Dar es Salaam provides a particularly revealing context in which these dynamics are operationalized in practice. Dar es Salaam city stands out as one of the continent’s fastest-growing urban centres, hosting around 10.6 million residents (United Nations, 2025; NBS, 2025). Amidst its rapid urbanization, the city exemplifies a dynamic and evolving food landscape that shapes food security outcomes (Sauer et al., 2023). Informal food markets account for approximately 70% of food provision because they are cheaper, readily available, and prevalent in suburban and crowded areas (World Bank, 2024; Wenban-Smith et al., 2016). These markets remain particularly important for low-income consumers, while more formalized retail outlets tend to serve higher-income groups. Within this urban context, Mabibo food market serves as a major trading hub for both wholesale and retail of food commodities (World Bank, 2024). Mabibo Market presents an analytically compelling case for examining hybrid food governance, given the visible tensions between formal municipal authorities and informal trader associations. Such conflicts reflect broader challenges of accountability and participation within urban food governance in Tanzania.

Despite the growing interest in urban food governance, there remains a limited empirical understanding of how power operates within hybrid market arrangements in practice. Existing studies have usefully identified the range of actors involved in food market governance, including municipal authorities, trader associations, informal networks, NGOs, and private actors. However, less attention has been paid to how authority is negotiated among these actors, how participatory spaces are controlled, and how formal inclusion may coexist with unequal influence over everyday decisions. This matters because the involvement of both state and non-state actors does not automatically mean that authority is shared or that participation is meaningful. Therefore, hybrid governance should not be treated as synonymous with inclusive governance. Instead, it requires examining how power operates within participatory spaces, whose interests shape decisions, and how formal inclusion may coexist with continued exclusion. To address this gap, this study draws on an in-depth case study of Mabibo Market, a major trading hub for both wholesale and retail food commodities in Dar es Salaam, to examine how power is negotiated, exercised, and reproduced. It argues that hybrid governance at Mabibo operates through managed participation rather than substantive inclusion: trader associations and other non-state actors are formally incorporated, but their influence is constrained by municipal authority, selective consultation, informal networks, gendered leadership norms, and historical claims to market space. Using Gaventa’s Power Cube, the study demonstrates how visible, hidden, and invisible forms of power intersect across closed, invited, and claimed spaces of participation. It is guided by three research questions: (1) How are power and authority negotiated, exercised, and distributed among traders, government actors, and leaders of trader associations in the governance of Mabibo Market? (2) To what extent do traders participate in decision-making processes concerning market opportunities, regulations, and the allocation of key resources? (3) What governance-related and operational challenges are experienced by different actors in Mabibo Market? In doing so, the study contributes to debates on food governance and urban informality by challenging the assumption that hybrid governance necessarily produces more inclusive or accountable market management.

2 Literature review

2.1 Conceptualizing hybrid governance in urban food markets

Food governance has changed since the 1990s, with formal regulatory frameworks shifting from centralized, single-actor structures toward more pluralistic and multi-actor arrangements (Verbruggen and Havinga, 2017; Levi-Faur, 2012; Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). At the same time, formal and informal governance practices have long coexisted within African food systems. Recent political and economic shifts have further reconfigured these arrangements, giving rise to what is now conceptualized as hybrid governance (Huttunen et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2004; Smit, 2016). Scholars such as Motadi and Sikhwari (2024) show that this shift has moved attention away from purely regulatory systems toward processes of convergence, transformation, and mutual interdependence among food market actors. Rather than viewing food governance as a strictly top-down process of policymaking, Lindell (2008, p. 1883), drawing on work in Mozambique, further conceptualizes it as a combination of activities “through which the state and other actors guide the society and economy,” illustrating how market rules are shaped through collaboration and contestation in everyday governance.

Evidence from other country contexts shows that hybrid governance is not unique to Tanzania alone. For instance, in Nanjing, China, food markets have undergone three stages: a public market structure, a privatized market approach, and, recently, a hybrid governance structure (Zhong et al., 2019). This change connotes a broader global trend toward regulatory pluralism, in which actors and their relations engage in overlapping governance roles. Similarly, in Lusaka, Zambia, several council-managed markets operate under municipal authority, yet local vendor committees and informal political groups wield significant influence over stall allocation, fees, and daily operations, especially where municipal oversight is weak (Blekking et al., 2017). Informal markets and street vendors also self-organize their food businesses and provide critical food access to low-income households but operate largely outside formal regulatory frameworks. Comparable patterns are observed in Tuscany, Italy, where farmers reveal hybrid governance arrangements with local authorities, producers’ associations, and market committees that share overlapping mandates (Belletti et al., 2024). Local governments regulate market spaces, fee collections, and enforce safety standards, while producer groups coordinate stalls, pricing rules, and other market activities. This hybridity allows actors to become responsive to local needs. However, it imposes constraints on accountability and decision-making, especially when priorities differ between authorities and market actors.

At its core, hybrid governance depends on inclusive, participatory arrangements that draw on the collective contributions of actors (Huttunen et al., 2022). It is rooted in democratic ideals like representation, inclusion, and consensus-building (Booth and Coveney, 2015). These principles are critical in urban markets where multiple interests intersect, and governance outcomes directly impact livelihoods. In Tanzania, municipal councils have become frontliners to this transformation, increasingly responsible for creating enabling environments where diverse stakeholders can participate in shaping outcomes to market challenges (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). However, despite extensive advocacy for participation as a foundation of good governance, practical implementation reveals power struggles and unequal opportunities (Baldy and Kruse, 2019). Mabibo Market reflects this complex governance reality, involving multiple actors, including government authorities, market committees, trader associations, and informal networks (Wegerif and Kissoly, 2022). Its hybrid structure often results in power struggles and uneven participation among key actors. Within these settings, Swinburn (2019) shows that, power is concentrated among a few dominant groups such as well-connected, established, or wealthier traders and those with longer trading tenures, leaving aside underprivileged ones. In food governance debates, these dynamics reveal who holds power, how power is exercised, and who is excluded from these processes.

While participation in food governance is often desired, it has been challenging to achieve (Steyaert et al., 2025; Lindell, 2008; Battersby and Watson, 2018; Blay-Palmer et al., 2026). Participation is more than physical presence in decision-making spaces; it is the “involvement of key actors in decision-making processes that affect their lives and communities” (Baldy and Kruse, 2019, p. 3). low levels of participation have been reported as a persistent challenge in the initiation of proper food governance (Wegerif and Hebinck, 2016). According to Cornwall (2002) and Gaventa (2006), a deeper analysis is needed into how participatory spaces are created, who controls them, and whose voices are legitimate. Traders often face barriers ranging from exclusion in leadership elections and lack of consultation on decisions to abrupt policy or instructional changes that directly affect their trading experiences. Such exclusions do reinforce existing power hierarchies and weaken accountability mechanisms (Adeosun et al., 2023; Gaventa, 2006; Robaey, 2019; Blay-Palmer, 2016).

Actor involvement is also shaped by spatial and institutional contexts. As Gaventa (2006) highlights, participatory dynamics vary depending on whether spaces are officially sanctioned, informally claimed, or closed. When formal mechanisms fail to meet the needs of traders, informal networks and self-organized initiatives emerge as alternative avenues for engagement (Adeosun et al., 2023; Gaventa, 2019). While these spaces may foster resistance and innovation, they also face the risk of being overlooked or co-opted by dominant interests (Porter and Ashcraft, 2020). Without addressing the underlying power struggles that limit who participate and how, efforts to encourage participatory governance risk becoming symbolic, reinforcing the very hierarchies they aim to dismantle (Anderson, 2023; Tschersich and Kok, 2022). From that lens, an examination of who participates, how, and under what conditions is crucial for promoting more inclusive, fair, and practical hybrid food governance systems.

2.2 Governance challenges in African urban food markets

The governance of food markets in East Africa is understood as a dynamic and negotiated process, where traders conduct their businesses within regulatory gray zones and continuously navigate formal and informal practices (Porter et al., 2004). In Tanzania, these dynamics are further shaped by everyday forms of resistance and the “quiet encroachment” of key market actors (Scott, 1986; Bayat, 2000). That means, traders do not start or expand their trading space by negotiating within multi-stakeholder forums; they begin by setting up small, temporary stalls along roadsides or near recognized markets, and then slowly contribute to the informal expansion of the marketplace. These dynamics unfold within contexts of regulatory ambiguity and limited state capacity, which create room for informal negotiation (Lindell, 2008).

The government in Tanzania often lacks the institutional capacity to address key governance challenges such as accountability, inclusivity, and equitable decision-making (World Bank, 2024; Steyaert et al., 2023). Food markets, traders, and their representatives are occasionally involved in decision-making processes that affect the operation of their businesses. However, key matters related to market upgrading and infrastructural improvements are often shaped by donor-driven projects or external investors whose priorities may not align with local needs (Wegerif and Kissoly, 2022). In addition, municipal governments and their bureaucracies retain final authority over critical governance issues, including enforcement, levies, security fees, and spatial organization (Sauer et al., 2023). Together, these dynamics produce a hybrid governance structure in which authority is not fully devolved or grounded in bottom-up decision-making processes.

Market-based organizations, such as trader cooperative groups, religious organizations, and NGOs, provide platforms for solidarity, mutual support, and collective advocacy among market actors (Resnick, 2017). Despite their crucial contributions in enhancing trader participation and voice in hybrid food governance, their capacity to exert meaningful influence that boosts trader welfare is often undermined by a number of challenges, such as power struggles, low participation, and favouritism. Others include weak representation in matters related to gender, class, and ethnicity (Carriedo et al., 2022). These organizational weaknesses often tend to exacerbate systemic governance failures, contributing to inadequate infrastructure, poor sanitation, irregular service delivery, and pervasive regulatory uncertainty, all of which are vividly observed in Mabibo Market (Mwagike, 2015; Wegerif and Wiskerke, 2017).

Leadership within trader groups is frequently self-appointed or sometimes selected by municipal market officers (Affre et al., 2024; Wegerif and Kissoly, 2022). The election processes are opaque and only reflect the interests of the state rather than those of the traders. Literature on food governance shows that, even when elections occur, leadership structures are typically male dominated, lack term limits, and gain influence by aligning their discourse with donor and governmental expectations (Park et al., 2015). As a result, leaders tend to serve dominant market actors rather than addressing the concerns of marginalized groups like small-scale traders or the broader community (Lindell, 2008; Arribas-Bel and Fleischmann, 2022). While public forums and other forms of meetings exist to promote stakeholder participation, their effectiveness is also constrained (Robaey, 2019; Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005). These platforms aim to address governance challenges and facilitate dialogue; however, studies show limited evidence of the successful implementation of the agreements reached (Anderson, 2023; Wenban-Smith et al., 2016). Coordination among traders and their committees, market authorities, and local government remains weak, leading to policy inconsistencies and enforcement gaps (Howard, 2021). Additionally, many actors such as small-scale and underprivileged traders, are either absent from or underrepresented in these forums.

3 Methodology

3.1 Analytical framework: Gaventa’s power cube

The Power Cube framework has been widely applied in studies of participatory governance to analyse how power operates across spaces, levels, and forms. For instance, Gruberg et al. (2022) apply the framework to co-creation processes in water governance in Bolivia, showing how visible, hidden, and invisible power shape policy outcomes and participation. Building on such applications, this study extends the framework to urban food market governance in the Global South, focusing on how hybrid institutional arrangements shape power dynamics, actor participation, and the reproduction of power hierarchies in contexts such as Mabibo Market in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. To guide this analysis, we also adopt Gaventa’s Power Cube as our central analytical framework (Gaventa, 2006, 2019). This three-dimensional framework (see Figure 1), comprising forms of power (visible, hidden, and invisible), spaces of participation (closed, invited, and claimed), and levels of governance (local to global), provides a structured and analytical lens for examining how formal and informal practices tend to intersect, and how power is contested, hidden, or internalised in complex hybrid governance settings.

The forms of power, which are visible, hidden, and invisible as illustrated in Figure 1, guide us to understand different ways in which authority is exercised and contested (Worth, 2022). Visible power refers to evident decision-making processes in food governance (Gaventa, 2006). However, visibility alone does not guarantee equity. Hidden power can shape participation by determining who is included, what issues are prioritized, and whose voices are excluded (Gaventa, 2006; Harris, 2019). In order to understand the dynamics of participation and representation in Mabibo Market, we focused on interactions between trader associations and government officials, recognizing that some actors may have greater access to participatory spaces than others. Invisible power operates at a deeper level as it shapes how individuals perceive their agency (Gaventa, 2019). As discussed by Wegerif and Kissoly (2022), this includes the tendency of internalizing marginality by inferior traders, such as informal and entry-level traders who may perceive themselves as undeserving or illegitimate participants.

The spaces of participation are grouped as closed, invited, or claimed/created (Gaventa, 2006). Closed spaces are those decisions made without external contributions, as they are often influenced by government actors or elite trader groups. Invited spaces refer to forums or consultative meetings where participation is permitted, typically on the terms of those who have the power to control the process. Claimed or created spaces emerge when less powerful actors establish their platforms for participation, such as self-organized trader groups (Harris, 2019). It is also vital to understand that categories within the framework are applied as an analytical lens rather than mutually exclusive classifications. Although close spaces are usually associated with more powerful actors such as government authorities and claimed or created spaces with less powerful groups, this relationship is not always fixed. As elaborated by Gaventa (2006, 2019), spaces of participation are dynamic and relational. That means they can be produced, controlled, and reshaped by different actors and shift over time depending on evolving political and institutional relations within hybrid governance settings.

In some cases, less powerful actors such as trader associations or market committees may create and regulate exclusive spaces that limit broader participation. For example, association leaders may restrict access to meetings, control agendas, or filter traders’ concerns before they reach municipal authorities, thereby reproducing internal hierarchies among them. Forms of power (visible, hidden, and invisible) may also overlap, as actors may simultaneously engage across multiple dimensions of power. For instance, the same actor may exercise visible authority in formal decision-making spaces while also shaping participation through more subtle or informal mechanisms. Recognizing that participatory spaces are fluid and contested, this study included both formally engaged committee members and traders to capture variations in influence and representation within the hybrid governance structure. The levels at which power operates extend from local to national and global scales (Gaventa, 2019). Accordingly, since local governance processes in Mabibo Market are influenced by broader national and international policy frameworks, this research adopts a multi-scalar approach, allowing an assessment of how decisions by municipal authorities, national agencies, and development partners, like donor-driven programs, intersect to shape market governance at the local level.

3.2 Study setting and design

This study was conducted at Mabibo Market, located in Ubungo District in Dar es Salaam. The city was selected due to its rapid urbanization and the central role that informal food markets play in shaping urban food systems. Mabibo Market was also purposefully selected because of its key characteristic of the hybrid governance, which brings together trader associations and the Ubungo Municipal Council. Although this market reflects governance arrangements that are common in many African food markets, it stands out as an analytically rich case in which the dynamics of hybrid governance are visible, allowing for a detailed examination of how formal inclusion coexists with informal mechanisms of control in market management.

Mabibo market is jointly managed by trader associations and the Ubungo Municipal Council, under the broader oversight of local government authorities (Wegerif and Kissoly, 2022). However, this hybrid structure remains heavily top-down, with key decision-making processes largely dominated by municipal officials rather than participatory engagement with trader representatives. The market faces several governance challenges, including constrained accountability, uneven resource distribution, and fragmented coordination between trader committees and municipal departments. Such issues have led to tensions over the allocation of stalls, access to information, and enforcement of bylaws, which in turn affect traders’ trust in the overall governance process (Mwagike, 2015; Wegerif, 2020). Currently, Mabibo has a total of 3,995 traders (Kinondoni Municipal Council, 2026), primarily dealing in fresh produce, including fruits, vegetables, and tubers, with all organized according to their respective associations. A sizable group of food porters exists and assists with the flow of goods in the market. Primarily, they work by unloading produce from vehicles and supporting customers with their purchases. Another group includes food brokers, famously known as “madalali,” who act as intermediaries by linking together farmers, wholesalers, and small food traders. Although not formally part of the governance structure, they influence information flows and market interactions through their trust-based relationships. The distribution of these groups according to their commodity membership and gender is clearly illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Composition of market actors by trading group and gender at Mabibo Market.

To ensure broad representation and offer a detailed account of data collection, we mapped the market structure by identifying key trading zones, formal and informal stalls, and the spatial distribution of trader associations, as shown in Figure 2. Additionally, this map was an important tool in informing the selection of interview participants and observation sites.

Given the complexity and context-specific nature of power relations and governance challenges in the study setting, a qualitative, single-case design was employed (Lee, 2024; Yin, 1994). This market is considered typical of urban food markets with hybrid governance in Dar es Salaam and similar African cities, particularly in terms of informal to formal authority arrangements and active trader associations. While the findings are context-specific, the case offers insights relevant to other markets with comparable governance structures. Data were collected in five stages (see Figure 3). In total, the study involved 92 participants, comprising 60 food traders, 12 trader committee leaders, 10 government officials, and 10 food systems experts. The distribution of participants across actor categories, data collection methods, and phases is presented in Figure 3. First, we performed a preliminary investigation across a diverse set of Dar Es Salaam’s markets, including Mabibo Market, from the 15th to the 18th of April 2025. Furthermore, we proceeded with an intensive data collection from June to July 2025 and consisted of four groups of actors. Food traders were purposively selected at the Mabibo Market. These traders were categorized into six primary groups: groups selling fresh produce, onions and potatoes, fruits, tomatoes, bananas, and food vendors (see Table 1). After extensive interaction with each group, the first author applied snowball sampling to reach out to additional respondents under the same category. Among the 60 respondents interviewed, their ages ranged from 22 to 63 years, with a nearly equal gender distribution consisting of 28 women and 32 men. Their periods of trading ranged from 6 months to more than 10 years, offering a balance between entry-level and senior food traders. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions examined market governance, including management arrangements, decision-making processes, interactions between government authorities and trader associations, and experiences of participation and power. Specifically, two focus group discussions were conducted: one with trader committee leaders to explore their roles in power negotiation and conflict mediation, and another with government officials to examine their influence on hybrid governance perspectives and decision-making processes. Questions were also adapted to participants’ roles while maintaining a shared thematic structure across interviews.

Leaders of the trader committees were purposively selected based on their active roles in the internal governance structures of Mabibo Market. This group mainly included chairpersons and their secretaries in each of the trader groups. These individuals were important for understanding leadership dynamics, channels of decision-making, and exploring means of power negotiation between traders, government actors, and other stakeholders. Government officials were also purposively selected due to their institutional roles and direct engagement in supervising several aspects of the market. Their insights were critical in revealing state-led governance mechanisms, collaborations with trader committees, and enforcement practices. Lastly, ten food systems experts involved in food-system governance were interviewed. Respondents under this category were professionals working at Rikolto East Africa, the Ubungo Municipal Council (UMC), Trias Tanzania, and the Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA). The principal researcher purposively selected them due to their thematic expertise on matters related to food governance and security. They also provided a systematic perspective on food governance, associated challenges, and strategies for improving governance in urban food systems. These actors were included because they are directly involved in market governance processes. Other actors, such as consumers, institutional buyers, farmers and their associations, wholesale suppliers, food activists, and others, were not included because they participate mainly through the food supply chain rather than in hybrid governance decisions.

3.3 Data analysis

This study employed a thematic approach to conduct data analysis. First, interviews and focus group discussions were recorded, transcribed (verbatim and anonymised) in the Kiswahili language and cross-checked for completeness. Thereafter, transcripts were uploaded along with other relevant documents into MaxQDA Analytics Pro (24.9.1) for systematic management and analysis. A set of deductive codes, guided by the study objectives and Gaventa’s Power Cube analytical framework, was developed. The software was used to identify patterns, themes, and relationships to highlight the recurring insights in the hybrid governance of Mabibo. The coding process was carefully reviewed to ensure consistency of the results over time. Additional inductive codes that emerged during the coding process were coded separately until the saturation point was reached. Finally, summaries, figures, and relevant synthesis were created with main themes and expressions from respondents to represent the study findings. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Ardhi University, Tanzania. All required research permissions were granted by the regional, district, and ward authorities prior to data collection. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, who were fully informed about the purpose of the study and their right to withdraw at any time without consequence.

4 Results

4.1 Historical context and evolution of Mabibo market

To understand the food governance trajectory of Mabibo Market, this section introduces five, partly overlapping, key phases that capture the evolution of Mabibo Market, reflecting the changing dynamics of the nature of governance until when the market adopted a hybrid structure (see Figure 4).

4.1.1 Informal beginnings (2001–2010)

Historically, Mabibo Market was famously known as “Mahakama ya Ndizi” which means “the court of bananas,” due to its popularity as the largest banana trading area in Dar es Salaam. It was formed in 2001 by traders who informally occupied the land owned by Urafiki textile. When instructed by the government of Tanzania to relocate, they refused to move. Later on, they initially started their business by setting up small, temporary stalls, which accumulated over time and led to the expansion of a recognizable food market. During that time, their business activities were conducted independently without government oversight. They formulated informal leadership structures embedded within their associations, primarily led by top members, including the chairperson, secretary, and committee members. From that viewpoint, the government official of Mabibo Market confirmed that “At that time, only a few vehicles delivered banana stalks to the market, but over the years, increased inflow from rural areas contributed to the market’s expansion” (INT 1, Market Leader).

4.1.2 Textile-led facilitation and infrastructure expansion (2010–2015)

The accumulation of traders on the land where Mabibo Market had developed set the stage for the subsequent and direct involvement of Urafiki Textile. This land covered approximately ten acres, and it was originally intended to serve as an industrial buffer zone, functioning as a breathing space for the industry. The area was also used to facilitate the discharge of wastewater and accommodate other operational needs. On account of continued trading activities, Urafiki Textile collected levies from traders through their association. Due to the unanticipated transformation of the area because of the growing concentration of banana trading activities, the trader association convinced Urafiki Textile to enhance market infrastructure facilities. Such improvements attracted more traders to Mabibo. As a consequence of the daily expansion of the market, the government of Tanzania, through the UMC, intervened to coordinate market governance along with trader associations.

4.1.3 Emergence of hybrid governance (2015–2020)

Following the establishment of the Ubungo Municipal Council in 2015, the government adopted a hybrid governance approach regarding the governance of Mabibo Market. Municipal officers were assigned to intervene and oversee the daily management of the market alongside the existing trader association. Despite that, the land was still under the ownership and management of Urafiki Textile. The Ubungo Municipal Council mainly focused on the collection of levies and offering basic services related to cleanliness, security, and sanitation. However, the Ubungo Municipal Council faced challenges that later described the phase of state withdrawal from managing the Mabibo Market.

4.1.4 Contestation and municipal withdrawal (2016–2021)

A few years later in 2020, the government of Tanzania stepped into the management of Mabibo Market and decided to roll back its supervision to the trader association. This decision was influenced by the fact that the market’s land was still owned by Urafiki Textile. As a result, the Ubungo Municipal Council (UMC) was unable to implement significant infrastructure upgrades, prompting negotiations between Urafiki Textile and the Government of Tanzania.’ These negotiations concerned the usage of the land, whether for market activities or as a breathing space for the textile industry.

The gradual expansion of trading activities at the land occupied by the Mabibo Market led to the prolonged contestation over its use and ownership. This was specifically between the Tanzanian government-owned parastatal under the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development, known as the National Housing Corporation (NHC), and Urafiki Textile. As a result, the NHC made efforts to relocate traders to other areas that were deemed more suitable for trading. However, traders viewed these new areas as less feasible for their trading, particularly in terms of accessing customers. Therefore, in September 2016, the NHC started negotiations with Urafiki Textile about the reclamation of the land and officially considered registering Mabibo as a public Market.

4.1.5 Formal municipal control and market upgrading (2022–2025)

Mabibo market continued to expand over time as traders were attracted by its business flow, establishing stalls and temporary sheds. Most public markets in Dar es Salaam fall under the principal supervision of the Tanzanian government through municipal councils. Mabibo Market was viewed as a rapidly growing food market that also required major infrastructural and sanitation improvements. In May 2022, President Samia Suluhu Hassan issued a directive to the municipal and regional councils of Ubungo, instructing them to manage the market. The intervention was largely successful since it was the outcome of several years of negotiations between Urafiki Textile and the UMC. A shift occurred in April 2024, when the UMC and the National Housing Corporation (NHC) declared that land was officially owned by the government of Tanzania. This move marks the official acquisition of the market from the Urafiki. The portion of land was given to the Ubungo Municipal Council. The UMC upgraded the infrastructure by constructing permanent trading sheds and laying down concrete pathways. However, the involvement of the municipal authority did not replace the existing trader-led arrangements. Instead, it created a hybrid governance in which municipal officers, trader, and their informal networks continued to interact and negotiate their roles and responsibilities. Understanding this transition is important for assessing how leadership structures, mediation practices, and power relations shape everyday governance at Mabibo Market.

4.2 Leadership, mediation, and power relations in Mabibo market

Leadership dynamics at Mabibo Market are central to understanding the distribution and negotiation of power and authority (see Figure 5). The trader community is organized in 6 groups (see Table 1), which provide a platform for representation and participation. They are typically represented by a leadership team consisting of a Chairperson, Secretary, and four committee members. Leaders of these associations link all traders to the municipal authorities. When traders face conflicts and challenges, they report these matters to their leaders before involving the UMC officers.

The UMC officers play five major roles. They maintain peace and security by enforcing bylaws and other regulations. These bylaws are formulated by district councillors and then implemented in their respective areas, including all food markets. On some occasions, municipal officers are consulted during official meetings to offer their recommendations on these bylaws to the Local Government Authorities (LGAs), thus contributing to their refinement and relevance. The office of the Ubungo Municipality also collaborates with the leadership teams of associations to mediate disputes. Under this obligation and based on the constitution derived from the Ubungo Municipal Council (UMC) head office, one of their key mandates is to evaluate and impose sanctions on traders who violate market rules, such as theft, disputes, or disorderly conduct. As the office often charges an administrative fee of 50,000 Tsh (approximately 20 USD)¹ from the traders to resolve these conflicts, traders are discouraged from seeking formal intervention and persuades them to resolve conflicts within their networks.

Second, officers are responsible for collecting fees and taxes from traders. Kiosk operators pay the highest monthly fee of 150,000 Tsh (61 USD), while traders with permanent stalls or tables pay a smaller amount of 15,000 Tsh (6 USD). Fees also cover vehicle parking and entry or exit for trucks delivering or picking up produce, as well as daily access levies of 500 Tsh (0.2 USD) for traders coming from other areas. In addition, all food traders contribute 1,000 Tsh (0.4 USD) weekly for security services provided by the Ubungo Municipal Council (UMC).

Third, the UMC officers allocate trading spaces to traders who meet established requirements. The procedure for obtaining these spaces requires traders to have an official letter from their respective Local Government Authorities (LGAs) addressed to the market manager. However, due to the scarcity of stalls, many applicants end up on the waiting list pending final confirmation for accessing these spaces. These officers also manage space by regulating improper extension, repair, or maintenance and preventing illegal street vending. Beyond spatial regulation, they also oversee important aspects of health, sanitation, and safety. They attain this by serving as lead actors in supervising waste collection and maintaining proper sanitation. Lastly, they help to provide administrative oversight by working together with all actors. Some of their duties consist of maintaining official records, facilitating monthly and ad hoc meetings, and coordinating with ward or other municipal offices on food policy directives. Furthermore, they disseminate announcements and carry out inspections by verifying trading permits and monitoring compliance related to food safety rules. One officer added: “We meet traders once per month, but we hold additional meetings as needed to address issues like infrastructure challenges, stall allocations, or disease outbreaks” (INT 2, Market Leader).

Leaders of the trader associations confirm their involvement in the governance. They are meant to serve for a maximum of 2 years, with the first group taking office when the market started to operate under the administration of the UMC. These leaders have four main responsibilities, including keeping the official records of their members and monitoring their participation in governance, mediating conflicts by coordinating with the UMC, supervising and regulating social networks to support one another in times of need, and undertake gatherings with their members once in 3 months to discuss several issues, including challenges and proposing solutions. These leaders register businesses from different producers who want to trade at Mabibo Market. Such arrangements operate on the basis of trust, with key actors such as producers, traders, and brokers cooperating to ensure the flow of goods, sometimes without even knowing each other personally. This is a common practice for producers who do not travel to Mabibo to trade their goods but instead communicate with brokers and arrange the terms of their businesses. To support this, one of the leaders said: “Producers often trust brokers remotely, instructing them on price and quantity. Trust makes their business sustainable and shows the importance of recognizing these networks.” (INT 6, Market Leader).

The municipal council holds official meetings with trader association representatives on a quarterly basis. While municipal officials set the main agenda, these meetings also provide space for association leaders to raise concerns requiring attention. Similarly, trader associations may convene meetings with their members, but only with municipal approval, in order to share information and facilitate participation. Despite these formal channels, traders often face challenges in effectively using them to influence day-to-day market operations. Cooperation between the UMC and trader associations is also reflected in the practical management of the market, including the identification of trading spaces, mediation of conflicts, promotion of sanitation and order, and enforcement of key regulations such as fee and tax collection. However, tensions emerge in situations requiring negotiation. For instance, stall allocation may involve informal practices shaped by social, political, or personal networks that influence access. In other cases, the municipal office may abruptly change tax collection modalities without prior consultation or notification. Such instances place trader association leaders in a difficult position, as they must either align with their members’ concerns or comply with municipal directives.

4.3 Uneven participation and representation in hybrid governance

Trader participation and representation in making decisions at Mabibo Market have changed across the five above mentioned phases. During the informal beginnings, 2001–2010, traders relied on self-organized arrangements where leaders served extended terms until replacements were proposed. This concentration of authority within leadership committees limited broader participation. During the expansion phase (2010–2015), trader associations negotiated with the management of Urafiki Textile about space allocations, sanitation, and other market conditions. Although participatory spaces such as meetings and other informal gatherings were created, key decisions were still largely controlled by the Urafiki Textile, the landowner.

From 2015 onward, when the Ubungo Municipal Council (UMC) began formal collaboration with trader associations, participation and representation gradually improved. New channels of participation were established, with shared responsibilities between associations and municipal officers. However, field mapping and discussions with market leaders show that approximately 40% of 836 traders operating from temporary or unregistered setups continued to have limited influence in governance. Their weak representation and lack of official recognition restricted access to market resources such as credit and business training.

This scenario persisted until 2020, when Mabibo Market gradually evolved to a more well-structured hybrid governance system. Although the modality of participation remained the same, participants reported that informal networks, including relationships with leaders and senior traders, continued to influence access to opportunities and decision-making processes. One trader explained: “Some traders could gain access to prime stall locations or protection from certain rules due to their close relationships with leaders or even municipal officials” (INT 22, Trader). Actors outside these networks had a limited voice and struggled to navigate market rules. Since stall allocation was initially managed by traders before the municipal oversight, many gained de facto ownership of their spaces, leaving much of the market under association control. Even after the formalization, our findings show that about 40% of stalls were privately owned. Moreover, market leaders and traders reported frequent trader mobility, with some traders leaving or subleasing their stalls as a source of income.

During the municipal-led phase (2022–2025), participation was formalized through meetings, trainings, and sensitization programs organized by government and non-governmental actors. These initiatives aimed to educate traders on disease prevention, business development, market regulations, and financial assistance. However, traders reported limited access and low understanding of these resources, thus reducing their ability to benefit from them. Participation remained shaped by inequalities linked to trading experience, business size, and social connections with association leaders. For example, traders with limited experience or weaker networks continued to face barriers to representation and decision-making. Participation in high-profile platforms was also not easily accessible to marginalized traders. Most of these gatherings were frequently held in hotels, office boardrooms, or even outside the country. Consequently, although participatory spaces formally exist, their reach remains limited and often excludes the traders they are intended to serve.

Among 60 interviewed traders, approximately 70% expressed that their voices were underrepresented in leadership selection processes. In these discussions, one of the traders had to say this: “Usually, the election processes consist of manoeuvring activities from the UMC. There is a tendency to disqualify candidates who were formerly proposed by traders if their priorities may not align with the municipal goals, even if they might reflect broader concerns” (INT 18, Trader). Some traders perceived that, in such cases, municipal officials supported alternative candidates, thereby reducing traders’ influence over leadership-selection processes.

Based on the composition and examination of the six trader association leadership committees, nearly 90% of 36 leadership positions were occupied by men. Women reported receiving limited support from their networks during election periods compared to men, who were perceived as more influential, experienced, and resilient in addressing daily market challenges. Regarding market rulemaking, traders and their leaders were neither consulted during the formulation of market rules nor involved in determining enforcement procedures. However, trader associations retained autonomy in developing bylaws for their cooperatives. This autonomy was further complemented by efforts from association leaders to create participatory spaces for members to engage in daily activities and other cooperative-related matters.

4.4 Structural and operational challenges in hybrid governance

The findings revealed five interconnected challenges in the hybrid governance of Mabibo Market, broadly related to institutional tensions, resource limitations, governance capacity constraints, and the persistence of informal arrangements.

Persistent tensions exist between the Ubungo Municipal Council (UMC) and trader associations, relating to policy inconsistencies, weak enforcement, and overlapping responsibilities that created friction rather than coordination. One trader explained: “The municipal office wants us to move from the spaces we created on our own. They say they are in charge of controlling everything, but we already had our own settlement here even before they came” (INT 14, Trader). These issues often lead to confusion on whose directives to follow, with joint decisions later contested or reversed by either side.

Despite the existence of market rules, most traders were unfamiliar with them, leading to disputes and unequal access to resources. Several participants reported perceived instances of corruption and favouritism in access to stalls, loans, and training. Although informal networks were widely recognized by the UMC, they continued to shape access to market opportunities such as loans, space allocation, and training. While these networks often served as effective dispute-resolution mechanisms, they also reinforced mistrust and weakened institutional legitimacy.

Hybrid governance arrangements at Mabibo further created confusion over the management of stalls. Some were owned by traders, while others by UMC. For example, several groups of traders tend to sub-rent their stalls to others, an informal practice which, though officially prohibited, it was still conventional. These challenges affected the chains of service delivery and made it difficult for the UMC to identify legitimate occupants or enforce rules consistently. The municipal officers acknowledged these matters by educating traders about regulations and admitted that frequent trader mobility further undermines compliance and market stability.

The transition to hybrid governance at Mabibo Market has also been accompanied by significant resource constraints. Several problems, such as shortages of administrative staff, office space, and essential equipment, hindered routine market management and oversight. Additionally, funding gaps affected infrastructural maintenance and monitoring efforts across the market. As one market leader stated: “When a new trader wants to join, they can only get space when another trader leaves, dies, or goes bankrupt. These issues make entry difficult and limit government income” (INT 8, Market Leader).

The majority of traders (around 70%) have low levels of formal education, and many inherited their businesses without formal training. They remain insufficient to support business management or compliance with regulations. Physical infrastructure also remains inadequate in the market. For instance, stalls and tables are too small, sanitation is poor, and flooding during the rainy season disrupts the trading activities. Traders rely on porters to fetch their commodities during floods, as these matters reinforce informal arrangements and trust-based transactions. In addition, weak waste management systems, limited storage, and persistent resistance to perceived unfair regulations further constrain governance effectiveness.

5 Discussion

The findings demonstrate an evolving landscape of power dynamics, participation, and hybrid governance that resonates with other food markets in the Global South, including East Africa. This section discusses how power operates across multiple forms, spaces, and levels, shaping participation among market actors. It also examines how hybrid governance can enable and constrain participation, reproduce inequalities, and provide implications for more inclusive and accountable food governance. A key finding is that power in hybrid governance settings is not simply distributed among actors, but it is continuously negotiated, shifting, and reproduced across spaces and relationships over time.

5.1 Negotiating power in Mabibo Market

As stipulated in Gaventa’s Power Cube (Gaventa, 2006), “power is not a static possession but a process unfolding across visible, hidden, and invisible forms.” Visible power was identified through formal decision-making channels, regulations, and enforcement practices, including municipal bylaws, stall allocation procedures, and fee collection. Hidden power emerged through agenda-setting processes, exclusion from decision-making, and informal mechanisms such as patronage, favouritism, and personal connections influencing resource access and dispute resolution. Invisible power was reflected in norms, expectations, and perceptions that constrained meaningful participation, particularly among less experienced, new, or marginalized traders.

Forms of power in African food markets are shaped through negotiation and everyday bargaining among actors (Wegerif and Kissoly, 2022). This is evident in rapidly urbanizing cities such as Dar es Salaam, where power relations persist despite formal divisions of authority between municipal councils and trader associations. Government authorities retain decision-making influence, while traders manage their activities through associations. This hybrid system produces interdependence as informal practices coexist with official regulations. Similar dynamics have been documented in Ibadan, Nigeria, where informal networks mediate formal authority and produce contested governance systems (Adeosun et al., 2023).

The historical evolution of Mabibo Market contextualizes these power negotiations. During the early informal phase, authority was mainly embedded in self-organized trader leadership structures. As the market expanded and formal authorities became involved, visible power emerged at local and national levels, while traders retained relational influence over everyday trading practices. During the transition to hybrid governance, municipal officers exercised visible power, while associations maintained hidden power through their networks. This demonstrates that governance outcomes are not determined by the state alone but emerge through negotiations among multiple actors (Wegerif and Hebinck, 2016).

Since the establishment of UMC intervention in 2015, municipal officers have exercised visible power through market oversight and regulatory functions. These activities occurred mainly within invited spaces, particularly scheduled meetings where municipal priorities were established. At the same time, traders who secured stalls before formalization retained influence over these spaces. This illustrates how pre-existing informal power intersects with newly formalized authority within hybrid governance arrangements. Although hybrid governance structure is observed to be entirely top-down, municipal authority alone does not determine outcomes. The presence of informal arrangements still has an influence on structuring access to resources and reinforcing inequalities even within a formally regulated system. This pattern corresponds with Tang’s research on Urban China (Tang, 2023). He noticed that in intermediate governance spaces, both bottom-up and top-down governance structures can coexist, with informal practices shaping resource access and sustaining uneven outcomes, despite formal governance arrangements in hybrid authoritarian contexts.

We further discovered that trader associations are organized according to their commodity lines. They retain substantial agency and act as a bridge between traders and municipal authorities. Apart from their primary activities, their role puts them within both visible and hidden spaces of power. Their informal influence formed within social networks and their trust-based arrangements intersect with the formal channels of making decisions within a hybrid governance structure. Thus, participants’ accounts suggest that trader associations exercise hidden power by influencing whose concerns are represented and who gains access to opportunities within their networks. The same is observed in Southern Germany by Baldy and Kruse (2019): traders who lack social connections in this kind of setting may struggle to navigate informal power networks and are likely to be vulnerable to systematic exclusion and uneven access to market resources. Moreover, these associations exercise their hidden power through patronage, trust-based networks, and resolving conflicts among their members, especially before such cases are presented to the UMC office.

Power negotiation is also mediated by spatial considerations. Market actors exercise power by everyday practices that influence flows of goods and regulate economic interactions, instead of formal governance channels alone. For example, brokers and porters play an important role in controlling market logistics and facilitating transactions even though they are not formally recognized as part of governance. Traders often expand stall boundaries or even conduct businesses in areas that are not formally designated for supporting trading activities. Through “quiet encroachment” (Bayat, 2000), traders informally reclaim spaces in and around the market and assert their economic presence, although this challenges trading regulations set by the municipal authorities. In other African cities like Cairo in Egypt and Oran in Algeria, Bouhali (2018) reports similar claims that traders negotiate their presence in public spaces, leveraging weakened urban authorities to assert their economic influence.

Invisible power also operates on trader associations. They internalize norms of cooperation, traditions, and expectations that shape market behaviour without explicit enforcement of visible authority. Members, specifically traders, comply with rules set within their cooperatives; they tend to rely on trust-based networks and use informal ways for resolving conflicts. As elucidated by Gaventa (2019), this kind of internalization shapes their practices and expectations, gives authority to their leaders, and assists them to know the right way to legitimate behaviour. It also reveals how hybrid governance structures accommodate informal actors whose power affects market efficiency, access to key resources, and other opportunities.

Although collaboration is common in the joint management of the food markets in Eastern Africa, tensions emerge over stall allocation, sudden changes to fees, or the perception of favouritism (Wegerif and Kissoly, 2022). These conflicts show the contested nature of authority and the capacity of hidden forms of power that limit the full control of formal authority. Trader associations and market committees are crucial and the closest part of the recognized civil society to the actors that make up food markets (Lindell, 2008). Yet they often face internal struggles over representation, class, and ethnicity, which constrain inclusive participation.

When municipal officers introduce changes, such as new fee structures, association leaders face challenges balancing municipal expectations with traders’ interests. These tensions reflect Gaventa’s concept of hidden power, where procedures and structures influence whose interests shape decisions. Similar patterns have been observed in Kenya and Mozambique, where participation in food markets often supports policy implementation rather than shared decision-making (Blakeley, 2005; Lindell, 2008; Allen, 2004).

Table 2. Changing dynamics of participation and representation in Mabibo market.

5.2 Spaces of participation in hybrid governance

Spaces of participation (closed, invited, and claimed) were examined based on who accessed decision-making, how decisions were made, and the influence different actors exercised. In Gaventa’s Power Cube framework (2006, 2009), closed spaces refer to decisions controlled by limited actors, invited spaces involve formal participation opportunities, and claimed spaces emerge when actors create alternative avenues to negotiate power or access resources.

The nature and extent of trader participation and representation evolved unevenly over time. During the initial period of trader self-organization, participation was limited to the members of committees and decisions relied on invisible and hidden forms of power. Key decisions were made within closed, claimed spaces, giving little opportunity for traders to influence outcomes. The evolution of participation and representation across the different phases is summarized in Table 2. In the textile-led facilitation phase (2010–2015), our reflection reveals that informal consultation with Urafiki Textile created invited spaces. However, due to significant hidden power, the agency to make key decisions remained with the landowner and the association leadership. Hidden power was also exercised through behind-the-scenes negotiations, while invisible power continued to limit participation, specifically for traders. Most traders were forced to perceive these structures as legitimate, as they could not go against them.

Jongh (2020) corroborates that trader associations often arise as a “tool” for traders to protect themselves against hostile regulatory environments. Drawing on evidence from urban Zambia, he shows that trader associations are crucial in organizing traders to establish and defend their legal rights, create channels for representation, raise their collective effort, and build leadership through member empowerment. Even though these associations can be useful in raising trader concerns, they can also reproduce internal hierarchies that restrict wider participation. As for the case in Mabibo Market, although the extent of participation among actors seemed to expand over time, it remained highly selective for some individuals, especially leaders of associations.

Hybrid governance introduced formal participation through meetings, consultations, and training sessions. These represent invited spaces within Gaventa’s framework (Gaventa, 2006, 2019). However, participation remained uneven, as traders with stronger networks or historical ownership of stalls had greater influence. Traders with temporary stalls or limited recognition faced barriers to accessing these spaces, showing how hidden and invisible power shapes participation. Informal channels, including broker relationships and cooperatives, also created claimed spaces of participation. These networks enabled traders to access resources, resolve conflicts, and influence market processes. This corresponds with Adeosun et al. (2023) from Nigeria, who highlight trust as a key element in informal networks that support cooperation.

Across all governance phases, gender disparity has been a critical problem. A majority of association leaders are men, leaving women behind in elections and decision making. This situation shows both hidden power (male leaders controlling candidate selection) and invisible power (internalized norms that men are “natural” leaders). These gendered norms shape perceptions of legitimate leadership, discouraging women from seeking leadership positions and limiting their influence even where formal opportunities for participation exist. Similar patterns are reported in other African contexts, including in Uganda, and Mozambique where in most public food markets, leaders of trader associations are made up of men who serve for indefinite periods and derive their influence from being able to talk the language that government and NGOs want to hear, and not the entire trading community (Lindell, 2008; Wegerif and Wiskerke, 2017). In this scenario, women are underrepresented in both formal and informal decision-making, proving that participation is shaped by relational networks and socially embedded power.

Training and sensitization programs on important issues such as disease prevention, market regulations, and business development have created an additional layer of invited spaces. Despite that, their access is often selective for traders to participate meaningfully. From the data, we learnt that participation was geared towards traders with higher literacy, stronger social networks, or historical connections, often excluding newcomers and those with limited education. With this observation, invisible power continues to shape perceptions: many traders accepted their exclusion from professional training, reinforcing inequalities in skills and knowledge. This made traders face more challenges in expanding their businesses.

Some administrative procedures limit meaningful participation in hybrid governance, as municipal officers typically oversee elections and determine eligibility criteria, thereby shaping formally invited spaces in line with governance priorities. However, participants’ perceptions of selective candidate selection and preferential treatment of certain traders indicate the possible operation of hidden power within these processes. Invisible power further reinforces exclusion, as traders internalize norms regarding who is considered capable or legitimate for leadership positions. As a result, newcomers, women, and other marginalized traders may self-exclude by accepting these limitations as “normal.” This reveals that participation in formal channels alone is insufficient to ensure equitable representation. Instead, the interaction of visible, hidden, and invisible forms of power with administrative procedures reproduces existing power asymmetries. This dynamic constrains the voices and influence of certain groups by revealing how subtle social and cultural norms shape who participates in decision-making and whose interests are represented.

6 Conclusion

This study investigated the dynamics of hybrid food governance, power relations, and participation among actors at Mabibo Market in Dar es Salaam. The findings show that tensions and negotiations between state authorities and trader associations continue to shape hybrid governance in urban food markets across many African countries. This interaction determines who participates, who benefits, and how power and resources are distributed. As such, this study contributes to the growing discourse on food governance in East Africa and other regions where hybrid governance structures operate in similar ways. It highlights the importance of clearer institutional coordination between municipal authorities and trader associations, meaningful participation beyond procedural consultation, and gender-sensitive market governance. It also proposes four key strategies to strengthen hybrid food governance, promote meaningful participation, and support more equitable resource allocation.

First, institutional coordination, clarity, and power relations require greater attention. This study shows that tensions between municipal departments and trader associations often create conflicts and governance inefficiencies. Strengthening coordination through a joint institutional framework involving government departments, NGOs, and trader associations would improve accountability, collaboration, and legitimacy while reducing institutional ambiguity. Second, inclusive participation remains a persistent challenge. Food governance must move beyond participation in action. Expanding participatory channels through rotational leadership within trader associations could strengthen inclusiveness and representation. Although food policy forums exist to promote awareness and participation, they have had limited success in East Africa in producing agreements that translate into action. Bringing these forums into market spaces through on-site meetings would allow entry-level and marginalized traders to participate more meaningfully. Third, gender inequalities continue to constrain participation. These inequalities reflect broader structural hierarchies within the political economy of food systems, where patriarchal norms and unequal access to leadership persist. This study therefore calls for gender-sensitive governance, including gender quotas or reserved leadership positions for women in food markets. Stronger collaboration among governments, NGOs, and trader associations to promote women’s empowerment would enhance fairness and representation in food governance.

Finally, operational and infrastructural constraints continue to undermine market efficiency at Mabibo Market. These challenges include budget constraints, inadequate trading space, poor sanitation, flooding, weak waste management, and limited administrative capacity. This study therefore advocates for greater transparency, accountability, and inclusive planning in future market improvements. Governments, policymakers, and NGOs should ensure that traders are actively involved throughout infrastructure planning and implementation processes. Such involvement can help ensure that interventions respond to actual market needs and improve the effective use of market facilities.

There remains a significant empirical gap in research on hybrid food governance in East Africa. Comparative studies across markets and countries could deepen understanding of the historical and institutional factors shaping power relations, participation, and governance outcomes. Future research should also examine how hybrid governance arrangements influence equity, accountability, and efficiency in food systems, while longitudinal studies could reveal how these relationships evolve over time. Although this research is based on a single case study, its context-specific nature limits the extent to which findings can be generalized across other food markets. However, it provides important insights into hybrid governance structures, actor negotiations, and participation dynamics at Mabibo Market. The findings offer analytical lessons that may be relevant to similar urban food markets with comparable governance arrangements in African contexts. Ultimately, this study calls for interventions that move beyond top-down regulatory approaches towards more inclusive food governance. Reforms should recognize, support, and integrate the informal institutions and practices that traders rely on to organize their businesses and negotiate power. Strengthening these locally grounded systems may provide a pathway towards more equitable food governance in rapidly urbanizing contexts.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Ziad Mouhanna, Arab International University, Syria

Reviewed by: Stephen Nyaki, University of the Free State, South Africa

Lucy Khofi, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Footnotes

Currency conversations are based on the average 2025 exchange rates of 1 USD equivalent to 2,456 Tsh.