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Frontiers in Social Psychology ·

Volume 4 - 2026 | https://doi.org/10.3389/frsps.2026.1704627

Authoritarianism in response to threat is possible among the left but more prevalent among the right: a critique of the LWA literature

  • Conrad Baldner1*corresponding author
  • Giammaria Trimarco1
  • Ginevra Maltese1
  • Riccardo Rocchi1
  • Sofia Sorvillo1
  • Parya Mojtahedzadeh1
  1. Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
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Abstract

There has been a recent surge of interest in left-wing authoritarianism. This new wave has found that LWA is just as prevalent as the more commonly-studied RWA. Following (Nilsson 2024) critique of the LWA literature and (Osborne et al. 2023) suggestion to study threat and authoritarianism across the political spectrum, we conducted secondary data analyses on the interaction between political orientation and different types of threat and the desire for a more authoritarian leader. Two cross-sectional samples were collected in Italy in 2022 (N = 1159) and 2023 (N = 1668). In both samples, participants were asked their perceived need for a more authoritarian leader and their perceived personal, physical, and economic threat towards two potentially threatening events: The COVID pandemic and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. We found that (1) a left-wing political orientation was associated with a desire for a more authoritarian leader with reference to the Russian Invasion in the 2023 data; a right-wing political orientation was associated with this desire in the other cases; (2) the effect of threat depended on the larger context; (3) there was little difference in the above relationship across political orientation. Although we found no evidence that LWA is a prevalent as RWA, the relationship between threat and authoritarianism likely depends on the nature of the threats and the perceived capability of an authoritarian leader to resolve these threats. Pre-registered hypotheses, data, and R code are available at https://osf.io/65hrc.

Keywords

1 Introduction

The concept of left-wing authoritarianism, or LWA, has been heavily debated over the past 70 years. While authoritarianism has been extensively studied among the political right (e.g., as right-wing authoritarianism or RWA, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), there is a debate as to whether it is prevalent among individuals on the political left. Following (Nilsson 2024) critique of the LWA literature and (Osborne et al. 2023) suggestion to study the relationship between threat and authoritarianism across a broader political spectrum, we assessed (1) if the desire for a more authoritarian leader was associated with left-right political orientation, (2) if different types of political threat were associated with the desire for a more authoritarian leader, and (2) if the strength of political threat on the desire for a more authoritarian leader differed among left- and right-wingers.

The structure of the work is as follows: First, we briefly summarize the history of the psychology of authoritarianism, highlighting that it originally focused on the fascist, or antidemocratic, tendency. Second, we show that examples of the recent LWA literature are not consistent with the original emphasis on the fascist/antidemocratic tendency and instead fails to clearly distinguish authoritarianism from political ideology. Third, we suggest that authoritarianism among both left- and right-wing individuals could be studied by assessing the relationships between perceived threat and the desire for a more authoritarian leader across the political spectrum. Fourth, we present pre-registered exploratory analyses from two datasets in which the desire for a more authoritarian leader by left- and right-wingers depended on the political context and type of threat, but that it was generally more prevalent among right-wingers.

1.1 A (very) brief history of authoritarianism from the political right to the left

Western media commentators have recently observed a rise in authoritarian rhetoric and governments in the US and Europe (Benson, 2025; Wolf et al., 2025), especially in right-wing governments. This worry was shared by (Adorno et al. 1950) and subsequently studied in their classic work on the authoritarian personality. As they focused on potentially fascist or antidemocratic individuals, their work studied authoritarianism as a right-wing phenomenon. This focus on the political right was attacked almost immediately by (Shils 1954), who criticized this approach for ignoring authoritarianism among the political left. This could be thought of as the birth of the idea of left-wing authoritarianism.

The interest in the LWA continued for roughly the next 25 years. (Rokeach 1956, 1960) work on the dogmatism scale found high scores across the political spectrum, and (Eysenck and Coulter 1972) found that both communists and fascists scored high on the fascist/antidemocratic tendency. However, (Stone 1980), in a review of the literature, concluded that although authoritarianism was observable among left-leaning individuals, there was no evidence that it was equally present among both the left and the right. Although there were some later attempts to study LWA (Altemeyer, 1996; Van Hiel et al., 2006), interest only resurged after (Conway et al. 2018) introduced their own LWA scale.

In contrast to (Stone 1980); (Conway et al. 2018) argued that authoritarian tendencies were as common among left-wingers as among right-wingers. Subsequent work has followed this trend. For instance, (Costello et al. 2022) found that LWA is associated with approval for behavioral aggression and political violence. More recent work (Deverson et al., 2025; Ferguson, 2025) has found connections between LWA and acceptance of left-leaning ideologies, in particular Critical Race Theory, which posits racial oppression as central to social structure, and Critical Social Justice, a left-leaning ideology that criticizes established power structures. Furthermore, (Conway III et al. 2023) have argued, on the base of their own LWA scale (Conway et al., 2018) that the LWA is more reality than myth.

The research that followed (Conway et al. 2018) was criticized by (Nilsson 2024), who emphasized that early authoritarianism researchers did not deny the existence of LWA, but rather questioned its frequency. As he pointed out, despite (Conway et al. 2018) claim that (Stone 1980) argued that LWA is a myth, Stone instead clearly argued that LWA is possible but not prevalent. Similarly, (Conway et al. 2018) cited Altemeyer (1996, p. 217) question: “Is “authoritarianism on the left” like the Loch Ness monster: an occasional shadow, but no monster?” as evidence of the dismissive attitude toward the LWA (e.g., as the Loch Ness monster of social psychology). However, it is likewise clear that Altemeyer was doubting the prevalence, not existence, of LWA.

1.2 Current LWA measures include a focus on normative political beliefs, not just fascist and antidemocratic tendencies

(Nilsson 2024) further argued that antidemocratic tendencies should be studied among both left-and right-wingers but that current LWA measures conflate political ideologies with antidemocratic predispositions. Indeed, (Costello et al. 2022) specifically claimed that they intermixed antidemocratic attitudes and left-wing ideology when developing their own LWA scale, given that the RWA scales in use mixed antidemocratic attitudes with right-wing ideology. Our interest began examining items from existing LWA measures. We observed that many items were indistinguishable from conventional left-wing ideological statements. Alongside items that could arguably be seen as authoritarian (“we must line up behind strong leaders who have the will to stamp out prejudice and intolerance;” Costello et al., 2022), there are items that reflect normative left-wing values, for instance “schools should be required by law to teach children about our country's history of racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia” (Costello et al., 2022) and “it's always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in science with respect to issues like global warming and evolution than to listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubts in people's minds” (Conway et al., 2018).

Insofar as such items are used to assess LWA, it should not be a surprise that it is associated with acceptance of the aforementioned Critical Race Theory (Ferguson, 2025) and Critical Social Justice (Deverson et al., 2025). The inclusion of items that assess normative political ideology in scales of authoritarianism is problematic as individuals can endorse, for instance, trust in science without having antidemocratic or fascist tendencies. The use of these scales can give an inaccurate assessment of antidemocratic predispositions and tendencies among left-wingers.

1.3 The potential role of threat in the desire for an authoritarian leader across the political spectrum

How are we to assess authoritarianism among the left without using modern LWA measures? As (Osborne et al. 2023) recently summarized, perceived threat has a strong relationship with authoritarianism. Moreover, they suggested that (1) threat-based approaches may offer a more ideologically neutral way to study authoritarian tendencies, and (2) that threat should be studied with regards to the LWA, in addition to the existing literature on the RWA. This view on threat is consistent with a long tradition of research showing that authoritarian attitudes often emerge in response to perceived danger or social instability: political crisis, economic decline, rising crime, terrorism, and so on (Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt and Fisher, 2003). This literature is consistent with (Stenner 2005) authoritarian dynamic, whereby latent authoritarian predispositions become activated when people perceive normative or societal threat and with (Kay et al. 2008, 2009) compensatory control theory, which proposes that individuals support external sources of order, including hierarchical institutions or powerful leaders, when they experience a loss of personal control. Although left- and right-wingers can perceive different targets as threatening, threat defined in relatively non-ideological terms can offer a conceptually grounded and ideologically neutral way to examine the desire for authoritarian leadership. This approach avoids the ideological confounds present in current LWA scales, aligns with the broad literature on threat and authoritarianism, and allows us to test whether left- and right-wingers react similarly to threat.

1.4 Research questions and analysis plan

We tested the general hypotheses that (H1) threat would be positively associated with the preference for a more authoritarian leader and (H2) a right-wing political orientation would be positively associated with the preference for a more authoritarian leader. We also explored if H1 was equally strong across both left- and right-wing participants. Three possibilities were considered: (1) that left- and right-wingers would be equally susceptible to perceived threat, (2) that left-wingers would be more susceptible, or (3) that right-wingers would be more susceptible.

2 Methods

We tested these hypotheses using two large cross-sectional samples collected online in Italy in 2022 and 2023, as a part of a larger project on the psychological basis of political beliefs, on which we conducted secondary analyses. Each dataset assessed the desire for a more authoritarian leader under two threatening contexts (the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine), and measured perceived personal, physical, and economic threats associated with each context. None of these threats are likely to be confounded with political ideology.

Each dataset included single items for the need for a more authoritarian leader and for each type of threat. We made the a priori decision to conduct analyses at the level of these individual items. In other words, we did not aggregate these items into scales. We made this decision in order to observe the effects of each individual type of threat in each individual context. All items were presented in the Italian language and were identical across the 2022 and 2023 datasets. Analyses were conducted with the R statistical program (R Core Team, 2023) along with the dplyr (Wickham et al., 2023), emmeans (Lenth, 2025), estimatr (Blair et al., 2025), and ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016) packages. We used heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors according to the Huber-White method. All results were interpreted with regard to our pre-registered alpha levels (2022: α = 0.01; 2023: α = 0.05). Pre-registered hypotheses, data, and R code are available at https://osf.io/65hrc. Extended information about demographic and substantive variables is available on Supplementary Table 1.

2.1 The 2022 dataset: demographics and context

The 2022 dataset was collected between April and May of 2022. The dataset consisted of 1,668 participants [53.4% women, 46.6% men; M*age* (SD*age*) = 32.9 (14.1)] who completed all measures. For the purposes of including gender as a covariate in regression analyses, 11 participants who entered their gender as “other” were removed. Mean political orientation on a left-right scale from 1 to 7 was 3.42 (SD = 1.31). A pre-registered power analysis (α = 0.01; power = 95%) indicated sufficient sensitivity to detect a small effect (r = 0.119).

By 2 April 2022 (i.e., approximately when the 2022 data collection began), Italy recorded 246,890.55 confirmed COVID-19 cases per million people (World Health Organization, 2025a). Starting in April 2022 the government gradually lifted major public health restrictions (EuroHealth Observatory, 2023). In an opinion poll conducted among Italians in January 2022 (Ipsos, 2022a), 38% responded that Italy was at the apex of the emergency whereas 16% responded that the worst was yet to come and 27% responded that the worst had passed. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion, launched on February 24th, had resulted in approximately 1,800 civilian deaths in the April to June period, following more than 4,000 civilian deaths in March (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2023). In an opinion poll conducted among Italians in March 2022 (Ipsos, 2022b), 50% of respondents reported to be very concerned (with 94% being very or somewhat concerned); 53% of respondents expected many economic repercussions (with 95% of respondents expecting many or some economic repercussions).

2.2 The 2023 dataset: demographics and context

The 2023 dataset was collected between April and June of 2023. The dataset consisted of 1,159 participants who completed all measures [55% women, 46% men; M*age* (SD*age*) = 33.5 (14.8)]. For the purposes of including gender as a covariate in regression analyses, 6 participants who entered their gender as “other” were removed. Mean political orientation on a left-right scale from 1 to 7 was 3.47 (SD=1.34). A pre-registered power analysis (α = 0.05; power = 95%) indicated sensitivity to detect a small effect size, equivalent to r = 0.105.

By 8 April 2023 (i.e., approximately when the 2023 data collection began), Italy recorded 431,278.22 confirmed COVID-19 cases per million people (World Health Organization, 2025b). In an opinion poll conducted among Italians in January 2023 (Ipsos, 2023a), 11% responded that Italy was at the apex of the emergency whereas 6% responded that the worst was yet to come and 65% responded that the worst had passed. This represents a notable reduction in perceived threat from the January 2022 opinion data. In the context of Ukraine, by this period the Russian invasion had slowed, with limited territorial advances and with a slow decrease in civilian deaths (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2023). However, Italians remained worried about the conflict, albeit at a reduced level relative to 2022: 29% of respondents in a February 2023 poll (Ipsos, 2023b) reported being very worried about the conflict (with 77% of respondents being at least somewhat worried).

2.3 Measures

Political Orientation was assessed via an item with a scale from 1 (Strongly Left) to 7 (Strongly Right). All other variables were measured on a scale from 1 (Totally disagree) to 7 (Totally agree). Each question was asked twice: once for the COVID pandemic and once for the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.

2.3.1 Desire for an authoritarian leader

Participants were asked “In the context of the pandemic (Invasion), Italy needs a more authoritarian leader.” With regard to the responses in the COVID context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 3.96 (SD = 1.77). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 3.49 (SD = 1.71). With regard to the responses in the Invasion context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 3.91 (SD = 1.77). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 4.08 (SD = 1.78).

2.3.2 Personal threat

Participants were asked “Indicate how much you feel threatened: personally threatened.” With regard to the responses in the COVID context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 3.51 (SD = 1.83). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 4.49 (SD = 1.85). With regard to the responses in the Invasion context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 3.89 (SD = 1.72). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 3.53 (SD = 1.67).

2.3.3 Physical threat

Participants were asked “Indicate how much you feel threatened: physically threatened.” With regard to the responses in the COVID context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 3.35 (SD = 1.82). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 4.25 (SD = 1.91). With regard to the responses in the Invasion context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 3.31 (SD = 1.76). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 2.91 (SD = 1.57).

2.3.4 Economic threat

Participants were asked “Indicate how much you feel threatened: economically threatened.” With regard to the responses in the COVID context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 4.69 (SD = 1.77). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 4.51 (SD = 1.90). With regard to the responses in the Invasion context, the mean in the 2022 dataset was 5.31 (SD = 1.54). The mean in the 2023 dataset was 4.71 (SD = 1.68).

3 Results and discussion

3.1 Correlational results

Bivariate correlations, including demographic variables (age, gender, SES, education level) are reported on Supplementary Table 2. Political orientation showed small-to-moderate positive correlations with the need for a more authoritarian leader in both 2022 contexts and in the 2023 COVID context (rs range from.230 to.307), indicating a stronger preference as political orientation moves toward the right in these contexts. However, there was a small, negative correlation between political orientation and the need for a more authoritarian leader in the Invasion context in the 2023 data (r = −0.133), indicating a stronger preference as political orientation moves toward the left. Overall, left-wingers were more likely to perceive the Russian Invasion as a threat in 2023, while right-wingers perceived greater threat in other contexts, indicating that perceived threats changed over time. The correlations between each type of threat with the desire for a more authoritarian leader were fairly small in both 2022 contexts (rs range from 0.151 to 0.217) and in the 2023 invasion context (rs range from 0.124 to 0.161). However, they were slightly smaller in the 2023 data for the COVID context (rs range from 0.061 to 0.183). There were few significant correlations involving the demographic variables. Of note, however, SES was negatively related to economic threat in both context and both datasets (rs range from −0.115 to −0.206).

3.2 Multiple regression results

Multiple moderated regressions are presented on Table 1 (2022 Dataset) and Table 2 (2023 Dataset). Tables 1, 2 present the analyses as they were pre-registered, albeit after removing participants who indicated an “other” gender (Model 1) as well as the analyses controlling for age, gender, SES, and education level, as suggested by a reviewer (Model 2). Figures 1, 2 illustrate the results from Model 2. Our original analyses without covariates but with all participants are available on Supplementary Table 3. Spotlight analyses (i.e., conditional effects) are available on Supplementary Table 4.

Table 1. Predictors of Need for an Authoritarian leader in the COVID and Invasion contexts, 2022 data.

2022
Personal ThreatPhysical ThreatEconomic Threat
*b**se**p**b**se**p**b**se**p*
Need for an Authoritarian Leader in the COVID context
Model 1
P.O.0.2920.032< 0.0010.2960.032< 0.0010.2950.032< 0.001
Threat0.2410.023< 0.0010.2260.023< 0.0010.1770.025< 0.001
P.O. x Threat−0.0510.0180.004−0.0530.0170.002−0.0430.0190.024
Model 2
Age0.0060.0030.0440.0070.0030.0230.0090.0030.004
Gender0.2280.0810.0050.2250.0820.0060.2860.082< 0.001
SES−0.1290.0500.010−0.1450.0500.003−0.0910.0520.080
Education−0.1350.0460.003−0.1330.0460.004−0.1290.0470.006
P.O.0.4500.068< 0.0010.4620.065< 0.0010.4910.098< 0.001
Threat0.3960.066< 0.0010.3990.065< 0.0010.3210.068< 0.001
P.O. x Threat−0.0480.0170.006−0.0530.0170.002−0.0440.0190.020
Need for an Authoritarian Leader in the Invasion context
Model 1
P.O.0.3020.034< 0.0010.2980.034< 0.0010.2920.034< 0.001
Threat0.1540.026< 0.0010.1640.025< 0.0010.1850.028< 0.001
P.O. x Threat−0.0070.0200.706−0.0270.0200.1770.0160.0240.506
Model 2
Age0.0090.0030.0040.0090.0030.0030.0100.0030.001
Gender0.2100.0840.0120.2060.0830.0130.1920.0840.022
SES−0.1850.052< 0.001−0.1930.051< 0.001−0.1680.0520.001
Education−0.1780.047< 0.001−0.1610.047< 0.001−0.1750.047< 0.001
P.O.0.3220.088< 0.0010.3630.076< 0.0010.1810.1430.206
Threat0.1830.0740.0140.2410.0730.0010.1190.0880.178
P.O. x Threat−0.0100.0200.615−0.0250.0200.2160.0160.0250.502

Italicized effects reached significance according to a priori alpha levels; Gender (1 = man; 2 = woman). PO, Political Orientation; SES, Socio-economic Status.

Table 2. Predictors of need for an authoritarian leader in the COVID and invasion contexts, 2023 data.

2023
Personal ThreatPhysical ThreatEconomic Threat
*b**se**p**b**se**p**b**se**p*
Need for an Authoritarian Leader in the COVID context
Model 1
P.O.0.3830.038< 0.0010.3840.038< 0.0010.3690.038< 0.001
Threat0.0520.0280.0670.0550.0260.0390.1480.026< 0.001
P.O. x Threat0.0010.0210.947−0.0270.0190.166−0.0080.0190.676
Model 2
Age0.0010.0030.6340.0010.0030.7270.0030.0030.362
Gender−0.0160.0980.870−0.0140.0980.886−0.0240.0960.803
SES0.0330.0630.5980.0280.0630.6560.1090.0640.086
Education−0.0670.0560.225−0.0650.0560.241−0.0730.0540.175
P.O.0.3670.108< 0.0010.4920.095< 0.0010.3930.089< 0.001
Threat0.0460.0760.5420.1480.0710.0370.1880.0670.005
P.O. x Threat0.0020.0210.926−0.0260.0190.179−0.0080.0190.672
Need for an Authoritarian Leader in the Invasion context
Model 1
P.O.−0.1700.042< 0.001−0.1740.043< 0.001−0.1530.044< 0.001
Threat0.1510.034< 0.0010.1250.035< 0.0010.1350.034< 0.001
P.O. x Threat0.0240.0250.3560.0170.0280.5260.0230.0250.361
Model 2
Age0.0110.0030.0020.0110.0030.0010.0120.003< 0.001
Gender−0.0130.1030.893< -0.0010.1030.995−0.0060.1030.952
SES−0.0260.0710.710−0.0290.0710.684−0.0150.0710.832
Education0.0470.0570.4110.0520.0580.3700.0440.0580.446
P.O.−0.2700.1020.008−0.2310.0920.012−0.2750.1250.028
Threat0.0600.1000.5450.0700.1010.4870.0600.1000.543
P.O. x Threat0.0250.0260.3480.0150.0280.5720.0230.0260.376

Italicized effects reached significance according to a priori alpha levels; Gender (1 = man; 2 = woman). PO, Political Orientation; SES, Socio-economic Status.

Interactions between Political Orientation and Threat for the 2022 Dataset. Results from COVID context are on the upper row; results from the Invasion context are on the lower row. Center, Left, and Right groups were created by taking the mean of political orientation (Center), the mean minus 1 SD **(Left)**, and the mean plus 1 SD **(Right)**. Ribbons represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 1. Interactions between Political Orientation and Threat for the 2022 Dataset. Results from COVID context are on the upper row; results from the Invasion context are on the lower row. Center, Left, and Right groups were created by taking the mean of political orientation (Center), the mean minus 1 SD (Left), and the mean plus 1 SD (Right). Ribbons represent 95% confidence intervals.
Interactions between Political Orientation and Threat for the 2023 Dataset. Results from COVID context are on the upper row; results from the Invasion context are on the lower row. Center, Left, and Right groups were created by taking the mean of political orientation (Center), the mean minus 1 SD **(Left)**, and the mean plus 1 SD **(Right)**. Ribbons represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2. Interactions between Political Orientation and Threat for the 2023 Dataset. Results from COVID context are on the upper row; results from the Invasion context are on the lower row. Center, Left, and Right groups were created by taking the mean of political orientation (Center), the mean minus 1 SD (Left), and the mean plus 1 SD (Right). Ribbons represent 95% confidence intervals.

3.2.1 2022 data: COVID context

There were significant effects for political orientation such that the desire for a more authoritarian leader was more common as participants' political orientation moved toward the right (see top half of Table 1 and top row of Figure 1). Likewise, each type of threat was positively associated with this desire. Although the political orientations by threat interactions suggested that left-wingers were more sensitive to threat, the interactions only reached our a priori significance level (α = 0.01) in the cases of physical and personal threat. We observed R2 s of 0.133 (personal threat model), 0.127 (physical threat model), and 0.104 (economic threat model).

3.2.2 2022 data:invasion context

There were significant effects for political orientation, similar to the analyses of the 2022 COVID context (i.e., more desire for a more authoritarian leader as political orientation moved toward the right). We observed R2 s of 0.098 (personal threat model), 0.102 (physical threat model), and 0.102 (economic threat model). Results are displayed on the bottom half of Table 1 and the bottom row of Figure 1. However, only the effect of physical threat reached our a priori significance level (α = 0.01). Moreover, none of the political orientation by threat interactions were significant.

3.2.3 2023 data: COVID context

There were significant effects for political orientation, similar to the previous analyses (see top half of Table 2 and top row of Figure 2). We observed R2 s of 0.097 (personal threat model), 0.099 (physical threat model), and 0.124 (economic threat model). However, among the types of threat, only physical and economic threat reached our a priori level of significance (α=0.05). Moreover, none of the political orientation by threat interactions were significant. An inspection of Figure 2 likewise shows that individuals across the political spectrum showed higher levels of the desire for an authoritarian leader as they perceived more threat.

3.2.4 2023 data: invasion context

There were significant but negative effects for political orientation. In other words, unlike the previous analyses, participants also had more desire for a more authoritarian leader as political orientation moved toward the left (see top half of Table 1 and top row of Figure 1). We observed R2 s of 0.049 (personal threat model), 0.041 (physical threat model), and 0.048 (economic threat model); these were notably lower than in the previous analyses. Interestingly, there were no significant effects of any type of threat, nor were there any political orientation by threat interactions. In this case, the desire for an authoritarian leader seems to be divorced from any type of perceived threat.

4 General discussion

Although the notion of LWA is not new, scholarly interest has recently revived following (Conway et al. 2018) work; subsequent studies have linked LWA to endorsement of left-wing normative beliefs, such as social justice (Deverson et al., 2025; Ferguson, 2025). Consistent with (Nilsson 2024) critique, we argue that current LWA measures often blur the distinction between political ideology and antidemocratic attitudes, and that equivalent assessments should be applied to both sides of the political spectrum.

Following (Osborne et al. 2023) recommendation to examine perceived threat in relation to authoritarianism in both left- and right-wingers, we tested these relationships in two large Italian datasets collected in 2022 and 2023. These datasets included measures of personal, physical, and economic threat, as well as desire for authoritarian leadership across two contexts: the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. This approach captures authoritarian tendencies in the spirit of (Adorno et al. 1950) –that is, as antidemocratic predispositions–while avoiding potential ideological bias. Although we hypothesized that threat would be positively associated with a need for a more authoritarian leader (H1), and that right-wingers would show more desire for this type of leader (H2), we made no hypotheses regarding the relative strength of this need among left- and right-wingers.

Results regarding H1 were mixed. In the 2022 COVID context, each type of perceived threat was positively associated with the desire for a more authoritarian leader, regardless of political orientation. However, only physical threat showed a significant effect for the 2022 Invasion context. On the other hand, in the 2023 data, only physical and economic threat predicted the desire for an authoritarian leader in the COVID context. Surprisingly, there were no significant effects for threat in the 2023 Invasion context. Moreover, even significant effects were modest.

H2 received partial support. While right-wingers generally preferred more authoritarian leadership, left-wingers expressed higher authoritarian preferences in the 2023 Invasion context. This pattern may reflect differential threat perception across the political spectrum: right-wing participants, perhaps more supportive of Putin or skeptical of Western intervention, may have felt less threatened, whereas left-wing participants perceived the invasion as a greater menace. As this result was only present in the 2023 data; it is possible that the ongoing nature of the conflict was particularly worrisome to left-wingers. Finally, minor interaction effects indicated slightly stronger links between perceived threat and authoritarianism among left-wingers in the 2022 COVID data. However, overall, both groups exhibited similar responses. Nonetheless, we can preliminarily conclude that (1) a version of authoritarianism that is consistent with (Adorno et al. 1950) conception of the antidemocratic tendency is visible among the left but more prevalent among the right and (2) that threat is typically, but not always, associated with a greater desire for a more authoritarian leader.

5 Limitations

This research has several limitations that should be addressed in future work. Due to the cross-sectional and correlational nature of the data, we cannot rule out the possibility that authoritarianism influences individuals' threat perception. Moreover, although our samples were large by social psychological standards, they were not representative. Because we conducted secondary analyses, we could not choose the wording of items; it is possible that future studies could clarify the meaning of a “more authoritarian” leader (e.g., a very strong leader vs. one is who is explicitly antidemocratic). With regards to the measurement of threat, threats can be categorized as realistic (e.g., threats to resources) or symbolic (e.g., threats to worldviews and values) according to the Intergroup Threat Theory (see Stephan et al., 2015). Physical and economic threat are consistent with realistic threats whereas “personal threat” is fairly vague and ambiguous. We lacked a direct assessment of symbolic threat, which may also play a critical role. It is also possible that respondents may have downplayed their authoritarianism when the current political leader was from the other party as to not be seen as an implicit endorsement for them; however, while this may be true for the 2023 data, it is unlikely the case for the 2022 data, as the government in charge at the time of data collection was a coalition of all but one existent political parties.

6 Conclusions

Consistent with (Nilsson 2024) argument, we contend that current LWA scales conflate ideology with authoritarianism. Our results show that both left- and right-wing participants, when perceiving personal, physical, or economic threats, may express greater desire for more authoritarian leaders, suggesting that authoritarian tendencies can be contextually activated rather than ideologically bound. Although, contrary to (Conway et al. 2018), we did not find that authoritarianism to be equally prevalent among the left and right, whether left- or right-leaning individuals exhibit stronger authoritarian tendencies could depend on the specific nature of the perceived threat. Future research should examine which types of threat are believed to require authoritarian solutions, and whether these perceptions differ by ideological orientation.

The dynamic nature of threat and authoritarianism may be difficult to capture in generalized measures. A broader implication of these results is that a desire for authoritarian leadership may persist as long as the world is perceived as dangerous or unstable, and that this inclination is not confined to a single side of the political spectrum. Ultimately, addressing this dilemma may require reducing the underlying sense of threat itself, as strengthening democratic institutions alone might not be sufficient.

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Supplementary material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsps.2026.1704627/full#supplementary-material

Supplementary material Supplementary material at the source

Footnotes

Edited by: Richard P. Eibach, University of Waterloo, Canada

Reviewed by: Silvia Moscatelli, University of Bologna, Italy

José J. Pizarro, University of the Basque Country, Spain

Statements

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

Data availability

Publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. This data can be found here https://osf.io/65hrc/.

Ethics approval

Ethical approval was not required for the study involving humans in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent to participate in this study was not required from the participants or the participants' legal guardians/next of kin in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements.

Author contributions

CB: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – original draft. GT: Investigation, Writing – review & editing. GM: Investigation, Writing – review & editing. RR: Investigation, Writing – review & editing. SS: Investigation, Writing – review & editing. PM: Investigation, Writing – review & editing.

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Citation

Baldner, C., et al. (2026). Authoritarianism in response to threat is possible among the left but more prevalent among the right: a critique of the LWA literature. Frontiers in Social Psychology, Volume 4. https://doi.org/
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4 - 2026

Copyright

Copyright © 2026 Baldner, Trimarco, Maltese, Rocchi, Sorvillo and Mojtahedzadeh.

License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

*Correspondence: Conrad Baldner

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