Challenging the individual adversity paradigm: a shift toward a collective experiences model of worldviews and ideologies

1 Introduction

One of the key assumptions of the contemporary investigation of worldviews and ideologies is that individual adverse experiences—such as parental violence—play a key role in shaping worldviews and ideological commitments. For instance, Duckitt (2001) argued that harsh parenting fosters a perception of the world as a dangerous place, which subsequently promotes ideological commitments focused on social control. This line of thinking linking individual adverse experiences to specific worldviews and ideologies can be traced back to the 20^th-century theorists Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950), who built upon the psychoanalytic framework of Sigmund Freud to explain the psychological roots of ideological development.

While influential, this perspective has come under increasing scrutiny. Recent studies suggest that individual adverse experiences rarely predict worldviews or ideologies in a consistent or systematic manner (e.g., Clifton, 2020; De Neve, 2015; Kerry et al., 2024; Unnever et al., 2007; Vilanova et al., 2024). We argue that this disconnect stems from the flawed application of clinical reasoning—originally designed to address individual pathology—to broader social and ideological phenomena. Yet, despite growing evidence challenging these assumptions, no alternative framework has emerged to clarify the complex interplay between personal experience and ideological development. Therefore, in this manuscript, we propose a novel framework for understanding the development of worldviews and ideologies. Instead of adhering to the traditional framework in which individual adverse experiences directly shape the endorsement of specific worldviews and ideologies (see Figure 1), we propose an alternative model. Our approach emphasizes the effects of collective phenomena, in particular media effects, group dynamics, cohort influences, and collective disruptive events (see Figure 2). Specifically, we highlight the role of news coverage on violence and inequality, the influence of group conformity driven by ingroup similarity in worldviews and ideologies, the impact of being born into a specific historical period shaped by its unique Zeitgeist, and the societal consequences of disruptive events such as terrorist attacks or economic shifts that exacerbate inequality and resource scarcity.

Hence, we will begin exploring the Freudian conception of symptom formation. Afterward, we will provide a narrative review of the works of Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950), particularly pointing out the familial and broader adverse experiences highlighted by the authors as affecting worldviews and ideologies. Next, we will apply these same considerations to the Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice (Duckitt, 2001), given its significant influence on research in this area and its insightful propositions regarding the developmental pathways of worldviews and ideologies. We then identify its limitations and present our novel model, the Collective Experiences Model of Worldviews and Ideologies, situating it within the relevant attitudinal literature that informs its development and how it overcomes current paradoxes in contemporary theories. The discussion of psychoanalytic and early critical-theoretical perspectives is intended as a genealogical and heuristic clarification of the historical assumptions that have shaped later social-psychological models of worldview and ideological formation. Accordingly, it illustrates how these perspectives informed subsequent theories, against which the collective mechanisms developed in the later sections are explicitly articulated as the primary theoretical contribution of the manuscript. Readers primarily interested in contemporary theory may choose to begin with Section 5; however, doing so carries the risk of overlooking the broader genealogical trajectory through which assumptions about adverse experiences became influential in current theories of worldview and ideological development.

1.1 The Freudian conception of symptom formation

The works of Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950) represent foundational contributions to the psychological study of worldview and ideology formation. Drawing from the etiological framework of Sigmund Freud, these scholars adopted a psychoanalytic perspective, suggesting that the development of worldviews and ideologies is a reaction to the formation of psychological symptoms. Even more recent models (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt and Sibley, 2017) which aim to explain these phenomena without explicitly invoking psychoanalytic theory bears traces of Freudian influence, particularly in its focus on individual adverse experiences. In this section, we outline Freud's conceptualization of symptom formation and examine its enduring impact on psychological theories of worldviews and ideologies from the 20^th century to the present.

During the development of his theory, Sigmund Freud provided a systematic explanation for the emergence of clinical symptoms. The initial version of this explanation was proposed in his collaboration with Josef Breuer in their seminal work, “Studies on Hysteria,” published in 1895. Within this work, Freud and Breuer posited the concept of “symptom overdetermination,” suggesting that the emergence of symptoms is influenced by various recurring adverse experiences throughout the life of an individual. Consequently, while a symptom may apparently stem from a seemingly trivial event (such as a hysterical reaction triggered by a cat jumping on the shoulder of a girl, Freud and Breuer, 1895, p. 166), its onset is actually intricately linked to prior adverse experiences, many of which remain unconscious.

The theory of overdetermination finds further refinement and formalization in Freud's proposition of the “etiological equation,” elucidated in his introductory lectures on psychoanalysis from 1916 to 1917. According to this equation, the genesis of psychopathologies, particularly neurosis, results from the combination of two factors: the “disposition stemming from the fixation of libido” and an “incidental or traumatic event” (see Figure 3).

The fixation of libido primarily depends on two additional factors: the “sexual constitution” and the infantile experiences. The sexual constitution refers to inherent predispositions, such as genetic and biologic factors, that shape the developmental trajectory of individuals and their susceptibility to fixation at various psychosexual stages. Complementing this, infantile experiences play a crucial role in determining whether fixation occurs. These early experiences—ranging from parental relationships to early emotional traumas or gratifications—can anchor the libido at a specific psychosexual stage if conflicts arise or remain unresolved. However, these two factors alone—sexual constitution and infantile experiences—are not sufficient to result in neurosis. Freud emphasized that the actual development of neurosis requires an additional element: a triggering experience, often referred to as an “accidental” or adverse/traumatic event, that activates the underlying predisposition. This adverse experience can range from a significant loss or emotional shock to a more subtle form of psychological distress. It is the combination of this triggering event with the pre-existing dispositions and unresolved conflicts that culminates in the onset of neurotic symptoms, underscoring the dynamic interaction between early developmental factors and later life events in the formation of psychopathologies.

Freud's etiological framework is the aspect of his work that most profoundly influenced theories on worldview and ideological development. Although Freud addressed social phenomena in works such as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), and Freud (1939), these writings were often dismissed as “speculative” and “naïve” by Adorno et al. (1950, p. lxii). Adorno et al. (1950, p. lxiii) emphasized instead: “We are indebted to the Freud who developed the theory of the unconscious and of repression, of the Id, the ego and the superego—not Freud the anthropologist.” Hence, the following sections will examine Freudian influences and key formative factors in the theories of Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950) through three thematic lenses: “Familial Adverse Experiences Affecting Worldviews and Ideological Formation,” “Broader Adverse Experiences Affecting Worldviews and Ideological Formation,” and “Individual Adversity Assumptions Within the Theory.” We will then extend this discussion to the contemporary Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice, highlighting its limitations and proposing an alternative model to address these gaps.

2 The mass psychology of fascism

One of the earliest explorations into the psychology of worldviews and ideologies in the 20^th century was undertaken by Reich (1970) in his seminal work “The Mass Psychology of Fascism.” He proposed that the endorsement of ideologies such as fascism primarily stems from sexual inhibition, which is imposed through familial and social experiences. According to Reich, these repressive forces begin to shape an individual's character in early childhood, forming a psychological predisposition to fascist ideologies. Although these tendencies are deeply rooted, they can be altered, particularly through broader societal changes related to sexual morality.

2.1 Familial adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

Notably, Reich (1970) identified the family as the primary institution responsible for imposing sexual inhibition and shaping an individual's character. He argued that within families characterized by rigidity and a strict adherence to ascetic, puritanical ideals, children are more likely to develop submissive character. This process begins early in life, particularly within the complex child-mother relationship, which psychoanalytic theory often highlights as central to the emotional development of children. According to Reich, the primal desire for the mother, which psychoanalysis frames as a natural part of a child's early emotional experience, is typically harshly suppressed in such families. This suppression marks the child's first “barricade to sexual reality” (Reich, 1970, p. 44), i.e., the first barriers to their sexual expression and autonomy, reinforcing patterns of repression that persist into adulthood.

Reich further contended that this dynamic extends beyond the suppression of sexual desires. The early repression of these primal urges not only fosters a submissive character but also shapes the child's broader emotional and ideological framework. The mother, often perceived as a figure of safety, nurturing, and belonging, becomes symbolically linked with concepts like homeland and nation, such that “in their subjective emotional core the notions of homeland and nation are notions of mother and family” (Reich, 1970, p. 44). In this way, the emotional attachment to the mother evolves into a deeper identification with broader societal structures. Reich believed that the family unit, with its hierarchical and authoritarian dynamics, serves as a microcosm of the nation-state. Just as children are taught to obey their parents and suppress their individual desires within the family, they are later conditioned to submit to national authorities and conform to the collective ideals of the state.

2.2 Broader adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

According to Reich (1970), sexual inhibition is fostered not only by familial relationships, but also by broader social events. Firstly, economic crises often create a climate of uncertainty and instability, such that “when the entire social organization is plunged into a state of political upheaval, the conflict between sexuality and compulsive morality will of necessity reach an acute peak” (Reich, 1970, p. 63). In response to such challenges, authorities may adopt stricter moral codes and reinforce social norms as mechanisms for maintaining control and social order, including forms of sexual regulation. By imposing more stringent moral standards, those in power seek to pacify the population and reduce the likelihood of widespread social unrest, thereby preserving existing social arrangements and power structures. Secondly, the promotion of religious affiliation serves as a potent mechanism for reinforcing sexual inhibition, exacerbating sexual anxiety. By promoting adherence to religious doctrines that emphasize abstinence, chastity, and strict moral regulations surrounding sexuality, individuals may internalize norms that constrain sexual impulses and desires. Such processes of sexual repression are associated with the development of feelings of “guilt” and “shame” surrounding sexual expression (Reich, 1970, p. 185), as well as with heightened experiences of “religious fear” related to perceived divine punishment for moral transgressions (Reich, 1970, p. 43). Consequently, individuals become more susceptible to seeking solace and refuge in submission to authority figures, perpetuating a culture of obedience and conformity. Thirdly, the implementation of ascetic, sex-negating education plays a pivotal role in shaping the submissive disposition, especially among children and adolescents. This educational approach instills a sense of shame or guilt surrounding sexual desires, fostering the character predisposed to deference to authority figures (see Figure 4).

2.3 Individual adversity assumptions within the theory

Reich's exploration of sexual inhibition draws a clear parallel to Freud's theory of symptom formation. Reich suggests that sexual inhibition, whether within families or broader social contexts, generates sexual anxiety, prompting individuals to seek comfort in submission to authority figures. This mirrors Freud's concept of overdetermination, wherein a recurring adverse experience (i.e., sexual inhibition) sets the stage for the emergence of a symptom (i.e., sexual anxiety) when broader adverse experiences take place (e.g., promotion of sex-negating education, economic crises), and individuals thus submit to authority seeking to alleviate this sexual anxiety. Thus, Reich's work presents a pioneering psychological insight into the roots of fascist endorsement. While subsequent scholars have elaborated on this idea with variations, they generally agree that the inclination toward submission to authority stems from adverse experiences in familial and social settings. In the wake of this proposition, one key author that also contributed to psychological theories about the formation of worldviews and ideologies is Fromm (1941) in his work “Escape from Freedom.”

3 Escape from freedom

Another milestone in the psychology of fascism was the book “Escape from Freedom” by Fromm (1941). Similar to Reich (1970), Fromm (1941, p. 15) aims to “analyze the character structure of modern man, who gave up freedom in Fascist countries and which so widely prevail in millions of our own people.” Fromm proposes that feelings of anxiety, isolation, and powerlessness are the main drivers behind individuals' decisions to abandon their freedom, and giving up personal freedom is pointed out as an attempt of escaping these negative emotions. Two particular experiences are pointed out as promoting these intense negative feelings: submitting to the orders of a strict and threatening father, as well as the individuation process that strengthens the self but also distances individuals from the familiar world throughout human development.

3.1 Familial adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

According to Fromm (1941), when a child submits to the demands of a harsh and intimidating father, a profound hostility toward the father emerges. Hostility toward the father is suppressed due to the perceived risks of expressing or even consciously acknowledging it, but it is transformed into a diffuse sense of defiance directed not at a specific target but toward life more broadly. This conversion of suppressed hostility paradoxically deepens insecurity, reinforcing submission to the father and to authority figures in general. As development proceeds, particularly during adolescence, new challenges and unfamiliar situations intensify this insecurity, prompting the questioning of previously held beliefs and identities. While these processes foster individuation and the development of personality, they also weaken earlier sources of security, increasing feelings of isolation. This isolation is accompanied by an overwhelming feeling of powerlessness and loneliness, leading individuals to seek psychic mechanisms of escape from these negative feelings.

Fromm (1941) argues that the most common mechanisms of escape are (1) giving up one's own independence and (2) merging with somebody or something outside oneself. These mechanisms are used to gain the strength the individual lacks, offering an escape from unbearable loneliness. According to Fromm (1941), escape from insecurity may take the form of intertwined desires for submission and domination, which he describes as simultaneous masochistic and sadistic strivings. Masochistic tendencies involve submission to powerful individuals or institutions, allowing the individual to relinquish the burden of freedom through obedience, a dynamic that is particularly reinforced within mass movements such as fascism, where identification with a collective provides a sense of security. At the same time, these tendencies are often accompanied by sadistic impulses, expressed in the exploitation, humiliation, or mistreatment of others, frequently targeting marginalized groups. Though it may seem contradictory for someone to oscillate between masochistic and sadistic strivings, Fromm notes that both arise from the same fundamental need: the inability to tolerate isolation and personal weakness. Both tendencies require an object—masochism finds security through submission to another, while sadism seeks it through domination. As a result, individuals cannot be classified as purely sadistic or masochistic, as they often fluctuate between these tendencies depending on the circumstances.

3.2 Broader adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

As previously noted, the family, particularly the presence of a strict and intimidating father figure, plays a pivotal role in the development of sadistic and masochistic tendencies. However, two additional adverse experiences can also contribute to the fostering of these tendencies. Firstly, undergoing an economic crisis can exacerbate such tendencies. Economic crises present significant challenges that individuals may not have previously encountered, leading to heightened feelings of anxiety, powerlessness, and isolation, thereby increasing the inclination to give up personal freedom. Secondly, experiencing a decline in the social prestige of one's economic class can also fuel sadistic and masochistic tendencies. This decline is often accompanied by new difficulties and adversities previously unencountered, further exacerbating negative emotions and predisposing individuals to employ mechanisms of escape such as submitting to an authoritarian leader.

3.3 Individual adversity assumptions within the theory

The Freudian Assumptions within the Theory of Fromm (1941) are even more clear than those in the work of Reich (1970). For instance, Fromm (1941, p. 115) explicitly traces the parallel between the development of the authoritarian character and the development of a neurotic syndrome by stating that “the phenomena which we observe in the neurotic person are in principle not different from those we find in the normal.” According to him, giving up freedom as a means to overcome loneliness is a strategy that is also regularly used by neurotic individuals. Both in neurotic and non-neurotic people this strategy is only partially efficient as it “assuages an unbearable anxiety and makes life possible by avoiding panic; yet it does not solve the underlying problem and is paid for by a kind of life that often consists only of automatic or compulsive activities” (Fromm, 1941, p. 117).

Hence, once again, similar to the Freudian etiological equation, recurring individual adverse experiences (i.e., orders of a strict and threatening authority) set the stage for the emergence of symptoms (i.e., anxiety, isolation, and powerlessness) when broader adverse experiences take place (e.g., economic crises, decline in the social prestige of one's economic class). Seeking to overcome the symptoms that emerged, individuals give up their freedom by joining a mass movement such as fascism, where some security is gained by finding oneself united with millions of others who share these feelings (see Figure 5). Like Reich (1970), Fromm (1941) also views fascist endorsement as a means of mitigating symptoms. While Reich mentions “sexual anxiety,” Fromm focuses on “anxiety, isolation, and powerlessness.” But despite this minor difference, both consider submission to authority a strategy for alleviating symptoms and Fromm (1941) includes outgroup hostility as part of this alleviating strategy. Subsequent authors, such as Adorno et al. (1950), similarly regard submission to authority as a method of attenuating symptoms arising from adverse experiences, as seen in their proposition of the formation of the “Authoritarian Personality” that will be explored in the next section.

4 The authoritarian personality

In the very introduction of “The Authoritarian Personality,” Adorno et al. (1950, p. xliv) point out that the aim of the work is “to analyze the type of person […] whose general psychological disposition makes him a potential follower of totalitarian movements and bigoted ideologies.” Adorno et al. (1950) explicitly argued that a significant contradiction motivated their investigation of the authoritarian personality: the political, economic, and social convictions of authoritarians involved hostility toward a wide variety of minority groups, but most of them never had any actual experience with minorities. Hence, even though most authoritarians described minorities as essentially bad, immoral, and the cause of social problems, authoritarians often did not have any acquaintances or personal contact with members of minority groups. Adorno et al. (1950) thus pointed out that the authoritarian outgroup hostility does not derive from concrete negative experience with minorities, but rather from personal unconscious needs that foster a certain type of person (i.e., the authoritarian personality) that could be explained through Freudian concepts.

The authoritarian personality is a key concept in the work of Adorno et al. (1950). It predisposes individuals to embrace certain ideologies, being thus defined by Adorno et al. (1950, p. 5–6) as “a more or less enduring organization of forces within the individual” which is “resistant to fundamental change” and a “determinant of ideological preferences.” Complementarily, ideology is defined as an organization of opinions, attitudes and values, and authoritarians tend to adopt ideologies aligned with those propagated by the ruling class through media channels like the press and radio. This alignment is influenced not only by familial experiences but also by broader social factors that shape individual perspectives.

4.1 Familial adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

Adorno et al. (1950), expanding on the ideas of Reich (1970) and Fromm (1941), emphasized that early familial experiences play a pivotal role in fostering submission to authority and hostility toward outgroups. Grounded in Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex—the early desire to possess the mother and eliminate the father (Freud, 1900)—they argue that resolving this internal conflict helps children accept external constraints and develop a realistic view of the world. However, variations in parenting styles can lead to different resolutions of this Oedipal conflict. In particular, Adorno et al. (1950) describe a “sadomasochistic” resolution that arises from harsh discipline, excessive demands for obedience, and limited affection. In this case, one of the hardest tasks of the child is to transform the hatred toward parents into love, which is never completely successful. This dynamic fosters both fearful subservience to authority (i.e., “masochistic” tendencies) and suppressed resentment that manifests as hostility toward outgroups (i.e., “sadistic” tendencies). Such patterns, they propose, form the psychological basis of the authoritarian personality, where obedience and aggression coexist as enduring traits shaped by early emotional conflicts.

It is worth noting that Adorno et al. (1950) proposed that authoritarians are hostile toward members of minority groups because minorities become the substitute for the hated parent. As the transformation of hatred toward parents into love is never completely successful, the remaining hatred is suppressed due to social constraints. When individuals become adults, this hatred emerges and is directed toward groups who are socially accepted as targets of prejudice. Authoritarians thus attribute to minorities characteristics of their parents that provoked anger, such as “being practical, cold, domineering and even a sexual rival” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 759).

4.2 Broader adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

According to Adorno et al. (1950), the endorsement of bigoted ideologies by authoritarian individuals is deeply influenced by broader social conditions, particularly through media manipulation, economic crises, and rising global inequality. Adorno et al. (1950) observed that during the rise of the Nazis in Germany, Jews were scapegoated as symbols of societal threats, a narrative amplified by media campaigns orchestrated by economic elites. Interestingly, anti-Jewish demonstrations were more common in regions without strong antisemitic traditions, highlighting how media-driven portrayals can shape ingroup-outgroup divisions. Beyond propaganda, economic conditions also play a pivotal role in fostering authoritarian tendencies. Adorno et al. (1950) argued that economic crises fuel anxieties and frustrations, which authoritarian leaders exploit by directing hostility toward institutions and minorities blamed for societal instability—often through manipulated narratives serving elite interests. Additionally, widening global inequality intensifies feelings of resentment and powerlessness as the gap between aspirations and reality grows. These frustrations create fertile ground for authoritarian personalities, who gravitate toward strong leaders promising order, justice, and identity while scapegoating marginalized groups to channel public anger. Together, these social forces—media distortion, economic instability, and inequality—reinforce authoritarian tendencies by providing psychological and structural conditions for prejudice, submission to authority, and hostility toward perceived outsiders (see Figure 6).

4.3 Individual adversity assumptions within the theory

A particular relationship with Freudian theory can be observed throughout the work of Adorno et al. (1950). Recurring adverse experiences (i.e., orders of a strict and threatening authority) sets the stage for the emergence of the authoritarian personality when broader adverse experiences take place (e.g., media manipulation, economic crises, increasing inequality), leading to the emergence of fascist endorsement and its consequences (i.e., outgroup hostility and submission to authority). The impact of the distinct adverse experiences pointed out by Adorno et al. (1950) are pervasive in the social psychological literature, and its influence is noteworthy even in contemporary models that do not draw upon the psychoanalytical framework, such as the Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice (Duckitt, 2001).

5 The dual process motivational model of ideology and prejudice

The Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice is a contemporary model initially proposed by Duckitt (2001) that also seeks to explain the formation of worldviews and ideologies. It has drawn upon evidence that emerged after the works of Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950), challenging some of their main assumptions. For instance, the “masochistic” and “sadistic” outcomes of the alleged sadomasochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex were pointed out by Fromm (1941) and Adorno et al. (1950) as happening simultaneously. However noteworthy, the simultaneous occurrence of submission to authority and outgroup hostility in the same person was severely challenged by empirical data indicating their temporal independence. For instance, Altemeyer (1998) indicated that whereas submission to authority is primarily associated with the personal necessity of fitting into a group and obeying its leaders, outgroup hostility is primarily associated with the dissimilar personal necessity of having power and control over others. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that those who are particularly hostile toward outgroups hardly submit to established authorities, and vice-versa, providing evidence that “masochism” and “sadism” as defined by Fromm (1941) and Adorno et al. (1950) usually do not occur simultaneously, but rather as independent and complementary phenomena.

As the propositions of Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950) faced increasing challenges from more empirical evidence, psychological investigations of worldviews and ideologies gradually shifted away from the psychoanalytic framework. A new approach was proposed to assess submission to authority and outgroup hostility, focusing on the interaction between social factors rather than the unconscious and the resolution of the Oedipus complex. In the wake of this paradigmatic shift, new psychological constructs were introduced to measure submission to authority and outgroup hostility, leading to the emergence of two key ideological variables: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) and Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994).

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) is defined as an ideology indexing the endorsement of harsh coercive measures, uncritical submission to authorities, and traditional moral values (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt et al., 2010). It resembles the masochism described by Adorno et al. (1950), as right-wing authoritarians often focus on how individuals should obey established authorities in society, particularly the leaders of their groups (Duckitt, 1989). RWA is significantly associated with distinct facets of social conformity, such as describing oneself as a conforming and obedient person (Jugert and Duckitt, 2009), defending those group members from punishment if they offend group rules (Stellmacher and Petzel, 2005), and supporting persecution against immigrants that refuse to assimilate into the dominant culture (Thomsen et al., 2008).

Complementarily, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is defined as an ideology indexing the general support to establish and maintain hierarchically structured intergroup relations in society (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 2001), indexing forceful oppression of low status groups and preference for group-based inequality (Ho et al., 2015). It resembles the sadistic tendency described by Fromm (1941) and Adorno et al. (1950), as it is significantly associated with prejudice against a wide array of groups (Anderson and Ferguson, 2018; Ching et al., 2020; Gouveia et al., 2021; Lee et al., 2011; Mandalaywala et al., 2018; Pratto and Shih, 2000) and indexes the overt support to group-based dominance.

Despite their similar ideological nature and correlations with prejudice, RWA and SDO express dissimilar and relatively independent perspectives about reality (see Figure 7). According to the Model proposed by Duckitt (2001), RWA and SDO are expressions of dissimilar worldviews salient for each person. For instance, RWA is the expression of Dangerous World Beliefs (DWB), characterized by the perception of the social world as an unpredictable, dangerous and threatening place (Duckitt, 2001). The social world is seen as always susceptible to disharmony, chaos and abrupt subversion of values, leading people to perceive greater threats in their daily lives. The goals of social control, security and conformity thus become salient, making people ideologically endorse harsher punitive measures, traditional moral values and submission to authority as a way to “normalize” society, indexed by high levels of RWA (Duckitt et al., 2002).

On the other hand, SDO is the expression of Competitive World Beliefs (CWB), characterized by the perception of the social world as a competitive jungle that forces people to ruthlessly struggle for survival (Duckitt, 2001). The social world is thus seen as “dog-eat-dog world,” where people have to do whatever is necessary to survive, obtain social status and privilege, even through amoral ways. The goals fostered by this worldview are those of power and dominance, providing the belief that the strong and able win, the weak and unfit lose, indexed by high levels of SDO (Duckitt et al., 2002).

As ideologies are expressions of worldviews salient for each person, their developmental processes are inherently connected. Throughout the development of the Model, distinct familial and broader adverse experiences have been pointed out as contributing to the development of worldviews and ideologies, which will be explored in the following sections.

5.1 Familial adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

The Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice has undergone two main formulations. In its initial version proposed by Duckitt (2001), familial adverse experiences, and the parent-child relationship in particular, were given the greatest emphasis in the development of worldviews and ideologies, compared to the subsequent version (i.e., Duckitt and Sibley, 2017). Specifically, “strict socialization” and “unaffectionate socialization” were identified as key predictors of worldview and ideology development. Notably, strict socialization refers to an upbringing characterized by frequent punishments, as indicated by items such as “I would describe my upbringing as very strict,” “I was strictly disciplined while I was growing up,” and the reverse-coded item “I grew up in an environment where I was rarely punished” (Duckitt, 2001, p. 72). In contrast, unaffectionate socialization refers to a lack of parental affection during childhood, assessed by items such as “I grew up in an unaffectionate environment,” “I did not receive love or affection from my father while I was growing up,” and “I grew up in a hard and brutal environment” (Duckitt, 2001, p. 72).

The Model posits that a strict upbringing is associated with perceiving the world as a dangerous place (i.e., DWB), leading to the endorsement of harsh coercive measures, uncritical submission to authorities, and traditional moral values (i.e., RWA). Similarly, an unaffectionate upbringing is linked to viewing the world as a competitive jungle (i.e., CWB), fostering support for hierarchically structured intergroup relations in society (i.e., SDO). This initial formulation echoes earlier theories by Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950) by underscoring the parent-child relationship as a significant factor in the development of worldviews and ideologies, even without the psychoanalytic framework (see Figure 8). However notable, the emphasis on the parent-child relationship shifted in the later versions of the Model, instead focusing on broader adverse experiences.

5.2 Broader adverse experiences affecting worldviews and ideological formation

The characteristics of the social environment where children, adolescents and adults socialize, along with the adverse experiences within these settings, have been central to the investigation of factors affecting the development of worldviews and ideologies according to the further developments of the Model (Duckitt and Sibley, 2017). Similar to the initial propositions about the impact of parent-child relationship, authors later proposed that socialization in contexts with high criminality rates, inequality and resource scarcity could significantly foster the development of specific worldviews and ideologies. In particular, socialization in a dangerous environment marked by social instability and the constant presence of threats could foster the belief that the world is dangerous (i.e., DWB). This could in turn make the goals of social control, security, and conformity salient, expressed by high levels of RWA. Complementarily, socialization in a poor, unequal environment where competition is often stimulated could foster the belief that the world is a competitive jungle, where one must struggle to overcome resource scarcity (i.e., CWB). This could in turn make the goal of obtaining power, dominance, and superiority over others salient, expressed by high levels of SDO (see Figure 9).

These recent advancements of the Model have shifted focus from parent-child relationships to the characteristics of the social environment, guiding much of the current research within this framework. Experimental evidence supported some propositions of the Model, as participants randomly assigned to fictional scenarios with higher levels of threat correlated with increased levels of DWB and RWA among participants (e.g., Jugert and Duckitt, 2009; Radkiewicz, 2022; Vilanova et al., 2022b). Hence, findings suggest that the adverse experiences described in the fictional scenarios, such as being exposed to rising unemployment, houses getting burgled and muggings, may also happen in places with high inflation, unemployment rates, and inequality, likely increasing DWB, CWB, RWA, and SDO.

5.3 Individual adversity assumptions within the theory

Although the Model does not explicitly rely on the psychoanalytic framework, the influence of the earlier psychoanalytic propositions focused on adverse experiences is evident in two main aspects. First, the influence of parent-child relationship in the development of worldviews and ideologies proposed by Duckitt (2001) is very similar to earlier psychoanalytical propositions. For instance, as Fromm (1941) and Adorno et al. (1950) emphasized the role of the harsh and intimidating father in the development of submission to authority and a bigoted posture toward outgroups, Duckitt (2001) proposes that frequent punishments are associated with the development of DWB and RWA. Furthermore, Duckitt (2001) also proposes that growing up in a familial environment without love or affection could foster the development of CWB and SDO, resembling the proposition of Adorno et al. (1950) that few expressions of affection could foster the development of bigoted ideologies.

The similarities with the earlier psychoanalytic propositions are also evident when considering broader adverse experiences. For instance, Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950) point out economic crises as key factors contributing to the endorsement of fascist ideology, and Duckitt and Sibley (2017) also indicate that resource scarcity deriving from economic crises could foster the development of CWB and SDO. Moreover, Adorno et al. (1950) highlight the impact of widening inequality in contributing to the endorsement of fascist ideology, resembling the proposition of Duckitt and Sibley (2017) that socialization in an unequal environment could foster the development of CWB and SDO. Therefore, although the Model does not rely on the sadomasochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex to explain the development of worldviews and ideologies, it emphasizes the role of strict and unaffectionate childhood socialization, along with adverse experiences in dangerous, poor, and unequal environments, in shaping certain worldviews and ideologies.

It is important to note that the emphasis on adverse experiences as key predictors of worldviews and ideologies resembles Freud's etiological equation, which sought to explain the roots of neurosis by linking adverse experiences to the emergence of psychopathology. We do not suggest that the Dual Process Motivational Model is itself psychoanalytic; rather, we point to a genealogical continuity whereby the model traces its intellectual lineage to Adorno et al. (1950), who explicitly acknowledged their reliance on Freudian assumptions, thereby reproducing—within a contemporary social-cognitive framework—the broader explanatory logic linking formative adversity to later ideological orientations. Although this approach has been adopted by scholars both within and outside the psychoanalytic tradition, we argue that recent evidence from the past 5 years reveals its growing limitations in explaining the formation of worldviews and ideologies. These limitations, discussed in the following section, underscore the need for a new theoretical framework that moves beyond the traditional focus on adverse experiences.

6 Recent evidence pointing out the limitations of individual adverse experiences on the development of worldviews and ideologies

Notably, the emphasis on adverse experiences within a clinical context is warranted, as individual adverse experiences indeed are significant predictors of clinical symptoms. Trauma literature extensively documents that adverse experiences are strongly associated with higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress (e.g., Mayo et al., 2017). Notably, a meta-analysis by Sahle et al. (2021) indicated that adverse experiences could increase the probability of developing anxiety disorders by approximately 94%. In particular, experiencing a single adverse event could increase the probability of behavioral problems by about 61% (Petruccelli et al., 2019), and experiencing four or more adverse events could increase the probability of attempting suicide by more than 3,000% (Hughes et al., 2017).

The focus on adverse experiences when considering the development of worldviews and ideologies is not as warranted though. Recently, Vilanova et al. (2024) compared the predictive effects of adverse experiences on clinical symptoms, worldviews and ideologies. Notably, it has been highlighted that the total amount of adverse experiences that adolescents (n = 901) had throughout their lives significantly predicted depression (β = 0.22, p < 0.001), anxiety (β = 0.25, p < 0.001), and stress (β = 0.20, p < 0.001). However, the total amount of adverse experiences did not significantly predict DWB (β = 0.02, p = 0.624) or CWB (β = 0.04, p = 0.199), and only weakly predicted RWA (β = −0.08, p = 0.015) and SDO (β = −0.08, p = 0.013). Notably, the mean magnitude of the predictive associations between adverse experiences and clinical symptoms (i.e., |0.22|) was over 3.6 times higher than that between adverse experiences, worldviews, and ideologies (i.e., |0.06|). The negligible associations between adverse experiences, worldviews and ideologies was also observed by Vilanova et al. (2024) in a sample of prisoners (n = 207) with a higher degree of adverse experiences. For instance, the total amount of adverse experiences that prisoners had throughout their lives did not predict DWB (β = −0.03, p = 0.631), CWB (β = 0.00, p = 0.631), RWA (β = 0.05, p = 0.437) or SDO (β = −0.04, p = 0.608), confirming the lack of association between adverse experiences, worldviews and ideologies even among individuals who have gone through several experiences typically deemed severe.

Such marginal associations are evident even when different ideological assessments are used. For example, De Neve (2015) analyzed data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, which includes four waves of a nationally representative sample of adolescents and adults in the USA (n = 15,701). The study examined whether experiences of verbal violence or corporal punishment (spanking) before the age of 18 and sexual assault significantly predicted self-placement on a political ideology scale ranging from 1 (“very conservative”) to 5 (“very liberal”). Notably, self-placements on the conservative-liberal scales, while not identical to RWA and SDO, are strongly associated with their levels (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988; Duckitt et al., 2010; Ho et al., 2015; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Vilanova et al., 2018) and thus serve as meaningful correlates of ideology. The results showed that the composite score, which summed the occurrences of these violent experiences, was only marginally associated with political ideology (r = 0.07). Additionally, the direct predictive effect of this composite score on political ideology controlling for gender, race, education, and income was also negligible (β = 0.08), confirming the weak relationship between individual adverse experiences and political ideologies.

Similar negligible associations were observed by Unnever et al. (2007). Using data from the General Social Survey, another representative sample of the American adult population collected across multiple years (n = 10,352), the authors examined whether experiencing a home burglary or a robbery involving force in the past year predicted distinct measures of ideological endorsement. Specifically, they assessed self-placement on a political ideology scale (1 = “very liberal” to 7 = “very conservative”) and stances on issues such as gun control, abortion, homosexual civil rights, preferential treatment of African Americans, the death penalty, and harsher local courts. All predictive pathways from victimization to these ideological measures were once again negligible, with coefficients ranging from β = −0.01 (political self-placement) to β = 0.02 (opposition to preferential treatment of African Americans), further supporting the absence of noteworthy associations between individual adverse experiences and specific ideological endorsement.

Further studies have found that demographic characteristics often believed to be strongly linked to adverse experiences and worldviews are, at best, only marginally associated. For instance, Kerry et al. (2024) found that, despite expectations from both laypeople and researchers, living in high-crime neighborhoods did not significantly correlate with the belief that the world is a dangerous place (r = −0.03, p = 0.104). Similarly, negligible associations were found between living in states with higher violent crime rates and DWB (r = −0.05, p < 0.001), as well as between experiencing trauma in adulthood and DWB (r = −0.09, p < 0.001). The small or non-significant associations between adverse experiences and worldviews extend beyond DWB. Notably, Clifton (2020) observed that living in lower-income families did not reliably correlate with perceiving the world as less promising in terms of opportunities and resources (r = −0.07, p > 0.05), contrary to what might be expected given the scarcity experiences associated with poverty. Similarly, high family income did not significantly correlate with viewing the world as more pleasurable (r = −0.06, p > 0.05), despite the presumed lack of adverse experiences in abundance. Even when considering an adverse experience such as surviving cancer, no significant associations were found between cancer survivors and their worldviews compared to healthy controls (Kerry et al., 2024). These findings collectively challenge the assumption that individual adverse experiences have a direct and predictable impact on worldviews and ideologies.

The findings from large-sample studies suggesting a negligible association between individual adverse experiences and specific worldviews and ideologies are also reflected in biographical accounts. Notably, individuals with harsh parenting, such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, held vastly different political views. For example, Hitler was raised by a domineering father, Alois Hitler, who was known for his authoritarian and harsh methods of discipline, frequently subjecting young Adolf to physical punishment and emotional abuse (Shirer, 1991). Similarly, Stalin's father, Besarion Jughashvili, had a violent temper and, after his alcoholism caused the loss of the family business, became increasingly abusive. He frequently beat both Stalin and his mother, creating a hostile and fearful home environment (Deutscher, 1949). Churchill's father, Sir Randolph Churchill, was also strict, distant, and highly critical, frequently expressing disapproval of his son's choices. His emotional distance and constant absence from Winston's life created a sense of neglect and longing for paternal approval (Gilbert, 1992). More recent democratic leaders further illustrate this pattern. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, former president of Brazil, pursued a social-democratic political agenda despite growing up under conditions of severe material deprivation and domestic violence, with biographical accounts documenting sustained paternal abuse toward Lula, his siblings, and his mother (Paraná, 2002). Bill Clinton was also exposed to chronic domestic violence during childhood, as his alcoholic stepfather repeatedly abused his mother, an experience Clinton himself has described as formative (Clinton, 2004). Despite these shared experiences of early adversity, these individuals ultimately endorsed profoundly different political projects—Hitler advocating for Nazism, Stalin for Communism, and Churchill, Lula, and Clinton for liberal or social democracy. Taken together, these cases underscore that while individual adverse experiences may exert some psychological influence, they are weak and non-specific predictors of the particular worldviews and ideologies individuals ultimately endorse. We also note that these examples are not intended to substitute systematic empirical analysis, but to complement it by illustrating the theoretical problem at stake.

7 Reconciling conflicting evidence

How can these limitations pointed out by recent studies be reconciled with the empirical support for the propositions of the Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt and Sibley, 2017)? We propose that the key lies in distinguishing between collective and individual experiences. Although experimental evidence indicates that individual adverse experiences described in fictional scenarios, such as being exposed to rising unemployment, houses getting burgled, and muggings, may increase DWB, CWB, RWA, and SDO (e.g., Jugert and Duckitt, 2009; Radkiewicz, 2022; Vilanova et al., 2022b), findings assessing the impact of real-world indicators such as inflation, unemployment, inequality and homicide rates on worldviews and ideologies indicate that they are not reliably associated. For instance, contrary to theoretical expectations, (Fischer et al. 2012) pointed out that the Gross National Income or the income inequality of a country (as measured by the GINI index) did not reliably predict individual SDO levels across 24 countries. Similarly, Perry et al. (2013) found no significant moderating effect of the GINI index in the relationship between DWB and RWA or between CWB and SDO across 7 distinct countries. Furthermore, Kerry et al. (2024) found no significant relationships between neighborhood mean income and Abundant worldview (i.e., the view that the world is full of opportunities and resources). Moreover, Cassario and Brandt (2025) observed that ecological threats do not consistently push people toward conservatism. These findings are complemented by the observations of Pratto et al. (2013), proposing that awareness toward group inequality is more influential for various political outcomes, such as political action, than the magnitude of inequality itself.

Contradictory evidence also exists regarding the relationships among violence, worldviews, and ideologies. As mentioned earlier, Kerry et al. (2024) found no significant relationships between neighborhood violent crime rates and DWB. Moreover, Vilanova et al. (2024) pointed out that being a victim of robbery, home burglary, or fights was not significantly associated with DWB or RWA. De Neve (2015) and Unnever et al. (2007) similarly found negligible associations between being a victim of verbal or physical violence and ideology. As counterevidence, studies have shown that terrorist attacks significantly increase levels of RWA (Bonanno and Jost, 2006; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede, 2006), suggesting that experiencing group violence can indeed shape worldviews and ideologies. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that terrorist attacks increased levels of RWA not only among high-exposure survivors but also among individuals who did not directly witness the attacks (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede, 2006). This indicates that direct exposure to terrorism is not the critical factor. Rather, we argue that the key factor is the extent to which these events are made aware to the public.

The awareness process is particularly relevant when considering floor and ceiling effects in media coverage, where either minimal (i.e., floor) or maximal (i.e., ceiling) attention is given to an issue. When a disruptive violent event like a terrorist attack occurs, it tends to attract significant media coverage, which can increase DWB and RWA levels among both those directly affected and those who were not direct witnesses. Similarly, an economic crisis is likely to attract widespread media attention, potentially affecting CWB and SDO levels not only among those who lose their jobs but also among individuals who retain some level of financial stability. For example, the Great Depression of 1929 generated ideological support for wealth tax increases during the New Deal, both from those who lost everything and from those who maintained a relatively stable financial situation (Piketty, 2020).

It is worth noting, however, that the significant media impact does not imply that the media can routinely depict events in a way that significantly diverges from reality. In rare cases where media coverage sharply contradicts what actually happened, the portrayal is unlikely to endure. The Iraq weapons of mass destruction case in the early 2000s is noteworthy. For instance, in the lead-up to the Iraq War, many media outlets, particularly in the USA, heavily reported that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, a key justification for the invasion in 2003 (Huang, 2023). The coverage arguably relied on government sources and intelligence reports that were later found to be inaccurate or exaggerated. After the war began, extensive investigations, including those led by the Iraq Survey Group, revealed that Iraq did not have active weapons of mass destruction programs at the time of the invasion. The initial media narrative—that Iraq posed an immediate threat due to weapons of mass destruction—was a significant divergence from reality. As investigations evolved, public opinion shifted, and many media outlets faced criticism for failing to critically question the claims of the government. This situation underscores how some events are especially difficult to dispute due to its widespread impact, but it is worth highlighting that such situations are rare. In particular, news about daily violence and inequality could be disputable, as it often involves complex, long-term issues that are less immediately visible and harder to confirm or refute within short timeframes.

7.1 The impact of media coverage of violence and inequality on worldviews and ideologies

We contend that studies have found negligible associations between individual experiences with violence, worldviews, and ideologies (e.g., Kerry et al., 2024; Vilanova et al., 2024) due to the frequent media coverage of violence, which reaches a broad audience of both victims and non-victims. This widespread exposure creates a similar ideological effect across the population, regardless of direct experience. This disconnect between actual violence experience and public perceptions of violence has been well-documented in various polls. For instance, in 23 of 27 Gallup surveys conducted between 1993 and 2024, most people in the USA consistently said that national crime had increased compared to the previous year, despite the overall decline in both violent and property crime rates throughout most of this period (Gramlich, 2024). This disconnect is often attributed to the influence of media, as the amount of violent content aired during prime-time television significantly predicts heightened fear of crime nationwide (Jamieson and Romer, 2014). Furthermore, Americans who frequently consume local crime news tend to be “extremely” concerned about crime, even in the absence of rising crime rates (Gramlich and Eddy, 2024).

Considering the effects of income inequality, we argue that it was not reliably associated with worldviews and ideologies in distinct studies (e.g., Fischer et al., 2012; Kerry et al., 2024; Perry et al., 2013; Pratto et al., 2013) for the opposite reason, that is, because inequality is not made very salient to the public. For instance, despite rising inequality in the USA (Piketty, 2020), inequality was one of the least mentioned topics in distinct American media channels in 2023 (Smyth, 2024). Even the limited coverage that does exist rarely includes potential solutions or provides a detailed analysis of inequality (Grisold and Theine, 2017), making fewer than half of Americans see economic inequality as a “very big problem” in the country (Horowitz et al., 2020), which in turn leads to reduced ideological support for welfare spending (Epp and Jennings, 2020).

The key influence of media on worldviews and ideologies resembles the well-documented effect of indirect experiences on shaping psychological attitudes (explored in the following section). To better understand how worldviews and ideologies shift and develop, as well as to explore additional influencing factors, we propose focusing on the literature about attitudes rather than symptom formation. Research on attitude development offers valuable insights into how collective events influence these processes, revealing developmental trajectories that can inform new frameworks to understanding the formation and evolution of worldviews and ideologies, which we will now explore.

8 Worldviews and ideologies as attitudes

Attitudes have been classically defined by (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, p. 1) as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (although we are aware that distinct definitions of attitude can be traced back to Thurstone, 1928). Worldviews and ideologies are related to this definition, as Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 145) also define ideologies as “clusters or configurations of attitudes and beliefs that are interdependent or organized around a dominant societal theme such as liberalism or conservatism.” Notably, worldviews have been defined as “a set of interrelated assumptions about the nature of the world” (Overton, 1991, p. 269), “a way of describing the universe and life within it, both in terms of what is and what ought to be” (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 4), and “one's total outlook on life, society and its institutions” (Wolman, 1973, p. 406). Overall, worldviews refer to sets of beliefs and assumptions that describe reality, similar to a filter through which phenomena are perceived and comprehended (Miller and West, 1993).

Similarly, ideology has been described as “an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values—a way of thinking about man and society” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 2). It has also been defined as “an organization of beliefs and attitudes” (Rokeach, 1968, p. 123). Some definitions even explicitly regard ideologies as attitudes, such as “a pattern or gestalt of attitudes” (Billig, 1984, p. 446). Overall, ideology could be defined as a set of beliefs about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved (Tedin, 1987), warranting its conceptualization as an attitude as individuals can either endorse or reject ideas about the goals of society and the methods to achieve them, such as the belief that “an ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1028).

8.1 Key influences on attitude development

Two key factors for attitude development are central for the development of worldviews and ideologies: the role of indirect experiences with attitude objects (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), and the degree to which ingroups share similar attitudes (Festinger, 1950). First, it is widely recognized that individuals can form attitudes toward an object based on individual direct experiences with it. For instance, direct experience is particularly relevant for objects that are not starkly polarized in society, such as amphibians (Tomažič, 2008), battery electric vehicles (Schmalfuss et al., 2017) or the bottling design of wines (Gómez-Carmona et al., 2023). However, for objects with greater political and social significance, broader societal factors that promote indirect experiences may have a more significant impact. For instance, it has been pointed out that factors such as political discourses about the health-care system and the occurrence of wars may cumulatively impact attitudes toward it more than direct personal experience with the system itself (Bleich et al., 2009). Similarly, attitudes toward COVID-19 were significantly influenced by factors other than being contaminated by the virus itself, including broader societal factors such as media coverage (Tune et al., 2021), and nationwide lockdowns (Satherley et al., 2022). This formation of attitudes toward an object mostly based on broader societal factors has already been extensively demonstrated in classic social psychology research, pointing out that people can hold negative attitudes toward certain groups without any prior direct contact with them, mostly based on media representations and opinions of those seen as role models (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bandura et al., 1961; Sherif, 1961), indicating the robustness of this effect.

Historical evidence also demonstrates that attitudes can shift due to factors unrelated to direct experience with the attitude object. For instance, Kollontai (1921) observed that attitudes toward divorced women in Russia underwent substantial changes following the October Revolution. These changes were driven by reforms in marriage legislation rather than personal interactions with divorced women. Prior to the revolution, divorced women were often marginalized and viewed as socially undesirable. However, legislative reforms eliminated the requirement for a husband's consent to obtain a divorce and abolished inheritance transmission, and it contributed to more favorable attitudes toward divorced women because these legal changes symbolized broader societal shifts toward gender equality and personal autonomy. By redefining marriage and divorce as matters of individual choice rather than patriarchal control, the reforms challenged traditional norms, fostering opposition to long-standing prejudices. Additionally, the elimination of inheritance transmission reduced economic dependency within families, further diminishing the stigma attached to divorced women by framing their status as a legitimate and independent social position rather than a deviation from societal expectations. A similar transformation occurred during the Iranian Revolution. After Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in 1979, attitudes toward the West shifted dramatically. Under Shah Pahlavi's rule, Iranians were encouraged to engage with Western institutions and generally held more favorable views. With the change in government, however, attitudes toward the West became increasingly negative—shifts that occurred without direct interactions with Westerners themselves (Coggiola, 2007).

The degree to which ingroups share similar attitudes also plays a crucial role in shaping attitudes of widely discussed public matters. It has been demonstrated that people with whom voters most frequently discuss political attitudes usually share very similar attitudes, promoting an echo chamber whereby the same positions are usually reinforced (Butters and Hare, 2022). Furthermore, discussions within group settings where the majority holds a particular view can substantially impact attitudes about voting importance, minimum wage increases, and abortion (Carlson and Settle, 2016). This pattern is similarly evident in discussions about climate change, where attitudes are influenced by the extent to which the person estimates that others hold similar attitudes (Mildenberger and Tingley, 2019). These changes driven by group discussions can endure privately for weeks (Levitan and Verhulst, 2016), indicating that such effects can be substantial.

The impact of ingroup similarity has also been confirmed in research on worldviews and ideologies. Close interpersonal relationships often strengthen ideological alignment, as individuals are likely to adopt the values and attitudes that are common within their immediate social circles. For instance, research on adolescents in the U.S. has demonstrated that the mean level of SDO within a friendship group reliably predicted each member's SDO levels 8 months later (Poteat et al., 2007). Similarly, within family units, Altemeyer (1996) found that RWA scores among married couples show a correlation of about 0.60, indicating that spouses tend to share similar authoritarian attitudes. Furthermore, Altemeyer (1988) observed a notable intergenerational similarity of these attitudes, with RWA scores between parents and their children correlating at approximately 0.40. These findings were later corroborated by Dhont et al. (2013), who reported a similar correlation of 0.47 between the RWA levels of parents and their children. Overall, these findings highlight the significant role of distinct ingroups in shaping and maintaining worldviews and ideologies.

The interplay between broader societal factors and the most prevalent beliefs at a given point in time shapes the prevailing Zeitgeist, which promotes noteworthy cohort effects. For instance, it has been shown that attitudes toward childhood vaccinations have become progressively more positive across 11 birth cohorts, encompassing those born between 1936 and 1990 (Hayes et al., 2024). Similarly, younger cohorts have demonstrated more favorable attitudes on drug liberalization (Nielsen, 2010) and have exhibited lower levels of antiblack prejudice (Firebaugh and Davis, 1988). This generational shift is also reflected in changes in causal attributions for racial disparities, which have increasingly emphasized personal responsibility and individual willpower (Smith, 2014). Moreover, a generational pattern is evident in political attitudes, with younger cohorts showing weaker party identification (Dassonneville et al., 2012) and stronger pro-environmental attitudes (Ahlfeldt et al., 2022). These cohort effects demonstrate how changing social climates, and the evolving Zeitgeist can reshape attitudes across generations, being thus an important component for the development of worldviews and ideologies.

Considering the significance of collective disruptive events, media coverage, ingroup similarity, and cohort effects we can now propose a new attitudinal framework for the development of worldviews and ideologies that best accounts for the available evidence, especially recent findings. By prioritizing these factors over individual adverse experiences, we introduce new and promising avenues for research, which will be examined in the following sections.

9 A collective experiences model of worldviews and ideologies

Firstly, rather than focusing on individual adverse experiences, as Reich (1970) did with negative sexual experiences, Fromm (1941) and Adorno et al. (1950) with submission to a strict and threatening father, and Duckitt (2001) with harsh, unaffectionate upbringings—later modified by Duckitt and Sibley (2017) to socialization in environments of threat, poverty, and inequality—we shift our attention to disruptive collective experiences. As recent evidence indicates that individual adverse experiences with violence, poverty, or inequality are not consistently linked to any specific worldview or ideology (Clifton, 2020; De Neve, 2015; Kerry et al., 2024; Unnever et al., 2007; Vilanova et al., 2024), we shift our focus away from these individual experiences. Instead, we highlight evidence indicating that collective disruptive events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks increased collective levels of RWA among both high-exposure survivors and individuals who did not directly witness the attacks (Bonanno and Jost, 2006; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede, 2006). Notably, we define collective disruptive events as large-scale events or processes that affect entire populations, or substantial segments thereof, simultaneously and are shared through common social and mediated contexts, regardless of individuals' direct personal exposure. We thus propose that collective violent disruptive events heighten levels of DWB and RWA.

Secondly, considering CWB and SDO, we propose that collective disruptive events that increase inequality and resource scarcity lead to lower levels of CWB and SDO, regardless of whether individuals were direct victims of these events. This proposition contrasts with the Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideology and Prejudice, which suggests that increases in inequality and resource scarcity are associated with higher levels of CWB and SDO (see Figure 9). Our reasoning diverges because prior research has demonstrated that distinct national economic indicators, such as Gross National Income and the GINI Index, do not reliably predict individual levels of SDO (Fischer et al., 2012) or CWB across different countries (Perry et al., 2013). Historical evidence complements these indications by indicating that periods of heightened income inequality have often aligned with greater ideological support for redistributive policies, including wealth taxation. For instance, the Great Depression of 1929 spurred widespread support for wealth tax increases during the New Deal, both among those who faced severe losses and those who remained relatively financially stable (Piketty, 2020). Similarly, major protests, strikes, and movements advocating for social change to address inequality were most pronounced during times of acute poverty and resource scarcity throughout the 20^th century, including movements in countries as dissimilar as Brazil (Martins, 2016), Iran (Coggiola, 2007), Vietnam (Visentini, 2007), and Cuba (Ayerbe, 2004), which gained momentum during periods marked by severe resource scarcity and inequality. Hence, rather than reinforcing competitive worldviews or dominance-oriented ideologies, periods of economic crisis and resource scarcity may instead elicit greater support for structural changes aimed at reducing inequality, particularly when institutional actors—most notably political parties—mobilize and channel protest against these conditions.

Thirdly, we emphasize that while the impact of disruptive collective events is hard to dispute due to their widespread effects, such situations are relatively rare. In contrast, the effects of daily violence, resource scarcity, and inequality can be more contentious, as these issues are often complex and long-term, making them less immediately visible and harder to assess within short timeframes. This creates greater potential for media influence on the formation of worldviews and ideologies related to perceptions of danger, resource scarcity, and inequality. We propose that frequent news coverage of violence tends to increase levels of DWB and RWA, while consistent reporting on inequality and resource scarcity leads to lower levels of CWB and SDO. This is based on studies pointing out that frequent news about violence can reinforce the belief that the world is dangerous, regardless of actual declines in violent crime rates (Gramlich, 2024; Gramlich and Eddy, 2024; Jamieson and Romer, 2014). Additionally, the reverse effect can also be observed, as the lack of coverage regarding inequality was significantly associated with the perception that it is not a significant issue (Grisold and Theine, 2017; Horowitz et al., 2020; Smyth, 2024), resulting in decreased support for welfare spending (Epp and Jennings, 2020). This proposition is rooted in the Cultivation Theory, initially introduced by Gerbner and Gross (1976), which posits that worldviews are significantly shaped by overarching media narratives, particularly through television. This pattern may also apply to various media platforms, including online streaming, and social media, particularly internet social networks, which could also influence DWB, CWB, RWA, and SDO (Abdallah and Jöckel, 2022). We incorporate this evidence and these initial propositions into a more comprehensive model of worldview and ideological development. We also emphasize that, although our primary focus is on news coverage related to violence and inequality, it is important to recognize that media coverage of other social phenomena, such as political elections, economic trends, or labor market disruptions, could also influence worldviews and ideologies.

Fourthly, the extent to which ingroups share similar worldviews and ideologies also has to be taken into account. As mentioned earlier, group beliefs have important influence on the formation of political attitudes (Butters and Hare, 2022; Carlson and Settle, 2016; Levitan and Verhulst, 2016; Mildenberger and Tingley, 2019). Specifically, regarding worldviews and ideologies, the average level of SDO within a friendship group reliably predicts each member's SDO levels over time (Poteat et al., 2007). Additionally, significant correlations in RWA scores have been observed among married couples (Altemeyer, 1996) and between parents and children (Altemeyer, 1988; Dhont et al., 2013). Therefore, we propose that an individual's levels of DWB, CWB, RWA, and SDO will align closely with the average levels observed within their ingroups (although see Kandler et al., 2016 for distinctions between SDO and RWA).

In line with human development research, we also suggest that the ingroups most influential in shaping worldviews and ideologies may change throughout different life stages (Papalia et al., 2007). For instance, during childhood parents may be the primary ingroup affecting a child's worldviews and ideologies (Hatemi and McDermott, 2012; Kandler et al., 2012). As adolescents, the key influencers shift from parents to peers, particularly schoolmates (Harris, 1998). In adulthood, the groups that shape worldviews and ideologies may continue to change based on specific circumstances. In the early stages of adulthood, for instance, university peers often have a significant impact (Guimond and Palmer, 1990, 1996; Lepièce et al., 2016; Scott, 2024), while later, the perspectives of colleagues at work, social movement participants, or members of political parties can become increasingly important (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Thus, the role of peer pressure is noteworthy at various stages of life.

Finally, it is worth noting that cohort effects are also important in shaping worldviews and ideologies. For instance, it has been shown that the age cohort that transitioned to young adulthood during the Civil Rights movement and the opposition to the Vietnam War exhibited significantly lower levels of SDO compared to both older and younger cohorts (Pratto and Cathey, 2002). Furthermore, cohort-specific effects were found for women who experienced National Socialism: whereas research has traditionally shown that women tend to have lower SDO levels than men (e.g., Ho et al., 2015; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Vilanova et al., 2022a), women who experienced National Socialism had higher SDO levels than men within the same cohort (Küpper and Zick, 2011). Finally, lower levels of SDO were observed among younger birth cohorts, alongside a significant declining trend in RWA across distinct cohorts, indicating societal shifts that also foster changes in worldviews and ideologies (Zubielevitch et al., 2023).

Hence, we propose a new attitudinal framework for the development of worldviews and ideologies, the Collective Experiences Model of Worldviews and Ideologies, which incorporates these highlighted factors (see Figure 10). This model builds on the literature on attitude formation rather than symptom formation, highlighting significant directions for future research as well as providing a new interpretation for existing studies.

10 Implications for the dual process model of ideology and prejudice

The propositions of the Dual Process Model of Ideology and Prejudice regarding worldviews and ideologies—such that CWB predict SDO and DWB predict RWA (see Figure 7)—are well-established in the literature (Asbrock and Fritsche, 2013; Duckitt and Fisher, 2003; Perry et al., 2013; Sibley and Duckitt, 2010, 2013; Sibley et al., 2007). Likewise, the assertion that worldviews and ideologies predict prejudice toward a wide range of groups is also robust (Anderson and Ferguson, 2018; Ching et al., 2020; Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010; Cozzarelli et al., 2002; Crawford et al., 2016; Gouveia et al., 2021; Hunsberger et al., 1999; Makwana et al., 2018; Mandalaywala et al., 2018; Pratto and Shih, 2000; Rowatt et al., 2005; Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2005; Vilanova et al., 2021). However, the part of the model that has been largely overlooked involves the origins of these worldviews and ideologies. This aspect has undergone significant revision over time, initially emphasizing parent-child relationships (Duckitt, 2001) and later shifting focus to the degree of threat, inequality, resource scarcity and competition of the environment (Duckitt and Sibley, 2017). We believe our proposal offers a more coherent reformulation of the model that better aligns with its foundational principles. For example, while the Dual Process Model defines worldviews and ideologies as social attitudes (Duckitt and Sibley, 2017, p. 190), it paradoxically explains their origins in a way similar to psychoanalytic theories of symptom formation. Again, we do not suggest that the Dual Process Motivational Model is itself psychoanalytic; rather, we point to a genealogical continuity whereby the model traces its intellectual lineage to Adorno et al. (1950), who explicitly acknowledged their reliance on Freudian assumptions, thereby reproducing—within a contemporary social-cognitive framework—the broader explanatory logic linking adversity to later ideological orientations. Our approach moves beyond this by incorporating key insights from the literature on attitude formation (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Festinger, 1950), addressing recent evidence that highlights the limitations of individual experiences (Clifton, 2020; De Neve, 2015; Kerry et al., 2024; Unnever et al., 2007; Vilanova et al., 2024), and considering empirical findings on the influence of disruptive collective events, media effects, ingroup pressure, and cohort effects. Thus, we focus on the social dynamics central to the formation of worldviews and ideologies, expanding on the most up-to-date version of the model (Duckitt and Sibley, 2017) and bridging the gap between individual and collective explanations of ideological development, proposing a model that more accurately reflects the complexity of how worldviews and ideologies are shaped.

Another important modification we proposed is that increases in inequality and resource scarcity could lead to lower levels of CWB and SDO, contrary to the higher levels originally suggested (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt and Sibley, 2017). This proposition aligns with broader research on attitudes toward redistributive policies, particularly support for wealth tax increases. Studies have consistently shown that during periods of pronounced inequality and widespread poverty, mass movements advocating for social equality tend to emerge, fostering increased public endorsement of policies aimed at reducing disparities (Ayerbe, 2004; Coggiola, 2007; Martins, 2016; Piketty, 2020; Visentini, 2007). These mobilizations suggest that under conditions of severe inequality, the psychological appeal of cooperation and solidarity may override competitive and dominance-driven orientations. Therefore, rather than reinforcing competitive worldviews and dominance preferences, widespread economic distress may instead activate egalitarian tendencies and motivate support for structural reforms designed to mitigate inequality, particularly when institutional actors such as political parties mobilize and channel protest against it. This reinterpretation highlights the need to integrate socio-economic context into models of ideological development, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of how inequality influences psychological orientations and political preferences.

Another proposal of the Dual Process Model that is often overlooked is the proposal that worldviews and ideologies crystallize by “mid to later adolescence” (Duckitt and Sibley, 2017, p. 192). The lack of studies with adolescents makes it hard to empirically test this proposal, but preliminary evidence indicates that the relationships between DWB, CWB, RWA, and SDO continually unfold from 13 to 17 years old (Vilanova et al., 2024). The crystallization hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence demonstrating considerable stability in worldviews and ideologies over extended periods, including 1 year (Onraet et al., 2014), 10 years (Osborne et al., 2021), and even 15 years (Ludeke and Krueger, 2013). However, it is crucial to recognize that most of these studies were conducted during times of relative social stability. For example, the research by Ludeke and Krueger (2013) was carried out in Minnesota between 1990 and 2009, Osborne et al. (2021) analyzed data collected in New Zealand from 2009 to 2018, and Onraet et al. (2014) focused on a period between 2010 and 2011 in the Netherlands. Thus, while these findings affirm the long-term stability of worldviews and ideologies, it remains unclear whether the same patterns would hold during periods of intense social disruption or rapid societal change. In times of social upheaval or instability, such as during the Nazi rise to power, greater ideological fluidity has been observed (Shirer, 1991), challenging the idea of early crystallization. Therefore, we propose that worldviews and ideologies may continue to develop throughout the life course, influenced by social and environmental factors highlighted in our model. The extent to which they crystallize may depend on the social context, with periods of instability potentially leading to greater ideological change. The stability or instability of a given period may contribute to the predominant worldviews and ideologies of specific generations, as evidenced by the cohort effects recently documented (e.g., Zubielevitch et al., 2023). Moreover, it is worth noting that studies that examine ideological development across childhood are also essential for understanding the developmental processes underlying the formation of worldviews and ideologies.

Another area of research worth noting examines the relationship between parenting styles and the development of specific worldviews and ideologies. Notably, studies have shown that parents who endorse corporal punishment as a child-rearing practice tend to exhibit higher levels of RWA (Danso et al., 1997; Manuel, 2006). Building on this, Altemeyer (1988) hypothesized that parenting styles characterized by high demands and low responsiveness are likely to foster higher levels of RWA in offspring, and this hypothesis has gained such traction that some researchers have used child-rearing values scales as proxy measures for RWA (e.g., Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). Moreover, Lansford et al. (2025) recently observed statistically significant predictive effects of parental warmth on the child seeing the world as good (β = 0.21, p < 0.001), safe (β = 0.18, p = 0.002), and enticing (β = 0.17, p = 0.002). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the parenting style framework does not fully account for cohort effects or the transformative impact of disruptive events. As previously discussed, evidence points to intergenerational discontinuity in both RWA and SDO (Küpper and Zick, 2011; Pratto and Cathey, 2002; Zubielevitch et al., 2023) and if parenting practices accounted for a high share of worldview and ideological development, such instability would not be found. These patterns suggest that factors beyond parenting—such as societal shifts and collective experiences—may play a critical role in shaping ideological orientations, highlighting the need for more comprehensive models of ideological development that go beyond parenting styles.

The broader implications for the Dual Process Model linking worldviews and ideologies to prejudice are also noteworthy. Since worldviews and ideologies are shaped by the social conditions of specific historical periods, the degree and targets of prejudice may shift accordingly. While it is difficult to predict exactly who will become the targets of prejudice in a given era, we can reasonably propose that social instability will likely lead to change in levels of DWB, CWB, RWA, and SDO, and consequently levels of prejudice. To determine whether prejudice will increase or decrease, it is crucial to examine whether disruptive events have occurred and whether they have led to heightened violence. If these conditions arise, prejudice is likely to intensify. Similarly, if media coverage shifts to focus more on violence, worldviews and ideologies may evolve in ways that increase prejudice. On the other hand, if social changes significantly reduce violence, we can expect prejudice to decline as a result of corresponding changes in worldviews and ideologies. Similarly, if disruptive events lead to heightened inequality and resource scarcity or if media coverage focuses more on inequality and resource scarcity, it is likely that prejudice will be reduced, as people will likely perceive existing levels of inequality and poverty as unacceptable.

Finally, it is important to note that Duckitt (1989) himself offered a critical appraisal of the authoritarian personality tradition, explicitly challenging the proposal by Adorno et al. (1950) that reduced collective and intergroup phenomena to individual-level explanations. Duckitt (1989) had already proposed a shift toward conceptualizing authoritarianism as an orientation to the group rather than as merely an individual personality syndrome. In this sense, the author was clearly aware of, and shared, concerns about overly individualistic explanations of ideological variables. This makes it particularly noteworthy that, in his later formulation of the Dual Process Motivational Model (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt and Sibley, 2017), explanatory weight is placed on individual adversity experiences as key antecedents of worldview and ideologies. The re-emergence of this assumption, even within a framework developed by a scholar previously critical of reductionism, underscores the persistence of individual-level explanatory intuitions in the literature and highlights the need to more systematically theorize collective and macro-social mechanisms of worldview formation and change.

11 Implications for psychological theories on worldviews and ideologies

While individual experiences may significantly shape constructs commonly explored in psychology, such as psychiatric symptoms (Hughes et al., 2017; Mayo et al., 2017; Petruccelli et al., 2019; Sahle et al., 2021), this influence is less evident in more complex social phenomena. Shifting the focus from individual to collective experiences is crucial for overcoming current paradoxes in social psychological theories addressing the development of worldviews and ideologies. Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), for instance, suggests that individual factors—such as belonging to a dominant social group—is a key factor for the development of worldviews and ideologies. However, there is a paradox whereby individuals often adopt dominance-oriented worldviews, even when their personal circumstances do not align with these beliefs (e.g., Glick et al., 2000; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Jost and Thompson, 2000). We propose that this paradox is resolved when we consider media effects as we did in our model, as it has a more profound effect in shaping worldviews and ideologies than individual experience itself.

Similarly, System Justification Theory (Jost, 2020) has traditionally examined both personal and societal factors that contribute to the formation of system-justifying beliefs, suggesting that individuals are motivated to defend, legitimize, and sustain existing social, economic, and political systems, even to their own detriment. In particular, Jost (2011) observed that members of disadvantaged groups are often more likely to support the status quo than members of advantaged groups, attributing this to rationalization effects, wherein those who experience hardship may justify their suffering to alleviate cognitive dissonance. This cognitive dissonance is fueled by socially-shared narratives that cultivate a false consciousness, leading individuals to endorse the very systems that perpetuate their disadvantage (although see Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018 for opposite effects). By emphasizing the role of media, disruptive events, and cohort effects, our perspective deepens the understanding of how collective forces, rather than individual struggles, contribute to the development of these ideologies, reinforcing that system-justifying beliefs are less about individual psychological defenses and more about the social and cultural influences that normalize and rationalize inequality.

Another important aspect to be considered is the theory about RWA. For instance, the leading proponent of the RWA, Altemeyer (1988, p. 55) based on the social learning theory of Bandura (1977), argued that RWA is “mostly learned through imitation and vicarious reinforcement,” acknowledging the role that various socializing agents such as family members and peers, and even news media, could play on the development of RWA. Nevertheless, he still insisted that some individual experiences such as becoming a parent play a key role in shaping RWA levels (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 97). Hence, even theorists like Altemeyer, who advocated for an attitudinal approach, still attributed a major role to individual experiences. We argue that this influence is negligible, and future studies should focus on collective experiences instead.

12 Implications for genetics studies

It is also worth considering the implications of our model for studies examining the genetic impact on worldviews and ideologies. While our model does not explicitly address genetic influences, we recognize their presence, particularly within the context of group dynamics, such as familial effects. For instance, studies have shown dissimilar estimates in the proportion of variance on worldviews and ideologies that could be attributed to genetic factors, ranging from circa 5% to 60% (Hatemi and McDermott, 2012), suggesting a significant genetic influence. Dissimilar estimates have been found for RWA and SDO, with genetic factors accounting for 44% of the variance in RWA (Kandler et al., 2016) and 30% of the variance in SDO (Kleppestø et al., 2019). Despite acknowledging the role of genetics, we chose to focus on environmental factors because research consistently highlights the profound influence of the social environment on worldview and ideology formation. Genetic predispositions alone cannot fully account for the variation in worldviews and ideologies observed across different social groups and cultures, as these are heavily shaped by collective experiences and the broader social environment. For instance, Shirer (1991) documented the historical case of the Nazi party in Germany, a compelling illustration of how social upheavals and collective experiences can dramatically alter ideological orientations and political support. In 1925, the Nazi party had approximately 27,000 members, but by the end of 1929, following the onset of the economic crisis, this number surged to 178,000—a staggering increase of around 560%. Moreover, the party's political influence expanded even more dramatically: in the May 1928 German elections, the Nazi party garnered only 2.6% of the total votes. By March 1933, in the midst of severe economic and social turmoil, this figure had risen to 44% of the votes, marking a dramatic shift in public sentiment. Following the Reichstag fire in August of the same year, a climate of fear and propaganda facilitated the consolidation of power, and around 90% of voters supported Hitler in taking over the powers of the presidency. This transformation highlights how social and historical events, rather than innate individual characteristics, can shape mass ideological shifts, underscoring the need to consider collective experiences and social contexts when examining the emergence and persistence of ideological beliefs.

By centering our model on broader social factors, we offer a more nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between genetics and environment. We emphasize that while genetic predispositions may set the stage, they do not operate in a vacuum. Instead, it is the collective disruptive events, media effects, ingroup, and cohort effects that largely drive the development, transmission, and reinforcement of worldviews and ideologies. This focus on social factors does not negate the role of genetics or of other biological factors such as those posited by the parasite-stress theory of values and sociality (Thornhill and Fincher, 2014), but rather places it in a broader context where social influences ultimately shape the expression and evolution of worldviews over time.

13 Guiding future research on worldviews and ideological development with the collective experiences model of worldviews and ideologies

Our new theoretical framework provides concrete directions for future research, particularly emphasizing the importance of panel longitudinal studies. The future directions discussed below were selected because they follow directly from the theoretical scope of the proposed model, rather than aiming to provide an exhaustive list of all possible extensions. In addition, the data-analytic strategies highlighted in this section are grounded in contemporary statistical modeling techniques appropriate for testing complex, multilevel theoretical frameworks. Such studies are increasingly necessary to capture how worldviews and ideological orientations evolve in response to social, economic, and political transformations. Given that global inequality continues to rise (World Bank, 2023), future research should focus on tracking shifts in CWB and SDO over time and their associations with local indices of inequality. Consistent with our predictions, if the current inequality trend persists and escalates into a widespread economic crisis, we anticipate a decline in both CWB and SDO, as perceptions of resource scarcity heighten concerns about distributive justice and equality. Conversely, the growing geopolitical tensions and recent wars, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and ongoing violence in the Middle East, highlight the potential for increased perceptions of dangerousness in the global landscape. Should these conflicts escalate or spread to additional regions, we predict a corresponding rise in DWB and RWA as individuals seek stability and protection through stricter hierarchical structures and authority figures. Therefore, incorporating multi-level modeling approaches to examine how macro-level events, such as economic downturns or wars, interact with micro-level factors, could be helpful to clarify the interplay between individual experiences and structural forces, advancing our understanding of the dynamic processes shaping worldviews and ideologies over time.

Longitudinal panel designs should also include adolescent samples, as research examining the development of worldviews and ideologies in adolescents is still in its early stages. While there is a growing body of literature on worldviews and ideologies in adulthood, much less is known about the specific trajectories of ideological development during adolescence and the dynamics of the developmental process as individuals transition from youth to adulthood. For instance, most of the longitudinal studies examining worldviews and ideologies have focused primarily on adult samples (e.g., Onraet et al., 2014; Osborne et al., 2021; Zubielevitch et al., 2023), which leaves a significant gap in understanding how these beliefs develop during adolescence. To address this gap, growth curve modeling or latent trajectory analysis could be applied to longitudinal data from adolescent samples, enabling the assessment of individual differences in ideological development over time. Moreover, longitudinal studies that include adolescents can help identify key moments or experiences that contribute to the formation or reinforcement of worldviews, such as exposure to political events, societal changes, and shifts in family dynamics. Understanding how these factors interact during adolescence can enhance our understanding of the long-term development of ideological orientations and provide a clearer picture of how attitudes formed in adolescence may continue to evolve or remain stable into adulthood.

Another critical factor to consider in social psychological research on the development of worldviews and ideologies is the amount of media coverage dedicated to violence and inequality across different countries. Given the substantial media effects outlined in our framework, establishing an international database that tracks prevalent media topics in each country could provide valuable insights. While similar initiatives have been conducted in the United States to examine media influences (e.g., Gerbner and Gross, 1976), a comprehensive international database is still lacking. Such a resource would enable cross-national comparisons, shedding light on how variations in media content shape ideological orientations globally. To assess the potential impact of media coverage on worldviews, multilevel modeling could be applied, allowing for the examination of both individual and country-level media effects on ideological outcomes. For instance, the World Values Survey database (Haerpfer et al., 2020) could be leveraged to investigate whether a higher frequency of broadcast news coverage about violence is associated with elevated levels of DWB and RWA. Similarly, researchers could assess whether more extensive coverage of news about inequality is linked to lower levels of CWB and SDO. Developing such a database would not only advance our understanding of media-driven shifts in worldviews but also facilitate cross-cultural comparisons, enabling researchers to assess how these patterns vary depending on regional, cultural, and historical contexts.

Future research should investigate whether the frequency of broadcast news coverage about inequality moderates the relationship between belonging to dominant social groups and levels of SDO, as outlined by Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). It is essential to assess whether increased media exposure to inequality issues might amplify or attenuate the association between dominant group membership and SDO, potentially by influencing individuals' perceptions of the need to justify and sustain hierarchical structures in society. To examine this, moderation analysis could be employed, allowing researchers to explore how media exposure interacts with group membership to predict SDO. Additionally, this moderation process should also be assessed in light of System Justification Theory (Jost, 2020), which posits that individuals in disadvantaged groups may support the status quo to reduce perceived threats to their social identity. Specifically, research should investigate whether exposure to media that emphasizes systemic inequality leads individuals in disadvantaged groups to either increase or decrease their endorsement of the status quo. This interaction could be analyzed using multigroup modeling or latent interaction techniques to assess differential effects across groups.

Considering the growing body of research on RWA, it is crucial for future studies to shift their focus from primarily examining intraindividual factors—such as personal beliefs and cognitive processes—to a greater emphasis on interpersonal factors that influence the development of worldviews and ideologies. While much of the existing research has centered on the relationship between individual beliefs related to RWA, such as DWB, and other constructs like CWB and SDO (e.g., Asbrock and Fritsche, 2013; Duckitt and Fisher, 2003; Perry et al., 2013; Sibley and Duckitt, 2010, 2013; Sibley et al., 2007) or existential security, which may be crucial to these worldviews and ideologies (Inglehart, 2018), these studies often fail to capture the social and relational dynamics that shape ideological development. To more comprehensively account for the formation and evolution of worldviews, future research must consider not only the interconnectedness of individual beliefs but also the broader interpersonal factors that play a pivotal role in shaping ideological orientations, including the media effects, group effects, and disruptive events, all of which are interpersonal in nature and have significant implications for how individuals adopt and adapt their worldviews. Therefore, future research could use social network analysis to examine how participants' social connections (family, friends, and colleagues) influence their beliefs. Moreover, group effects could also be tested through surveys or experiments where participants engage in discussions with peers who either reinforce or challenge authoritarian beliefs.

Notably, a further refinement of the model should aim to specify more precisely what is meant by individual and collective experiences by explicitly incorporating intermediate, meso-social levels of analysis. While the current formulation distinguishes experiences primarily along an individual-collective axis, future refinements could benefit from disentangling direct vs. indirect experiences and personal vs. societal contexts across multiple social scales. In this perspective, familial experiences would operate at a micro-social level through direct, recurrent interactions, whereas community-level contexts such as neighborhoods, districts, or local communities would constitute meso-social environments (see for example Bronfenbrenner, 1979). These meso-level experiences may involve both direct exposure (e.g., everyday interactions, local violence, or resource scarcity) and indirect exposure (e.g., shared narratives or local media), positioning them ambiguously between micro- and macro-social domains. Clarifying whether and how such meso-social experiences function as extensions of individual experience or as localized forms of collective experience would help refine the explanatory scope of the model, allowing it to better capture how different layers of social reality jointly contribute to the development of worldviews and ideologies. Another important refinement is to differentiate between chronic and sporadic adverse experiences and to account for the developmental periods in which such experiences occur, as these dimensions may interact and give rise to qualitatively dissimilar outcomes.

Finally, future research should also address the effects of formal education on the development of worldviews and ideologies. Although we did not focus on this variable in our model, there is evidence supporting its influence. For example, longitudinal studies have shown that SDO levels significantly decrease after 1 year of attending university college (Sinclair et al., 1998), particularly among psychology students (Dambrun et al., 2009). Similarly, 4 years of formal education have been found to significantly reduce RWA levels, with majors in liberal arts promoting a greater decrease in RWA compared to nursing majors, and nursing majors promoting a greater decrease than majors in administrative studies (Altemeyer, 1988). Future studies could employ growth curve modeling or latent change score analysis to track ideological shifts over time and examine the trajectories of RWA and SDO development in relation to different educational contexts. Additionally, multigroup analysis could be used to assess whether the effects of education vary by field of study, and cross-lagged panel designs could clarify causal relationships between formal education and changes in ideological orientations. While this was not the primary focus of our model, we acknowledge that education likely plays a critical role in shaping worldviews and ideologies, and we encourage future research to explore these relationships further.

14 Conclusion

By introducing our new Collective Experiences Model of Worldviews and Ideologies, we contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing collective events rather than individual adverse experiences. Our conclusions are tentative, since we did not conduct any meta-analysis to make them more robust. However, we highlight a crucial aspect that has been largely overlooked: the clinical assumption that adverse experiences are central to the formation of worldviews and ideologies. This assumption has seldom been empirically tested, and recent evidence indicates only marginal associations between adverse experiences and worldviews and ideologies. This finding encourages us to advocate for a shift in focus toward collective events, positioning it within a new, coherent framework that integrates both past and current evidence regarding the development of worldviews and ideologies.

While we have identified several empirically supported factors that influence worldviews and ideologies—such as media coverage, terrorist attacks, economic crises, and ingroup belief similarity—it is important to note that this list is not exhaustive. Future research should aim to uncover additional events that shape worldviews and ideologies. Collectively, these factors contribute to cohort effects, which can be analyzed to determine how specific influences affect members of each generation. Furthermore, it is important to consider constraints on generality, as the distinct components of the model may dissimilarly affect development in different contexts, particularly considering the cultural context and nationality.

It is important to emphasize that the framework we propose offers a novel perspective on the development of worldviews and ideologies—one that diverges from earlier conceptions rooted in psychopathological explanations. Unlike the theories originally advanced by Reich (1970), Fromm (1941), and Adorno et al. (1950), which conceptualize ideological orientations and worldviews as defensive reactions to underlying psychological symptoms, our framework situates these constructs within broader social and structural dynamics. Rather than viewing the formation of ideologies—along with their potential consequences, such as prejudice—as pathological responses to intrapsychic conflict or psychological dysfunction, we argue that they emerge from intricate social processes driven by contextual, historical, and cultural forces. Specifically, we reject interpretations that attribute authoritarianism to sexual repression, punitive parenting, or “dysfunctional” family dynamics. Nor do we contend that ideological orientations primarily reflect clinical symptoms or are reducible to individual adverse experiences. Instead, we posit that worldviews and ideologies are shaped by the interplay of macro-level social processes—including media narratives, disruptive societal events, group norms, and generational influences—that operate independently of personal pathology. This approach highlights the importance of examining how systemic and structural factors coalesce to influence belief systems, moving beyond explanations rooted in individual pathology or isolated psychological trauma. Hence, social psychology will move beyond reductionist explanations of worldviews and ideologies, moving away from traditional models and ultimately offering more comprehensive strategies for addressing prejudice, polarization, and ideological conflict. In fact, we believe that a multidisciplinary approach holds considerable promise for generating novel insights into the model, particularly by integrating perspectives from psychoanalysis with those from social-cognitive and affective neuroscience, which may meaningfully advance its further development.

Finally, it is worth noting that although our model was largely motivated by historical processes that unfolded in the Global South and we explicitly referenced cases such as the October Revolution (Kollontai, 1921), the Iranian Revolution (Coggiola, 2007), the Vietnamese Revolution (Visentini, 2007), and the Cuban Revolution (Ayerbe, 2004), its theoretical core relied primarily on the Dual Process Model, which was originally developed in the Global North (Duckitt, 2001). Importantly, a substantial body of evidence indicates that the core assumptions of this model are also applicable to contexts in the Global South, particularly with regard to the relationships between worldviews, ideologies, and prejudice (e.g., Cantal et al., 2015; Gouveia et al., 2021; Vilanova et al., 2021). At the same time, we acknowledge that theoretical contributions developed in the Global South offer valuable perspectives that could meaningfully advance and refine our framework. For example, Silva's (1970) account of ideological development in the Venezuelan context, Fals Borda's (1970) analysis of the social and political implications of violence in Colombia, and Pinto's (1960) reflections on the formation of critical consciousness provide conceptual resources that are highly relevant to our aims. Future research should therefore seek to engage more systematically with these and other contributions from Global South scholars in order to deepen and extend the proposed model.

Correction note

A correction has been made to this article. Details can be found at: 10.3389/frsps.2026.1849496.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Richard P. Eibach, University of Waterloo, Canada

Reviewed by: Benjamin Giguère, University of Guelph, Canada

Pablo Chaverri, National University of Costa Rica, Costa Rica