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Frontiers in Social Psychology ·

Volume 4 - 2026 | https://doi.org/10.3389/frsps.2026.1719133

Government's economic management and citizen satisfaction: a Partisan Disconfirmation Model

  • Lloyd George Banda1,2*corresponding author
  • Kamal Yakubu3
  1. 1Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University, Western Cape, South Africa
  2. 2Institute for Economics, Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg, Freiburg, Baden-Württemberg, Germany
  3. 3Capacity Building, Afrobarometer, Accra, Ghana
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Abstract

How do citizens evaluate government economic performance? Although both economic perceptions and partisan identity are known to shape political attitudes, their interaction remains poorly understood. This study develops a Partisan Disconfirmation Model (PDM), integrating expectancy–disconfirmation theory (EDT) with partisan identity to explain how citizens form satisfaction judgments about government economic management. The study uses a nationally representative Afrobarometer survey data from Malawi (N = 1,200). Ordered logistic regression models are estimated to examine how perceptions of national economic conditions and partisan identification influence satisfaction with government economic management. The analysis includes interaction terms to assess whether partisan effects vary across economic contexts. Hypotheses are evaluated using omnibus Wald tests of joint parameter significance, alongside post-estimation contrasts based on predicted probabilities. Perceived economic performance emerges as the strongest predictor of satisfaction, with more positive evaluations significantly increasing the likelihood of favorable assessments of government economic management. Partisan alignment also shapes evaluations, as ruling-party identifiers report higher satisfaction than opposition supporters. While joint tests confirm the independent effects of economic perceptions and partisanship, post-estimation contrasts provide no evidence that partisan effects vary across economic contexts, indicating that these influences operate independently rather than conditionally. The findings highlight the central role of economic performance perceptions in shaping satisfaction with government economic management. Although partisanship influences baseline attitudes, the absence of conditional partisan belief updating suggests that economic perceptions and partisan identity exert independent effects, rather than interacting through a disconfirmation process as predicted by the PDM.

Keywords

Introduction

Understanding how citizens evaluate government economic management remains central to the study of democratic accountability, particularly in developing democracies where economic performance often dominates political discourse. In these contexts, citizens often equate democratic success with improved living standards, economic conditions, and economic growth (Aitalieva and Morelock, 2019; Amri, 2023). Since extended economic crises in the third world stimulated riots and the resulting overthrow of dictators during the third wave of democracy, governments are frequently judged by their capacity to deliver economic improvement, stabilize prices, create employment, and reduce poverty (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Levitsky and Way, 2024; Makinda, 1996). Nevertheless, citizens' satisfaction with government economic management does not derive solely from objective economic outcomes; instead, it emerges from how individuals interpret economic conditions through political and cognitive lenses.

This study examines how citizens form satisfaction judgments about government economic management by integrating expectancy–disconfirmation theory (EDT) with partisan identity through the Partisan Disconfirmation Model (PDM). The core objective of the study is therefore to determine whether satisfaction with government economic management is primarily driven by perceived economic performance or conditioned by partisan identity, and how these two forces interact. Existing research offers two broad perspectives on political satisfaction and government approval. One strand emphasizes performance-based evaluation, arguing that citizens reward or punish incumbents based on economic outcomes and policy performance (Aitalieva and Morelock, 2019; van Ryzin, 2004, 2006; Oliver, 1997; Foster and Warren, 2025; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011; Lewis-Beck et al., 2013). A second strand highlights the role of partisan attachments, suggesting that political identities shape how citizens interpret economic realities and government performance (Bratton et al., 2012; Mattes and Krönke, 2020; Ward and Tavits, 2019; Söderberg, 2024). However, much of this literature treats performance evaluations and partisanship as competing explanations rather than examining how they interact within citizens' cognitive evaluation processes.

A key limitation in the existing literature is the insufficient attention paid to how economic assessments and political beliefs jointly structure satisfaction judgments. Studies often assume either performance dominance or partisan bias without systematically modeling how partisan effects vary across different economic performance contexts. In particular, limited empirical work examines whether partisan conditioning weakens when economic performance signals are clear and strengthens when performance evaluations are ambiguous. This gap is especially evident in African contexts, where political competition, economic vulnerability, and party-system institutionalization differ markedly from advanced democracies.

This study addresses this gap by explicitly modeling satisfaction as the outcome of a disconfirmation process combining perceived economic performance and partisan identity. The study draws on nationally representative survey data from Malawi, a theoretically informative case because its institutional design combines a unitary (non-federal) state structure with meaningful—though uneven—multilevel governance through decentralization, and because its competitive electoral politics provides variation in partisan expectations and performance evaluations. Constitutionally, Malawi operates a presidential system in which executive authority is vested in a directly elected president, while a unicameral National Assembly exercises legislative authority with powers to debate, amend, accept or reject bills, approve public finance, and pursue executive accountability measures (Constitution of Malawi, 1994).

Empirically, the county's post-1994 governance trajectory is influenced by experimental decentralization reforms that seek to devolve selected functions to local authorities; however, Malawian scholarship shows that accountability and capacity constraints, elite bargaining, and the political control of local resources often limit the depth of effective devolution (Tambulasi and Kayuni, 2007; Chasukwa et al., 2013). In a comparative African perspective, Malawi is institutionally closer to the continental “modal” pattern than to the federal minority: most African democracies are unitary states (with notable federal exceptions such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa) and many combine strong executives with legislatures that are formally empowered yet variably effective in practice. What makes Malawi especially useful for this study is that it pairs this standard institutional template with periodic episodes of robust horizontal accountability, especially judicial and civil-society resistance to executive overreach. These traits position Malawi between a typical executive predominance and meaningful checks (e.g., courts and civil society) that remain analytically consequential for citizen evaluations (Dionne and Dulani, 2025).

The contribution of this study, therefore, is threefold. First, it extends EDT to macro-political evaluation by demonstrating how citizens' satisfaction with government economic management arises from the interaction between citizens' perceived economic outcomes and political party affiliation. Second, it introduces a systematic empirical test of the PDM, thereby allowing a joint examination of economic performance and partisan effects, which are often separately examined. Third, it contributes to the growing literature on political behavior in Africa by providing evidence that citizens' assessments of economic performance strongly shape their satisfaction judgments about government performance.

The empirical findings show that perceived economic performance is the primary driver of satisfaction with government economic management. Satisfaction remains very low when economic conditions are perceived as bad but increases substantially as economic evaluations become neutral or positive. These effects are observed consistently across partisan groups, indicating that citizens' perceptions of economic conditions exert a strong and systematic influence on their satisfaction with government economic management.

At the same time, partisan identity independently shapes baseline levels of satisfaction. Ruling-party partisans are significantly more likely to report satisfaction than opposition party partisans, even when economic conditions are perceived as poor. However, the analysis does not find evidence that partisan identity significantly conditions the relationship between economic perceptions and satisfaction. Instead, economic performance perceptions and partisan identification exert additive effects on citizens' establishment of satisfaction. More broadly, these findings suggest that democratic accountability in Malawi operates primarily through performance-based evaluations of government economic management rather than through conditional partisan belief updating, consistent with research showing that voters in emerging democracies often evaluate governments based on perceived policy outcomes (Evans and Pickup, 2010; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007).

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and develops the hypotheses guiding the study. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the regression results and marginal effects estimates. Section 5 discusses the findings in relation to theory and prior research. Section 6 concludes with implications for democratic accountability and future research directions.

Background and theory

Expectancy-disconfirmation and citizen satisfaction

EDT conceptualizes satisfaction as the outcome of a comparative evaluation in which perceived performance is assessed relative to a prior reference standard called expectations (Anderson, 1973; Oliver, 1980; Kim et al., 2024; Favero et al., 2024; Morgeson, 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen and Porumbescu, 2017). The EDT states that satisfaction increases when performance exceeds expectations, decreases when performance falls short, and remains moderate when performance confirms expectations (van Ryzin, 2004, 2013). Importantly, the EDT emphasizes that satisfaction emerges from the comparison between perceived performance and prior expectations rather than from performance alone (Oliver, 1980; van Ryzin, 2004). Nevertheless, empirical studies in both consumer research and public administration consistently demonstrate that perceived performance often exerts a strong direct influence on satisfaction judgments, even while operating through the broader disconfirmation process (Spreng et al., 1996; Schiebler et al., 2026).

This framework has been widely adopted beyond consumer research, particularly in studies of citizen satisfaction with public services. van Ryzin's work adapts EDT to the public sector and demonstrates that satisfaction with government services is best explained by the relationship between perceived performance and expectations, rather than by performance alone. Across multiple studies, (van Ryzin 2004, 2006, 2013) shows that expectations structure how citizens interpret service outcomes and condition their satisfaction responses, providing a strong foundation for applying EDT to political and governmental evaluations.

A central refinement in the EDT literature is the distinction between predictive expectations—beliefs about what is likely to occur—and normative expectations or desires—beliefs about what should occur (Spreng and Olshavsky, 1993). Predictive expectations play a vital role in disconfirmation processes by anchoring the interpretation of outcomes prior to evaluation.

Predictive expectations and the role of partisanship

In political contexts, predictive expectations about government performance are rarely measured directly prior to evaluation. Instead, citizens rely on durable cognitive and social cues to form beliefs about likely performance. In this study, partisan identification is conceptualized as a proxy for predictive expectations. Partisanship provides an informational shortcut that structures beliefs about government competence and anticipated outcomes (Baylor, 2026; Rau, 2021). That is, ruling party partisans tend to hold more favorable expectations of performance, whereas opposition identifiers tend to anticipate poorer performance (Carkoglu et al., 2025).

This conceptualization is consistent with research on learning and information processing, which shows that prior beliefs shape how new information is interpreted and weighted, especially in complex environments characterized by uncertainty and delayed feedback (Hoch and Ha, 1986). More recent work in political psychology and political economy reinforces this insight, demonstrating that individuals update political and economic beliefs in a belief-consistent manner, often using partisan identity as a heuristic in information-rich but cognitively demanding environments (Druckman and McGrath, 2019; Tappin et al., 2021). Studies on motivated reasoning and partisan information processing further show that prior identities influence the interpretation of performance signals, particularly when objective indicators are noisy or temporally distant, as is the case with macroeconomic outcomes (Taber and Lodge, 2012; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Bisgaard, 2019). In macroeconomic domains specifically, citizens rely on partisan cues to form forward-looking expectations about government competence under uncertainty, rather than engaging in detailed retrospective performance accounting (Kayser and Peress, 2012). Macroeconomic evaluations constitute precisely this type of informational context. Economic outcomes are typically complex, delayed, and difficult for citizens to attribute clearly to government action. As a result, citizens often confront economic information in environments that are simultaneously information-rich yet cognitively demanding, which increases reliance on heuristic cues such as partisan identity when interpreting economic performance signals.

Conditional evaluation and the limits of partisan influence

The EDT and related learning theories suggest that the influence of expectations on satisfaction is conditional rather than uniform. When performance information is clearly positive or clearly negative, satisfaction judgments are expected to be dominated by performance assessments, leaving limited scope for prior expectations to shape evaluations. In contrast, when performance signals are ambiguous, mixed, or weak, prior expectations exert greater influence, conditioning how outcomes are interpreted (Anderson, 1973; Hoch and Ha, 1986). Contemporary work in political psychology and behavioral decision-making reinforces this conditional logic, showing that belief updating is most responsive to objective signals when information is clear and diagnostic, but reverts to identity-consistent interpretation under ambiguity or uncertainty (Taber and Lodge, 2012; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Bisgaard, 2019; Druckman and McGrath, 2019).

In the context of macroeconomic evaluations, neutrality in reported economic conditions often reflects informational ambiguity rather than a stable or precise assessment of performance (Gilboa and Marinacci, 2016; Ilut and Schneider, 2022). Macroeconomic outcomes are complex, delayed, and frequently interpreted through incomplete information. When citizens evaluate economic conditions as clearly good or clearly bad, performance signals are relatively unambiguous and easier to attribute to government competence or failure. By contrast, neutral (neither good nor bad) evaluations typically arise when individuals encounter mixed, uncertain, or weak performance signals that do not clearly confirm or disconfirm prior expectations. Under such conditions of informational ambiguity, individuals are more likely to rely on heuristic cues—such as partisan identity—to interpret economic performance. Research in political psychology and behavioral decision-making shows that prior beliefs exert stronger influence when information is ambiguous or difficult to interpret (Hoch and Ha, 1986; Taber and Lodge, 2012; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Bisgaard, 2019). In this sense, neutral economic evaluations provide an empirically observable context in which ambiguity is more likely to arise, thereby allowing the conditional influence of partisan expectations to be examined.

Applied to political evaluations, this implies that partisanship should not exert a constant main effect on satisfaction. Instead, its influence should be most substantial under conditions of evaluative ambiguity and attenuated when economic conditions are clearly good or bad. This conditional logic aligns with citizen-satisfaction research showing that expectations matter most when performance signals are weak or mixed (van Ryzin, 2006, 2013).

The contribution of the PDM lies in clarifying when economic performance evaluations dominate citizens' satisfaction judgments and when partisan identity becomes more influential. Existing approaches often assume either that performance evaluations determine satisfaction or that partisan loyalties systematically bias political judgments. The PDM instead proposes that these forces operate conditionally: performance perceptions dominate when economic signals are clearly positive or negative, whereas partisan identity exerts greater influence when economic evaluations are ambiguous. By modeling this interaction, the framework can explain variation in satisfaction judgments across performance contexts rather than treating performance and partisanship as competing explanations. The hypotheses derived below, therefore, specify how satisfaction patterns shift across combinations of economic evaluations and partisan alignment.

In reference to EDT, satisfaction increases as perceived performance improves relative to prior expectations (Oliver, 1980; van Ryzin, 2004). In political contexts, citizens interpret macroeconomic conditions as signals of government competence. When economic conditions are perceived as poor, citizens experience negative disconfirmation and are therefore more likely to express dissatisfaction with government economic management. Conversely, when economic conditions are perceived as favorable, citizens experience positive disconfirmation, increasing the likelihood of reporting satisfaction. Indeed, the focus of EDT lies on the gap between expectations and performance perceptions. However, it has been widely assumed and empirically demonstrated that performance exhibits an independent main effect on satisfaction (Golder et al., 2012; Schiebler et al., 2026), irrespective of expectations, hence our performance dominance hypothesis as follows:

H**1**: Performance effect: Citizens who evaluate national economic conditions more positively are more likely to report satisfaction with government economic management than those who evaluate economic conditions negatively.

In political environments, expectations about government performance are rarely formed in isolation but are structured by prior beliefs that function as cognitive reference points. Drawing from the Hypothesis Testing Theory (HTT), which conceptualizes individuals as intuitive hypothesis testers who evaluate new information against prior expectations (Deighton, 1984; Hoch and Ha, 1986), expectations in this framework are represented as hypotheses about likely outcomes, and that individuals tend to interpret incoming information in ways that are consistent with these prior beliefs due to confirmation bias. Applied to political evaluations, partisan identification serve as a salient cognitive prior that structures expectations about government competence and anticipated economic performance (Campbell et al., 1960; Bratton et al., 2012). Ruling party partisans are more likely to expect positive economic performance, whereas opposition party partisans tend to anticipate negative economic outcomes. These expectation differences influence how citizens interpret observed economic conditions and evaluate government performance. This expectation-consistent evaluation process provides a micro-foundation for the role of partisanship in shaping political judgments.

H**2**: Partisanship alignment effect: Consistent with hypothesis testing theory, citizens evaluate government economic performance in ways that are congruent with their prior partisan expectations. Consequently, ruling-party identifiers are more likely to report satisfaction with government economic management than opposition identifiers, while non-partisans are expected to report intermediate levels of satisfaction.

EDT and related learning models suggest that the influence of prior expectations is conditional on the clarity of performance signals. When performance outcomes are clearly positive or clearly negative, individuals rely primarily on observed performance outcomes to form satisfaction judgments (Schiebler et al., 2026). However, when performance signals are ambiguous or mixed, prior expectations play a stronger role in shaping evaluations. In political contexts, neutral assessments of economic conditions often reflect such informational ambiguity (van Ryzin, 2013). Under these circumstances, citizens are more likely to rely on expectations or otherwise partisan cues to interpret economic performance (Rami et al., 1995; Yi, 1990). Consequently, partisan differences in satisfaction should be strongest when economic evaluations are neutral.

H**3**: Partisan conditioning under neutral evaluations: Economic conditions moderate the relationship between partisan identification and satisfaction with government economic management.

H**3a**: The relationship between partisan identification and satisfaction with government economic management is stronger when economic conditions are evaluated as neutral than when they are evaluated as bad.

H**3b**: The relationship between partisan identification and satisfaction with government economic management is stronger when economic conditions are evaluated as neutral than when they are evaluated as good.

In addition, when economic signals are clear, either strongly positive or strongly negative, citizens can more easily attribute economic outcomes to government performance. Under such conditions, the relative influence of partisan expectations on satisfaction should be smaller than under neutral or ambiguous economic conditions. Thus, in our partisan attenuation hypothesis, we expect smaller differences in satisfaction between partisan groups when economic conditions are clearly favorable or clearly unfavorable, compared to when economic conditions are neutral.

H**4**: Attenuation under clear performance signals: When economic conditions are evaluated as clearly bad or clearly good, differences in satisfaction with government economic management between partisan groups are smaller than when economic conditions are evaluated as neutral.

Taken together, these hypotheses suggest that citizens' satisfaction with government economic management is shaped by the joint influence of perceived economic performance and partisan identity. However, the relative importance of these factors is not constant across contexts. When economic signals are clear—either strongly positive or strongly negative—citizens are more likely to rely on observable performance information when forming evaluative judgments. Under these circumstances, satisfaction becomes primarily performance-driven. By contrast, when economic signals are ambiguous, such as when citizens perceive economic conditions as neither clearly good nor clearly bad, individuals are more likely to rely on prior political orientations to interpret economic outcomes. In these situations, partisan identity functions as a cognitive prior that structures how economic information is interpreted and translated into satisfaction judgments. The PDM therefore predicts that performance perceptions and partisan identity interact in shaping satisfaction, with performance dominating under clear economic signals and partisan predispositions exerting greater influence under conditions of informational ambiguity.

In the study of expectancy-disconfirmation theory of consumer and customer satisfaction, existing studies demonstrate that factors such as perceptual bias, the availability of information, government budget allocation, and policy effectiveness significantly shape citizens' formulation of blame or praise attributions (Brunner et al., 2024; Mohr and Afonso, 2024; Amirkhanyan et al., 2023). For the purposes of empirical estimation, economic perceptions and partisan identification are treated as exogenous predictors of satisfaction, although both may themselves be shaped by broader political and socio-economic processes such as economic management. Importantly, we utilized the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach to check for endogeneity in our model. While absent, we still explained our results as associations rather than causality.

Materials and methods

The data used to examine the PDM is generated from the ninth wave of the Afrobarometer (AB) survey conducted in 2022. Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life. Nine survey rounds in up to 42 countries have been completed since 1999. The surveys are conducted face-to-face by Afrobarometer's national partners in the language of the respondent's choice (Nakayiza and Kamara, 2025). The AB survey questions equally solicit people's opinions on various aspects of life through ratings of the economy, political beliefs, and other experiences. AB provides a suitable opportunity for researchers and policymakers with evidence-based information for research and informing policy decisions (Afrobarometer, 2011). Importantly, operationalizing partisan identification as a proxy for predictive expectations allows the analysis to avoid the temporal sequencing problem common in traditional applications of the expectancy–disconfirmation model, where expectations and performance must be measured at different points in time (Favero et al., 2024).

For the sake of simplicity in the model's initial empirical application, the analysis will focus on a single country, Malawi. Malawi was specifically chosen because it provides a compelling case study for examining citizen satisfaction with economic management. The country faces significant socioeconomic challenges, with an average Human Development Index value of 0.501 (Human Development Report, 2024) and an average GDP per capita at 2015 constant prices of $574 (World Bank, 2025). In addition, Malawi is a small democratic country with a pluralistic party system that holds elections every 5 years and has already witnessed six transfers of power since the democratic dispensation in 1994 (Banda, 2025). The fundamental freedoms in Malawi's 1994 Constitution have led to the flourishing of many political parties and a vibrant civil society, which strongly shape Malawi's policy and political processes, such as creating platforms for grassroots participation in open political spaces (James and Malunga, 2006; Makuwira, 2011). Understanding these economic, political, and institutional contexts is paramount in citizen satisfaction research. Notably, the survey in Malawi involved a nationally representative, random, stratified probability sample of 1,200 adult Malawians. The sample yields country-level results with a desirable margin of error of ±3% at a 95% confidence level (Centre for Social Research, 2022). Table 1 presents key variables used in operationalizing the PDM.

Table 1. Disconfirmation variables and question wording.

VariableNo.Question wordingCategories
PartisanshipQ89bDo you feel close to any particular political party? Which political party?0 = identified with the opposition (all other parties), 1 = non-partisans, 2 = identified with the ruling party.
Perceived (realities of) economic conditionsQ4aIn general, how would you describe: the present economic condition of this country?Recoded into binary: 0 = very bad and bad; 1 = neutral; and 2 = very good and good.
Satisfaction with government economic managementQ46aNow let's speak about the performance of the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: (a) managing the economy?Retained: 0 = strongly dissatisfied, 1 = dissatisfied; 2 = satisfied, and 3 = very satisfied.

Source: Authors' compilation of AB round nine survey.

Citizens' satisfaction with government economic management is the dependent variable, which is four-scale ordered from very dissatisfied to very satisfied, distinguishing respondents who express satisfaction from those who express dissatisfaction. The key independent variables include citizens' evaluations of current national economic conditions and partisan identification. Economic conditions are classified into three categories (bad, neutral, and good), while partisan identification distinguishes between opposition supporters, ruling-party supporters, and non-partisans.

The study includes demographic factors such as respondents' age, rural-urban location, gender, education, and whether they are from the northern, central, or southern region, employment, and lived poverty to control for omitted variables that lie on the path of citizens' political behavior. As in most countries, the selected demographic variables have also been proven as fundamental determinants of political behavior, such as voting (Michael and Brooks, 2020; Dulani et al., 2021; Prytz, 2022). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study.

Table 2. Summary statistics of the study population.

VariablesFrequencyDissatisfiedSatisfied
n (%)n (%)n (%)
Age
18–25367 (34)311 (34)47 (29)
26–35319 (23)272 (23)43 (26)
36–44212 (18)186 (20)24 (13)
45–90302 (25)244 (23)47 (33)
Gender
Male601 (51)482 (49)102 (66)
Female599 (49)531 (51)59 (34)
Region
North152 (13)132 (13)191 (16)
Central528 (44)411 (41)106 (65)
Southern520 (43)470 (47)36 (19)
Location
Urban168 (14)138 (13)27 (19)
Rural984 (82)837 (83)126 (76)
Peri-urban48 (4)38 (4)8 (4)
Education
No education87 (7)74 (7)11 (7)
Primary718 (60)611 (61)92 (51)
Secondary337 (29)284 (28)47 (36)
Tertiary56 (4)43 (4)10 (6)
Employment
Unemployed1,097 (92)931 (93)143 (89)
Employed103 (8)82 (7)18 (11)
Partisanship
Opposition480 (40)432 (41)41 (20)
Non-partisan466 (39)392 (40)58 (34)
Ruling party247 (21)182 (19)62 (46)
Economic conditions
Bad1,012 (85)895 (89)96 (60)
Neutral68 (6)46 (4)22 (15)
Good113 (9)69 (7)41 (25)

Source: Authors' analysis.

We also included how often respondents obtain news from various sources. Regarding these sources of news, we classified them into broadcasting (radio, television, and newspaper) and digital (internet and social media) news using factor analysis, as shown in Table 3. Similarly, we included an index of lived poverty, which measures citizens' lived experiences by asking how many times they have gone without food, water, medical care, fuel, and cash income in the past year (Mattes, 2020). Responses range from never (0) to always (4), and a composite continuous variable was created using factor analysis, as shown in Table 4.

Table 3. Correlations and factor analysis for broadcast and digital news.

Broadcasting newsDigital news
VariablesRadioTelevisionNewspaperVariablesInternetSocial media
Radio1.0000
Television0.29061.0000Internet1.0000
Newspaper0.22450.40621.0000Social media0.8981.0000
Factor loadings>0.40070.72520.5602Factor loadings>0.92340.9234
Eigenvalue1.0002Eigenvalue1.705
Cronbach's alpha0.5407Cronbach's alpha0.8156

Source: Authors' analysis.

Table 4. Correlations and factor analysis for lived poverty.

VariablesFoodWaterMedicalFuelCash
Food1.0000
Water0.28581.0000
Medical0.31950.36081.0000
Fuel0.33050.35750.36751.0000
Cash0.42870.18350.34240.33631.0000
Factor loadings>0.59400.50530.60450.60650.5704
Eigenvalue2.215
Scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha)0.708

Source: Authors' analysis.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Using AB's weighting index for a single-country study, the descriptive statistics in Table 5 indicate a fair distribution of respondents across all ages, with the youthful population aged 18–25 years proportionally higher at 34%. The age group 45–90 has more individuals (33%) who express satisfaction with government economic management than the age group 36–44 (13%). Male citizens, who constitute 51% of the total population, have 66% expression of satisfaction with economic management compared to 34% of female respondents. Citizens from the central region, the current base of the ruling party (the Malawi Congress Party), constitute 65% individuals satisfied with government economic management, compared to the southern region, a stronghold for opposition parties, where only 19% are satisfied, and the northern region (16%). Interestingly, in the rural areas, which make up 82% of the survey respondents, 76% of respondents are satisfied with government economic management compared to urban (19%) and peri-urban (4%). It is important to note that the rural-urban distribution aligns with national census statistics, which confirm that 83% of Malawi's population is rural (National Statistics Office, 2019). The summary statistics also show that only 7% of the survey respondents had no formal education.

In addition, 40% of respondents identified themselves as closer to an opposition party, 21% as closer to the ruling party, and 39% as neither the incumbent nor the opposition party. Forty-six percent of citizens who identify with the ruling party are satisfied with the government's economic management, compared to non-partisans (34%) and opposition party identifiers (20%). Unsurprisingly, 85% of the sample expressed a negative evaluation of economic conditions. Out of 1,162 respondents captured in the study, 86% are dissatisfied, and only 14% are more likely to be satisfied with government economic management.

Model estimation output

To examine the determinants of satisfaction with government economic management, an ordered logistic regression model was estimated. Satisfaction with government economic management retains all four survey categories; very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, satisfied, and very satisfied. The key independent variables include citizens' evaluations of current national economic conditions and partisan identification. Economic conditions are classified into three categories (bad, neutral, and good), while partisan identification distinguishes between opposition supporters, ruling-party supporters, and non-partisans. To test the study's hypotheses regarding the conditional influence—that under neutral evaluations, economic conditions moderate the relationship between partisan identification and satisfaction with government economic management—we include interaction terms between economic conditions and partisan identification. Doing so allow as to examine whether the relationship between partisanship and satisfaction is strong when economic conditions are perceived as neutral that when perceived as bad or good. In addition, the interaction terms enable us to evaluate the attenuation hypothesis—that when economic conditions are clearly bad or clearly good, the differences in satisfaction between partisan groups are smaller than when economic conditions are evaluated as neutral.

Tables 5a–c below present the results of the ordered logistic regression model examining the determinants of satisfaction with government economic management. In Table 5a, the reference category for economic conditions is “Bad” evaluations, while for partisanship is “opposition” partisans. In Table 5b, the reference category for economic conditions is “neutral” evaluations, while for partisanship is “non-partisans.” On the other hand, in Table 5c, the reference category for economic conditions is “Good” evaluations, while for partisanship is “ruling party” partisans. Changing these reference category of these key variables does not change the results of control variables which range from range of socio-demographic and informational variables including age, gender, location (urban/rural), region, education, employment status, lived poverty, and exposure to broadcast and digital news. The purpose of presenting these tables is to show all pairwise comparisons from which joint (Wald) tests are computed to (dis)confirm the hypotheses.

Table 5a. Ordered logistic regression estimation results.

Mode 1aModel 2a
VariablesOdds ratioStd. errorodds ratioStd. error
Economic conditions (Ref: Bad)
Neutral2.691***(0.666)3.875***(1.612)
Good3.667***(0.762)3.174***(1.307)
Partisanship (Ref: Oppositions)
Non-partisans1.363**(0.224)1.358**(0.249)
Ruling party2.401***(0.471)2.621***(0.576)
Economic conditions *Partisanship
Neutral × Non-partisan0.725(0.424)
Neutral × Ruling0.452(0.269)
Good × Non-partisan1.356(0.703)
Good × Ruling1.039(0.568)
Controls
Age1.001(0.005)1.001(0.005)
Female0.759**(0.111)0.751**(0.110)
Locationn.s.
Region (Ref: Central)
North1.640**(0.351)0.760(0.152)
Southern0.940(0.212)0.569(0.219)
Educationn.s.n.s.
Employment1.424(0.357)1.425(0.358)
Lived poverty0.841***(0.038)1.128***(0.039)
Broadcasting news1.098(0.066)1.100(0.067)
Digital news0.988(0.075)0.983(0.075)
vhat_partisan1.231(0.015)1.3321.221
vhat_eco0.784(0.149)0.4120.474
Cut12.492(0.582)2.486(0.587)
Cut23.511(0.588)3.505(0.593)
Cut34.984(0.607)4.978(0.612)
Observations1,1421,142
Chi-square158.12***160.38***
Log-likelihood−914.1−912.99

Standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, vhat_par and vhat are residuals from 2SRI method for the two endogenous variables.

Table 5b. Ordered logistic regression estimation results.

Mode 1bModel 2b
VariablesOdds ratioStd. errorOdds ratioStd. error
Economic conditions (Ref: neutral)
Bad0.372***(0.092)0.356**(0.148)
Good1.363(0.412)1.531(0.752)
Partisanship (Ref: Non-partisans)
Opposition0.733**(0.120)1.015(0.564)
Ruling party1.761***(0.320)1.203(0.678)
Economic conditions *Partisanship
Bad × Opposition0.725(0.424)
Bad × Non-partisans1.604(0.955)
Neutral × Opposition0.535(0.393)
Neutral × Non-partisans1.229(0.875)
Controls
Age1.001(0.005)1.001(0.005)
Female0.759**(0.111)0.751**(0.110)
Locationn.s.n.s.
Region (Ref: Central)
North1.640**(0.351)0.760(0.152)
Southern0.940(0.212)0.569(0.219)
Educationn.s.n.s.
Employment1.424(0.357)1.425(0.358)
Lived poverty0.841***(0.038)1.128***(0.039)
Broadcasting news1.098(0.066)1.100(0.067)
Digital news0.988(0.075)0.983(0.075)
vhat_partisan1.231(0.015)1.3321.221
vhat_eco0.784(0.149)0.4120.474
Cut12.492(0.582)2.486(0.587)
Cut23.511(0.588)3.505(0.593)
Cut34.984(0.607)4.978(0.612)
Observations1,1421,142
Chi-square158.12***160.38***
Log-likelihood−914.1−912.99

Standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, vhat_par, and vhat are residuals from 2SRI method for the two endogenous variables.

Table 5c. Ordered logistic regression estimation results.

Mode 1cModel 2c
VariablesOdds ratioStd. errorOdds ratioStd. error
Economic conditions (Ref: Good)
Bad0.273***(0.057)0.303***(0.109)
Neutral0.734(0.222)0.531(0.277)
Partisanship (Ref: Ruling party)
Opposition0.416***(0.082)0.367**(0.188)
Non-partisans0.569***(0.103)0.676(0.297)
Economic conditions *Partisanship
Bad × Opposition1.039(0.567)
Bad × Non-partisans0.766(0.367)
Neutral × Opposition2.297(1.748)
Neutral × Non-partisans1.229(0.875)
Controls
Age1.001(0.005)1.001(0.005)
Female0.759**(0.111)0.751**(0.110)
Locationn.s.n.s.
Region (Ref: Central)
North1.640**(0.351)0.760(0.152)
Southern0.940(0.212)0.569(0.219)
Educationn.s.n.s.
Employment1.424(0.357)1.425(0.358)
Lived poverty0.841***(0.038)1.128***(0.039)
Broadcasting news1.098(0.066)1.100(0.067)
Digital news0.988(0.075)0.983(0.075)
vhat_partisan1.231(0.015)1.3321.221
vhat_eco0.784(0.149)0.4120.474
Cut12.492(0.582)2.486(0.587)
Cut23.511(0.588)3.505(0.593)
Cut34.984(0.607)4.978(0.612)
Observations1,1421,142
Chi-square158.12***160.38***
Log-likelihood−914.1−912.99

Standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, vhat_par and vhat are residuals from 2SRI method for the two endogenous variables.

In line with Hypothesis 1, the regression results show that economic performance evaluations are strongly associated with satisfaction. Compared with respondents who evaluate national economic conditions as bad, those who evaluate them as neutral are over two times more likely to report satisfaction (OR = 2.69, p = 0.002), while respondents who evaluate economic conditions as good are more than three times as likely to report satisfaction compared to those who report bad economic conditions (OR = 3.67, p < 0.001). Across alternative reference categories, all relevant pairwise comparisons are consistently estimated, ensuring that the full set of contrasts underlying economic conditions is accounted for, namely: Neutral vs. Bad(Ref) (significant), Good vs. Bad(Ref) (significant), Bad vs. Neutral(Ref) (significant), Good vs. neutral(Ref) (significant), Bad vs. Good(Ref) (significant), Neutral vs. Good(Ref) (not significant) as observed from Tables 5a–c. Taken together, the joint (Wald) test in Table 6 show that economic performance is significantly associated with citizen satisfaction with government economic management (χ2=16.72; p < 0.001), hence support for the performance dominance hypothesis (H1).

Table 6. Hypothesis tests.

HypothesisTestX2/Coefficientp-valueConclusion
H**1**: Performance effectJoint test of EC variables16.72< 0.001Supported
H**2**: Partisan alignmentJoint test of partisanship variables19.48< 0.001Supported
H**3**: ModerationInteraction block test2.260.688Not supported
H**3a**: Neutral vs. badNeutral interaction test1.780.410Not supported
H**3b**: Neutral vs. goodNeutral vs. good test1.280.526Not supported
H**4**: AttenuationDifferences-in-difference test
Neutral vs. bad−0.7940.184Not supported
Neutral vs. good−0.8320.275Not supported

In line with Hypothesis 2, partisan alignment also influences satisfaction. Holding opposition partisans as a reference category in Table 5a, ruling-party identifiers are significantly more likely to report satisfaction with government economic management than opposition identifiers (OR = 2.401, p = 0.001). Similarly, non-partisans are more likely than opposition party partisans to be satisfied with government economic conditions (OR = 1.363, p < 0.05). Besides these two partisan pairwise combinations: Non-partisans vs. Opposition(Ref) and Ruling vs. Opposition(Ref), other combinations from Tables 5b,c include: Opposition vs. Non-partisans(Ref), Ruling vs. Non-partisans(Ref), Opposition vs. Ruling(Ref), and Non-partisans vs. Ruling(Ref). While all partisan pairwise combinations are significant, it is not surprising to see that the block test is equally significant (χ2=19.48; p < 0.001), thereby providing support for the partisan effect on satisfaction (H2).

Regarding the interaction term for Hypothesis 3, a total of nine combinations results from changing the reference categories of economic conditions and partisanship, and these are Neutral × Non-partisan, Neutral × Ruling, Good × Non-partisan, Good × Ruling, Bad × Opposition, Bad × Non-partisans, Neutral × Opposition, Neutral × Non-partisans, and Neutral × Opposition. Contrary to the predictions of the PDM, none of these pairwise combinations are significant. Consequently the interaction block test in Table 6 show that the interaction between economic evaluations and partisan identification is not statistically significant (χ2 = 2.26, p = 0.688), indicating that perceptions of economic conditions do not vary across partisan alignment. Additional tests comparing neutral economic evaluations with both negative and positive evaluations similarly reveal no statistically significant differences in the strength of partisan effects. As a result, Hypotheses 3a and 3b, are not supported.

To evaluate the attenuation hypothesis (H4), we examined whether partisan differences (Partisan gap = Ruling – Opposition) in satisfaction vary across economic conditions (GapNeutral – GapBad) and (GapNeutral – GapGood) by comparing the gap between ruling-party and opposition identifiers when economic conditions are bad [(Ruling – Opposition)Neutral vs. (Ruling – Opposition)Bad] and good [(Ruling – Opposition)Neutral vs. (Ruling – Opposition)Good]. Using post-estimation contrasts based on predicted probabilities from the ordered logit model, we conducted difference-in-differences tests to assess whether partisan gaps under neutral economic conditions are significantly larger than those observed under clearly negative or clearly positive conditions.

[(Ruling-Opposition)Neutral>(Ruling-Opposition)Bad](i)[(Ruling-Opposition)Neutral>(Ruling-Opposition)Good](ii)

The results provide no evidence in support of the attenuation hypothesis. Specifically, the difference between the ruling–opposition gap under neutral economic conditions and the corresponding gap under bad economic conditions is not statistically significant (β = −0.794, SE = 0.597, and p = 0.184). Similarly, the difference between the partisan gap under neutral conditions and that under good economic conditions is also not statistically significant (β = −0.832, SE = 0.761, and p = 0.275). In both cases, the estimated coefficients are negative, indicating that partisan differences are not larger under neutral conditions than under clearly negative or positive economic evaluations. These difference-in-differences tests indicate that partisan differences in satisfaction with government economic management do not vary systematically across economic contexts. Importantly, partisan gaps under neutral economic conditions are not significantly larger than those observed under either good or bad conditions. Thus, contrary to the expectations of the PDM, there is no evidence that partisan effects are amplified under conditions of evaluative ambiguity or attenuated when economic signals are clearly positive or negative. These results provide no support for the attenuation hypothesis (H4), suggesting that the influence of partisan identification on satisfaction does not vary across economic contexts.

Control variables

Among the control variables, gender and lived poverty exhibit statistically significant associations with satisfaction with government economic management. Female respondents are significantly less likely than male respondents to report higher levels of satisfaction (OR ≈ 0.75, p < 0.05). In addition, lived poverty is negatively associated with satisfaction (OR ≈ 0.84, p < 0.01), indicating that individuals experiencing higher levels of deprivation are 15.9% less likely to report satisfaction with government economic management. Other control variables, including age, location, region, education, employment status, and media exposure, are not statistically significant.

A note on endogeneity

As explained in the theoretical section, as in applications of the expectancy–disconfirmation model (van Ryzin, 2004, 2006, 2013; Favero et al., 2024), the PDM is also subject to endogeneity, as the two variables used to formulate the disconfirmation process are influenced by factors outside the model. Just like in the EDM (Hjortskov, 2019; Zhang et al., 2021), there is also a possibility of unobserved factors that are generating party identity and citizens‘ evaluations of economic conditions that we observe, as well as reverse causality, where satisfaction with government management could be a cause of citizens' evaluation of economic conditions or partisan identity, or both.

To test for possible endogeneity in our model, we used Liu's (2023) two-stage residual inclusion approach, which is suitable for regressions that use sigmoid functions such as logistic regression (Liu, 2023; Zhang and Lewsey, 2024). In the first step, potentially endogenous variables (economic conditions and partisanship) were regressed on the relevant instruments (religion, presidential performance evaluation, and employment status). The selection of instruments was based on strong correlations with either economic conditions or partisanship (see Table A1 in Appendix). Residuals from these auxiliary regressions were computed, and in the second step, they were entered into the main model (logistic regression) to examine their influence on satisfaction with economic management. The test results show that all computed residuals are not statistically different from zero (vhat_partisan, OR = 1.332, p = 0.422; vhat_eco, OR = 0.412, p = 0.591). Thus, the 2SRI results indicate that there is no significant endogeneity in the key independent variables of our model. As a result, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as strong associations—though not as causation, since we are using cross-sectional data—with no significant bias due to any of the excluded variables. Therefore, our results are consistent and provide reliable evidence for the relationship between economic conditions, partisanship, and satisfaction with economic management.

Discussion

The findings of this study provide important insights into how citizens establish satisfaction judgment with government economic management in Malawi. Consistent with a large body of research on economic voting and performance-based accountability, perceptions of economic conditions emerge as the most powerful predictor of satisfaction with government economic management. The study reported various pairwise combinations of economic conditions. For example, we showed that citizens who perceive national economic conditions as neutral or good are significantly more likely to report satisfaction than those who perceive economic conditions as bad. When we tested an overall economic effect on satisfaction using the block (Wald) test, we found a strongly statistically significant association between economic conditions and citizen satisfaction. This result suggests that citizens' evaluations of economic realities play a central role in shaping their political judgments.

These findings align with a long tradition of research showing that citizens reward or punish governments based on perceived economic outcomes (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2019). Similar patterns have increasingly been documented in African democracies, where voters demonstrate sensitivity to economic performance when evaluating political leaders and institutions (Bratton et al., 2012; Harding, 2015; Carlin and Love, 2018). The Malawian case therefore reinforces the growing evidence that economic perceptions constitute a central component of political accountability even in relatively young democracies.

At the same time, the results indicate that partisan alignment remains an important influence on citizens' establishment of satisfaction judgments with government economic management. Ruling-party partisans are significantly more likely to report satisfaction with government economic management than both opposition partisans and non-partisans. However, non-partisans are more likely to be satisfied with government economic management than opposition party partisans. While various comparisons of partisanship were reported by the regression results, a separate block test revealed that overall partisanship is significantly associated with citizens establishment of satisfaction judgments. This pattern reflects the well-established role of partisan identity as a cognitive shortcut that shapes how citizens interpret political information and assess government performance (Taber and Lodge, 2012; Gerber and Huber, 2010; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).

Contrary to the expectations of the PDM, the analysis does not find evidence that partisanship significantly conditions the relationship between economic evaluations and satisfaction. The interaction between economic perceptions and partisan identification is not statistically significant, and additional tests comparing neutral evaluations with both negative and positive evaluations similarly fail to reveal systematic differences in the strength of partisan effects. These findings indicate that economic perceptions and partisan alignment influence satisfaction largely as independent factors rather than interacting in the manner predicted by the PDM.

In addition, we examined whether partisan differences in satisfaction vary across economic conditions by comparing the gap between ruling-party and opposition identifiers across categories of economic evaluations. Using difference-in-differences tests to assess whether partisan gaps under neutral economic conditions are significantly larger than those observed under clearly negative or clearly positive conditions, our results provide no evidence in support of the attenuation hypothesis. Specifically, the difference between the ruling–opposition gap under neutral economic conditions and the corresponding gap under bad economic conditions is not statistically significant. Similarly, the difference between the partisan gap under neutral conditions and that under good economic conditions is also not statistically significant. In both cases, the estimated coefficients are negative, indicating that partisan differences are not larger under neutral conditions than under clearly negative or positive economic evaluations.

These findings suggest that partisan identity operates as a stable and additive influence on satisfaction rather than as a conditional cognitive prior that varies with the clarity of economic signals. In contrast to expectations derived from EDT and hypothesis-testing frameworks, citizens do not appear to systematically rely more heavily on partisan cues under conditions of economic ambiguity. Instead, economic perceptions and partisan identification exert independent effects on satisfaction, with no evidence of systematic interaction across performance contexts.

One possible interpretation of this pattern is that citizens who hold mixed or uncertain evaluations of economic conditions—those often characterized as cross-pressured, swing, or ambivalent (Endres and Panagopoulos, 2019; Lavine et al., 2012); individuals who may not resolve this ambiguity by increasing reliance on partisan cues. Rather than exhibiting stronger identity-consistent evaluation under uncertainty, such individuals may process economic and political information in a more fragmented or weakly structured manner. This is consistent with research on cross-pressured voters, which suggests that individuals facing competing evaluative signals may exhibit attenuated or less coherent political responses (Banda, 2026a,b; Endres and Panagopoulos, 2019; Groenendyk, 2013; Hillygus and Shields, 2009; Lavine et al., 2012). In this context, the absence of conditional partisan effects may reflect a broader tendency toward ambivalence in political evaluations, rather than heightened motivated reasoning under ambiguity. While our data do not directly measure political disengagement, this pattern may be consistent with forms of cognitive fatigue, indifference, or reduced decisiveness in political judgment, which future research could examine more directly (Schulz-Herzenberg and Mattes, 2023).

Although the conditional mechanism proposed by the PDM is not supported, the results nonetheless contribute to understanding political evaluations in emerging democracies. They suggest that citizens rely simultaneously on economic perceptions and partisan cues when assessing government performance, but that economic perceptions exert a substantial influence. This pattern challenges claims in some African political behavior literature that political attitudes are primarily driven by identity-based loyalties such as ethnicity or partisan attachment (Bratton et al., 2012; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2019; Mattes and Krönke, 2020). Instead, the evidence indicates that citizens respond to perceived economic conditions when forming judgments about government economic management.

The analysis also highlights several socio-demographic influences on satisfaction. Female respondents are significantly less likely than men to report satisfaction with government economic management, and respondents in one region of the country exhibit higher satisfaction levels than those in the reference region. Lived poverty is also significantly associated with satisfaction, suggesting that citizens' material economic experiences continue to shape political evaluations. Other demographic characteristics, including age, education, employment status, and place of residence, do not exhibit statistically significant relationships with satisfaction.

The limitation of the study concerns the use of partisan identification as a proxy for predictive expectations. Ideally, expectations about government economic performance would be measured directly prior to evaluation. However, such measures are rarely available in cross-sectional survey data. In this study, partisan identity is used as a theoretically grounded proxy because political identification provides a durable cognitive cue shaping expectations about government competence and anticipated policy outcomes. Nevertheless, partisan identification does not perfectly capture individual-level predictive expectations, and future research using panel surveys or experimental designs could directly measure expectations prior to evaluation to more precisely test the disconfirmation mechanism proposed by the PDM.

A further limitation concerns the operationalization of performance ambiguity. In this study, ambiguity is proxied through neutral evaluations of economic conditions. While this approach is theoretically consistent with research showing that individuals rely more heavily on prior beliefs when performance signals are mixed or weak, evaluative neutrality does not necessarily imply informational ambiguity in all cases. Some respondents may report neutral evaluations because they perceive economic conditions as stable rather than uncertain. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the Afrobarometer survey, it is not possible to directly measure the degree of informational ambiguity citizens face when forming economic judgments. Consequently, the use of neutral evaluations should be interpreted as an empirical approximation of ambiguous performance signals rather than a direct measure of ambiguity. Similarly, future research could address this limitation by employing panel surveys, experimental designs, or measures of perceived economic uncertainty to more directly capture ambiguity in citizens' evaluations of economic performance.

Conclusion

This study examined how citizens form satisfaction judgments regarding government economic management by integrating EDT with partisan identity through the PDM. Using nationally representative survey data from Malawi, the analysis shows that perceptions of economic conditions constitute a powerful predictor of satisfaction with government economic management. Citizens who perceive economic conditions more positively are substantially more likely to express satisfaction with government performance.

The results also demonstrate that partisan alignment influences political evaluations. Ruling-party identifiers report significantly higher satisfaction with government economic management than opposition supporters, highlighting the continuing role of partisan identity in shaping political attitudes. However, the analysis does not find evidence that economic evaluations significantly condition the relationship between partisanship and satisfaction. Instead, economic perceptions and partisan alignment appear to influence satisfaction largely as independent factors.

These findings contribute to ongoing debates about political accountability in African democracies. While both economic performance evaluations and partisan identities shape political judgments, the results show that these influences operate independently rather than conditionally. In contrast to expectations derived from motivated reasoning and expectancy–disconfirmation frameworks, we find no evidence that partisan bias intensifies under conditions of economic ambiguity. This suggests that ambiguity does not systematically amplify identity-based reasoning in this context, highlighting an important boundary condition in the relationship between partisanship and economic evaluations.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Monica Ewomazino Akokuwebe, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Reviewed by: Cameron Anderson, Western University, Canada

Tom Schiebler, Munich University of the Federal Armed Forces, Germany

Statements

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

Data availability

The data presented in this study are available at: https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-sets/.

Ethics approval

Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on human participants in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent from the participants/participants' legal guardian or next of kin was not required to participate in this study in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements.

Author contributions

LB: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Resources, Software, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. KY: Resources, Supervision, Validation, Visualization, Writing – review & editing.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Professors Robert Mattes, Rajen Govender, and George Ofosu, as well as participants in the 2024 Afrobarometer Emerging Scholars Workshop at the University of Pretoria and the 2025 Thematic Workshop at the University of Cape Town, for their invaluable comments on earlier versions of this paper. We also greatly appreciate the thoughtful and constructive comments from the handling editor and reviewers.

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Citation

Banda, L. G. & Yakubu, K. (2026). Government's economic management and citizen satisfaction: a Partisan Disconfirmation Model. Frontiers in Social Psychology, Volume 4. https://doi.org/
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4 - 2026

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Copyright © 2026 Banda and Yakubu.

License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

*Correspondence: Lloyd George Banda

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