Forecasts of United States oil and gas production to 2100

1 Introduction

This paper summarizes a detailed report, Laherrère (2026), which updates and extends earlier forecasts, available at https://aspofrance.org/tag/jean-laherrere. Compared to the paper here, the full report gives significant additional detail on methodology and results and covers wider sub-categories of US oil and gas as well as a number of commodities.

To provide background to the methodology used below, we note that, in 1956, M. K. Hubbert correctly forecast the production of United States (US) Lower-48 states’ conventional oil. This was the main category of oil being produced at the time and excluded Alaskan, deep offshore, and non-conventional oils (with the latter including ‘light-tight’ LTO oil, production of which only became significant after 2010), very heavy oils, and oil from kerogen, coal, and gas; see Hubbert (1956). Wallace Pratt had asked members of the petroleum industry whom he regarded as especially well informed for estimates of the ultimately recoverable resource (URR) of US Lower-48 conventional oil and received estimates ranging from 150 billion barrels (Gb) to 200 Gb; similar results had come from the studies of Lewis Weeks. Hubbert, in his 1956 paper, then used logistic-derivative (“peak at URR mid-point”) curves constrained by the URR values of 150 Gb and 200 Gb to forecast that Lower-48 conventional oil would reach resource-limited production peak in 1965 if the lower URR estimate was correct and in 1970 if the upper was. For further details, see Hubbert (1956), the 1988 interview by Andrews (2016), and the interviews of Hubbert in 1989 (AIP, 2025), as well as the comprehensive study by Inman (2016). For a similar 1956 US oil forecast, see Pogue and Hill (1956).

In the event, US Lower-48 conventional oil production indeed reached its resource-limited peak in 1970, when some 100 Gb—half the upper URR estimate of 200 Gb—had been produced. Note, however, that some authors overlook that this forecast was only for US Lower-48 conventional oil, see, e.g., Deming (2023) and Lynch (2024). Not surprisingly, a second, smaller, US oil production peak occurred in 1985 due to Alaskan oil, and a third significantly higher peak is expected about now due to LTO production (see the results below). To understand how Hubbert’s forecasts explain long-term trends in the price of oil see Bentley et al. (2025).

2 Data and methodology

2.1 Background

Earlier forecasts by the lead author of this paper estimated URRs using petroleum-industry data, which give generally reliable dates and volumes of US oil and gas discoveries, as opposed to the usually far less reliable data available in the public domain. URR estimates by category of oil and gas were then generated by extrapolating the discovery trends and using other data and techniques where appropriate, see for example Campbell and Laherrère (1998) and subsequent papers on the ASPO-France website. For more recent forecasts, including those below, this author no longer has access to these industry data, so instead uses primarily the generally reliable technique of Hubbert linearization to estimate URR values, as this requires only data on past production of oil and gas by category. But if cumulative production of oil or gas has not followed a logistic curve at least reasonably well, then URR estimates from HL can be unclear (see examples below), and so the results below in these cases simply forecast a production decrease asymmetric with production increase, as was essentially the case for US oil production before the advent of LTO.

2.2 Data

In the analyses below, US Energy Information Administration (EIA) historical data on US oil and gas production by category are used. But a caveat is needed, as these data are not measured, only estimated, and come from 50 States and from many agencies and sources. Only Gulf of Mexico data from BOEM seem fully reliable, and only then from 2001 to 2019, as after this the data seem to drift somewhat.

Note that EIA US oil production data in both its Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) and its longer-term Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) correspond to crude-plus-condensate (“C + C”) production, so includes LTO oil but excludes the large oil contribution the US gets via its gas production in terms of natural gas liquids (NGLs), mainly liquids from natural gas processing plants (NGPLs). For example, US oil production in 2025 averaged 13.6 Mb/d for C + C vs. 21.1 Mb/d if NGLs are included and the latter figure excludes “liquid fuels from other sources, such as biofuels and synthetic derivatives of coal and natural gas, refinery processing gain, and oil from shales/kerogen extracted in solid form” (Energy Institute, 2026).

2.3 Methodology

Hubbert linearization (“HL”) plots production of a commodity divided by its cumulative production on a y-axis versus cumulative production on an x-axis. Where cumulative production of the commodity has followed a reasonably logistic curve, this plot yields a straight line that intersects the x-axis at an estimate of the commodity’s URR; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubbert_linearization. Then the ‘peak at mid-point of URR’ rule (itself resulting from production of the commodity following the derivative of the logistic curve) can be used to predict the point at which the commodity will reach its resource-limited production maximum.

Note that if production in a region does not follow a ‘Hubbert’ (logistic-derivative) curve then HL becomes more difficult. One example is the UK North Sea, where two production peaks occurred, with the resource-limited one being in 1999; and it is from 1999 onward that UK cumulative oil production develops a straight-line HL plot which nicely indicates the UK’s North Sea oil URR. Another example is US total oil production due to the large rise in LTO production coming on-stream since about 2008, as examined below.

But HL generally works well, and the technique has often been used to predict when the resource-limited peak of oil production will occur. For example, Campbell and Heapes (2009) applied the technique to “Regular Conventional oil” for some 70 countries and regions; Laherrère has likewise frequently employed the technique, see charts on the ASPO-France website. In Laherrère et al. (2022), HL was applied to four major categories of global oil production, where the HL plot to 2019 of global conventional oil (approximated by total crude oil less ‘light-tight’ and extra heavy oils) showed a straight line for 27 years, indicating a global conventional oil URR of 2,500 Gb. Given that global production of conventional oil reached a plateau in 2005, when some 1,008 Gb had been produced and has been in decline since 2008, this provides a good example of the application of HL to oil production at the global scale.

Further details of the data and methodology used in the analysis below are given in Laherrère et al. (2022) and Laherrère (2026); for Hubbert Linearization see also Brocorens (2026). For understanding the fundamental drivers of ‘peak oil’, see Bentley (2016).

3 Results for US oil

3.1 Hubbert linearization analyses and, hence, estimated URRs

Using EIA production data, HL analyses can be applied. Figure 1 gives the HL analysis for US annual crude-plus-condensate oil production to 2025.

As shown in Figure 1, there is no credible straight line indicating a URR for total US crude-plus-condensate oil. This is not surprising, given the very non-Hubbert curve of US oil production after the advent of LTO. But tellingly, Figure 1 does show a straight line from 1973 to 2008 prior to LTO (with a bit of a wiggle from 1980 to 1988 due to the impact on US oil demand, and hence production, from the oil price shocks of the 1970s), indicating a URR for US Lower-48 conventional oil plus Alaskan oil plus shallow offshore oil plus a small amount of deep offshore oil, at around 240 Gb, supporting Hubbert (1956) upper URR estimate of 200 Gb for Lower-48 conventional oil alone.

Turning to LTO oil itself, if HL is applied to US LTO on a monthly scale, Figure 2, a straight-line emerges from 2021 onward, suggesting a URR for US LTO of about 70 Gb.

Next, we turn to other oil categories within US total crude oil to better understand the current situation in terms of resource-limits to US production. The first category is the US Lower-48 conventional oil category that Hubbert and others examined from 1956 onwards. Here we approximate this category by taking total US crude-plus-condensate oil production as defined by the EIA and subtracting off Alsakan oil, oil from the Gulf of Mexico, and LTO; see Figure 3.

As Figure 3 shows, this approximation to US Lower-48 conventional oil follows a fairly good trend line for the four decades from 1968 (top point on the chart) to 2008 (inflection point towards the bottom of the chart), indicating a URR of about 187 Gb. The usual ‘wiggle’ appears post-1973, due to the high oil price at the time impacting demand and, in turn, production. But post-2008, the straight line inflects to a new URR of around 220 Gb, in part probably reflecting the very high oil price from 2008 somewhat increasing US oil production across the board. It is also worth noting that this URR 220 Gb is only some 10% greater than Hubbert (1956) upper estimate for US Lower-48 conventional oil (and excluding deep offshore) of 200 Gb despite some 70 years of development in oil exploration and production having since occurred!

A similar HL chart can be produced for Alsakan oil, indicating a URR of 25 Gb also it can also be produced for US Gulf of Mexico (GoM) oil, both shallow and deep offshore; Figures 4, 5.

As Figure 4 shows, and as would be expected, HL shows a pretty straight rend line for many years for shallow GoM oil, indicating a URR of about 14 Gb.

As Figure 5 shows, and again as would be expected, the situation is not so clear-cut for deepwater GoM oil, which is still being discovered in reasonable quantity. The HL since 2019 would seem to indicate a URR of about 24 Gb, yielding a total URR for US GoM oil, both shallow and deep, of around 40 Gb.

Returning to total US crude-plus-condensate oil, if the above URRs are added, a URR of 355 Gb results. But by including the forecast in a recent EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook report, this paper adopts a more conservative URR for US total C + C oil of 340 Gb as seeming realistic.

3.2 Oil forecast

Figure 6 shows this paper’s resulting US oil forecast by category of oil.

Categories:

• US Lower-48 “Conventional” oil: URR 220 Gb (Figure 3).
• Alsakan oil: URR 25 Gb.
• US GoM oil: URR 40 Gb (Figures 4, 5).
• LTO oil: URR 70 Gb (Figure 2).
• US Total C + C oil: 340 Gb. (Note: The URRs of the components of “total oil” are shown add to 355 Gb but are rounded down here to 340 Gb, both to agree EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook and to improve the symmetry of increase vs. forecast decline; a principle it is accepted may turn out to be incorrect).

The lessons from Figure 6 are dramatic and, in terms of US total oil production, only apparent because total production has been spilt by category of oil. The lessons are:

• US Lower-48 conventional oil peaked in 1971, agreeing with Hubbert (1956) forecast based on a URR of 200 Gb, and has declined steeply since.
• Alaskan crude oil peaked in 1988 and has declined since.
• US GoM oil (combining shallow and deep offshore) looks to peak around now (2026), as indicated in BOEM (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, U.S. Department of the Interior) (2022).
• US LTO also looks to peak about now and must decline rapidly if its cumulative production is to meet the above HL-assessed URR. Note that the forecast production decline of LTO is steep to meet the URR but also reflects the rapid decline of many LTO wells compared to the more moderate decline rates of conventional oil and of Alaskan and GoM wells.
• Likewise, US total crude-plus-condensate oil production looks to be at peak and again must decline rapidly if its cumulative production is to meet its estimated URR.

3.3 Later forecast for US LTO

Since the analyses reported above were carried out, there has been an opportunity to revisit the data for US LTO. This has resulted in reducing the URR estimate for US LTO by about 20%, down from 70 Gb to 57 Gb. The revised results are shown in Figure 7.

4 Results for US gas

Now we turn to US gas production. Figure 8 shows the HL plot of total US marketed gas.

As with US total C + C oil (Figure 1), no clear HL trend-line emerges, again not surprising given the recent rise in production of US tight gas. But, again rather like Figure 2, if just US dry shale gas is plotted then a trend line does emerge, indicating a URR for this category of gas around 660 Tcf; Figure 9.

Furthermore, examination of US natural gas production from 1985 to 2005 (before tight gas became too significant) shows that this peaked in 2000 and indicates a URR for US conventional gas (i.e., ex tight gas) as about 1750 Tcf. To be on the conservative side, here we add 1750 Tcf for conventional US gas to a lower figure, 560 Tcf, for tight gas to arrive at a URR for ‘all-gas’ of ~2,300 Tcf. This, in turn, suggests that the resource-limited US all-gas production peak likely already happened in 2025; Figure 10.

Note that in the full report, Laherrère (2026) also includes production forecasts for the following: Oil: LTO in the Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken and Niobrara basins, and oil in the regions of Alaska, New Mexico, and Gulf of Mexico (shallow and deepwater). Gas: Gas in the Permian and Appalachia (Marcellus and Utica) basins and for the Alaska and Gulf of Mexico regions. Also analyzed is the production of NPGLs and coal as well as trends in commodity supply and in oil and gas prices.

5 Sensitivity analysis

5.1 US oil production

In Figure 11 we carry out a simple sensitivity analysis on US oil production. Figure 6 assumed a URR for US “C + C” oil of 340 Gb, but here, based in part on the later reduction in estimated US LTO URR of Figure 7, we have modelled URR values of 326 Gb and 336 Gb, and also a higher URR of 400 Gb with the latter reflecting perhaps an optimistic view of US future oil production based on the probability that the oil price stays high.

As can be seen in Figure 11, estimated URRs of 326 Gb and 336 Gb do not change the forecast by much, but if the US C + C URR were to be as high as 400 Gb, then the date of peak shifts a little, from 2026 to about 2028, and the rate of decline, though still steep, is significantly slower. Figure 11 also includes US production of NGLs and shows that these should not be overlooked when considering US “all-liquids” production.

There is more work that can be done in future on sensitivity analysis. More detailed analyses can be carried out on different, but still realistic, URRs for oil, in each case noting by how much the date of the resource-limited production peak changes and how much the post-peak decline is. For LTO, potential increases in URR might reflect increased multi-well pad drilling, extended horizontal drilling lengths, and use of new re-fracturing technologies and optimized proppant intensity. And across all-oil, increases in URR might result from extended high oil prices that improve recovery factors.

Likewise, as US supply of conventional and tight oil is constrained, it should be remembered that the US has perhaps 1,000 Gb of theoretically recoverable oil from kerogen, and more oil can come from chemical conversion of coal and gas, some perhaps in-situ. But, as mentioned earlier, for these “other oils” CO₂ limits, lower EROI ratios, and generally higher production costs limit the energy recoverable, and the main focus of this paper is expected dates of resource-limited peak rather than long-term post-peak production rates.

5.2 US gas production

Figure 12 carries out a sensitivity analysis for US gas production.

Based on an August 2026 EIA STEO chart of monthly dry shale natural gas production by formation, the analysis of Figure 12 increases the estimated URR of US marketed gas to 2,900 Tcf from the 2,300 Tcf of Figure 10. As the figure shows, and as would be expected, compared to Figure 10 increasing the URR to 2,900 Tcf changes the date of resource limited peak somewhat, from 2025 to about 2031, and slows the subsequent decline.

6 Comparison with other forecasts

6.1 Forecasts of US oil production

Finally, in this paper, we compare our forecasts to those from other sources. We start with oil and compare first to a forecast based on data from the oil consultancy Rystad Energy.

6.1.1 Rystad energy data

A simple forecast for US crude-plus-condensate oil production (i.e., including LTO but excluding NGLs) can be generated using data from Rystad Energy (2025). First, cumulative production of this category of oil to 2024 must be established. This can be done by taking cumulative US oil production to 1985 from the Encyclopedia Brittanica (1989) of 139.1 Gb (as, over this period, NGLs were only a small part of US production) and adding 107 Gb for US oil production without NGLs from 1986 to 2024 using data from Energy Institute (2026). This yields an estimate of US cumulative C + C oil production from 1859 to 2024 of 246 Gb.

Then the Rystad Energy (2025) US “2PCX” estimate of 169 Gb is added, as these Rystad ‘reserves’ data exclude NGLs, to yield an estimated URR for US C + C oil (i.e., including Alaska, shallow, and deep offshore and light-tight oil (LTO), but less NGLs) of 415 Gb; a URR value close to ‘high URR’ estimate of Figure 11. A simple peak forecast can then be made. Though for US oil a “mid-point” peak should not be expected as LTO has so changed the production curve, but with 246 Gb of US C + C oil produced to-date this is well past 208 Gb, the mid-point of 415 Gb, so the peak of US C + C oil production being about now should be no surprise.

6.1.2 Globalshift.co.uk

Next, we compare the forecast of Figure 6 to a forecast from Globalshift.co.uk (2026), Figure 13.

Note that Figure 13 is for “total fossil oil” and includes not only C + C plus NGLs but also other fossil oils such as that produced from kerogen, and chemically from coal and gas. As Figure 13 shows, Globalshift.co.uk sees production of this wider category of oil reaching peak production at some 20 Mb/d (i.e., 7.3 Gb/y), vs. the 4.85 Gb/y of US C + C oil in Figure 6. But importantly, the date of this resource-limited production peak is the same, at about 2025, as the peak in Figure 6 for C + C oil.

A Globalshift.co.uk estimate of URR for US “total fossil oil” can be generated from data kindly provided (private communication) of US cumulative oil production to 2100 of 524 Gb, plus an estimated 17 Gb for US production of this category of oil post 2100, giving a URR of about 540 Gb.

Note that Globalshift.co.uk forecasts oil production using a detailed bottom-up model, generally, where the data are available, by individual oil field for conventional oil and by-project for non-conventional oil. This methodology is very different to that of this paper (of combining an HL-generated URR estimate with ‘mid-point’ peak) and to the calculation above of using cumulative production plus Rystad “2PCX reserves” data. So all three methodologies forecasting the resource-limited US oil peak as being about now, for both C + C oil and for “total fossil oil”, suggests a strong conclusion.

6.1.3 EIA 2026 AEO

Finally, in this section we compare our forecasts for US C + C oil and also for NGLs with the corresponding forecasts in the EIA’s 2026 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO), as shown in Figure 14.

Note that, unlike Figures 6, 14 does not show LTO separately (included here in C + C), but does include our forecast for US NGL production based on an assumed URR of 105 Gb.

As Figure 14 indicates, the EIA 2026 Baseline scenario oil forecasts are considerably more optimistic than our forecasts, indicating a near-term peak for C + C oil but then recovery, and no peak in sight for NGLs. However, this 2026 AEO forecast does at least show a peak for US C + C oil (and also for light-tight oil, not shown here), as compared to earlier AEO forecasts which generally only showed ‘ever-upward’ US oil production with no peak in sight.

A question then arises: Why is there such a big difference between the forecasts of this paper, and also those from using Rystad Energy data and from Globalshift.co.uk, compared to the EIA AEO forecasts shown in Figure 14?

Firstly, the EIA has to be congratulated in making its modelling data and assumptions clear in a number of well-written reports. For oil and gas supply the report to look at is Assumptions to the Annual, Energy Outlook 2026: Hydrocarbon Supply Module. Its supply module gives the technically recoverable resources (TRR) of US oil as of 2024 as 310 Gb and of gas as 3,000 Tcf. These numbers are not URRs but are estimates of currently remaining technically recoverable resources, so cumulative production to-date needs to be added to generate the URR. The AEO forecast is for US C + C oil, and above we estimated the cumulative production of this oil to-date (2024) as 246 Gb, so this gives the AEO URR for US C + C oil as about 550 Gb.

And note that, as the EIA Hydrocarbon Supply report makes clear, the initial TRR estimate is expected to increase with time, especially for LTO, through “learning by doing”. We suggest that a partial explanation for a high AEO URR may be reliance on USGS estimates, which typically add significant quantities of oil due to anticipated “reserves growth” (and since 2000, not only for the US but also worldwide).

So here we summarize the URRs for US oil as given by the forecasts examined above. For C + C oil these estimates are, from our paper, 326, 336 and 400 Gb; Rystad Energy, 415 Gb; and the 2026 AEO, much higher, at 550 Gb (and likely to increase through “learning by doing”). For US “all-fossil oil”, Globalshift has a URR of about 540 Gb, which, since we estimate US NGLs have a URR of about 105 Gb (Figure 14), corresponds to a C + C URR of about 435 Gb, some 115 Gb lower than the 2026 AEO estimate. We suggest that this difference in US C + C URR estimates is the main reason why our forecast for C + C oil, and also that based on Rystad Energy data and from Globalshift.co.uk for all-fossil oil, all see the resource-limited production peak of US oil as about now, compared to the 2026 AEO which sees no clear peak in US C + C oil production out to 2050. Given the significant economic and societal impacts expected from a resource-limited peak in US oil supply, we suggest that attention is paid to the above forecasts that this peak will be near-term.

6.2 Forecasts of US gas production

Now we compare the results of this paper for US gas production to two other forecasts.

6.2.1 Globalshift.co.uk

The Globalshift.co.uk forecast for total US sales gas is given in Figure 13. This does give a relatively near-term production peak, in 2040, but only a gentle decline thereafter, in contrast to the somewhat earlier peaks, and steep production declines, expected in Figures 10, 12.

6.2.2 IEA and EIA forecasts

And finally in this section, in Figure 15 we compare our US gas forecasts of Figure 10 with two forecasts from 2023: the IEA’s 2023 World Energy Outlook 2023 “Stated Policies” forecast for US shale gas and the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2023 “Reference Case” forecast for dry gas.

As can be seen in Figure 15, the IEA’s 2023 forecast for US shale gas somewhat mirrors that from Globalshift.co.uk for all “sales gas”. And all three forecasts (our forecasts, that from Globalshift.co.uk, and that from the IEA 2023 WEO Stated Policies scenario for dry shale gas) see US gas production as reaching peak in the relatively near term and then declining. This is in contrast to a forecast from the EIA 2023 AEO for US dry gas, which sees no production peak out to 2050.

Again, a possible explanation for this significant difference between the 2023 AEO forecast for US gas supply compared to the three other forecasts given above is likely to be a high gas URR assumed by 2023 AEO. This view is supported by the 2026 AEO, which says its forecast for US gas is based on a TRR of 3,000 Tcf. To this, cumulative US gas production to-date must be added to arrive at the URR estimate, which can then be compared to the expected URR estimate of our estimate (Figure 10) of 2,300 Tcf for marketed gas, and the ‘high’ estimate of 2,900 Tcf of Figure 12. We leave it for future research to find Rystad Energy (if available) and Globalshift.co.uk URR estimates for US gas and hence to carry out a similar comparison to the AEO URR for US gas as is done above for US oil.

7 Conclusion

This paper summarizes a recent Laherrère (2026) report, which mainly uses Hubbert linearization to estimate URRs of different categories of US oil and gas. It then forecasts production by combining past production with single or multi-cyclic Hubbert (“logistic-derivative”) curves constrained by these URRs, or else, where the HL estimates are in doubt, by modeling post-peak production decline as symmetric to the pre-peak increase. The data used are historical US production of oil and gas by category from the US EIA, although these data reflect reports from numerous US sources and can be unreliable. By contrast, the US Gulf of Mexico production data reported by BOEM seem more reliable up to 2019, but since 2020 some of these data appear missing.

Our results give the likely dates of resource-limited maximum (“peak”) production of US oil and gas by category as follows: Lower-48 conventional oil plus shallow onshore (the category forecast by Hubbert, 1956): 1971 (which, in turn, was a key contributing factor to the oil price shock of 1973); light-tight (“fracked”) LTO oil: about now (2026); conventional oil plus LTO: also about 2026; NGLs: about 2027; marketed natural gas: about 2026; and tight gas: between about 2026 to 2028.

These forecasts indicate US oil production in 2050 will be at the same level as in 1935 unless US oil from kerogen, coal, or both can be brought onstream rapidly, which is perhaps unlikely given difficulty and cost of extraction, low EROI ratios, and the need to sequester the CO₂ produced. Our forecast for US natural gas production is that it will return to its 1955 level by 2045. And for natural gas we note that its price in the US is currently only perhaps a quarter of that in much of the rest of the world, in particular Europe, giving the US a significant commercial advantage, as natural gas is one-third of US commercial energy production.

Sensitivity analysis of our forecasts shows that higher—but still realistic—assumptions on URR values change the expected dates of peak of US oil and gas production by only a few years, although slowing post-peak decline.

The forecasts of this paper are then compared to those of others. For US oil, the comparison is to a calculation using Rystad Energy data; the “bottom-up” by-field, by-project forecast of Globalshift.co.uk; and that in the 2026 EIA Annual Energy Outlook. Our forecast, that Rystad Energy data and Globalshift.co.uk agree with, that US oil production is likely to see resource-limited decline about now, is in sharp contrast to the AEO forecast which sees no significant production decline out to 2050. The paper then compares our US gas forecast to those from Globalshift.co.uk, the IEA in 2023, and the EIA AEO in 2023. This finds that our forecast, that from Globalshift.co.uk, and the IEA in 2023 all see US gas production as reaching resource-limited peak within their forecast horizons, again in contrast to the EIA 2023 AEO forecast that forecasts no peak.

We suggest that the near-term resource-limited maxima of both US oil and gas production identified by this paper, and by the other forecasts cited except for those from EIA AEO, are likely to have significant commercial and political impacts. They need to be incorporated into current energy models and be understood more widely.

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Footnotes

Edited by: Bijan Rahimi, Enaxiom Pty Ltd, Australia

Reviewed by: Yingchao Chen, Shandong Technology and Business University, China

Wiryanta Muljono, Kementerian Komunikasi Dan Informatika Republik Indonesia, Indonesia