What explains the difference in nuclear energy policies? A comparison between France and Germany

The debate persists over whether nuclear energy can support global efforts to reduce carbon emissions and transition to cleaner energy systems. Different types of nuclear energy could still play an essential role during this transition. Some argue that investing in nuclear power comes with an opportunity cost for advancing renewable energy technologies. Concerns about nuclear waste remain unresolved. These debates and uncertainties surrounding the technology partly reflect the differences among the world's major economic superpowers, especially the two major EU countries: France and Germany. France continues to rely heavily on nuclear energy, whereas Germany has officially ceased using nuclear power for civilian energy purposes. This study aims to explain differences in policy outcomes by applying McAdam's theory of the political opportunity structure. Additionally, we develop a new theoretical framework that builds on this theory by incorporating two variables: public opinion and renewable energy capacity. Our findings show that although the political opportunity structure still has strong explanatory power, the different policy choices in these countries also relate to (1) public opinion that has driven social protests and parliamentary debates, and (2) the availability of alternative renewable energy sources as substitutes for nuclear power.

In Germany, nuclear energy made up only 9.5% of domestic energy production in 2022 [International Energy Agency (2023)]. The country announced its plan to phase out nuclear power in April 2023, a measure originally scheduled for 2022 [Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, (2024)]. Germany is known for its extensive use of renewable energies, which accounted for 53.8% of domestic energy production in 2022 [International Energy Agency (2023)]. The remaining percentage is divided among coal, natural gas, and other minor energy sources [International Energy Agency (2023)]. In contrast, France considers nuclear energy a vital part of its energy mix, accounting for 74% of its domestic energy production in 2022 [International Energy Agency (2023)]. This difference in energy strategies might seem puzzling at first, given that both countries are geographically close and have similar populations and GDPs. Given their demographics and proximity, one might expect France and Germany to share similar views on nuclear power. However, there is a clear distinction in their approaches. The Fukushima disaster reinforced these differences. After Fukushima, France aimed to upgrade some of its reactors but did not shut any down, continuing to rely on nuclear energy as its main power source. Germany, however, quickly shut down several nuclear plants after Fukushima. A wide range of literature and research findings is available for discussing nuclear energy. The research field is mainly focused on the debate over the economic and ecological benefits and drawbacks of nuclear energy (Prǎvǎlie and Bandoc, 2018; Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009; van der Zwaan, 2013). Initially, the assertion that nuclear energy is essential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions was supported by consecutive reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Chateauraynaud, 2011). However, as discussions continued, counter-arguments emerged that challenged the validity and implications of this position (Chateauraynaud, 2011). Muellner et al. examine nuclear energy as a possible solution to climate change; however, they emphasize that large-scale expansion may be limited by the availability of current nuclear technology (Muellner et al., 2021). Huhtala and Remes try to quantify the social cost of nuclear energy (Huhtala and Remes, 2017). Perceptions of risks associated with a nuclear accident influence voting behavior and, in turn, affect policy (Huhtala and Remes, 2017). Other studies are more optimistic about nuclear energy, considering its vital role in the energy transition (Faudon, 2020; Roques and Le Thieis, 2020).

We do not intend to further evaluate the benefits or drawbacks of nuclear energy. Instead, the study aims to analyze several factors that help explain the different outcomes in nuclear energy policies between two similar countries. We will first operationalize McAdam's theory of political opportunity structure as applied by Van Der Heijden in the context of nuclear energy (Van Der Heijden, 1997). Some literature to date has used the political opportunity structure theory, highlighting key differences in political systems and forms of government across countries (Van Der Heijden, 1997; Wiliarty, 2013; Kitschelt, 1986). However, simply applying the political opportunity structure to explain recent policy trends in nuclear energy in Germany and France is insufficient. To fill this gap, this paper proposes a revised theoretical framework that broadens the political opportunity structure theory by including public opinion and renewable energy capacity as intervening variables.

In the following section, we offer a brief overview of key historical events that have led to the current state of nuclear energy in France and Germany. Catastrophic accidents and serious safety concerns in Germany and France, the legacy of Cold War efforts to build a nuclear weapon that made nuclear power a national icon, and oil shocks that forced these countries to reduce dependence on foreign oil are deeply associated with the current outcomes, with Germany completely phasing out nuclear power and France deciding to expand its dependence on nuclear power.

Background: historical overview

Germany

In the 1950s and 1960s, Germany relied on domestic hard coal and lignite, along with imported crude oil, but the 1970s oil crisis shifted the focus to energy security and independence (Selje, 2022). The neoliberal shift in the 1970s and 1980s led to a deregulated, liberalized energy market (Renn and Marshall, 2020). Nuclear energy gained importance in the late 1950s, peaking with the creation of the Ministry of Atomic Affairs (Renn and Marshall, 2020). The first nuclear reactor was grid-connected in 1960, with Germany quickly adopting global standards (Selje, 2022). The first public shift was in 1975 when citizens' initiative formed to stop a power plant near Whyl in Baden-Württemberg (Shmid, 1987). This protest against land degradation sparked demonstrations across Germany and highlighted nuclear dangers (Shmid, 1987). A major change followed the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine, where reactor explosion released radioactive material. This profoundly impacted Germans, increasing anti-nuclear sentiment (McCauley et al., 2018).

Until 1998, the nuclear industry benefited from tax cuts and regulatory perks (Selje, 2022). That year, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Green Party coalition negotiated with energy companies, reaching an agreement in June 2000 to phase out nuclear power in the 2020s (Selje, 2022). Scientific research raised concerns about the dangers, costs, and long-term effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, Chernobyl, and nuclear waste (Selje, 2022). In 2007, a fire at Krümmel plant, though contained and with minimal radiation impact, boosted anti-nuclear sentiments (Selje, 2022). After the 2011 Fukushima disaster, widespread anti-nuclear protests erupted across Germany (Upham et al., 2020). Three days after the earthquake and tsunami, the German government announced a three-month moratorium, shutting down the eight oldest nuclear plants and forming the Reactor Security Commission (RSK) to inspect all German nuclear power plants (Upham et al., 2020).

France

In France, nuclear energy carries deep symbolism. In June 1940, German troops entered France for the second time in less than 30 years. France's prominence suffered during the war, and decolonization threatened further decline (Topçu, 2017). The crisis was seen as solvable through technology, which symbolized power. To address its technological lag, the Provisional Government created the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) in October 1945 to develop nuclear applications. Experts presented the nuclear program as the solution to France's challenges (Portelli et al., 2013). On July 24, 1952, the French National Assembly approved the first nuclear plan, and in 1954, the CEA and EDF (Électricité de France, the national electricity company) signed an agreement: CEA would design nuclear components, and EDF would operate them (Portelli et al., 2013).

On October 6, 1973, the Yom Kippur War began. The embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on countries supporting Israel triggered the first oil shock (Lewandowski, 2021). OPEC decided to raise oil prices by 70% and to implement a gradual 5% monthly reduction in production (Lewandowski, 2021). To reduce its energy dependence, France accelerated its civil nuclear program [Ministère de l'économie, des Finances, et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique, (n.d.)]. In March 1974, Pierre Messmer, then the prime minister, announced during a TV interview that the nuclear program would be accelerated, with the construction of 13 nuclear reactors (Le Gros, 2020). President Macron continued Pierre Messmer's legacy with a 2023 law promoting nuclear power, one of three priorities from 2022 to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 [French Government (2023)]. It accelerates reactor construction and extends the lifespans of existing plants [French Government (2023)].

Germany closed its nuclear plants: Grohnde, Gundremmingen C, and Brokdorf by 2021, and Isar 2, Emsland, and Neckarwestheim 2 in April 22 [Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, (2024)]. The Federal Office cited safety concerns, noting nuclear waste poses environmental and health risks. The Ukraine war heightened fears, as facilities could become conflict targets [Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management, (2024)]. In the following sections, we describe our research methods and theoretical framework and discuss our main findings from this comparative study.

This study presents a comparative qualitative analysis of France and Germany. Our approach involves two steps: first, we conducted a thorough review of existing literature. This included detailed document analysis of documents across a wide range of sources, including scientific articles, official reports, fact sheets, official websites, and reputable newspaper articles. We utilized electronic search engines, primarily Google Scholar, JSTOR, and ScienceDirect, to locate relevant documents. We first conducted keyword searches for “France nuclear energy”, “Germany nuclear energy”, “France renewable energy”, “Germany renewable energy”, and “Germany energy transition”. We then focused on “Comparative studies on energy regimes” and “Comparative studies on energy trajectories” to capture cross-jurisdictional comparative studies of energy policies and nuclear energy trajectories. Most studies examined multiple national contexts rather than focusing specifically on France and Germany. We also searched for “Public opinion of nuclear energy” and “Public perceptions of nuclear energy” paired with “France” and “Germany”. These keyword searches, combined with a review of the cited references in the identified scholarly work, led us to identify over 40 scientific studies on nuclear power, comparative studies of public perceptions, issues related to political institutional structures, and public discourse. Academic literature served as the theoretical foundation, while reports and media articles provided empirical context and facilitated discourse analysis.

Additionally, based on an analysis of repository documents, a new theoretical framework was developed to explain differences in nuclear energy outcomes across the two countries. This framework partly relies on the operationalization of McAdam's theory of political opportunity structures, following Van Der Heijden (Van Der Heijden, 1997). It is enhanced by two additional variables: (1) public opinion and (2) renewable energy as an alternative fuel source. While Wiliarty (Wiliarty, 2013) discusses public opinion on nuclear power in Germany and France, the discussion primarily serves to show that public opinion was similar despite their divergent nuclear energy trajectories. In contrast, our study considers public opinion as one of the key variables that helps clarify the divergent policy outcomes related to nuclear energy. Public opinion is analyzed alongside the nature of existing political cleavages in society and parliamentary discourse. The parliamentary discourses were examined based on the work of multiple authors, including M.R. Bern and G. Winkel (Bern and Winkel, 2013), F. Chateauraynaud (Chateauraynaud, 2011), and Aalto Johanna (Johanna, 2017). Given a more open and decentralized political opportunity structure, we assume that public opinion is inherently closely linked to political cleavages and parliamentary discourses.

The renewable energy data were primarily sourced from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and national statistical offices, including the French Ministry of Ecological Transition. It includes figures on nuclear and renewable electricity production, installed capacity, and investment levels.

Literature review

To understand the differences in policy outcomes between the two countries, we need to examine what contributes to the success of nuclear energy and, more importantly, what obstructs it—specifically, the factors that allow opposition movements to be effective. Since the 1960s, several sociologists have studied this question. They analyzed social movements as methods of influencing the political agenda (Dobson, 2001). These theories aimed to identify the conditions under which social movements can address the free-rider problem inherent in collective action. A movement with strong leadership, effective organization, and sufficient resources can succeed or fail depending on its political opportunity structure. Tilly first developed this concept in 1978 (della Porta, 2026). McAdam (1996) expands on this idea, stating that the political opportunity structure includes four components: (1) access to the political system, (2) divisions among elites, (3) availability of elite allies, and (4) the level of state repression (McAdam, 1996).

Van Der Heijden applies this theory by comparing four countries—France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—and analyzing specific cases (Van Der Heijden, 1997). Van der Heijden argues that a country's political opportunity structure influences the institutionalization of environmental movements (Van Der Heijden, 1997). This view is supported by Kitschelt (1986) (Roques and Le Thieis, 2020), who explains that a nation's political opportunity structure affects its anti-nuclear movements and, in turn, its overall energy policy. Kitschelt emphasizes the differences in political opportunity structures between France and Germany (Kitschelt, 1986). According to his classification, France is a strong, closed state, while Germany is a weak, closed state (Kitschelt, 1986). The difference between a strong and a weak state is that in a strong state, the executive branch dominates the legislature, with policymaking limited to a few interest groups (Kitschelt, 1986).

Furthermore, Wiliarty argues that differences in energy policies between France and Germany are best understood through differences in political opportunity structures, particularly in their distinct governance frameworks and legal and electoral systems (Wiliarty, 2013). The French legal system is highly centralized, whereas the German system is decentralized, providing more access points for anti-nuclear groups (Wiliarty, 2013). Similarly, France uses a two-ballot electoral system that institutionalizes the sidelining of minority environmental parties. At the same time, Germany adopts a mixed-member proportional representation system—one vote for a party and one for a specific candidate—allowing minority parties to win seats (Wiliarty, 2013). The influence of the electoral system on political participation is further examined by Karp and Banducci (2008), who indicate that the type of electoral system affects political engagement and the opportunities for smaller parties to voice their opinions and hold office (Karp and Banducci, 2008).

The governance system can affect political participation and, in turn, influence public policy. Gerring, J., Thacker, S., and Moreno, C. compare federal and unitary governance systems (Gerring et al., 2007). They explain that federal constitutions bring governments closer to the people. With decentralized decision-making, the personal vote (or regional vote) becomes increasingly important, and politicians are more accountable to local interests (Gerring et al., 2007). Therefore, electoral bodies may be more responsive to local needs and concerns, more flexible, and, in some ways, more democratic. Citizens may feel a stronger incentive to participate in state affairs when the venue is small enough for individual involvement. It can be assumed that local accountability is higher when local authorities (i.e., regional authorities) have greater autonomy (Gerring et al., 2007). This might explain why protests against nuclear energy in Germany had a larger impact than those in France. Additionally, the judicial system plays a key role: in both France and Germany, administrative courts were the primary venues through which anti-nuclear movements sought to stop the development of nuclear power. The relationship between the judiciary and the government can greatly influence policymaking.

Building on previous studies showing that public resistance to new nuclear plants is largely driven by perceived environmental harm and cost, not by nuclear technology alone (Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2009). Sonnberger et al. (2021) examined whether public concern about climate change influences support for nuclear energy in four European countries: France, Germany, Norway, and the UK. Contrary to what one might expect given nuclear power's low-carbon qualities, the results showed a consistent negative relationship: across all four countries, those who are more worried about climate change are less likely to support nuclear energy (Sonnberger et al., 2021). In contrast, Bohdanowicz et al. (2023) find that support for nuclear power is less negatively associated with environmental concerns in Poland, attributing the difference to the level of public knowledge of nuclear energy (Bohdanowicz et al., 2023). A study that applies a network approach adds further support to this narrative, explaining that while policy ideology is one of the central factors shaping public perception, environmental concerns, risk, and safety-related risk perception also determine public attitudes (Smolinski et al., 2024). This approach underscores the importance of considering the effects of multiple factors when attempting to explain disparate outcomes, likely an interplay of political underpinnings and public perception (Smolinski et al., 2024). Relatedly, Meyer (2021) contributed to the explanation of the concept of the territoriality of nuclear energy systems—that nuclear power plants are not just energy-producing facilities; they become deeply connected to the communities where they are built (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). Depending on the plant's location (urban or rural areas and income levels), how the company manages it (such as sourcing workers locally), and the local government's approach (such as generating tax revenue), a plant can be highly integrated into the local community or remain more separate (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). Similarly, additional studies in different contexts describe public acceptance as highly contextual, politically filtered, and sensitive to awareness and knowledge of nuclear power, as well as to preferences closely tied to the level of trust in nuclear facilities (Kelleher, 2022; Bian et al., 2021).

Taking into account lessons from existing scholarship on nuclear acceptance and the importance of contextual framing in public discourse, we aim to integrate these insights with the role of political opportunity structures. Against this backdrop, we aim to construct a new framework to better explain the disparate outcomes in France and Germany. More specifically, we aim to examine how public opinion, parliamentary debates, and the availability of renewable energy shape nuclear policies. While the analysis focuses on France and Germany, we believe the proposed framework could be further tested to better understand the post-Fukushima and post-Ukraine-war nuclear energy landscape in other parts of Europe.

Theoretical framework

Multiple studies support the idea that public opinion can explain public policy outcomes. Page and Shapiro (1983) present a pioneering study analyzing public opinion and policy data in the United States from 1935 to 1979 (Page and Shapiro, 1981). Our research further substantiates the claim that public opinion influences policy more than policy influences opinion. We complete this analysis by examining parliamentary discourse on nuclear energy, where political cleavages exist, and by considering how public opinion may contribute to the rise of various non-labor-exclusive social movements, including notable anti-nuclear movements in Germany. Additionally, Johnstone and Stirling use renewable energy capacity as a variable to compare the nuclear trajectories of Germany and the United Kingdom (Johnstone and Stirling, 2020). Based on the literature review, we have developed a theoretical framework (see Figure 1) that guides further analysis, enhancing and expanding existing knowledge while aiming to explain the differences between France and Germany in more detail.

Public opinion as an explanatory variable

Public opinion can shape policy outcomes in democratic nations. Brooks (1990) explores the connection between public opinion and public policy in former West Germany (Brooks, 1990). By examining approximately 150 cases, the author demonstrates a consistent relationship between majority preferences and government actions. This also helps explain how majoritarian public opinion in Germany influenced the decision to phase out nuclear power. Likewise, Burstein finds that only 25% of studies show no effect of public opinion on policy and argues that the more critical an issue, the greater public opinion's influence on policy (Burstein, 2003).

The political cleavages within a society mirror public opinion (see Figure 1). Hix (1999) argues that understanding public opinion is essential to understanding how political cleavages develop (Hix, 1999). These cleavages are traditionally classified into two types: those resulting from national revolutions—often seen between the church and the state, and between the center and the periphery—and those originating from the Industrial Revolution, such as the split between the city and the countryside and between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In Germany, these dividing lines are less distinct. In contrast, labor and other traditional social movements in France continue to play a significant role in social protests that reflect public interests. Indeed, in France, new social movements make up only one-third of all movement activities. Conversely, in Germany, new social movements that represent public pressure and mobilize collective action—including the anti-nuclear movement—have become more prominent and have significantly shaped the energy transition.

Parliamentary discourse also reflects public opinion (see Figure 1), as it influences decision-making bodies in France and Germany, specifically their parliaments. In Germany, the Bundestag is elected by the German people and functions as the forum where diverse opinions on the country's policies are developed and debated. The parliament plays a similar role in France, with its main responsibility being to pass laws. As a result, the parliament directly influences public policy. Therefore, discussions on nuclear energy can directly affect each country's energy policy.

Renewable energy as an explanatory variable

Johnstone and Stirling analyze nuclear trajectories in Germany and the United Kingdom, concentrating on the “availability of renewable energy resources.“ They justify this focus by explaining that the ability to switch between technologies depends in part on the alternative energy resources available in a country and the relative costs of exploiting them (Johnstone and Stirling, 2020). We hypothesize that the availability of alternative renewable sources similarly influences the differing nuclear energy policy outcomes in France and Germany. Gielen et al. also contend that renewable energy is vital for a transition to cleaner energy, and increased availability or adoption of alternative energy sources could reduce nuclear energy use (Gielen et al., 2019).

To further examine alternative energy capacity, we analyze and compare wind, solar, hydropower, and bioenergy, as they are the main sources of renewable energy in both countries. We chose not to include geothermal energy because it accounts for a very small share of energy production in both nations. Germany has not developed its geothermal resources, despite having abundant hot water reserves beneath its surface. Deep geothermal plants make up just 0.1% of the country's heating and cooling [Clean Energy Wire (2020)]. Likewise, France has not developed its geothermal energy to any extent. In 2019, the share of primary renewable heat production in metropolitan France from geothermal surfaces (geothermal heat pumps) and deep sources was 3% and 1%, respectively. The total geothermal energy contribution to primary renewable energy production was 1.7% [Richter (2020)]. Considering the Paris Agreement and the goal of achieving carbon neutrality, we see renewable energy sources as a long-term alternative to nuclear power.

The political opportunity structure

The differences in institutional structures give citizens more opportunities to build an anti-nuclear movement in Germany. The tools of direct democracy allow the movement to grow at the local level before ultimately influencing the legal system and Parliament.

The degree of horizontal concentration of state power

A distinction exists between countries with strong parliaments, such as Germany, and those with powers heavily concentrated in the executive branch, like France, where parliament cannot dismiss the government. Regarding the judiciary system, the French court system is highly centralized and overseen by the Ministry of Justice (Roques and Le Thieis, 2020). Germany is a democratic, federal parliamentary republic in which legislative authority is vested in the Bundestag (the German parliament) and the Bundesrat (the representative body of the Länder, Germany's regional states) [Facts about Germany (n.d.)]. The German court system is decentralized and structured into three hierarchical levels. Moreover, German courts are connected to both national and regional (Länder) governments, which means that the German anti-nuclear movement had considerably more access points within the legal system than the French movement did (Wiliarty, 2013).

The nature of the electoral system

The French electoral system is a non-proportional, plurality system (Blais and Loewen, 2009). France employs a two-ballot process for presidential and legislative elections: voters cast an initial vote, followed by a runoff 2 weeks later (Blais, 2010). The candidates and parties that perform best in the first round advance to the second round, where the runoff winner is declared the overall victor. Usually, parties and candidates that do not advance to the second round support one of the finalists in the runoff. In contrast, Germany uses a mixed-member proportional representation system, in which voters cast two votes—one for a party and one for a specific candidate (Blais and Massicotte, 1999). The candidate-focused ballot guides the electoral system toward a two-party dynamic (Wiliarty, 2013). However, proportional representation allows minor parties to win seats in parliament if they obtain at least 5% of the vote.

The availability of direct-democratic procedures

France operates under a representative democratic system with limited direct-democratic mechanisms. At the national level, the Constitution provides four distinct instruments of direct democracy: the constitutional referendum, the executive- and legislature-initiated referendum, the “shared referendum initiative,” and a referendum on a country's accession to the European Union. (Stefanini, 2021). The shared-initiative referendum was intended to “renovate” democracy but has only been implemented once, in 2019, with minimal results [Vie publique (2026)]. A minority of parliamentarians, along with a minority of citizens, can propose a law to Parliament that may be submitted to a referendum. However, the process needs simplification, and the requirement of one-tenth of registered voters to petition—making this procedure ineffective [Vie publique (2025)].

In terms of structure, France is a unitary state composed of municipalities (communes), departments (départements), and regions (régions). Unlike Germany, local democracy does not exist in France (Dubreuil, 2013). This is primarily due to the belief that sovereignty is a national principle, which leads to local democracy being viewed as representing only the national level (Dubreuil, 2013). The responsibilities of local government include municipal transportation, culture, public health, economic development, environmental management (water and waste), and housing [European Committee of the Regions (n.d.)].

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Länder (federal states) oversee municipal affairs [European Committee of the Regions (n.d.)]. In German local government, direct democracy mainly takes several forms. The most common involves procedures started by citizens called “Bürgerbegehren,” which lead to a vote (Geissel, 2009). This process can bring a topic to the political agenda that local political leaders haven't considered or can aim to “correct” a decision made by the local council (Geissel, 2009). A Bürgerbegehren needs a certain number of supporting signatures to be valid. The required signatures—shown as a percentage of the electorate—differ by state (Geissel, 2009).

Local councils, not mayors, can call referendums on municipal issues known as “Buergerentscheid” (council referendums) (Schiller, 2011). Mandatory referendums do not exist at the local level in Germany (Schiller, 2011). Aside from the institutional structure, we argue that the difference in the strength of the anti-nuclear movement between the two countries stems from differing public opinion.

The role of public opinion

Public opinion on nuclear energy

In France, the public has generally supported the use of nuclear energy. A survey conducted in September 2022 found that a large majority of respondents (75%) favored nuclear energy, with 65% even supporting the construction of new nuclear power plants [IFOP (2022)]. In October 2021, before the Russo-Ukrainian war, 59% of respondents approved of new nuclear power facilities [Odoxa (2021)]. In Germany, public opinion has historically been opposed to nuclear energy. A study demonstrates how the German Bundestag employed security-based claims to legitimize the accelerated phase-out of nuclear energy and frame it as a national security threat, thereby influencing public opinion (Tambarin, 2019). In April 2011, shortly after the Fukushima incident, the Deutschlandtrend survey (the monthly survey conducted by Germany's first public TV channel) reported that 90% of respondents supported a complete phase-out of nuclear power (Tambarin, 2019). It is important to note that Germany was already starting with a high level of opposition, as shown by the Eurobarometer survey on Europeans and Nuclear Safety in 2009, which indicated that, even before Fukushima, Germany was one of only three EU countries where a majority of respondents wanted to reduce the share of nuclear power (Tambarin, 2019). Additionally, there was an early anti-nuclear movement marked by protests in the 70s and 80s against nuclear sites at Wackersdorf, Whyl, and Brockdorf (Tambarin, 2019). In light of the energy crisis, public opinion became less radical; by August 2022, up to 70% of respondents viewed nuclear energy positively [Tech for Future (2025)].

However, even in 2022, from a long-term perspective, the majority of Germans (52%) still opposed the construction of new nuclear power plants [Civey (2022)]. This may explain why the plan to phase out nuclear power by the end of 2022 was only delayed, not reversed.

Political cleavages

In France, ‘old' social movements play a much more critical role in social protest. The actions of new social movements make up only about one-third of all movement activities (Van Der Heijden, 1997). In fact, demonstrations mainly focused on education, labor, and pension issues. Conversely, in Germany, agrarian-industrial divisions and trade unions are regularly involved in negotiations and have addressed these issues more effectively (Van Der Heijden, 1997). As a result, public opinion can shift around new topics, giving rise to new social movements. For example, the anti-nuclear movement began to gain momentum in Germany during the 1970s (see Figure 2).

Parliamentary discourses

In the French parliamentary discourse, which reflects mainstream public opinion, nuclear energy is seen as a means to achieve energy independence, foster economic growth, and protect the environment [International Energy Agency (2023), Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la cohésion des territoires, (2017)]. The most debated issue, nuclear waste, is viewed as a challenge that can be addressed in the future through improved research [International Energy Agency (2023)]. Radioactive waste is considered a manageable risk. Investment in nuclear energy is seen as a responsible political decision, as it ensures national independence and affordable electricity for the French people while promoting economic growth (see Figure 3). Analysis of French public discourse shows that French nuclear energy policy is considered unique, especially compared with neighboring countries [International Energy Agency (2023)]. Therefore, it can be seen as a tool for boosting France's international recognition. Opposition is quickly dismissed as misinformation, which can be reframed as “Transparency ensures public support” [International Energy Agency (2023)].

In Germany, parliamentary discourse is categorized into two groups: pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear (Johanna, 2017). The pro-nuclear argument claims that nuclear power can improve living standards, including financial viability and technological advancement (Bern and Winkel, 2013). The anti-nuclear argument raises concerns about energy safety and security. These debates concern not only the Fukushima nuclear disaster but also terrorism and energy supply (Johanna, 2017). The development of renewable energy is widely seen as an alternative [International Energy Agency (2023)]. It is argued that nuclear energy poses risks and should therefore be replaced by investments in renewable sources. The discourse is based on an “unacceptable risk potential”: if an accident were to occur, nobody could be held responsible (Bern and Winkel, 2013). Therefore, this accident must be prevented at all costs. Unlike Germany, where two prevailing discourses dominate, the anti-nuclear movement in the French parliament is rarely acknowledged and sometimes dismissed as misinformation (Bern and Winkel, 2013).

Renewable energy capacity

Besides political-institutional factors and public opinion, social movements, and parliamentary discourse, the availability of alternative clean energy sources also helps explain the different outcomes of nuclear power in the two countries. In 2022, renewable energy accounted for 53.8% of Germany's domestic energy production, demonstrating that renewable energy capacity can effectively replace other energy sources, including nuclear [International Energy Agency (2023)]. In contrast, France's renewable energy is gradually insufficient to meet increasing demand, accounting for only 25.3% of domestic energy production, as shown in Figure 4 [International Energy Agency (2023)].

Wind power

France currently has onshore wind turbines at 1,942 sites, and wind energy production has continued to develop over the past 20 years [Vie publique (2020)]. In 2021, production was about 37 TWh, 7% lower than in 2020 [Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la cohésion des territoires, (2023)]. This drop can be linked to less favorable weather conditions. With 10.3 GW of connected wind power by the end of 2015, France was ranked 4th in the EU, behind Germany (44.9 GW), Spain (23 GW), and the United Kingdom (13.9 GW) [Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la cohésion des territoires, (2018)]. Wind power accounted for 23% of Germany's electricity production in 2021 [Bundesverband WindEnergie (2022)] (see Figure 5). A total capacity of 63.924 MW is installed, producing 122 TWh of energy in 2021 [Bundesverband WindEnergie (2022)].

Hydropower

France has a strong historical foundation in hydroelectric facilities, developed from the beginning of the twentieth century and throughout it [Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la cohésion des territoires, (2023). With approximately 25.7 GW (gigawatts) of installed capacity in mainland France, the country boasts one of the largest hydroelectric power plants in Europe [Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la cohésion des territoires, (2023)]. This accounts for about 20% of the total installed electrical capacity (Geissel, 2009). Production varies significantly from year to year depending on hydrological conditions, as shown by recent data: production increased from 50.3 TWh in 2011 to 75.7 TWh in 2013 [Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la cohésion des territoires, (2017)]. It reached 62.5 TWh in 2021, accounting for 12% of annual electricity production [Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la cohésion des territoires, (2018)]. In Germany, the hydropower sector is extensive, with an installed capacity of 11,022 MW in 2019 [International Hydropower Association (2022)]. Most of the country's hydropower resources are located in the mountainous southern provinces, where 50 percent of all projects are in Bavaria and 20 percent in Baden-Württemberg [International Hydropower Association (2022)]. Together, these two states account for over 80 percent of Germany's yearly hydropower output [International Hydropower Association (2022)]. Of an estimated 7,300 hydropower stations, about 6,900 have capacities of less than 1 MW, while nearly 6,000 have capacities of less than 100 kW [International Hydropower Association (2022)].

Solar power

France currently has 486,475 photovoltaic (PV) installations, and the solar PV industry has experienced significant growth since 2009 [Statinfo (2021)]. In 2021, production reached 15 TWh (including 0.5 TWh from French overseas departments and territories), marking a 12.6% increase from 2020 [Statinfo (2021)]. The sector has notably benefited from a significant reduction in PV module prices in recent years [Statinfo (2021)].

According to the Federal Statistical Office, there were over 2.5 million PV systems in Germany as of the end of November 2022 (Enpal, 2023). Collectively, these systems have a nominal capacity exceeding 60 gigawatts (GW), equivalent to 60 million kilowatts (kW) (Enpal, 2023). The Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems (ISE) reports that PV systems contributed a total of 46.5 terawatt-hours (TWh) to the German grid in 2019, an increase from 27.9 TWh in 2012 [Solarwatt (2025)]. Approximately 48.4 TWh of electricity was produced in 2021 [Solarwatt (2025)].

Bioenergy

Bioenergy encompasses the utilization of heat from solid fuels (such as wood), liquid fuels (such as vegetable oil), and gaseous fuels (including biogas derived from manure and energy crops, as well as sewage and landfill gas) (European Technology Innovation Platform, 2020). Biomass energy is the primary source of renewable energy in France. Solid, liquid, or gaseous biomass can provide energy for various uses, including heat, electricity, biogas, and fuels [Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la Cohésion des Territoires, and Ministère de la Transition énergétique, (2018)]. In 2021, solid bioenergy production was 130 TWh [Statistique Développement durable (2025)]. About two-thirds of Germany's renewable energy comes from bioenergy (European Technology Innovation Platform, 2020). By 2050, more than a quarter of Germany's primary energy needs could potentially be met by domestic biomass (European Technology Innovation Platform, 2020). The most significant portion comes from agricultural crops (such as energy crops) and their residues, such as straw and manure (European Technology Innovation Platform, 2020).

Indeed, differences in outcomes of nuclear energy programs in these two neighboring countries can be attributed to variations in their political opportunity structures, particularly in their formal institutional frameworks. Systems that inherently restrict the translation of votes into seats may alienate and discourage supporters of smaller or “minor” parties who are not adequately represented. As the results show, Germany features greater institutional flexibility and more social tools for advocating specific policy outcomes. At the same time, France is more centralized, which limits the scope of anti-nuclear movements. However, given the continuation of past trends that led to the decline of nuclear energy as a dominant fuel source in Germany, along with the official announcement of nuclear energy expansion in France, we examine additional variables to help explain the unexpectedly contrasting outcomes. We observe that public opinion mobilizes social movements and collective action, pressures political cleavages, and further shapes political discourse that influences policy decisions (as illustrated in Figure 1).

Our findings support other studies (Van Der Heijden, 1997; Karp and Banducci, 2008) and explain why public opinion has greater influence in Germany, a country with a proportional representation system, than in France, which uses a plurality system. This clarifies why France's anti-nuclear movement never gained traction in the political arena and rarely appears in parliamentary discourse. While social cleavages in France are more focused on traditional social issues (such as labor), a significant number of new social movements have emerged in Germany since 1975, including those centered on environmental issues and nuclear energy.

Parliamentary discourse in France and Germany suggests that opposition to nuclear energy comes from misinformation or ideology, and radioactive waste is seen as a problem to be solved through technology (Bern and Winkel, 2013). However, in Germany, the nationalist argument was not used. In France, nuclear energy is seen as a means of gaining international recognition, and being anti-nuclear can be perceived as anti-nationalist (Wiliarty, 2013). Nationalism is deeply rooted in France, and nuclear technology has come to symbolize France's desire for global recognition. Meanwhile, in Germany, nationalist sentiment became dangerous because of World War II and has largely been suppressed. The development of nuclear energy in Germany is driven more by practical considerations than by ideology.

Additionally, Germany, unlike France, developed a strong anti-nuclear movement, leading most of the public to oppose nuclear energy. This movement grew even stronger after the Fukushima accident, but it was already significant beforehand. Parliamentary discussions supporting this movement mainly focus on safety concerns and the potential of renewable energy alternatives. The difference in public opinion is also evident from the number of Greenpeace members in France and Germany, given that Greenpeace is an anti-nuclear environmental NGO. In 2020, Germany had 633,000 registered Greenpeace members, compared to only 230,000 members in France [Greenpeace (2023)].

Moreover, France and Germany chose different paths for investing in renewable energies. While Germany made renewable energy a key part of its budget [27.89 billion euros in 2010 and 13.78 billion euros in 2018 (Statista, 2023)], France lagged behind in investment [13 billion euros in 2010 and 8.5 billion euros in 2018 Chiffres Clés Des Énergies Renouvelables (2021)]. This difference in investment leads to variations in the growth of renewable energy generation. As shown in Table 1, Germany significantly outperforms France in renewable energy production, particularly in solar and wind power. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, consumers have less motivation to change their energy choices due to pricing advantages. The French population benefits from lower energy prices than in Germany and the EU average, primarily due to the reliability and affordability of nuclear energy. Moreover, there is a growing argument for increasing investments in renewables, treating current nuclear investments as sunk costs—since reducing greenhouse gas emissions could be achieved more quickly and effectively by transitioning to renewable energy sources (Ramana, 2024). Public opinion, particularly regarding the unresolved issue of nuclear waste and global pressure to adopt cleaner fuels, could soon reshape the policy landscape (Sovacool and Funk, 2013).

France and Germany's differing views on nuclear energy can be partly explained by their varying levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, as described by Hofstede's cultural dimensions [The Culture Factor Group (n.d.)]. France has a significantly higher power distance than Germany, indicating a greater acceptance of top-down authority and centralized decision-making. This cultural trait aligns with France's long history of state-led energy policies, in which decisions on nuclear power are often made with little public input [The Culture Factor Group (n.d.)]. In contrast, Germany's lower power distance leads to more participative, decentralized decision-making, in which public opinion and regional influences play a greater role. France's high uncertainty avoidance also reflects a cultural preference for stability, predictability, and risk management—traits that fit well with the controlled nature of nuclear energy [The Culture Factor Group (n.d.)]. Germany, with a lower uncertainty avoidance score, is more open to change and better equipped to handle the uncertainties of switching to renewable energy sources. The German society is relatively pragmatic, showing a notable ability to adapt to changing conditions or achieve specific goals. This avoidance of uncertainty is evident in the reaction to the nuclear accident, which helps explain the significant policy shift. Overall, these cultural dimensions help explain why France maintained its nuclear program while Germany opted for a phase-out.

In conclusion, the results reveal a significant difference between the two countries in terms of political cleavages, creating more space for new social movements. The state's institutional structure allowed smaller parties to hold office in Germany. As a result, parties like “The Greens” entered the political scene and actively blocked the development of nuclear energy. French public opinion highlighted the effectiveness of the pro-nuclear campaign. Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear movement in Germany contributed to a major policy shift toward the complete phase-out of nuclear energy.

Renewables in France have also struggled to gain momentum, partly due to the nationalist stance against nuclear energy and comparatively lower consumer energy prices. In contrast, Germany is taking the lead by gradually phasing out fossil fuels and expanding renewable energy sources. Germany's increase in renewable energy capacity has enabled the country to move away from nuclear energy, a shift not seen in France. The political opportunity structures in both countries differ, with additional factors pushing Germany further away from nuclear energy. The differences in public opinion between France and Germany have created distinct political cleavages, as seen in parliamentary debates. In democracies, parliament serves as the decision-making arena, and the differing debates have resulted in divergent energy policies between the two nations. Public opinion in France emphasizes the effectiveness of the pro-nuclear campaign, while the anti-nuclear movement in Germany has significantly influenced the major policy shift toward a complete phase-out of nuclear energy.

This study did not aim to explain the direct causal relationships between the various factors examined and the different nuclear policy outcomes, nor does it compare the relative explanatory power of these variables. Based on these two variables and the previously considered political opportunity structure in the context of nuclear energy, they further validate the divergent outcomes of nuclear energy in the two countries. We present several examples that support and expand on discussions in the existing literature, highlighting key differences between public opinion and renewable energy capabilities. The availability of resources, along with public acceptance and support for renewable energy, influenced narratives and pathways forward that do not rely on nuclear energy. This trend is likely to continue in the short term unless new safety and waste concerns arise in France. Additionally, France is increasingly focusing on new renewable energy sources, such as low-carbon hydrogen. However, questions remain about how quickly France could implement this transition at scale to meet the significant energy demand currently met by nuclear energy and natural gas imports. Future research will further investigate the role of renewable energy and the nuanced impact of public opinion on shaping policy outcomes. Additional research can be conducted at subnational levels across multiple countries to enrich the narrative on public perspectives and the implementation of renewable energy.